gno.law

People v. Mortera

California Court of Appeal · D017125 · 1993-03-29 · Published · 14 Cal. App. 4th 861 · 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 · 93 Daily Journal DAR 4010 · 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2378 · 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 339

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ADAM TIMOTHY MORTERA, Defendant and Appellant

Area
criminal
Panel
Froehlich (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:31Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to 15 years to life with 505 days of presentence credit. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the plea withdrawal but modified the judgment to increase the presentence credit to 631 days.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea based on Civil Code section 35 (minor's right to disaffirm contract)
“In this regard, guilty pleas are not contracts. Criminal proceedings determine culpability and responsibility for criminal acts, not the contractual rights between two parties.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
agree with court
Calculation of presentence credits (505 days awarded)
“We further conclude Mortera is entitled to additional presentence credits and accordingly affirm the judgment as modified.”
de novoerroragree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 — Trial court must evaluate whether defendant entered guilty plea under mistake, inadvertence, or overreaching of free judgment.
  • relied: People v. Hightower (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 923 — Allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
  • relied: Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606 — Civil Code section 35 obligations are to ensure unfair advantage is not taken of minors in civil contracts.
  • relied: In re Gary O. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 38 — Nothing in juvenile court law entitles a minor to withdraw an admission based solely on age.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly distinguishes civil contract law from criminal plea procedures, citing established case law that guilty pleas are not contracts subject to minor disaffirmance. It also correctly identifies the error in the presentence credit calculation and modifies the judgment accordingly.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

inconsistent with cited authority

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:32Z · confidence medium

The trial court accepted Adam Mortera's guilty plea to second degree murder, denied his motion to withdraw the plea (made on the theory that as a minor he could disaffirm the plea bargain under Civil Code section 35), sentenced him to 15 years to life with CYA housing, and awarded 505 days of presentence credit. The Court of Appeal held Civil Code section 35 does not apply to guilty pleas and affirmed the denial of the withdrawal motion, but in an unpublished portion found the credit calculation wrong and modified the judgment to reflect 631 days of presentence credit.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea premised on a minor's right to disaffirm contracts under Civil Code section 35
“This section applies only to civil contracts entered into by a minor. It has never applied to pleas of guilty in a criminal action, nor should it.”
mixedcorrectagree with court
The court frames plea withdrawal as a matter of trial-court discretion under section 1018 (citing Hightower and People v. Superior Court), but the dispositive question—whether Civil Code section 35 reaches guilty pleas—is a pure question of statutory interpretation it resolved independently. Its conclusion is well supported: section 1018 supplies the governing standard for withdrawal (mistake, inadvertence, or overreaching of free judgment), sections 36 and 37 show the Legislature's scheme of exceptions is directed at civil obligations, and juvenile law itself does not let a minor withdraw an admission solely by reason of age (In re Gary O.). Mortera was prosecuted as an adult, conceded no authority supported him, and made no claim of coercion. The one weakness is the broad statement that 'guilty pleas are not contracts,' which sits uneasily with Supreme Court decisions treating plea bargains as contracts for some purposes, but that overstatement does not affect the result because contract principles are applied to plea bargains only by analogy and never to import a minor's unilateral disaffirmance right into criminal procedure.
Calculation of presentence custody and conduct credits (505 days awarded)
“The judgment is modified to reflect a total of 631 days of presentence credit.”
unclearerror (other)unsure
The appellate court found the trial court's award of 337 actual days plus 168 conduct days (505 total) was too low and modified the judgment to 631 days, but the entire analysis is in an unpublished Part II that is omitted from the opinion as provided. Without the court's reasoning or the custody dates, it is impossible to verify the recalculation or identify the specific miscalculation, so no independent view can be formed.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 — Under Penal Code section 1018 a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea must show mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, or any other factor overreaching his free and clear judgment.
  • relied: People v. Hightower (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 923 — Whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea rests in the sound discretion of the trial court after consideration of the factors necessary to bring about a just result.
  • relied: Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606 — The purpose of a minor's power to disaffirm contracts is to protect minors from unfair advantage being taken of them in contractual dealings.
  • relied: In re Gary O. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 38 — Nothing in juvenile court law entitles a minor to withdraw an admission based solely on his age; withdrawal of admissions is governed by ordinary juvenile court standards.
  • missed: People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855 — A plea bargain is in the nature of a contract and is analyzed under contract principles for purposes of determining whether its terms were breached and what remedy applies; the court's flat statement that 'guilty pleas are not contracts' should have been reconciled with this authority.
  • missed: People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013 — A plea agreement is a form of contract interpreted according to general contract principles, though the analogy is limited by constitutional and statutory requirements governing criminal pleas; the court did not address this when rejecting the contract analogy outright.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly held that a minor's statutory right to disaffirm civil contracts has no application to a guilty plea in an adult criminal prosecution, grounding the result in section 1018, the structure of Civil Code sections 35-37, and juvenile court practice. It reached a defensible result but overstated matters by declaring guilty pleas are not contracts without addressing Supreme Court decisions (Mancheno, Walker) that treat plea bargains as contracts by analogy, and the credit analysis is unpublished and unavailable.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion — Froehlich

*863 Opinion

FROEHLICH, J.

An information charged Adam Timothy Mortera with murder (Pen. Code, 2 § 187) with allegations he was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and caused the death of the victim as a result of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12022.55). Mortera pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.

Mortera later withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to second degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189). In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the balance of the information. After the court denied Mortera’s request to withdraw his guilty plea, it sentenced him to prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life; it ordered him housed at the California Youth Authority because he was under the age of 21 when he committed the crime; and it awarded him 337 days of actual custody credit plus 168 days of conduct credit for a total of 505 days.

On appeal, Mortera contends the court erred in (1) refusing to permit him, as a minor, to disaffirm his plea bargain contract under Civil Code section 35, and (2) calculating the amount of his presentence credits. We conclude the court properly denied Mortera’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We further conclude Mortera is entitled to additional presentence credits and accordingly affirm the judgment as modified.

Facts

About 12:40 a.m. on January 21, 1991, Mortera, Ramon Borboa and Raymond Carrasco were seen driving in a light-colored Mustang in Logan Heights. Borboa was driving, Mortera was in the front passenger seat and Carrasco was in the backseat behind the driver. Either Carlos Mendez or Cesar Ramos was the right rear passenger. The car circled the intersection of Martin and 30th streets several times. The fourth time it circled, Mortera fired a gun from the front passenger seat, killing Jose Alberto Vasquez.

*864 Discussion

I

Mortera contends the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Civil Code section 35, which allows a minor 3 to disaffirm contractual obligations. Although Mortera admits no authority exists for this proposition, he argues by analogy a plea bargain is a contractual relationship subject to many basic civil contractual principles, including disaffirmance.

Civil Code section 35 provides: “In all cases other than those specified in Sections 36 and 37, the contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor himself, either before his majority or within a reasonable time afterwards; or, in case of his death within that period, by his heirs or personal representatives.” This section applies only to civil contracts entered into by a minor. It has never applied to pleas of guilty in a criminal action, nor should it. Criminal proceedings and civil proceedings entertain different objectives. In a criminal proceeding involving a guilty plea, the court must ascertain if the defendant, either juvenile or adult, has been apprised of his or her constitutional rights and has knowingly and intelligently waived them. In considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court must evaluate whether the defendant has presented sufficient information to show he entered the guilty plea under a mistake, an inadvertence or any other factor overreaching his free and clear judgment. (§ 1018; People v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 797 [114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636].) Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court after due consideration of the factors necessary to bring about a just result. (People v. Hightower (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 923, 928 [274 Cal.Rptr. 201].) In this regard, guilty pleas are not contracts. Criminal proceedings determine culpability and responsibility for criminal acts, not the contractual rights between two parties.

In contrast, in a proceeding under Civil Code section 35, the court’s obligation is to ensure that unfair advantage is not taken of minors who have assumed contractual obligations. (See Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606, 609 [43 Cal.Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1].) Nevertheless, the ability of a minor to disaffirm contracts is not without its limitations. A minor may not disaffirm contractual obligations entered into for necessities for his support or that of his family when not under the care of a parent or guardian able to provide for them, or contracts which have been approved by a court for *865 artistic, creative or professional sports services. (Civ. Code, § 36.) Similarly, a minor cannot disaffirm an otherwise valid obligation entered into under the express authority of a statute. (Civ. Code, § 37.) Although a plea of guilty is not expressly excluded under this statutory scheme, we cannot fathom the Legislature intended to include it. Nor can we logically analogize an admission of guilt to the purchase of a stereo.

Even in the context of a juvenile court proceeding, Civil Code section 35 does not apply to admissions. Juvenile courts routinely entertain motions to withdraw admissions. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 775 [juvenile court’s order regarding person subject to its jurisdiction may be modified or set aside at any time].) Nothing in the law applicable to the juvenile courts entitles a minor to withdraw an admission based solely on his age. (See In re Gary O. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 38, 41-42 [148 Cal.Rptr. 276].)

Here, Mortera was charged as an adult and entered his plea as an adult. He freely and voluntarily admitted committing murder. Mortera does not claim, nor does the record support, he was coerced or unduly influenced. He may not simply void the plea because he was a minor. Thus, the court properly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

II *

Disposition

The judgment is modified to reflect a total of 631 days of presentence credit. The superior court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Kremer, P. J., and Work, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 23, 1993.

2

A11 statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

3

At the time Mortera pleaded guilty, he was 17 years old. He sought to withdraw his plea shortly after attaining the age of majority and before sentencing.

*

See footnote 1, ante, page 861.

Cites, in this corpus

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