People v. Cargill
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BARTHOLEMEW CARGILL, Defendant and Appellant
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County
- Trial judge
- William D. Mudd
- Outcome
- affirmed — The judgment is affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author)
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in prison, applying the newly enacted 'three strikes' law to double his sentence for a second strike offense. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the urgency statute was effective immediately upon the Governor's signature and filing, prior to the defendant's arrest, and that the law did not violate due process as it only increased penalties for pre-existing crimes.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Application of the 'three strikes' law (Penal Code § 667) to the defendant's sentence.“We find the new law was in effect at the time of this offense.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the plain language of Government Code section 9600, subdivision (b), which mandates that urgency statutes go into effect immediately upon enactment. Since the statute was signed and filed at 2:45 p.m. and the offense occurred at 10:15 p.m. the same day, the law was in force. The court's reliance on the definition of 'immediate' as 'without delay' is consistent with statutory interpretation principles and prior California authority regarding the effective date of urgency measures. |
Due process challenge regarding fair notice of the increased penalty.“Nothing in the new law changed or expanded the nature of the prohibited behavior. The new statute simply prospectively increased the punishment for violation of criminal laws which in this instance were pre-existing and correctly defined.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court correctly distinguished between the definition of criminal conduct and the imposition of penalties. Due process requires fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, not necessarily of the specific penalty range, especially when the underlying criminal statutes were well-established. The court's reasoning aligns with the principle that legislative changes to sentencing structures do not violate due process if they do not alter the elements of the crime. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Thierry S. (1987) 19 Cal.3d 727 — A statute is enacted when it is passed by the Legislature, signed by the Governor, and forwarded to the Secretary of State.
- relied: People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002 — When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it requires no construction by the court.
- relied: People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826 — Due process is not violated by a statute that increases penalties for recidivists without changing the nature of the prohibited behavior.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the plain language of Government Code section 9600 to determine the effective date of the urgency statute and properly distinguishes between the definition of criminal conduct and the imposition of penalties for due process purposes. The reasoning is supported by established California authorities regarding statutory enactment and fair notice.
The trial court sentenced Cargill as a second-strike offender under the newly enacted three strikes law (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (d), (e)) to six years, doubling the lower term for possession of cocaine base for sale, for offenses committed about 10:15 p.m. on March 7, 1994, the same day the urgency measure was signed and filed at 2:45 p.m. The Court of Appeal held the urgency statute took effect immediately upon filing with the Secretary of State and that applying it did not violate due process notice principles, and affirmed the judgment in full.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Application of the three strikes law to offenses committed roughly seven and one-half hours after the urgency measure was signed by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State“Plainly, the three strikes law, an urgency measure, went into effect at the time it was filed by the Governor with the Secretary of State and was validly in place when Cargill committed the current offenses.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The question of a statute's effective date is one of statutory interpretation reviewed independently. Government Code section 9600, subdivision (b) states urgency statutes take effect 'immediately upon their enactment,' and In re Thierry S. fixes enactment at passage, signature, and filing with the Secretary of State. The court's plain-language reading is defensible and supported by Woodhead's rule that unambiguous language needs no construction. The opinion does not engage the common-law notion that the law disregards fractions of a day, which appears to be the premise of Cargill's 'next day' argument, but the plain text of section 9600 supports the result. |
Rejection of due process fair-notice challenge to application of the three strikes sentencing enhancement“The new statute simply prospectively increased the punishment for violation of criminal laws which in this instance were pre-existing and correctly defined.” | de novo | correct | agree with court Due process fair notice concerns whether the conduct was defined as criminal when committed. Cargill's drug, driving, and disturbance offenses were long-established crimes; the three strikes law only increased punishment for recidivists and applied prospectively to conduct after its effective date. Under People v. Jackson, recidivist enhancements punish the new offense more severely because of prior conduct and raise no ex post facto or notice problem. The court's reasoning is sound. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727 — A statute is enacted when it has been passed by the Legislature, signed by the Governor, and forwarded to the Secretary of State; the opinion misdates this case as 1987.
- relied: People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002 — When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for judicial construction; courts apply the plain meaning.
- relied: People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826 — Recidivist sentencing provisions increase punishment for the current offense based on prior convictions and do not punish the earlier conduct anew, so they do not offend constitutional limits.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified Government Code section 9600 and Thierry S. as controlling the effective date of an urgency statute and applied Jackson appropriately to the due process claim. It did not expressly address the common-law rule disregarding fractions of a day that underlies the 'next day' argument, and it misdates Thierry S., but these gaps do not undermine the result.
Opinion — Huffman
Opinion
HUFFMAN, J.This case illustrates the wisdom of the commonly-used phrase, “Timing is everything in life.” In this instance, appellant Bartholemew Cargill was arrested in the possession of cocaine base about 10:15 p.m. on March 7, 1994. That rather uneventful statistical fact becomes more important in light of the action at 2:45 p.m. on the same day in Sacramento when the Governor signed and filed with the Secretary of State the new “three strikes” law. At the time of his current offense, Cargill had suffered at least one qualifying prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e).
Cargill appeals his sentence, raising, among other contentions, the urgency measure signed by the Governor on March 7, 1994, was not “immediately” effective until at least March 8, 1994. We will reject all of Cargill’s contentions and affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Facts and Procedural Background
About 10:15 p.m. on March 7, 1994, Cargill was stopped for driving erratically and without headlights. As a result of the arrest that followed, police recovered 8.4 grams of rock cocaine and found Cargill under the influence of drugs.
*1554 A jury convicted Cargill of transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). He was also convicted of driving under the influence of drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), and using offensive words within the meaning of Penal Code section 415, subdivision (3). Cargill waived trial on the alleged prior convictions. He admitted a prior prison term pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and a prior conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e). The trial court, treating the case as a second strike case, sentenced Cargill to a total term of six years in prison, representing the lower term for possession of cocaine base for sale, doubled for a total of six years. All other sentences were to run concurrently. The court also imposed a $1,000 restitution fine. Cargill has filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
I
Cargill challenges the application of the three strikes law to him on two grounds; first, that the law did not go into effect until after his arrest and, even if the law were applicable, it did not provide him adequate notice and therefore denied him due process of law. We reject both contentions.
A
Timing
The bill (Assem. Bill No. 971) which amended Penal Code section 667 to add the so-called three strikes provisions was signed by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State at 2:45 p.m. on March 7, 1994. (Stats. 1994, ch. 12.) Section 2 of the bill contains the statement, “This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 2.)
Since the statute as passed was an urgency measure, its effective date is controlled by Government Code section 9600, subdivision (b) which provides in part, “Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the state, and urgency statutes shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment.”
The statute was enacted when it was passed by the Legislature, signed by the Governor, and forwarded to the Secretary of State. (In re Thierry S. (1987) 19 Cal.3d 727, 738-739 [139 Cal.Rptr. 708, 566 P.2d 610].)
*1555 Cargill was arrested in possession of cocaine about 10:15 p.m. on March 7. The question thus presented is whether the statute signed by the Governor and transmitted to the Secretary of State some seven and one-half hours earlier immediately became effective so as to apply to Cargill. We find the new law was in effect at the time of this offense.
We look to the plain language of Government Code section 9600 to guide us as to when an urgency measure such as this becomes effective. According to the statute, the law is effective “immediately” upon its enactment. “Immediate” is a common term defined as “occurring or accomplished without delay; instant.” (Random House Diet, of the English Language (2d ed. 1983) p. 956.)
Cargill’s argument that “immediately” means the next day simply has no support in the plain language of the statute, or in any rational statutory interpretation. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and requires no construction by us. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].) Plainly, the three strikes law, an urgency measure, went into effect at the time it was filed by the Governor with the Secretary of State and was validly in place when Cargill committed the current offenses.
B
Notice
There is simply no basis for Cargill’s argument his due process rights were violated by lack of fair notice with the enactment of the statute.
The conduct in which Cargill was engaged at the time of his arrest violated penal laws within the Health and Safety Code, Vehicle Code, and Penal Code, established and well known long before he engaged in his unlawful behavior. The new statute enacted by the Legislature simply increased the penalty for recidivist felons such as Cargill who committed a new violation of an already defined set of penal laws. (People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 833 [210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736].) Nothing in the new law changed or expanded the nature of the prohibited behavior. The new statute simply prospectively increased the punishment for violation of criminal laws which in this instance were pre-existing and correctly defined. Cargill suffered no deprivation of his due process right to fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.
*1556 II, III *
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Work, Acting P. J., and Benke, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 12, 1995, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme court was denied December 21, 1995. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
See footnote, ante, page 1551.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Woodhead Crim. 25631 · 1987-09-08
- People v. Jackson Crim. 23622 · 1985-01-28
- King v. Thierry S. Crim. 19663 · 1977-07-22
Cited by
- People v. Carroll F051709 · 2008-01-17
- People v. Carroll No. F051709 · 2007-12-27
- Penton v. Kernan 06cv233 WQH (PCL) · 2007-12-20
- People v. Bunn S086128 · 2002-01-10
- People v. Bunn No. S086128 · 2002-01-10
- People v. Askey B097733 · 1996-09-16