A.A. v. Superior Court
A.A., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County
- Trial judge
- Charles R. Gill
- Outcome
- other — D043257. Fourth Dist., Div. One.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author)
Analysis
The juvenile court continued the jurisdiction hearing for a detained minor beyond the statutory 15-day limit and ordered the minor to remain in custody, relying on Penal Code section 1050.1 and a co-minor's request for new counsel. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, holding that Penal Code section 1050.1 does not apply to juvenile proceedings and that the court lacked authority to grant a continuance exceeding seven days for appointment of counsel, thereby ordering the minor's immediate release.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order continuing the jurisdiction hearing to December 9 and keeping the minor in custody“The court had no authority to grant A.B.S. a 22-day continuance until December 9.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the juvenile court misapplied Penal Code section 1050.1, which by its plain language applies only to defendants 'jointly charged in the same complaint, indictment, or information,' a condition not met here as A.A. was charged in an individual petition. Furthermore, the court correctly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 700 and Rule 1486(b)(2), which strictly limit continuances for the appointment of counsel or to enable counsel to become acquainted with the case to a maximum of seven days, rendering the 22-day continuance unlawful. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Samano (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 984 — In a multiple defendant criminal case, a request for continuance by one properly joined defendant with good cause is deemed a request of all jointly charged defendants under Penal Code section 1050.1.
- relied: In re Edwayne V. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 171 — In the case of a detained minor, absent proper grounds for a continuance, the court is required either to release the minor and reset the jurisdiction hearing or proceed with the jurisdiction hearing within the statutory 15-day period.
- relied: Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is proper when the action is unusually urgent and requires acceleration.
- relied: Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is proper when the action is unusually urgent and requires acceleration.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly distinguishes the criminal procedure statute (Penal Code § 1050.1) from the specific juvenile court rules governing continuances, noting that the plain language of the criminal statute does not apply to individual juvenile petitions. It also correctly applies the strict seven-day limit for continuances related to counsel appointment under Welfare and Institutions Code § 700 and Rule 1486(b)(2), which the trial court violated by granting a 22-day continuance.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe juvenile court, over detained 13-year-old A.A.'s objection, continued his jurisdiction hearing 22 days to December 9, 2003 so that a co-minor's newly retained counsel could prepare, accepting the People's position under Penal Code section 1050.1 and In re Samano that one minor's continuance request is deemed a request by all, and ordered A.A. to remain in custody. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition in the first instance, holding section 1050.1 does not apply to juvenile proceedings on an individual petition, that any continuance to let counsel become acquainted with the case cannot exceed seven days under Welfare and Institutions Code section 700 and rule 1486(b)(2), and directing the minor's immediate release.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Continuance of the detained minor's jurisdiction hearing beyond the 15-judicial-day limit based on Penal Code section 1050.1 and In re Samano, treating a co-minor's request as the request of all minors“We reject the notion that Penal Code section 1050.1 applies to this proceeding.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The court's reading is faithful to the statutory text: section 1050.1 by its terms requires defendants 'jointly charged in the same complaint, indictment, or information,' and A.A. was charged in an individual petition. The court also correctly characterized section 1050.1 as a continuance statute rather than a joinder rule imported by Welfare and Institutions Code section 675(b), and juvenile continuances are governed by sections 682 and 700 and rules 1485 and 1486. Samano, which harmonized two Penal Code provisions in an adult preliminary-hearing setting, does not purport to override the juvenile scheme, and the court's concern that borrowing Samano could leave an objecting detained minor in custody for months without a hearing is well taken. |
Granting a 22-day continuance (to December 9) to permit a co-minor's newly retained counsel to prepare“The court had no authority to grant A.B.S. a 22-day continuance until December 9.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court Welfare and Institutions Code section 700 and rule 1486(b)(2) cap a continuance for appointment of counsel or to enable counsel to become acquainted with the case at seven days, and section 682(b) and rule 1486(a) limit any continuance to the time shown necessary by the moving party. Even on the People's theory that A.B.S.'s request could be attributed to A.A., the 22-day continuance exceeded the statutory maximum. The court's alternative holding is independently sufficient. |
Order that A.A. remain in custody during the continuance and denial of his alternative request for release to home supervision“A. has been in custody and has been denied a jurisdiction hearing since October 7. He is entitled to immediate release.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Section 657(a)(1) and rule 1485(b) require a detained minor's jurisdiction hearing to begin within 15 judicial days of the detention order, and In re Edwayne V. holds that absent proper grounds for a continuance the court must either release the minor and reset the hearing or proceed within the statutory period. Because the continuance was not authorized, the remedy of release follows directly from rule 1485(d) and Edwayne V.; the court appropriately stopped short of ordering dismissal, which had not been sought below. |
A.A.'s request that the Court of Appeal order dismissal of the delinquency petition“We do not reach A.’s request that we order the juvenile delinquency petition to be dismissed because A. has not moved for a dismissal below.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court Declining to order dismissal where no motion to dismiss was made in the juvenile court is a conventional application of the rule that a reviewing court will not decide relief not first presented to the trial court. Release was the relief tied to the statutory violation shown. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Samano (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 984 — In an adult multi-defendant criminal case, Penal Code section 859b must be harmonized with Penal Code section 1050.1 so that one properly joined defendant's good-cause request to continue the preliminary examination is deemed the request of all jointly charged defendants; the court distinguished it as inapplicable to a minor charged in an individual juvenile petition governed by the Welfare and Institutions Code time limits.
- relied: In re Edwayne V. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 171 — Absent proper grounds for a continuance, the juvenile court must either release a detained minor and reset the jurisdiction hearing or proceed with the hearing within the statutory 15-day period; a minor held beyond that period without a proper continuance is entitled to release.
- relied: Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is proper where the matter is unusually urgent and requires acceleration.
- relied: Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29 — Issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance under Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 is appropriate in cases of unusual urgency.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion rests on the plain text of Penal Code section 1050.1, correctly characterizes it as a continuance rather than joinder provision, applies the specific juvenile continuance limits in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 657, 682 and 700 and rules 1485 and 1486, and offers an independent alternative ground (the seven-day cap) that disposes of the case even on the People's theory. It squarely distinguishes Samano, supports the release remedy with Edwayne V., and justifies the accelerated peremptory writ with Supreme Court authority, leaving no material argument unanswered.
Opinion — Benke
Opinion
BENKE, Acting P. J.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 9, 2003, the People filed a petition alleging 13-year-old A.A. (A.) is a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1 602, he committed robbery, theft, and assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and he was in custody. On October 10 A. denied the charges and the court continued his detention pending further hearing. At the October 30 settlement conference, with the concurrence of A.’s counsel and the attorneys for two co-minors who were alleged to have participated in the offenses, the court confirmed the date of the adjudication hearing 2 was November 3.
*4 On November 3 counsel for two co-minors failed to appear and the attorneys specially appearing for them requested a continuance. A.’s counsel reported for the hearing ready to proceed. The People also were ready to proceed. However, the People asked the court to continue the matter pursuant to Penal Code section 1050.1 3 in lieu of severing the co-minors and argued, among other things, it would be unfair to the victim to proceed with separate trials. After a discussion about severance and other matters, 4 the court continued the adjudication hearing to November 17 over A.’s objection and ordered that A. remain in custody in the interim. A. requested reconsideration on November 6 but the court affirmed its earlier ruling.
A. followed with a petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition (D043209). Our request for a response was met by a letter from the People advising that they opposed the petition but were unable to respond given the short deadline. We denied the petition.
When the parties appeared for a settlement conference on November 13, the juvenile court allowed recently charged co-minor A.B.S. to substitute retained counsel for his court-appointed attorney. Retained counsel asked the court to continue the adjudication hearing until December 2 or December 9 so that he could prepare. Co-minor A.I.S. agreed to the continuance and a waiver of time but his attorney preferred the December 9 date because of a scheduling conflict. However, A. reported ready and objected to any continuance; alternatively, if the court granted a continuance, A. requested he be released to home supervision. The People also reported ready but stated they would have no objection to a continuance as long as the minors were tried jointly and the People’s witnesses could be available on the new date. The court found good cause to continue the adjudication hearing until December 9 but ordered that A. remain in custody.
A. filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition seeking immediate release from custody. He asserts the court erroneously relied on Penal Code section 1050.1 and improperly continued the hearing more than seven days. A. also faults the court for putting the interests of a co-minor and *5 the People ahead of his right to a speedy adjudication without considering that the hearing had been already delayed once, the previous judge declined joinder for fear that A.’s case would be delayed even further and A.B.S., the party seeking the continuance, was not in custody. We requested a response.
DISCUSSION
Section 657, subdivision (a)(1), 5 and rule 1485(b) 6 entitle a detained minor to a jurisdiction hearing within 15 judicial days from the date of the detention order. Continuances may be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for the period of time shown to be necessary by the moving party. (§ 682, subd. (b); rule 1486(a).) “The court shall continue the hearing for not to exceed seven days ... to make an appointment of counsel, or to enable counsel to acquaint himself or herself with the case . . . .” (§ 700, italics added; see also rule 1486(b)(2) 7 .)
The People rely on In re Samano (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 984 (Samano) to justify the “all for one and one for all” continuance and take the position that Samano creates a rule of joinder applicable to juvenile proceedings under section 675, subdivision (b). 8 In Samano, a criminal prosecution involving 33 adult defendants, the trial court granted the request of two of the defendants to continue the preliminary examination, granted the People’s Penal Code section 1050.1 motion for a continuance of the hearing as to all defendants, but denied the motion of two other defendants to be released on their own recognizance because the preliminary examination went beyond the 10-court-day statutory limit in Penal Code section 859b. Holding Penal Code section 859b must be harmonized with Penal Code section 1050.1 in a multiple defendant case, the majority concluded, “The request of one properly joined defendant for a continuance of the preliminary examination with good cause shall be deemed a request of all jointly charged defendants.” (Samano, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 993.)
*6 We reject the notion that Penal Code section 1050.1 applies to this proceeding. First, the plain language of the statute requires that “two or more defendants . . . [be] jointly charged in the same complaint, indictment, or information.” (Pen. Code, § 1050.1.) The People filed an individual petition on A. He was not “jointly charged” in the “same” pleading with any other minor.
Second, Penal Code section 1050.1 is not a “joinder” statute, as the People urge. It is, if anything, a “continuance” statute—a statute that provides the People “good cause” to seek a continuance of the entire case when the court grants a continuance to two or more defendants in a jointly charged case. Continuances in juvenile proceedings are, however, controlled by their own set of rules. (See, e. g., rules 1485, 1486; see also §§ 682, 700.) In the case of a detained minor, absent proper grounds for a continuance, the court is required either to release the minor and reset the jurisdiction hearing or proceed with the jurisdiction hearing within the statutory 15-day period. (In re Edwayne V. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 171, 175 [242 Cal.Rptr. 748].)
Third, applying Penal Code section 1050.1 to this case could result in eviscerating the time frames that control juvenile proceedings. By way of example, if we borrow from Samano, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 984, and deem a request for continuance by one juvenile to be the request of the co-minors, a juvenile like A. who has in reality objected to every continuance, could find himself in custody without a jurisdiction hearing for up to six months. (See rule 1486(d).)
Finally, even if we were to accept the People’s position and deem A.B.S.’s request to be A.’s, a continuance to enable A.B.S.’s new counsel to familiarize himself with the case cannot in any event exceed seven days. (§ 700; rule 1486(b)(2).) The court had no authority to grant A.B.S. a 22-day continuance until December 9.
A. has been in custody and has been denied a jurisdiction hearing since October 7. He is entitled to immediate release. 9 (See In re Edwayne V, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 175; rule 1485(d).)
Because the action is unusually urgent, requiring acceleration, a peremptory writ in the first instance is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397, 859 P.2d 96]; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856, 840 P.2d 961].)
*7 Let a writ of prohibition issue directing the superior court to vacate its order of November 13, 2003, enter an order consistent with this opinion and release A. from detention on the charges subject to this petition. This opinion is made final immediately as to this court. (Rule 24(b)(3).)
McIntyre, J., and Aaron, J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
We note the juvenile court, the minute orders and the parties use the term “adjudication hearing” for the “jurisdiction hearing” referenced in rules 1485 and 1486 of the California Rules of Court. (All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.)
Penal Code section 1050.1 provides in pertinent part: “In any case in which two or more defendants are jointly charged in the same complaint, indictment, or information, and the court ... for good cause shown, continues the arraignment, preliminary hearing, or trial of one or more defendants, the continuance shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to continue the remaining defendants’ cases so as to maintain joinder. The court... shall not cause jointly charged cases to be severed due to the unavailability or unpreparedness of one or more defendants unless it appears to the court. . . that it will be impossible for all defendants to be available and prepared within a reasonable period of time.”
There was discussion about another co-minor, A.B.S., who had been charged that same day (November 3).
Section 657, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “In the case of a minor detained in custody at the time of the filing of the petition, the petition must be set for hearing within 15 judicial days from the date of the order of the court directing such detention.”
Rule 1485(b) provides: “If the child is detained, the jurisdiction hearing on the petition shall begin within 15 judicial days from the date of the order of the court directing detention. If the child is released from detention before the jurisdiction hearing, the court may reset the jurisdiction hearing within the time limit in subdivision (a) [i.e., within 30 days from the date the petition was filed].”
Rule 1486(b)(2) provides in pertinent part: “The court shall continue the jurisdiction hearing for . . . [n]o more than seven calendar days . . . [f]or appointment of counsel [or] [t]o enable counsel to become acquainted with the case . . . .”
Section 675, subdivision (b), provides: “Hearings for two or more minors may be heard upon the same rules of joinder, consolidation, and severance as apply to trials in a court of criminal jurisdiction.”
We do not reach A.’s request that we order the juvenile delinquency petition to be dismissed because A. has not moved for a dismissal below.
Cites, in this corpus
- In Re Samano Docket Nos. B076810, B077002 · 1995-01-19
- Alexander v. Superior Court S026431 · 1993-10-14
- Ng v. Superior Court S025119 · 1992-12-03
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