People v. Hopson
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHANNON HOPSON, Defendant and Appellant
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author)
Analysis
The trial court revoked Hopson's probation and sentenced him to a total of three years and eight months in state prison, exceeding the two-year cap specified in his negotiated guilty plea. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the plea bargain's sentencing limitations applied only to the initial sentencing and did not restrict the court's discretion upon probation revocation.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Revocation of probation and imposition of a sentence exceeding the plea bargain's two-year cap“It was within the discretion of the trial court to look at the situation anew, to continue or revoke probation, to commit [defendant] to the Youth Authority, a local or state institution. There was no abuse of discretion.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Turner (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 753 — A plea bargain contemplates only the initial sentencing proceeding; upon probation violation, the court has discretion to impose a new sentence not limited by the original bargain.
- relied: People v. Alkire (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 119 — The court explicitly rejected this prior holding, noting it was a divided panel opinion contrary to the weight of authority.
- relied: People v. Bookasta (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 296 — A consummated plea bargain is not a perpetual license to violate probation; it does not insulate a defendant from consequences of future misconduct.
- relied: People v. Jones (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 253 — A defendant gets the benefit of his bargain only once; like time, a plea bargain once spent is gone forever.
- relied: People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482 — Cited as part of the weight of authority rejecting the holding in People v. Alkire.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteAfter Hopson violated probation granted under negotiated pleas capping custody at a concurrent two-year middle term, the trial court revoked probation and sentenced him to the upper term of three years plus a consecutive eight months. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the plea bargain governed only the initial sentencing, expressly rejecting its own prior decision in People v. Alkire and following People v. Turner and the weight of later authority.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition, after probation revocation, of an upper term plus a consecutive term exceeding the plea bargain's two-year concurrent cap“When Hopson violated the terms of probation, there was no agreement limiting the court’s discretion to impose sentence.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The court's conclusion follows Turner, Jones, Bookasta and Martin, which hold a plea bargain for probation is satisfied at the initial sentencing and does not cap a sentence imposed after revocation, and the court noted the plea form warned Hopson he faced the maximum upon violation. However, the opinion does not grapple with the bargain's own language that 'any custody imposed' in either case 'will not exceed the two-year period and will be concurrent,' which could be read to cover custody imposed at any time; the court resolved that tension by reference to the form's advisement rather than by construing the term. The result is defensible and consistent with the prevailing line of authority, but the analysis of the specific bargain language is thin. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Turner (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 753 — A plea bargain contemplates only the initial sentencing; after a probation violation the court may look at the situation anew and sentence within its discretion.
- relied: People v. Bookasta (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 296 — A consummated plea bargain is not a perpetual license to violate probation and does not insulate a defendant from the consequences of future misconduct.
- relied: People v. Jones (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 253 — A defendant gets the benefit of his plea bargain only once; once probation is granted under the bargain, the bargain is spent.
- relied: People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482 — Rejects Alkire; a sentencing cap in a plea bargain resulting in probation does not limit the sentence imposed after revocation.
- missed: People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 — Binding Supreme Court authority that a sentence significantly exceeding the negotiated terms violates the plea bargain and that such terms are enforced according to the parties' reasonable understanding; the court did not address whether the 'any custody imposed' language created an enforceable expectation under Walker.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified the controlling line of authority (Turner, Jones, Bookasta, Martin), candidly overruled its own contrary decision in Alkire, and reasonably relied on the plea form's warning that the maximum term could follow a violation. It did not, however, analyze the bargain's broad phrase 'any custody imposed ... will not exceed the two-year period' or the Supreme Court's plea-bargain enforcement framework in Walker, leaving a gap in an otherwise defensible analysis.
Opinion — Benke
Opinion
BENKE, Acting P. J.Shannon Hopson appeals a judgment on his two convictions of taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851).
In CR94974 in March 1988 Hopson was found in a stolen Datsun. In CR97210 on July 17, 1988, he was driving a stolen Toyota with a switched vehicle identification number. Hopson entered negotiated guilty pleas in both cases conditioned on being “sentenced to no more than the middle term of two years in state prison, the [Penal Code section] 12022 [charge] will be stricken, and any custody imposed in this case and any custody imposed in CR94974 will not exceed the two-year period and will be concurrent.” The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Hopson on three years’ probation. On July 11, 1991, the court revoked probation. It sentenced Hopson to serve the upper term of three years in CR94974 with a consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) in CR97210. Hopson contends the sentence violated the plea bargain.
We find People v. Turner (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 753 [118 Cal.Rptr. 924] controlling. In Turner, a condition of the plea bargain was local time. Upon violation of probation, the court sentenced the defendant to prison. The argument made here was rejected:
“[A]fter the violation occurred, there was no plea bargain involved because the bargain contemplated the initial sentencing proceeding only. It was *3 within the discretion of the trial court to look at the situation anew, to continue or revoke probation, to commit [defendant] to the Youth Authority, a local or state institution. There was no abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 757.)
We recognize our divided panel opinion in People v. Alkire (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 119 [175 Cal.Rptr. 819] was to the contrary. Alkire, however, has not enjoyed universal approval. Indeed, it is rejected by the clear weight of authority. (See People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482, 487-489 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 548]; People v. Bookasta (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 296, 299-300 [186 Cal.Rptr. 193]; People v. Jones (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 253, 262 [180 Cal.Rptr. 228].)
Given the divided nature of the panel in Alkire, we have carefully examined its holding, and the cases which have disagreed with it. We find those cases persuasive. Therefore we choose at this time to reject our prior holding in Alkire. We adopt instead the admonition noted in People v. Bookasta, supra, at pages 299-300:
“A consummated plea bargain is not a perpetual license to a defendant to violate his probation. The plea bargain does not insulate a defendant from the consequences of his future misconduct. ‘A defendant gets the benefit of his bargain only once. Like time, a plea bargain once spent is gone forever.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bookasta, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pp. 299-300, quoting People v. Jones, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 262.)
With our revised position on appellant’s issue duly noted, we examine the facts of the case before us.
Here, the trial court placed Hopson on probation at the initial sentencing hearing. It complied with the terms of the plea bargain. When Hopson violated the terms of probation, there was no agreement limiting the court’s discretion to impose sentence. The plea bargain form advised Hopson he would face the maximum term if he violated probation. Hopson thus recognized the scope of the two-year limitation prior to entering into the agreement.
The judgment is affirmed.
Huffman, 1, and Froehlich, J„ concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 2, 1993, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 28, 1993.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Martin Docket Nos. A054371, A054372, A054373 · 1992-02-07
- People v. Bookasta Crim. 41772 · 1982-10-05
- People v. Jones Crim. 11379 · 1982-01-27
- People v. Alkire Crim. 11887 · 1981-07-28
- People v. Turner Crim. 6808 · 1975-01-21
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