People v. Estrada CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS256971
- Trial judge
- Edward P. Allard III
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Judith L. Haller, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court imposed a $480 restitution fine and denied a Pitchess motion after an in camera review. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, rejecting the defendant's Apprendi and ineffective assistance claims and finding no abuse of discretion in the Pitchess ruling.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of a $480 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b)“Accordingly, we conclude the trial's decision to impose a fine greater than the statutory minimum was lawful and did not violate the dictates of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the rule from People v. Urbano and People v. Kramis that Apprendi does not require a jury trial for sentencing factors that guide judicial discretion within a statutory maximum. The court properly distinguished Southern Union Co. v. United States, noting that the statutory maximum for the felony convictions was $10,000, so the $480 fine did not exceed the penalty authorized by the jury's verdict. The reasoning is consistent with binding California authority and federal precedent regarding the definition of statutory maximums. |
Denial of ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding failure to object to the restitution fine“More importantly, as we have discussed, Estrada's arguments regarding Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 and Southern Union, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2344, are completely without merit. Thus under the standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, there is no showing of error on the part of trial counsel and there is no basis for a finding of prejudice.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice. Because the underlying Apprendi claim was meritless, counsel's failure to raise it could not constitute deficient performance, and the defendant suffered no prejudice. The court also correctly noted that the issue was addressed on the merits, negating any forfeiture argument. |
Ruling on the Pitchess motion regarding the release of officer records“Our review of the sealed transcript reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial court.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court applied the correct standard of review for Pitchess motions, which is abuse of discretion. The court reviewed the sealed in camera transcript and found no error in the trial court's determination of what information to release. This is a procedural review of the trial court's discretion in balancing the defendant's right to exculpatory information against the officer's privacy interests. |
Authorities
- relied: Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 — Any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- relied: Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 — The 'statutory maximum' in Apprendi is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
- relied: Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2344 — A judge may not impose a fine based on facts not found by the jury if those facts increase the fine beyond the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.
- relied: People v. Urbano (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 396 — Apprendi and Blakely do not apply when the exercise of judicial discretion stays within a sentencing range authorized by statute.
- relied: People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346 — The discretionary process under section 1202.4, subdivision (d) in setting the amount of the fine within the statutory maximum does not constitute judicial factfinding that improperly increases punishment beyond the statutory maximum.
- relied: Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 — Ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of deficient performance and prejudice.
- relied: Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 — Defendants may move to inspect police records to obtain exculpatory or impeachment evidence, subject to in camera review by the trial court.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established California precedent (Urbano, Kramis) to distinguish the facts of Southern Union, accurately defining the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes. It addresses all raised issues, including the ineffective assistance claim and the Pitchess motion, with appropriate standards of review.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter a jury convicted Estrada of battery on a peace officer and felony resisting, the San Diego Superior Court imposed a seven-year term and a $480 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), above the $240 statutory minimum, and had earlier conducted an in camera Pitchess review and disclosed some officer records. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Apprendi and Southern Union do not require jury findings for a discretionary fine set within the statutory range, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, and that the sealed Pitchess transcript showed no abuse of discretion.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of a $480 restitution fine (above the $240 statutory minimum) under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), without jury findings on the subdivision (d) factors“Accordingly, we conclude the trial's decision to impose a fine greater than the statutory minimum was lawful and did not violate the dictates of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The Apprendi/Blakely 'statutory maximum' is the most a judge may impose on the jury verdict alone; for a felony conviction section 1202.4 authorizes up to $10,000, so a $480 fine is within the authorized range and the subdivision (d) factors merely guide discretion. Urbano and Kramis squarely reject the same argument, and Southern Union involved a fine that exceeded the maximum for the single count of conviction absent jury findings, so it is properly distinguished. Alleyne (2013), decided before this opinion, concerns facts that raise a mandatory minimum and would not change the result because the minimum here is fixed by statute, not raised by judicial factfinding. |
Denial of relief on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the restitution fine amount on Apprendi grounds“Thus under the standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, there is no showing of error on the part of trial counsel and there is no basis for a finding of prejudice.” | de novo | correct | agree with court Because the People did not assert forfeiture and the court reached the Apprendi claim on the merits, there was no prejudice from the failure to object; and because the underlying objection would have been meritless under Urbano and Kramis, counsel's omission was neither deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland. The analysis is brief but complete. |
Trial court's in camera Pitchess review and determination of which officer personnel records to disclose to the defense“Our review of the sealed transcript reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial court.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The court applied the correct deferential standard and independently reviewed the sealed transcript it ordered augmented into the record, which is the accepted appellate procedure for Pitchess rulings. The opinion does not describe the contents of the transcript or cite People v. Mooc, but a reviewing court cannot disclose sealed material, and nothing in the opinion suggests the review was inadequate; without access to the sealed record the result cannot be independently verified. |
Authorities
- relied: Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 — Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- relied: Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 — The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
- relied: People v. Urbano (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 396 — Apprendi and Blakely do not apply when the exercise of judicial discretion stays within a sentencing range authorized by statute; a restitution fine above the minimum but within the statutory maximum does not require jury findings.
- relied: People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346 — Setting a restitution fine within the section 1202.4 statutory range under the subdivision (d) factors is discretionary sentencing, not judicial factfinding that increases punishment beyond the statutory maximum, and Southern Union does not alter this.
- relied: Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2344 — Apprendi applies to criminal fines; a court may not impose a fine exceeding the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict based on judge-found facts (there, the number of days of violation).
- relied: Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 — Ineffective assistance requires both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
- relied: Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 — A criminal defendant may obtain discovery of relevant peace officer personnel records upon a proper showing, subject to in camera review.
- missed: People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216 — Sets out the procedure for in camera Pitchess review and for appellate review of the sealed record of that proceeding under an abuse of discretion standard; the court applied this standard but did not cite the controlling authority.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly identified the Apprendi 'statutory maximum' as the $10,000 ceiling authorized by the felony convictions, followed the directly on-point published decisions in Urbano and Kramis, and properly distinguished Southern Union, which involved a fine exceeding the maximum for the count of conviction. The Strickland and Pitchess discussions are brief but apply the right standards and reach results consistent with the record described, though the Pitchess section omits citation to People v. Mooc.
Opinion
Filed 12/2/13 P. v. Estrada CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063486
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS256971)
ROBERT LUNA ESTRADA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Edward P.
Allard, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Susan Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This appeal raises the question of whether a judge may impose a restitution fine greater than the statutory minimum without providing the defendant with a jury trial on the factors which guide the exercise of judicial discretion. In short, this appeal is about the difference between the $240 minimum restitution fine and the $480 fine imposed under a statute authorizing a maximum restitution fine of $10,000. Consistent with existing case law we will determine that, following an appropriate conviction, a trial judge may exercise discretion in setting the fine in any amount that does not exceed the statutory maximum.
A jury convicted Robert Luna Estrada of one count of battery of a police officer (Pen. Code,1 § 243, subd. (c)(2)) and one count of felony resisting arrest (§ 69).
Estrada admitted four prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and one strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). At sentencing, the court struck one of the prison priors and imposed a determinate term of seven years in prison. The court imposed a $480 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)).
Estrada filed a timely notice of appeal.
Estrada contends the imposition of a restitution fine in excess of $240 violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), and Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) ___ U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct.
2344, 183 L.Ed.2d 318] (Southern Union). In a related contention Estrada argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the amount of the restitution fine. Estrada also requests this court to review the in camera proceedings related to his motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We find the contentions 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 regarding the restitution fine to be wholly without merit. Our review of the transcript of the in camera proceeding revealed no error by the trial court. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.2
DISCUSSION
I
DOES APPRENDI APPLY TO THE RESTITUTION FINE IN THIS CASE?
Estrada contends, for the first time on appeal, that in order for a trial court to set a restitution fine above the statutory minimum, the defendant must be accorded a jury trial on the facts to be considered in the trial court's exercise of discretion.
In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Id. at p. 490.) In Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), the court explained that the "statutory maximum" as used in Apprendi means the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. (Blakely, supra, at pp. 303-304.)
In January 2012, section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) provided:
"(b) In every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states those reasons on the record. [¶] (1) The restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the seriousness 2 Since Estrada does not challenge the admissibility or the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions we will omit the traditional statement of facts. 3 of the offense, but shall not be less than two hundred forty dollars ($240) starting on January 1, 2012, two hundred eighty dollars ($280) starting on January 1, 2013, and three hundred dollars ($300) starting on January 1, 2014, and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), if the person is convicted of a felony, and shall not be less than one hundred twenty dollars ($120) starting on January 1, 2012, one hundred forty dollars ($140) starting on January 1, 2013, and one hundred fifty dollars ($150) starting on January 1, 2014, and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), if the person is convicted of a misdemeanor."
The statute describes the factors a trial judge should consider in determining the amount of restitution fine, within the range of minimum ($240) and maximum ($10,000).
Section 1202.4, subdivision (d) provides:
"(d) In setting the amount of the fine pursuant to subdivision (b) in excess of the minimum fine pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b), the court shall consider any relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the defendant's inability to pay, the seriousness and gravity of the offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by the defendant as a result of the crime, the extent to which any other person suffered losses as a result of the crime, and the number of victims involved in the crime. Those losses may include pecuniary losses to the victim or his or her dependents as well as intangible losses, such as psychological harm caused by the crime. Consideration of a defendant's inability to pay may include his or her future earning capacity. A defendant shall bear the burden of demonstrating his or her inability to pay. Express findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of the fine shall not be required. A separate hearing for the fine shall not be required."
Estrada argues that since one of the factors to be considered by the trial court is the defendant's ability to pay, the process is therefore judicial factfinding that increases punishment. The argument misunderstands the import of Apprendi and Blakely. Given that Estrada was convicted of relevant felonies, the court, by statute must impose a restitution fine of not more than $10,000. Thus, within the meaning of Apprendi, supra, 4 530 U.S. 466, the maximum fine, for the existing offenses is $10,000. The manner of determining the appropriate amount is the exercise of discretion, guided by appropriate sentencing factors.
In People v. Urbano (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 396, 405 (Urbano), the court rejected the identical argument made here. The court said that the holdings of Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296 and Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, "do not apply when the exercise of judicial discretion stays within a sentencing range authorized by statute." (Urbano, supra at p. 405) The court went on to uphold a $3,800 restitution fine as part of the total sentence.
Since Urbano, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 396, the U.S. Supreme Court filed its opinion in Southern Union, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2344. In that case a company was indicted and found guilty of one count of violation of a federal statute that authorizes a fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. After the jury verdict, the trial court calculated the number of days based upon the probation officer's report and set a fine in an amount vastly greater than called for by the single count of conviction. The jury was never asked to determine the number of days that the violations occurred. Consistent with Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the majority concluded the maximum fine for the one count, without further jury findings, violated the company's rights under Apprendi. Respectfully, Southern Union has no relevance to this case in which the statutory maximum fine, based on the jury's verdicts, is $10,000.
In People v. Kramis (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 346 (Kramis), the court examined the same argument as raised here by Estrada. The court rejected the contention that the discretionary process under section 1202.4, subdivision (d) in setting the amount of the 5 fine within the statutory maximum constituted judicial factfinding that improperly increased punishment beyond the statutory maximum for the offenses for which the defendant was convicted. (Kramis, supra, at pp. 349-352.) The court soundly rejected the identical argument to that raised here by Estrada. Appellant urges us to reject the court's analysis in Kramis. We find the court's analysis in Kramis to be correct and we will follow it here.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial's decision to impose a fine greater than the statutory minimum was lawful and did not violate the dictates of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466.
II
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
As a backup argument, Estrada contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the restitution fine amount based on Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466. We do not pause long with this contention.
First, the People have not urged forfeiture, so the issue of the applicability of Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 has been addressed on the merits. Thus Estrada has not been disadvantaged by the failure to raise the issue in the trial court.
More importantly, as we have discussed, Estrada's arguments regarding Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 and Southern Union, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2344, are completely without merit. Thus under the standard of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, there is no showing of error on the part of trial counsel and there is no basis for a finding of prejudice. Estrada was not denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.
6 III
PITCHESS MOTION
Estrada made a Pitchess motion in the trial court. The court held an in camera hearing and examined the records of the officers involved in this case. At the close of the hearing the court provided some information from those files to the defense. The record of the in camera hearing was sealed by the court.
Although appellate counsel did not designate the transcript of the in camera hearing as part of the record on appeal, he asked this court to review the sealed proceedings to determine if the trial court correctly determined what information to release. We ordered a transcript of the in camera hearing and have reviewed it. Our review of the sealed transcript reveals no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Kramis No. B236892 · 2012-09-13
- People v. Urbano F044381 · 2005-04-11
- Pitchess v. Superior Court L.A. 30224 · 1974-05-23