People v. Sanders CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN284313
- Trial judge
- Runston G. Maino
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Gilbert Nares, Cynthia Aaron
Analysis
The trial court sentenced Richard Sanders to four years in prison and awarded him 776 days of presentence custody credit, calculating conduct credit under the pre-October 1, 2011 version of Penal Code section 4019. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the enhanced conduct credit rate enacted in 2011 applies only to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011, and that this distinction does not violate equal protection.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of additional presentence conduct credit under amended Penal Code section 4019“subdivision (h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduct credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of Penal Code section 4019, subdivision (h), which explicitly limits the enhanced credit rate to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011. The court relied on binding precedent from the same district (People v. Rajanayagam) to interpret the statute's effective date clause, finding no ambiguity that would require a different construction. The reasoning is consistent with the legislative intent to apply the new rate prospectively based on the date of the offense, not the date of sentencing or custody. |
Rejection of equal protection claim regarding differential treatment of inmates based on offense date“Under the very deferential rational relationship test, we will not second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated purpose is better served by increasing the group of defendants who are entitled to enhanced conduct credits” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the rational basis test to the equal protection claim, as the classification did not involve a suspect class or fundamental right. The legislature's stated purpose of balancing cost savings with public safety provides a rational basis for limiting the enhanced credit to offenses committed after the effective date. The court properly deferred to the legislative judgment on the scope of the fiscal remedy. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 — The enhanced conduct credit provision of amended Penal Code section 4019 applies only to defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011, and the legislature's choice of effective date has a rational basis under equal protection analysis.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 530 — The language of amended section 4019 does not entitle a defendant who was sentenced after its effective date but whose crimes occurred prior to its effective date to additional conduct credit.
- relied: People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546 — The second sentence of amended section 4019, subdivision (h), does not extend the enhanced rate to any other group, but merely specifies the rate at which all others are to earn conduct credits.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the plain language of the statute and relies on consistent, contemporaneous precedent from the same district to resolve the statutory interpretation issue. The equal protection analysis is also sound, correctly applying the deferential rational basis test to the legislative classification.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court convicted Sanders of commercial burglary and check forgery, sentenced him to four years, and awarded 776 days of presentence credit (518 actual plus 258 conduct days) calculated under the pre-October 1, 2011 version of Penal Code section 4019 because his offenses predated the amendment. On appeal Sanders sought 166 more conduct days for local custody served after October 1, 2011, and the Court of Appeal rejected both his statutory-construction and equal protection arguments and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Calculation of presentence conduct credit under former section 4019 rather than the enhanced rate of amended section 4019 for custody served after October 1, 2011“Based on amendments to section 4019, which took effect on October 1, 2011, Sanders contends he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credit for the time he served from that date to his sentencing date.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court did not state a standard but treated the question as one of pure statutory interpretation. Subdivision (h) of amended section 4019 expressly limits the enhanced rate to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011, and the court followed the consistent Court of Appeal reading in Rajanayagam, Ellis, and Garcia that the second sentence of subdivision (h) merely confirms pre-amendment offenders earn credit under prior law. That reading matches the statute's text and the Supreme Court's prospectivity analysis in People v. Brown, though Brown is not cited. |
Rejection of equal protection challenge to applying the prior credit rate to defendants whose offenses predated October 1, 2011“This interpretation and its application to Sanders does not deprive him of equal protection of the law because, assuming he is similarly situated to inmates who committed their offenses after the effective date of amended section 4019” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court assumed similar situation and applied rational basis review, adopting Rajanayagam's reasoning that the Legislature could reasonably balance cost savings against public safety by choosing an effective date tied to the offense date. This is consistent with People v. Brown, which held that prospective-only application of a section 4019 credit increase does not violate equal protection because prisoners who served time before the change could not have been incentivized by it. The result is correct, but the opinion would have been stronger had it cited the binding Supreme Court authority rather than only Court of Appeal decisions. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 — Subdivision (h) of amended section 4019 limits enhanced conduct credit to defendants whose crimes were committed on or after October 1, 2011, and this prospective application survives rational basis equal protection review.
- relied: People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546 — The second sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) does not extend the enhanced credit rate to any other group but merely specifies the rate at which pre-amendment offenders earn conduct credits.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 530 — Amended section 4019 does not entitle a defendant sentenced after its effective date but whose crimes occurred before that date to additional conduct credit.
- missed: People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 — Amendments increasing section 4019 conduct credits apply prospectively absent clear contrary legislative intent, and prospective-only application does not violate equal protection because the incentive purpose of conduct credits cannot operate retroactively.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly reads subdivision (h) of amended section 4019 and applies rational basis review consistent with every published appellate decision on the question, so the result is clearly right. It omits, however, the controlling Supreme Court decision in People v. Brown, which resolved both the prospectivity and equal protection issues for section 4019 amendments and should have anchored the analysis.
Opinion
Filed 11/14/13 P. v. Sanders CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062588
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN284313)
RICHARD SANDERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila Quinlan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION A court found Richard Sanders guilty of commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 and check forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)). Sanders admitted having a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and the court found true allegations he had three prior prison commitment convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to four years in prison and awarded him 776 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 518 days of actual custody credit plus 258 days of conduct credit.
Sanders appeals, contending he is entitled to an additional 166 days of conduct credit. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION2
Based on amendments to section 4019, which took effect on October 1, 2011, Sanders contends he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credit for the time he served from that date to his sentencing date. He further contends failure to award him additional presentence conduct credit for this time deprives him of equal protection of the law.
Section 4019, which specifies the rate of presentence conduct credit an inmate in local custody may earn, has undergone numerous revisions in the past several years.
(People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48-50 (Rajanayagam) [detailing the history of recent amendments]; People v. Garcia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 530, 533-540 1 Further statutory references are also to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2 We omit a summary of the circumstances underlying Sanders's convictions, as they are not relevant to the issue Sanders raised on appeal. 2 [same].) At the time of Sanders's offenses, section 4019 allowed an inmate in local custody who had a prior serious or violent felony conviction to earn up to two days of conduct credit for every four days of actual custody. (Former § 4019, subds. (b)(2), (c)(2), & (f), Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50, eff. Jan. 25, 2010; People v. Garcia, supra, at pp. 536-537.)
As of October 1, 2011, section 4019 allows an inmate in local custody to earn up to four days of conduct credit for every two days of actual custody. (Amended § 4019, subds. (b), (c), & (f), Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, eff. Apr. 4, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011;
Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53, eff. June 30, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011; Stats. 2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35, eff. Sept. 21, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011; People v. Ellis (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1549-1550.) Unlike the formula under which the court sentenced Sanders, this formula applies to inmates with prior serious or violent felonies as long as the current offense is not a violent crime or murder. (§§ 2933.1, subd. (c), 2933.2, subd.
(c).)
Of pertinence here, subdivision (h) of amended section 4019 states, "The changes to this section . . . shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail . . . for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law." According to Sanders, the second sentence creates an ambiguity, which we should interpret to allow him to earn additional conduct credits for the local time served after October 1, 2011, even though he committed his crime before then. However, as the Rajanayagam court explained, "subdivision (h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature 3 intended the enhanced conduct credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision (h)'s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before October 1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)'s second sentence attempts to clarify that those defendant's who committed an offense before October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision (h), we read the second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed their crimes before October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct credits, just under prior law.
[Citation.] To imply the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to defendants who committed their crimes before the effective date but served time in local custody after the effective date reads too much into the statute and ignores the Legislature's clear intent in subdivision (h)'s first sentence." (Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52; see also, People v. Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553 ["The second sentence does not extend the enhanced rate to any other group, but merely specifies the rate at which all others are to earn conduct credits"]; People v. Garcia, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 541 [the language of amended section 4019 does not entitle a defendant who was sentenced after its effective date but whose crimes occurred prior to its effective date to additional conduct credit].)
This interpretation and its application to Sanders does not deprive him of equal protection of the law because, assuming he is similarly situated to inmates who committed their offenses after the effective date of amended section 4019, the Legislature 4 nonetheless had a rational basis for treating the latter inmates differently. Amended section 4019 was part of larger legislation whose purpose was to " 'to reduce recidivism and improve public safety, while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice spending.' " (Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.) "[I]n choosing October 1, 2011, as the effective date of [amended section 4019], the Legislature took a measured approach and balanced the goal of cost savings against public safety. The effective date was a legislative determination that its stated goal of reducing corrections costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who commit an offense on or after the amendment's effective date. But that is not the approach the Legislature chose in balancing public safety against cost savings. [Citation.] Under the very deferential rational relationship test, we will not second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated purpose is better served by increasing the group of defendants who are entitled to enhanced conduct credits when the Legislature has determined the fiscal crisis is best ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only those defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011." (Rajanayagam, at pp. 55-56.)
5 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
AARON, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Rajanayagam No. G046044 · 2012-11-15
- People v. Garcia No. B233562 · 2012-09-20
- People v. Ellis No. F063632 · 2012-07-30