gno.law

In re T.W. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063862 · 2013-11-21 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SJ12867
Trial judge
Garry G. Haehnle
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
dependency
Panel
Cynthia Aaron (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Judith L. Haller

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:48Z · confidence high

The trial court found jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, determined that placement with the father would be detrimental to the child's safety, and ordered supervised visitation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional and detriment findings and that the father forfeited his challenge to the supervised visitation order.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)
“We cannot reverse one portion of the true finding.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, noting that the single true finding encompassed all allegations and could not be partially reversed. The reasoning is supported by the cited authorities regarding the nature of dependency proceedings and the burden of proof.
Finding that placement with the father would be detrimental to the child
“This constitutes substantial evidence that it would have been detrimental to T.W. to be placed with Anthony.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The court found that the evidence of the child's severe behavioral issues and the father's lack of capacity to protect her met the clear and convincing evidence standard for detriment. The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard on appeal to affirm the trial court's factual finding.
Order requiring supervised visitation
“Anthony did not object in the juvenile court to the requirement that his visits with T.W. be supervised. He has thus forfeited the right to raise the issue on appeal.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The court first noted the issue was forfeited due to lack of objection in the trial court. It then reviewed the merits under an abuse of discretion standard, finding no error given the child's needs and the father's limited involvement. The court correctly applied the standard and the relevant statutory requirements for visitation safety.

Authorities

  • relied: In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311 — The agency bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence in juvenile dependency proceedings.
  • relied: In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127 — On appeal, the parent has the burden of showing that the jurisdictional finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
  • relied: In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128 — The appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling.
  • relied: In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189 — Dependency proceedings are civil and designed to protect the child; the court takes jurisdiction over children, not parents, and cannot dismiss the petition as to one parent while finding jurisdiction based on the other.
  • relied: In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412 — Detriment to a child's safety or well-being must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the appellate court applies the substantial evidence standard of review.
  • relied: In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684 — Detriment to a child's safety or well-being must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  • relied: In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564 — Detriment to a child's safety or well-being must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  • relied: In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28 — The appellate court reviews the lower court's ruling, not its reasoning, and may affirm the ruling if it was correct on any ground.
  • relied: In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212 — The appellate court will not second-guess the trial court's credibility determinations.
  • relied: In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 — In making a visitation order, the juvenile court must consider the child's well-being and best interests.
  • relied: In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227 — The court must consider the possibility of adverse psychological consequences to the child when making a visitation order.
  • relied: In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 — The visitation order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
  • relied: In re Alexandria M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088 — The visitation order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to the jurisdictional and detriment findings and the abuse of discretion standard to the visitation order, supported by appropriate authorities. It also correctly identifies the forfeiture of the visitation argument due to lack of objection in the trial court.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The juvenile court sustained a single-count section 300(b) petition alleging T.W. was exposed to domestic violence between her mother and the mother's boyfriend and that the mother had a history of domestic violence with the boyfriend and with the father, found by clear and convincing evidence that placement with the noncustodial father would be detrimental under section 361.2(a), placed T.W. in a group home, and ordered the father's visits supervised. The Court of Appeal affirmed, declining to review one portion of the single true finding, holding substantial evidence supported detriment given T.W.'s severe emotional and behavioral problems and the father's conduct, and finding the visitation challenge forfeited and meritless.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Jurisdictional true finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b), including the allegation of the father's history of domestic violence with the mother
“We cannot reverse one portion of the true finding.”
substantial evidencecorrectunsure
The result is defensible because jurisdiction is over the child and the unchallenged allegations about the mother and her boyfriend independently support it (In re Joshua G.). But the court's flat statement that it cannot review one portion of a single true finding overstates the law: published authority (In re Drake M.; In re I.A.) recognizes discretion to reach a nonoffending parent's challenge to a jurisdictional finding when that finding underpins challenged dispositional orders or could prejudice future proceedings. Here the father's domestic violence history fed into the detriment and visitation rulings he also challenged, so the court should have at least addressed whether to exercise that discretion. The court also never assessed whether the father-related allegation was itself supported by evidence.
Finding under section 361.2(a) that placement with the noncustodial father would be detrimental to T.W., and placement in a group home
“This constitutes substantial evidence that it would have been detrimental to T.W. to be placed with Anthony.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The court correctly stated the clear-and-convincing burden below and substantial-evidence review on appeal (In re Luke M.), and the record it recites amply supports detriment to T.W.'s emotional well-being: a psychologist and social worker concluded she needed months of intensive 24-hour treatment before any placement, she reported the father hit her with his cane, he admitted hitting her with a belt in 2009, he denied her abuse reports, had attended one therapy session, and had only telephone contact since separation. The court properly deferred to the trial judge's adverse credibility finding (In re Dakota H.) and reasonably held that the section 361(c)(3) emotional-damage factors the trial court referenced also establish detriment under section 361.2(a), and that it reviews the ruling rather than the reasoning (In re Natasha A.).
Order that the father's visitation with T.W. be supervised, with Agency discretion to lift supervision
“Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Anthony's visits with T.W. be supervised.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
The court properly found the issue forfeited for lack of objection below and alternatively rejected it on the merits under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard (In re Stephanie M.; In re Alexandria M.). Given T.W.'s need for constant monitoring, the father's unfamiliarity with her condition, his lack of in-person contact since January 2012, and his having attended only a parenting-class orientation, supervision was a reasonable protective condition consistent with section 362.1(a)(1)(B) and the child's best interests (In re Julie M.).

Authorities

  • relied: In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189 — Dependency jurisdiction is over the child, not the parent; the court takes jurisdiction if the conduct of either parent brings the child within section 300, and cannot sustain findings as to one parent while dismissing the petition as to the other.
  • relied: In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412 — Detriment under section 361.2(a) must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and may rest on harm to the child's emotional well-being; appellate review is for substantial evidence viewing the record favorably to the order.
  • relied: In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 — Juvenile court custody and visitation orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • relied: In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28 — A reviewing court reviews the lower court's ruling, not its reasoning, and may affirm on any correct ground.
  • relied: In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212 — Appellate courts do not second-guess the juvenile court's credibility determinations.
  • relied: In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127 — The appellant bears the burden of showing a jurisdictional finding is unsupported by substantial evidence.
  • relied: In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 — Visitation orders must be guided by the child's well-being and best interests.
  • missed: In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 — A reviewing court may exercise discretion to reach a parent's challenge to a jurisdictional finding, even where other findings sustain jurisdiction, when the finding serves as a basis for challenged dispositional orders, could prejudice the parent, or could affect current or future dependency proceedings.
  • missed: In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484 — A single parent's challenge to jurisdictional findings may be nonjusticiable when jurisdiction is independently supported, but courts consider whether the challenged finding carries collateral consequences warranting review.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The detriment and visitation holdings are well supported by the recited record and the correct authorities and standards of review, and the affirmance is plainly defensible. The jurisdiction discussion, however, states categorically that one portion of a single true finding cannot be reversed without addressing the published line of authority recognizing discretion to review a parent-specific finding that underpins challenged dispositional orders, and it never evaluated the evidence for the father-related allegation.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 11/21/13 In re T.W. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re T.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D063862 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. SJ12867) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY W., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Garry G.

Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.

Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Anthony W. appeals following the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of his daughter, T.W. He contends that there is not substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding or the finding that it would be detrimental to T.W. to be placed with him. Anthony also contends that the court erred in requiring that his visits with T.W. be supervised. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2011, Anthony separated from T.W.'s mother, Monica R., after a 27-year relationship. In December, Monica moved to San Diego with T.W.; Anthony remained in Alameda County. In October 2012, the Alameda County Superior Court awarded Monica physical custody of then seven-year-old T.W., with Monica and Anthony having joint legal custody. Anthony was allowed visitation on all three-day weekends, and on the first and third weekends of each month, if air transportation was arranged for T.W.

In January 2013, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a dependency petition on behalf of T.W. The petition alleged that in January, T.W. had been exposed to domestic violence between Monica and Monica's boyfriend, Johnny T., and that Monica had a history of domestic violence with both Johnny and Anthony.

T.W. was detained at Polinsky Children's Center (Polinsky). In February 2013, she was admitted to the hospital due to her violent behavior toward herself and others.

Two days later, she was moved to a group home. In March, the court made a true finding on the petition and ordered T.W. removed from Monica's custody. The court found that it would be detrimental to T.W. to be placed with Anthony and ordered her placed in a 2 group home. The court ordered supervised visitation and gave the Agency discretion to lift the supervision requirement, with notice to T.W.'s counsel, and to allow overnight and weekend visits, with the concurrence of T.W.'s counsel.

THE JURISDICTIONAL FINDING

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)1 allows a dependency when "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . ." In the juvenile court, the Agency had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Matthew S.

(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318; § 355, subd. (a).) Anthony now has the burden of showing that the jurisdictional finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling. (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140.)

Anthony requests that we reverse the portion of the jurisdictional finding relating to his history of domestic violence with Monica. He argues that any such domestic violence is long past and suggests that it is unlikely that he will engage in domestic violence in the future because he is physically disabled with multiple sclerosis, and there is no indication that he is involved in, or plans to become involved in, a romantic relationship. We reject Anthony's request.

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 3 "Dependency proceedings are civil in nature and are designed to protect the child, not to punish the parent. [Citation.] [T]he court takes jurisdiction over children (§ 300);

it does not take jurisdiction over parents. Moreover, the court has jurisdiction over the children if the actions of either parent bring the child within one of the statutory definitions in section 300. [Citation.]" (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202, italics added.) The court cannot make jurisdictional findings on allegations against one parent and dismiss the dependency petition as to the other parent. (Ibid.)

Here, the petition contained one count. The court made only one true finding that encompassed all of the factual allegations in the petition, rather than separate findings on each allegation. We cannot reverse one portion of the true finding.

PLACEMENT

"When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 361.2, subd (a).) In the juvenile court, detriment must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 700; In re John M.

(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569-1570.) On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence 4 standard of review, and view the record in the light most favorable to the court's order.

(In re Luke M., at p. 1426.)

Anthony asserts that there was no evidence of current domestic violence on his part; that T.W. developed behavioral problems only after she stopped living with him;

and that a 2009 child welfare referral stating that Anthony had hit T.W. with a belt was deemed unfounded, and T.W. had no marks or bruises at that time. In making these arguments, Anthony fails to acknowledge the severity of T.W.'s emotional and behavioral problems.2 T.W. told the social worker and a psychologist that Anthony had hit her with his cane. Anthony testified that he had "pretend[ed]" that he was going to hit T.W. with the cane, but denied that he had actually hit her.3 Anthony admitted that in 2009, when T.W.

was four years old, he hit her with a belt. T.W.'s adult sister testified that Anthony had disciplined T.W. by hitting her "on her butt" with his hand. Monica had also physically abused T.W.

2 Anthony suggests that the court erred in basing its detriment finding on factors listed in section 361, subdivision (c)(3), which applies to removal from a custodial parent when a child "is suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward himself or herself or others . . . ." These factors are present here and show detriment within the meaning of section 361.2, subdivision (a). Further, "we review the lower court's ruling, not its reasoning; we may affirm that ruling if it was correct on any ground." (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.)

3 The court found that Anthony lacked credibility and "minimize[d] . . . events." We will not second guess this credibility determination (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228). 5 T.W also exhibited violent behavior. After October 2012, she became increasingly aggressive. Her behavior worsened after she was detained. At Polinsky, she punched, bit and spat at staff members and pulled their hair; cursed at other children and staff members; removed her clothing while playing; destroyed property; and tried to run away. T.W. also bit her own wrists, slapped herself on the head and face, punched herself in the head and pulled her hair. A physician described T.W. as assaultive and "out of control." Polinsky staff members had to restrain T.W. at least three times a week.

T.W. was prescribed psychotropic medication.

In early February 2013, T.W. was suspended from school for five days for assaulting staff members and other students. The police were summoned and when they arrived on the scene, T.W. "displayed assaultive behaviors towards" a police officer.

When T.W. returned to school after the suspension, she yelled obscenities, hit staff members, ripped posters off the wall and punched a parent volunteer. T.W. said that she had been told that if she behaved well, she would be returned to Monica. She said that she did not want to return to Monica because Monica would "make a worse choice than [Anthony]," such as allowing Johnny into the home.

T.W.'s behavior continued to escalate in the group home, where she required "one- on-one" supervision. A psychological evaluation, conducted less than two weeks before the hearing, concluded that T.W. needed "a highly structured, 24-hour, seven-day-a-week treatment facility such as [her current placement]" and "six to nine months of intensive treatment." The psychologist noted that T.W. had been traumatized and had been a victim of physical abuse, which required treatment in therapy. The social worker also 6 recommended that T.W. be placed in the group home where she was currently residing, and that she remain there until her behavior stabilized. The social worker did not think that placement with Anthony would be appropriate, noting that Anthony admitted that he had been aware of previous threats by Johnny against Monica; Anthony had not shown an ability to protect T.W.; and he denied T.W.'s reports of physical abuse and domestic violence. Further, Anthony had attended just one therapy session.

Both the psychologist and the social worker were of the opinion that because of the severity of T.W.'s emotional problems, she needed to be stabilized emotionally before she could be safely placed anywhere other than the group home. This constitutes substantial evidence that it would have been detrimental to T.W. to be placed with Anthony.

SUPERVISED VISITATION

Anthony did not object in the juvenile court to the requirement that his visits with T.W. be supervised. He has thus forfeited the right to raise the issue on appeal.

However, considering Anthony's claim on the merits, we conclude that he cannot prevail on his contentions that there was no evidence that he posed a risk to T.W. and that supervision was necessary.

In making a visitation order, the juvenile court must consider the child's well- being and best interests (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49-50), including "the possibility of adverse psychological consequences" to the child (In re Danielle W. (1989)

207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238, 1239). "No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) We review the visitation order for an abuse of 7 discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Alexandria M.

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095.)

As noted above, T.W. had severe emotional and behavioral problems and required constant monitoring and treatment in a structured environment. There is no evidence that Anthony was acquainted with the nature or severity of T.W.'s behavioral problems or that he was capable of protecting T.W. and meeting her special needs during visits. Although Anthony claims on appeal that he visited T.W. after she was detained, he testified that he had not visited her since January 2012. Further, the record shows that after Anthony and Monica separated, Anthony's only contact with T.W. was by telephone. Anthony had begun a parenting class, but at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, he had attended only an orientation session. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Anthony's visits with T.W. be supervised.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J. WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

HALLER, J.

Cites, in this corpus