gno.law

People v. Duncan

California Court of Appeal · D050458 · 2008-03-05 · Published · 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264 · 160 Cal. App. 4th 1014 · 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 317

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEONZA KEVIN DUNCAN, Defendant and Appellant

Area
criminal
Panel
McINTYRE (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:08Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Duncan's motion to suppress evidence, ruling that an upside-down license plate violated Vehicle Code section 5201 and provided reasonable suspicion for a stop that revealed a suspended license. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that an upside-down plate is not 'clearly legible' as required by the statute and that the officer's testimony regarding the plate's orientation was supported by substantial evidence.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to suppress based on the finding that an upside-down license plate violates Vehicle Code section 5201.
“We conclude it would be a violation of the statute to mount the license plate upside down, which would make the plate more difficult or confusing to read.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied de novo review to the statutory interpretation question. The court reasoned that the plain language 'clearly legible' implies the plate must be readable with ease, and an upside-down orientation hinders this, thus constituting a violation. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to ensure plates are identifiable.
Factual finding that the license plate was upside down.
“The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, nothing indicates that an upside-down license plate on Duncan’s vehicle was physically impossible or that Officer Szymczak’s testimony was obviously false.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard to the factual findings. It noted that the trial court found the officer credible and that the testimony was not physically impossible or inherently improbable, despite conflicting reports from other officers. The court properly deferred to the trier of fact on credibility issues.
Lawfulness of the detention and subsequent inventory search.
“Having concluded that Officer Szymczak had a lawful basis upon which to stop Duncan and investigate the license plate violation, we need not address Duncan’s remaining contentions challenging the consensual nature of the contact with Officer Szymczak.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the rule from Whren v. United States that an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant if there is objective reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Since the stop was justified by the section 5201 violation, the subsequent discovery of the suspended license and the inventory search were lawful, rendering the suppression argument moot.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354 — Establishes the two-tiered standard of review for motions to suppress: deference to factual findings supported by substantial evidence and independent review of the legal question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
  • relied: People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668 — The trial court is vested with the power to judge witness credibility, resolve conflicts in testimony, and weigh evidence in determining if a search is constitutionally unreasonable.
  • relied: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284 — The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction (or factual finding) unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.
  • relied: People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 — To reject statements given by a witness found credible by the trial court, the statements must be physically impossible or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.
  • relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts as found, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact.
  • relied: People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145 — When interpreting a statute, courts must ascertain the legislative intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law.
  • relied: DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593 — Courts must look to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.
  • relied: Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1 — Absent ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.
  • relied: People v. White (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1022 — Defines 'clearly' as free from obscurity and unmistakable; also cites Whren v. United States for the proposition that an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant if there is objective reasonable suspicion.
  • relied: Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806 — A law enforcement officer may briefly detain a vehicle if objective facts indicate a traffic law violation; the officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard to defer to the trial court's credibility findings and uses de novo review to interpret the plain meaning of 'clearly legible' in Vehicle Code section 5201. The court effectively bridges the gap between the statutory text and the practical reality of reading upside-down text, citing dictionary definitions to support the conclusion that such a plate is not 'clearly' legible.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The trial court denied Duncan's motion to suppress methamphetamine and other items found in an inventory search of his car, finding the officer credibly testified the front license plate was upside down, that this violated Vehicle Code section 5201 and justified the stop, and that Duncan was driving on a suspended license. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding as a matter of first impression that an upside-down plate is not "clearly legible" under section 5201, deferring to the credibility finding, and concluding the lawful stop and discovery of the suspended license justified the impound and inventory search.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Factual finding that Duncan's front license plate was upside down, based on Officer Szymczak's credibility despite the omission from reports and Officer Camacho's contrary recollection
“Although we acknowledge that the evidence, as presented, could have resulted in different factual findings, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have concluded that Duncan’s license plate was upside down.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
Under Glaser and Woods the trial court resolves credibility and conflicts; a single witness's testimony suffices unless physically impossible or inherently improbable (Scott, Mayberry). The omission from reports and another officer's lack of recollection create a conflict the trial court was entitled to resolve, and nothing made the testimony impossible.
Interpretation of Vehicle Code section 5201 that an upside-down license plate violates the requirement that plates be maintained in a condition so as to be clearly legible
“It is evident that the Legislature, in using the phrase “clearly legible,” intended for the information on a license plate to be read with ease and without doubt or mistake.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court applied standard plain-meaning principles (Coronado, DaFonte, Kizer) and dictionary definitions of 'clearly' and 'legible.' A plate that must be mentally inverted to be read is reasonably not 'clearly legible'; the statute's absence of an express orientation requirement does not defeat the plain-meaning reading. No controlling contrary authority is identified.
Denial of the motion to suppress on the ground that the section 5201 violation gave the officer reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop, making the officer's subjective motive irrelevant and justifying the ensuing impound and inventory search
“During the lawful stop, Officer Szymczak determined that Duncan had been driving on a suspended license, which provided the justification for the impoundment and inventory search of Duncan’s vehicle.”
mixedcorrectagree with court
Whren and White establish that an objective traffic violation justifies a stop regardless of pretext. The court's conclusion follows, though it states the impound justification without citation to the impound statutes or community-caretaking authority; Duncan's argument, however, was framed as fruit of an unlawful detention, which the court properly rejected.
Alternative finding that the encounter between Officer Szymczak and Duncan was consensual even absent reasonable suspicion
“we need not address Duncan’s remaining contentions challenging the consensual nature of the contact with Officer Szymczak.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Because the court upheld the stop as supported by an objective traffic violation, it had no need to reach the alternative consensual-encounter ground; declining to do so was appropriate.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354 — Two-tiered standard of review for suppression rulings: defer to factual findings supported by substantial evidence, then independently determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
  • relied: People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668 — The trial court is vested with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences in deciding a suppression motion.
  • relied: People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284 — Uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient unless physically impossible or inherently improbable.
  • relied: People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 — To reject testimony the trial court found credible, it must be physically impossible or its falsity apparent without resort to inferences.
  • relied: People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 — When two or more reasonable inferences can be drawn, the reviewing court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact.
  • relied: People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145 — Statutory interpretation seeks to ascertain legislative intent to effectuate the purpose of the law.
  • relied: DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593 — Courts first look to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.
  • relied: Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1 — Absent ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and the plain meaning governs.
  • relied: People v. White (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1022 — An officer may briefly detain a vehicle when objective facts indicate a traffic violation; subjective motivation is irrelevant; also supplies a definition of 'clearly' in the Vehicle Code context.
  • relied: Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806 — A traffic stop supported by probable cause of a traffic violation is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the officer's subjective motives.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied the deferential substantial-evidence standard to the credibility finding and used standard plain-meaning tools to resolve the first-impression question under section 5201, then applied Whren/White to validate the stop. It stated without citation or analysis that the suspended-license discovery justified the impound and inventory search, and did not address the scope or duration of the post-stop records check, leaving minor gaps in an otherwise defensible result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — McIntyre

*1016 Opinion

McINTYRE, J.

This case presents an issue as to whether driving with an upside-down license plate constitutes a violation of Vehicle Code section 5201. (All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.) As a matter of first impression in California, we conclude that the answer is yes.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Leonza Kevin Duncan was arrested on April 24, 2006, by Chula Vista Police Officer Steve Szymczak and charged with transportation of methamphetamine, possession for sale of methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of tools with intent to break and enter. Following the preliminary hearing, Duncan brought a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his detention, arrest, and subsequent search of his vehicle.

At Duncan’s suppression motion hearing, Officer Szymczak testified that, while on duty, he observed a vehicle driving toward him and noticed that the front license plate was upside down. As soon as Duncan drove past, Officer Szymczak made a U-turn but was delayed at a traffic light and could not immediately stop Duncan. Officer Szymczak located Duncan moments later parked at a motel in a high-crime area.

Officer Szymczak approached Duncan, who was getting out of his car and was holding a bag of food. Officer Szymczak asked Duncan if he was staying at the motel and Duncan replied, “Yes, I am. No. I’m going to get a room later.” Duncan was then asked if the vehicle belonged to him and if he had a driver’s license. Duncan responded “yes” to both questions, pulled out his wallet, and handed his driver’s license to Officer Szymczak, stating that it was valid. Officer Szymczak then conducted a records check on Duncan’s driver’s license.

The records check showed that Duncan’s driver’s license was suspended. A corrected dispatch indicated that Duncan’s license permitted driving in the course of his employment. Because Duncan was holding a food bag and was standing in a motel parking lot, Officer Szymczak concluded that Duncan was not in the course of employment. At some point, Duncan admitted that his driver’s license was, in fact, suspended. The encounter lasted about three to five minutes.

*1017 Before the records check was completed, Officers Juan Camacho and J. English arrived. After completing the records check, Officer Szymczak cited Duncan and impounded his vehicle. The other officers assisted Officer Szymczak in an inventory search of Duncan’s vehicle, which revealed the methamphetamine, marijuana, electronic scale, and small baggies that were the subject of the motion to suppress.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found (1) Officer Szymczak testified credibly; (2) an upside-down license plate violates section 5201 because it is not clearly legible; (3) the violation provided the officer with reasonable suspicion; (4) Duncan violated his driver’s license suspension because he was “clearly not [driving] to and from work”; and (5) even if reasonable suspicion did not exist, the encounter between Officer Szymczak and Duncan was consensual. Therefore, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

After the trial court’s denial, Duncan pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine for sale and was sentenced to two years in prison. He appeals, contending (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the officer’s pretext stop; (2) the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 5201; and (3) evidence obtained during the inventory search was discovered as a result of an unlawful detention. We affirm the judgment.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we use a two-tiered standard of review. First, we view the record favorably to the ruling and “defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729].) We then exercise our independent review to determine “whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.)

2. Factual Findings

Duncan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that his license plate was upside down. He points to Officer Szymczak’s reports and Officer Camacho’s testimony as support for his contention. Duncan is correct that the probable cause statement and arrest report did not mention the upside-down license plate and that, although Officer Camacho documented the license plate number on the impound report and noted two license plates, he testified that he did not recall seeing the license plate upside down and in *1018 fact could not, in his experience, ever recall seeing an upside-down license plate. However, Officer Szymczak repeatedly testified that Duncan’s license plate was upside down.

The trial court, not the reviewing court, “is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019].) “The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 [145 Cal.Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123].) To reject the statements given by a witness whom the trial court has found credible, either they must be physically impossible or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].) When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts as found, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738].)

Although we acknowledge that the evidence, as presented, could have resulted in different factual findings, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have concluded that Duncan’s license plate was upside down. The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, nothing indicates that an upside-down license plate on Duncan’s vehicle was physically impossible or that Officer Szymczak’s testimony was obviously false. Therefore, we are bound by the court’s factual findings.

3. Section 5201

Duncan further contends the trial court erred in ruling that an upside-down license plate constitutes a violation of section 5201, which provides in pertinent part that: “License plates shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle for which they are issued so as to prevent the plates from swinging, shall be mounted in a position so as to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained in a condition so as to be clearly legible.” Duncan encourages a narrow reading of the statute, focusing on the absence of a specific requirement for the plate to be right side up. For additional support of this interpretation, he points to the lack of case law specifically imposing such a requirement.

When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the legislative intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232].) We first look to the *1019 words of the statute, “giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140].) Absent ambiguity, “the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 8 [255 Cal.Rptr. 412, 767 P.2d 679].)

The statute imposes three requirements—that the plate be securely fastened to prevent swinging, that it be clearly visible, and that it be clearly legible. In denying Duncan’s motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that an upside-down license plate is not clearly legible. We agree.

The words “clearly legible” are unambiguous. “Clearly” means “without equivocation; decidedly.” (Random House Unabridged Diet. (2d ed. 1993) p. 384.) “Clearly suggests without doubt or obscurity.” (Ibid.) The term has also been defined as “ ‘free from obscurity . . . unmistakable . . . unhampered by restriction or limitation.’ ” (People v. White (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1026 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 584], quoting Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1987) p. 247.) “Legible” is defined as “capable of being read or deciphered, esp. with ease . . . easily readable.” (Random House Unabridged Dict. (2d ed. 1993) p. 1099.) It is evident that the Legislature, in using the phrase “clearly legible,” intended for the information on a license plate to be read with ease and without doubt or mistake. Therefore, we conclude it would be a violation of the statute to mount the license plate upside down, which would make the plate more difficult or confusing to read. As the trial court noted, “There are people who can read things upside down, but you have to look at it for quite a while.” The court properly found that Duncan’s license plate violated section 5201.

4. Lawful Detention

“[A] law enforcement officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, briefly detain a vehicle if the objective facts indicate that the vehicle has violated a traffic law. The officer’s subjective motivation in effecting the stop is irrelevant.” (People v. White, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025, citing Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 S.Ct. 1769].)

Having concluded that Officer Szymczak had a lawful basis upon which to stop Duncan and investigate the license plate violation, we need not address Duncan’s remaining contentions challenging the consensual nature of the contact with Officer Szymczak. During the lawful stop, Officer Szymczak determined that Duncan had been driving on a suspended license, which provided the justification for the impoundment and inventory search of Duncan’s vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Duncan’s motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle.

*1020 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McConnell, P. J., and Huffman, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 11, 2008, S162579.

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