People v. Rivera
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FERMIN RIVERA, Defendant and Appellant
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County
- Trial judge
- Laura P. Hammes
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied Rivera's motion for judgment of acquittal and the jury convicted him of auto burglary. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that substantial circumstantial evidence supported the inference that the vehicle was locked.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal (Pen. Code, § 1118.1) and sufficiency of evidence for auto burglary conviction“It is not rational to conclude the car here was not locked. It was uncontested that when police arrived during the burglary, the car window had been broken and it was not broken six or eight hours earlier.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment. It properly distinguished the present case from People v. Burns by noting that the evidence here (broken window, disarray, recent time frame) supported a reasonable inference that the car was locked, whereas Burns lacked such evidence. The court correctly held that a jury may infer the car was locked from the circumstances, and that this inference was supported by substantial evidence. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Burns (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 566 — A broken window alone is not sufficient evidence that a car's doors were locked for purposes of an auto burglary conviction.
- relied: People v. Woods (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 226 — Insufficient evidence to support auto burglary conviction where car doors were locked but window was deliberately left open.
- relied: People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489 — Definition of substantial evidence as evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value.
- relied: Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 — Standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence; court must presume existence of every fact trier could reasonably deduce.
- relied: People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146 — Definition of circumstantial evidence and the process of inference required to establish guilt.
- relied: People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297 — Reversal for insufficient evidence is only warranted if there is no reasonable hypothesis supporting the verdict.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and distinguishes the precedent (Burns) based on the specific facts present (recent break-in, disarray, inference of locked doors). It properly relies on established California and federal authorities regarding circumstantial evidence and sufficiency of proof.
The trial court denied Fermín Rivera's Penal Code section 1118.1 motion for acquittal, and a jury convicted him of auto burglary under section 459, after which he was sentenced to three years in prison including a one-year prior-prison-term enhancement. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a car window shown to have been intact hours earlier and found broken while the defendant was inside the car in the early morning is substantial circumstantial evidence that the car doors were locked, and expressly disagreeing with People v. Burns on that point.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of defendant's Penal Code section 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal on the auto burglary count“Rivera contends the trial court erred in denying the motion for acquittal and there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court A section 1118.1 motion asks whether the evidence then before the court would be insufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal, so the appellate court properly folded the issue into the substantial evidence inquiry. Because the only disputed element was whether the doors were locked, and the evidence (window intact in the afternoon, broken out at 1-2 a.m. with defendant inside and fleeing with a screwdriver) permits a rational inference of locking, denial of the motion was supportable. The opinion does not separately analyze the state of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case, but nothing suggests the relevant evidence came later. |
Judgment of conviction for auto burglary (section 459) challenged as unsupported by substantial evidence that the vehicle's doors were locked“It is not rational to conclude someone would break a car window in the early morning hours in order to enter a car that is unlocked. Substantial circumstantial evidence supports the finding necessary to a conviction that the car was locked when the entry occurred.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The court correctly stated the Jackson v. Virginia/Samuel/Bolin standard and was entitled to decline to follow Burns, a sister Court of Appeal decision that is not binding on it. The inference that a person who breaks a window to enter a car does so because the doors are locked is a reasonable one a jury may draw, which is all the substantial evidence standard requires. The court's reasoning is somewhat imprecise in quoting CALJIC No. 2.01, a jury instruction directed to the trier of fact, as though it framed the appellate standard, and in asking whether the contrary conclusion was 'rational' rather than whether a rational juror could draw the inference of locking; but the result does not depend on that imprecision. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Burns (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 566 — Held a broken windwing and glass on the seat were not proof the car doors were locked; the Rivera court engaged with this holding directly and expressly disagreed with it, declining to follow it.
- relied: People v. Woods (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 226 — In a sting operation where the car doors were locked but a window was deliberately left open, evidence was insufficient to support auto burglary; distinguished in footnote as involving an open, not broken, window.
- relied: People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489 — Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value.
- relied: Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 — Reviewing court views the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt; that the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal.
- relied: People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297 — Reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction.
- relied: People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146 — Defines direct versus circumstantial evidence and explains that circumstantial evidence proves the principal fact through a process of inference from evidentiary facts.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court applied the correct substantial evidence standard with the right authorities and reached a defensible result by recognizing that a freshly broken window during a nighttime entry supports a reasonable inference that the doors were locked, and it was free to disagree with Burns as a non-binding sister-court decision. It left gaps by invoking CALJIC No. 2.01, a jury instruction, as if it governed appellate review, by not citing the authority permitting it to depart from Burns, and by not addressing alternative explanations for the broken window beyond a conclusory statement that the contrary view is irrational.
Opinion — Huffman
*1243 Opinion
HUFFMAN, J.After the court denied a motion for acquittal (Pen. Code, § 1118.1), 1 a jury convicted Fermín Rivera of auto burglary. (§ 459.) He admitted serving a prior prison term. (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668.) The court sentenced him to prison for three years: the two-year middle term for burglary, enhanced one year for the prior prison term. Rivera contends the trial court erred in denying the motion for acquittal and there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction.
Facts
Between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on January 9, 2002, San Diego Police Officer Richard Widner responded to a reported vehicle break-in. He saw Rivera and a companion sitting in a parked Ford Escort. Rivera came out of the Ford and threw some papers and a screwdriver to the ground. The window of the car was broken out and its interior was in disarray. Rivera turned and ran. Officers apprehended him in an alley near the parked Ford.
The owner of the Ford was not available to testify. His friend testified she had been with him during the afternoon before the break-in and the car’s window was not broken.
Discussion
“In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.” (§ 1118.1.)
Section 459 provides in pertinent part that “[ejvery person who enters any . . . vehicle . . . when the doors are locked . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.” Relying on People v. Woods (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 226, 229 [169 Cal.Rptr. 179] (Woods), 2 citing People v. Burns (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 566 [250 P.2d 619] (Burns), Rivera argues the conviction must be reversed because there was no evidence here that the Ford Escort was locked. He argues because the car *1244 owner did not testify the car was locked when broken into, substantial evidence does not support the verdict.
Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505 [174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485].) The court must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. If the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560].)
In Burns, police found the defendant inside a parked car. The windwing was broken and broken glass was on the seat and running board. The reviewing court reversed an auto burglary conviction in part because there was insufficient evidence the car was locked. The court said: “The fact that the windwing was broken and glass was on the front seat was not proof that the doors of the Buick were locked, and an inference could not be drawn from that fact that the doors were locked. There was no evidence as to the condition of the windwing at the time the Buick was left at the parking place—the broken condition could have been caused in various ways not related to the alleged burglary. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the doors of the Buick were locked.” (Burns, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 570.)
The People argue that the reviewing court in Burns was wrong when it found a broken window is not evidence that the car doors were locked. We agree with the People’s position. “Direct evidence is that which is applied to the fact to be proved, immediately and directly, and without the aid of any intervening fact or process: as where, on a trial for murder, a witness positively testifies he saw the accused inflict the mortal wound, or administer the poison. Circumstantial evidence is that which is applied to the principal fact, indirectly, or through the medium of other facts, from which the principal fact is inferred. The characteristics of circumstantial evidence, as distinguished from that which is direct, are, first, the existence and presentation of one or more evidentiary facts; and, second, a process of inference, by which these facts are so connected with the fact sought, as to tend to produce a persuasion of its truth.” (People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146, 152-153 [293 P.2d 495].)
As noted above, we cannot reverse on the ground of insufficient evidence unless there is no reasonable hypothesis supporting the verdict. *1245 (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374].)
CALJIC No. 2.01 instructs the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence. It provides: “However, a finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion, [fj Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other worlds, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [1j] Also, if the circumstantial evidence [as to any particular count] permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his innocence, you must adopt that interpretation that points to the defendant’s innocence, and reject that interpretation that points to his guilt, [f] If, on the other hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.”
It is not rational to conclude the car here was not locked. It was uncontested that when police arrived during the burglary, the car window had been broken and it was not broken six or eight hours earlier. It is not rational to conclude someone would break a car window in the early morning hours in order to enter a car that is unlocked. Substantial circumstantial evidence supports the finding necessary to a conviction that the car was locked when the entry occurred.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Kremer, P. J., and O’Rourke, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 10, 2003. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In Woods, as part of a sting operation, the car doors were locked but a window was deliberately left open. The court found insufficient evidence to support a conviction of auto burglary. (Woods, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 230.)
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Bolin S019786 · 1998-08-12
- People v. Samuel Crim. 21684 · 1981-06-15
- People v. Woods Crim. 20689 · 1980-11-18
- People v. Goldstein Crim. 5476 · 1956-02-09
- People v. Burns Crim. 4849 · 1952-12-04
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