Snow v. Department of Motor Vehicles
JULIE ANN SNOW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Respondent
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied Snow's petition for a writ of mandate seeking to have the DMV delete her license suspension and excessive blood alcohol record, ruling that the dismissal of her criminal charges under Penal Code section 1385 did not constitute an acquittal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice is not tantamount to an acquittal for purposes of Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (e).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for writ of mandate to delete DMV suspension and excessive blood alcohol record“The trial court did not err in denying the petition for a writ of mandate.” | unclear | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599 — The term 'acquittal' refers to a disposition following an adjudication on the merits, and a dismissal of criminal charges does not make it equivalent to an acquittal for the purpose of Vehicle Code section 13353.2.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
The superior court denied Julie Ann Snow's petition for a writ of mandate seeking to compel the Department of Motor Vehicles to delete references to her excessive blood alcohol and license suspension from its files after her criminal charges were dismissed under Penal Code section 1385 following a hung jury. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a section 1385 dismissal is not an 'acquittal' within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (e), while rejecting the Department's contention that Snow's failure to seek administrative review barred her petition.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for writ of mandate on the ground that dismissal of criminal charges under Penal Code section 1385 after a hung jury is not an 'acquittal' triggering reinstatement under Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (e)“Inherent in an acquittal is a factual determination in favor of the defendant. A court may dismiss a charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, regardless of the facts, if it concludes dismissal is in the interest of justice.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court did not articulate a standard, but the issue is pure statutory construction, effectively reviewed de novo. The holding follows directly from Agresti, which construed 'acquittal' in section 13353.2 as a disposition on the merits; a section 1385 interest-of-justice dismissal, even after a hung jury, involves no factual determination in the defendant's favor. The distinction the court drew (post-trial versus pre-trial dismissal) is immaterial because a hung jury is itself no adjudication. The court did speculate about the criminal court's motives, which was unnecessary, and did not address whether subdivision (e), which speaks only of reinstating and returning a license, would authorize deletion of records at all, but these do not undermine the result. |
Rejection of the Department's argument that Snow's failure to seek administrative review of the suspension barred her mandate petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies“The administrative ruling is not an adequate remedy to bar a petition for writ of mandate.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court reasoned that because an administrative hearing must be requested within 10 days of arrest and an acquittal cannot occur in that window, subdivision (e)'s acquittal remedy would be meaningless if conditioned on administrative exhaustion. The conclusion is sensible because subdivision (e) creates a distinct, self-executing duty triggered by acquittal rather than by the outcome of the administrative hearing. The court's invocation of 'judicial notice' is loose and no authority is cited, but the statutory logic supports the result, and the point was ultimately not dispositive since the petition failed on the merits. |
Authorities
- relied: Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599 — 'Acquittal' in Vehicle Code section 13353.2 refers to a disposition of a criminal case following an adjudication on the merits; a dismissal of the criminal charge, even one barring further prosecution, is not equivalent to an acquittal, and the administrative suspension is a civil matter independent of criminal guilt or innocence.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly extends Agresti's construction of 'acquittal' to a section 1385 dismissal entered after a hung jury, and its reasoning that an interest-of-justice dismissal involves no factual determination for the defendant is sound. It is thin in places: it disposes of the exhaustion argument by informal 'judicial notice' without authority, speculates about the criminal court's reasons for dismissing, and does not address whether subdivision (e) authorizes the record-deletion relief Snow actually sought.
Opinion — Benke
*232 Opinion
BENKE, J.Julie Ann Snow appeals the judgment denying her petition for a writ of mandate ordering the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) to delete from its files references to her driving with excessive blood alcohol and suspension of her driver’s license.
On July 21, 1991, California Highway Patrol Officer Eric Flynn arrested Snow for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with excessive alcohol in her blood. (Veh. Code., 1 § 23152, subds. (a) & (b).) After a breath test reflected a .09 blood-alcohol level, Flynn gave Snow notice her privilege to drive could be suspended for four months effective forty-five days after her arrest. (§§ 13353.2 & 13353.3.) Snow does not claim she sought administrative review of the suspension. It went into effect on September 4, 1991. (§ 13559, subd. (a).) The People charged Snow with driving under the influence of alcohol and with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more. A jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the court dismissed the charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.
Relying on section 13353.2, subdivision (e), Snow filed a petition for writ of mandate to order the Department to delete from its files reference to her excessive blood alcohol and suspension of her driver’s license. Section 13353.2, subdivision (e) provides in pertinent part: “If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a), the department shall immediately reinstate the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle if the department had suspended it administratively pursuant to subdivision (a), and the department shall return or reissue for the remaining term any driver’s license which has been taken from the person pursuant to Section 23158.5 or otherwise.”
Snow argues dismissal of the criminal charges was tantamount to an acquittal and the trial court erred in denying her petition. We disagree.
Before discussing the merits, we note the Department points out Snow did not appeal the suspension administratively and claims she is barred from seeking mandate by failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. However, Snow was given notice an administrative appeal had to be filed within 10 days of the notice of suspension given at the time of arrest if an administrative appeal was required to seek court relief. We take judicial notice an acquittal cannot occur within 10 days of arrest. Section 13353.2, subdivision (e) is meaningless to defendants who did not appeal the administrative ruling but are acquitted at a trial. The administrative ruling is not an adequate remedy to bar a petition for writ of mandate.
*233 In Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th, 599, 607 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353], the review court said: “The term ‘acquittal’ has consistently been held to refer to a disposition of a criminal case following an adjudication on the merits. This interpretation is consistent with the express purpose of section 13353.2 to suspend quickly the driving privilege of persons found to have been driving under the influence and to provide expeditious review. The fact that dismissal bars further prosecution of the related but separate criminal charge does not make it equivalent to an acquittal for the purpose of section 13353.2.”
While the case here differs from Agresti in that the criminal court here dismissed the charge after the jury had hung rather than before trial, the difference is not material. In Agresti, the court noted, “Before it may suspend a person’s driving privilege, the Department must make a specific factual determination the person was driving . . . while intoxicated [citation].” (5 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) The court noted this is a civil matter independent of a person’s guilt or innocence and the Department is required to terminate its administrative action only if the person is acquitted. Inherent in an acquittal is a factual determination in favor of the defendant. A court may dismiss a charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, regardless of the facts, if it concludes dismissal is in the interest of justice. The court which dismissed the criminal charge here may well have felt since Snow was incarcerated in Las Colinas after arrest and already had her license suspended for almost four months, dismissal served the interest of justice regardless of guilt. The trial court did not err in denying the petition for a writ of mandate.
The judgment is affirmed.
Todd, Acting P. J., and Huffman, J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise specified.
Cites, in this corpus
- Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles F016451 · 1992-04-23
Cited by
- People v. Alvarez CA5 F064349 · 2016-01-13
- Gikas v. Zolin S030724 · 1993-12-23
- Mosier v. Department of Motor Vehicles G012493 · 1993-08-27