Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Superior Court
ERNEST W. HAHN, INC., Et Al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; ROBERT A. MARTIN Et Al., Real Parties in Interest
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Gilbert Nares (author)
Analysis
The trial court overruled Hahn's demurrer to the plaintiffs' cause of action for strict liability, allowing the claim to proceed. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandamus, vacating the trial court's order and directing it to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend, holding that strict liability does not apply to commercial premises liability for invitees.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order overruling Hahn's demurrer to the strict liability cause of action“Let a peremptory writ issue directing the court to vacate its order overruling Hahn’s demurrer to the strict liability cause of action and to issue a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard for reviewing a demurrer, accepting the material allegations as true but determining that the legal theory of strict liability is inapplicable to the facts alleged. The court distinguished the residential landlord-tenant exception in Becker from the commercial premises context, correctly noting that the implied warranty of habitability and the specific policy reasons for Becker do not extend to commercial invitees. The reliance on Rowland v. Christian and the general principle that a possessor is not an insurer of safety supports the conclusion that fault-based negligence is the appropriate standard, making the trial court's allowance of a strict liability claim an error of law. |
Authorities
- relied: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57 — Establishes the traditional application of strict liability to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce.
- relied: Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 — Establishes that the proper test for premises liability is whether the landowner has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.
- relied: Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205 — States that a possessor of property is not an insurer of the invitee's safety but must use reasonable care to keep premises in a reasonably safe condition.
- relied: Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 484 — Supports the principle that liability for invitees is based on the requirement of reasonable care rather than strict liability.
- relied: Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454 — Extended strict liability to residential landlord-tenant relationships based on the implied warranty of habitability and the special relationship between landlord and tenant.
- relied: Muro v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1089 — Refused to extend strict liability to commercial landlords where the commercial tenant is in control of the premises and in an equal position to inspect and repair defects.
- relied: Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340 — Refused to extend the Becker rationale to the owner of hospital premises for injuries resulting from latent defects in a hospital room.
- relied: J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799 — Establishes the standard for testing the sufficiency of a complaint by accepting as true all material allegations therein.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly distinguishes the unique policy basis of Becker (implied warranty of habitability in residential tenancies) from the general premises liability framework applicable to commercial invitees. It logically concludes that extending strict liability to all commercial premises would abolish the traditional fault requirement without sufficient legal basis, relying on established California precedent regarding the duty of care for invitees.
The trial court overruled Hahn's demurrer to the strict liability cause of action added by Martin and Rogers, who were injured when a tree fell on them while seated at tables Hahn provided in the Horton Plaza courtyard. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance directing the trial court to vacate that order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend, holding that Becker v. IRM Corp.'s extension of strict liability to residential landlords does not reach a commercial landowner's liability to business invitees.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order overruling Hahn's demurrer to the strict liability cause of action asserted by commercial invitees injured by a falling tree in a shopping center common area“Because we conclude a strict liability theory is inapplicable to the facts of this case, we grant the petition.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The court correctly treated the sufficiency of the complaint as a question of law, accepting the allegations as true (J'Aire). It applied the settled rule that a possessor of land owes invitees reasonable care, not insurer liability (Rowland, Smith, Brown), and reasonably confined Becker to its stated foundations—the implied warranty of habitability and the policy of safe urban housing—which have no analogue in a shopping-center owner's relationship with lunchtime patrons. It candidly acknowledged Muro and Pierson were distinguishable rather than overreading them, and its observation that plaintiffs' theory would impose strict liability on every supermarket, restaurant, theater and store is a fair statement of the consequence. Directing the demurrer be sustained without leave to amend is appropriate because the defect is one of legal theory, not pleading, so amendment could not cure it. |
Authorities
- relied: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57 — Strict liability in tort applies to manufacturers and others who place defective products in the stream of commerce.
- relied: Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 — A landowner's liability turns on whether he acted as a reasonable person in managing his property in view of the probability of injury to others.
- relied: Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205 — A possessor of land is not an insurer of an invitee's safety but must use reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of latent perils.
- relied: Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 484 — Premises liability to invitees rests on reasonable care, not insurer liability.
- relied: Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20 — Persons who enter premises by express or implied invitation for the possessor's advantage are invitees.
- relied: Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454 — A residential landlord is strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by latent defects existing at the time of renting, based on the implied warranty of habitability and the landlord's role in marketing housing.
- relied: Muro v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1089 — Becker's strict liability rule does not extend to a commercial landlord sued by an employee of a commercial tenant injured on the leased premises.
- relied: Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340 — Becker does not extend to a hospital's liability for latent defects in a hospital room, which is part of a service package rather than a product.
- relied: J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799 — In testing the sufficiency of a complaint on demurrer, the court accepts as true all material allegations.
- missed: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — A peremptory writ of mandate may issue in the first instance only after the real parties have received notice that the court is considering doing so and an opportunity to oppose the petition; the court cited Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 and two Court of Appeal decisions but did not cite Palma or state that Palma notice was given.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion answers the plaintiffs' Becker argument directly with the controlling Supreme Court premises-liability authorities and a careful reading of Becker's own rationale, and it honestly concedes the limits of the intermediate appellate cases Hahn relied on. It is brief and does not discuss Palma or the propriety of denying leave to amend, but because the question is purely one of law neither omission undermines the result.
Opinion — Nares
Opinion
NARES, J.Petitioner Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., doing business as The Hahn Company, and Horton Plaza Associates (collectively Hahn) seek a peremp *1450 tory writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its order denying Hahn’s demurrer to Robert A. Martin (Martin) and Clifton J. Rogers’s (Rogers) cause of action for strict liability. Because we conclude a strict liability theory is inapplicable to the facts of this case, we grant the petition.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to the first amended complaint, 1 Martin and Rogers sustained personal injuries while they were seated at a table outside the Farmer’s Market in the courtyard at Horton Plaza. The injuries occurred when a palm tree or a giant bird of paradise tree fell on them as they ate lunch purchased from the Farmer’s Market. Hahn owns Farmer’s Market and Horton Plaza and provided the tables and chairs for use of the public.
Martin and Rogers filed separate actions for negligence that were consolidated for trial. By the first amended complaint they added a cause of action for strict liability to which Hahn demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and these proceedings ensued. The trial was stayed by this court.
Discussion
The sole issue before this court is whether Hahn may be held strictly liable in tort for injuries suffered by Martin and Rogers. Traditionally, tiie doctrine of strict liability has been applied to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62-63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049].) With respect to premises liability, however, the proper test to be applied is whether the landowner in the management of his property “has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others . . . .” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) Insofar as an invitee is concerned, the applicable general principle is that the possessor of the property is not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, but must use reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and warn of any latent or concealed peril. (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 208 [331 P.2d 645]; Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 484, 486 [222 P.2d 19].)
Under the facts alleged, Martin and Rogers were invitees having come onto the premises by express or implied invitation for Hahn’s advantage. (See Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, *1451 27 [77 Cal.Rptr. 914].) Accordingly, liability would normally be based upon the principle expressed in Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, supra.
Martin and Rogers, relying on Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454 [213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116], contend the general fault-based rule should not apply. In Becker, a tenant was injured when he fell against an untempered glass shower door in his apartment. The Becker court relied upon the special relationship between the landlord and tenant and upon the implied warranty of habitability when it modified traditional premises liability standards and extended the doctrine of strict liability to the residential landlord-tenant relationship. The court stated “In these circumstances, strict liability in tort for latent defects existing at the time of renting must be applied to insure that the landlord who markets the product bears the cost of injuries resulting from the defects ‘rather than the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.’ ” (Becker v. IRM Corp., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 465.)
Hahn citing Muro v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1089 [229 Cal.Rptr. 383] and Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340 [264 Cal.Rptr. 673] argues that courts have refused to extend the Becker rationale beyond the residential landlord-tenant relationship. In Muro the court refused to extend strict liability to apply to a commercial landlord when an employee of a commercial tenant was injured on the premises, while in Pierson, this court refused to extend the Becker rationale to apply to the owner of a hospital premises for injuries resulting from latent defects in a hospital room. Martin and Rogers distinguish Muro, the court there having refused to extend strict liability because the commercial tenant is in control of the premises and is in an equal position to the commercial landlord to inspect and repair defects on those premises. 2 Martin and Rogers likewise distinguish Pierson because there the court simply found the hospital room to be part of a “service package” being provided and not subject to the strict liability umbrella. Martin and Rogers contend the Becker rationale rather than that of Muro and Pierson should apply here since they, like residential tenants, are powerless to protect themselves against latent defects existing on Hahn’s property and Hahn, like the residential landlord, is in a better position to inspect for such defects on his premises and to bear the costs for injuries caused by those defects.
We agree with Martin and Rogers that Muro and Pierson are distinguishable. However, we disagree with Martin and Rogers’s contention that a *1452 commercial invitee should be extended the same protection as a residential tenant. There is no basis to extend the Becker rationale to commercial premises liability. The facts that were so crucial to the Becker analysis are not present here. In Becker, the extension of strict liability to owners of residential housing was founded upon the theory of an implied warranty of habitability and the need to provide safe, urban housing to the public. (Becker v. IRM Corp., supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 462-465.) Hahn is not in the business of leasing residential property to the general public. Nor is it a producer or distributor of goods, placing its product in the stream of commerce. Instead, it is a commercial landlord holding its premises open to the public. In essence, Martin and Rogers urge the application of strict liability in tort for all invitees to the common areas of every commercial establishment, be it a supermarket, a restaurant, a theater or a department store, and the abolishment of the traditional requirement of some measure of fault for the imposition of liability. Becker does not require or portend such a comprehensive change in the law.
An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation. A peremptory writ is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 [169 Cal.Rptr. 827]; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [96 Cal.Rptr. 165].)
Disposition
Let a peremptory writ issue directing the court to vacate its order overruling Hahn’s demurrer to the strict liability cause of action and to issue a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The stay issued on September 4, 1991, is vacated upon issuance of the remittitur.
Kremer, P. J., and Froehlich, J., concurred.
In testing the sufficiency of the first amended complaint we accept as true all material allegations therein. (J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803 [157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60].)
We reject Martin and Rogers’s argument that the Muro court recognized that had the plaintiff in that case been injured in a common area controlled by the landlord, a cause of action for strict liability would have been “more likely to follow.” Rather the dicta referred to dealt with whether a residential landlord could be held strictly liable for injury caused by a latent defect in the common area of an apartment house. (See Muro v. Superior Court, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1093, fn. 1.)
Cites, in this corpus
- Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. D008093 · 1989-12-01
- Muro v. Superior Court B019073 · 1986-08-26
- Becker v. IRM Corp. S.F. 24618 · 1985-04-29
- United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court Civ. 24286 · 1980-12-16
- J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory S.F. 23983 · 1979-08-13
- Goodenough v. Superior Court Civ. 11068 · 1971-07-12
- Rowland v. Christian S. F. 22583 · 1968-08-08
- Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. L. A. 26976 · 1963-01-24
- Smith v. Kern County Land Co. L. A. 24608 · 1958-11-14
- Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc. Civ. 14191 · 1950-09-19