Teal v. Superior Court
CHARLES TERRY TEAL II, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- McINTYRE (author)
Analysis
The trial court ordered defense counsel to provide copies of subpoenaed LAPD records to the prosecution and denied the release of motel records containing the security guard's contact information. The Court of Appeal granted the writ, vacating the order to share documents with the prosecution and directing the release of the witness's name, address, and telephone number.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order requiring defense counsel to provide copies of subpoenaed LAPD records to the prosecution“The trial court’s order to reveal the subpoenaed materials to the prosecution placed Teal in this untenable position. As such, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defense counsel to provide the subpoenaed materials to the prosecution and that the error impinged upon Teal’s constitutional rights.” | abuse of discretion | error | agree with court agree with court |
Denial of request for the name, address, and telephone number of the security guard from motel records“Although the trial court correctly ruled that personnel records produced by the motel are not discoverable, Teal is entitled to disclosure of the name, address and telephone number of the security guard who witnessed the incident, assuming this information is contained in the materials provided by the motel.” | unclear | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 — Materials discoverable by the defense include information in the possession of law enforcement agencies that investigated or prepared the case against the defendant.
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305 — It is inappropriate to force a defendant to choose between pursuing discovery and revealing defense strategies/work product to the prosecution; in camera review is the proper method to protect constitutional rights.
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Broderick) (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 584 — The statutory discovery scheme does not apply to information possessed by third parties or agencies that have no connection to the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the precedent from People v. Superior Court (Barrett) to determine that the trial court's order violated the defendant's constitutional rights by forcing a choice between discovery and disclosure of strategy. It also correctly distinguishes between non-discoverable personnel records and discoverable witness contact information under the statutory scheme.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court, after in camera review of third-party subpoenaed records, allowed defense counsel to obtain LAPD records but ordered her to give copies to the prosecution, and it withheld motel records (including information about the security guard witness) as personnel records. The Court of Appeal granted Teal's writ petition, holding the disclosure-to-prosecution order was an abuse of discretion that impinged on his constitutional rights and directing release of the security guard's name, address and telephone number while otherwise leaving the personnel-records ruling intact.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order requiring defense counsel to provide the prosecution with copies of the LAPD records obtained through third-party subpoena duces tecum“As such, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defense counsel to provide the subpoenaed materials to the prosecution and that the error impinged upon Teal’s constitutional rights.” | abuse of discretion | error | agree with court Barrett, from the same court, held that in camera production of third-party subpoenaed material protects the defendant from the Hobson's choice of revealing strategy and work product or forgoing discovery; forcing disclosure to the prosecution recreates that choice. Defense counsel also undertook to comply with sections 1054.3 and 1054.7 if she used the material at trial, so the prosecution's legitimate reciprocal discovery interests were preserved. The result is also consistent with section 1054, subdivision (e), which limits discovery in criminal cases to that authorized by the chapter, other statutes, or the Constitution, though the court did not invoke that ground. |
Refusal to release any motel records, including the name, address and telephone number of the security guard who witnessed the incident, on the ground they were personnel records“Although the trial court correctly ruled that personnel records produced by the motel are not discoverable, Teal is entitled to disclosure of the name, address and telephone number of the security guard who witnessed the incident, assuming this information is contained in the materials provided by the motel.” | unclear | error | agree with court The court upheld the personnel-records portion but found error in withholding basic contact information for a percipient witness who identified the defendant. The result is defensible, since locating and interviewing an eyewitness is central to the defense and contact information is not the kind of private personnel matter that warrants protection, but the opinion cites no authority and does not articulate a standard of review or balancing test, so the reasoning is conclusory. |
Denial of Teal's section 1054 discovery motion for prosecution-witness rap sheets, impliedly treating the LAPD and Sheriff as third parties rather than investigating agencies“Because the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on Teal’s motion is not before us, we do not know why the trial court denied discovery of the rap sheets.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The court did not review this ruling; it merely inferred from Teal's representation that the trial court treated the Los Angeles agencies as third parties under Barrett, which explains why subpoenas were required. Without the transcript, the court properly declined to evaluate the ruling and its correctness cannot be assessed from this opinion. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305 — The reciprocal discovery statutes do not reach third parties unconnected to the investigation; third-party subpoenaed materials may be reviewed in camera so the defense need not reveal strategy and work product to the prosecution, avoiding a Hobson's choice between discovery and constitutional protections.
- relied: In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 — Materials discoverable from the prosecution under section 1054.1 include information in the possession of law enforcement agencies that investigated or prepared the case.
- relied: People v. Superior Court (Broderick) (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 584 — The statutory criminal discovery scheme does not apply to information held by third parties or agencies with no connection to the investigation or prosecution.
- missed: Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 — Under section 1054, subdivision (e), discovery in criminal cases is limited to that authorized by the chapter, other express statutes, or the Constitution, and prosecution discovery from the defense is confined to the categories in section 1054.3 subject to work-product protection; this would have supplied a direct statutory basis for invalidating the order compelling disclosure to the prosecution.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies Barrett to hold that compelling defense counsel to share third-party subpoenaed records with the prosecution defeats the purpose of in camera review and burdens the defendant's constitutional rights, and the disposition sensibly preserves the prosecution's section 1054.3 rights if the material is used at trial. It is thin, however: it labels the error an abuse of discretion while also treating it as a constitutional violation without reconciling the two, does not invoke section 1054, subdivision (e) or Izazaga as the statutory bar on unauthorized prosecution discovery, and resolves the security-guard contact information issue without citing any authority.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion — McIntyre
*490 Opinion
McINTYRE, J.Charles Terry Teal II issued third party subpoenas seeking material to assist in defending criminal charges filed against him. After an in camera review, the trial court allowed defense counsel to obtain some of the subpoenaed material, but ordered her to provide copies of this material to the prosecution. Teal filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking review of the portion of this order requiring divulgence of the discovered information and denying his request for certain information relating to a percipient witness to the incident. We grant the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Teal was charged with attempted murder, battery causing great bodily injury and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury after he allegedly threw a man off the third floor balcony of a motel. A motel security guard saw the incident and identified Teal.
Teal made an informal request to have the prosecution produce, among other things, criminal records (rap sheets) for prosecution witnesses under Penal Code section 1054 et al. (All statutory references are to this code.) Defense counsel moved for discovery after she was unable to obtain the material based on her informal request. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) The trial court granted the motion in part, but denied the request for the rap sheets. Teal then served a subpoena duces tecum on the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) seeking records on Teal, the victim and two other individuals. Teal also subpoenaed records from the motel seeking, among other things, the names, addresses and telephone numbers of witnesses to the incident.
The records were subpoenaed directly to the court, and the trial judge reviewed the documents out of the presence of the prosecution. The court allowed defense counsel to obtain the LAPD records, but required her to provide copies of these records to the prosecution. The trial court also refused to release the motel records on the ground they were personnel records of the witness. Teal filed this petition seeking a stay of both the record production to the prosecution and the trial. We granted the stay and issued an order to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.
DISCUSSION
Section 1054 et seq. authorizes reciprocal discovery in criminal cases and requires the prosecuting attorney to disclose the “existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to *491 the outcome of the trial.” (§ 1054.1, subd. (d).) Under the statutory scheme, the parties must informally request the desired information, but may seek a court order enforcing discovery if the opposing party does not comply with the request. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).)
The prosecution is required to disclose a matter only if it is “in the possession of the prosecuting attorney” or “the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies.” (§ 1054.1.) Thus, materials discoverable by the defense include information in the possession of law enforcement agencies that investigated or prepared the case against the defendant. (§ 1054.5, subd. (a); In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 135 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42].) However, the statutory discovery scheme does not apply to information possessed by third parties or agencies that have no connection to the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge. (People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1313 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 264]; People v. Superior Court (Broderick) (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 584, 594 [282 Cal.Rptr. 418].)
Here, Teal requested rap sheets under the reciprocal discovery provisions of sections 1054 et seq. The prosecution opposed the motion, representing that it had disclosed to Teal all information required by section 1054.1 and that all other items were beyond the scope of discovery. Because the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on Teal’s motion is not before us, we do not know why the trial court denied discovery of the rap sheets. However, Teal represents that the trial court ruled the prosecution had no obligation to provide Los Angeles criminal records for prosecution witnesses, indicating that he must subpoena these records. If so, the trial court impliedly found that the LAPD and Sheriff were third parties, rather than investigating agencies connected to the investigation or prosecution of the charges against Teal. (Barrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) Based on this implied ruling, defense counsel was required to issue subpoenas to obtain the desired information.
To protect Teal’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the subpoenaed documents were produced in camera to allow defense counsel to present relevancy arguments without having to reveal possible defense strategies and work product to the prosecution. (Ba rrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-1321.) After hearing counsel’s argument, the trial court determined that Teal was entitled to the materials from the LAPD, but that a copy of the materials must be provided to the prosecution. The trial court made this order despite defense counsel’s representations that she would comply with the provisions of sections 1054 et seq. if, at trial, she intended to introduce any evidence relating to the documents or intended to call any witnesses whose names were included in the documents. (§§ 1054.3, 1054.7.)
*492 As this court noted in Barrett, it is inappropriate to give a defendant “the Hobson’s choice of going forth with his discovery efforts and revealing possible defense strategies and work product to the prosecution, or refraining from pursuing these discovery materials to protect his constitutional rights and prevent undesirable disclosures to his adversary. [Citation.]” (Barrett, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321.) The trial court’s order to reveal the subpoenaed materials to the prosecution placed Teal in this untenable position. As such, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defense counsel to provide the subpoenaed materials to the prosecution and that the error impinged upon Teal’s constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 1320-1321.) Should defense counsel decide to introduce evidence at trial relating to these documents or call any witnesses whose name appears in the documents, she must comply with the requirements of section 1054 et. seq.
Teal also contends he is entitled to the documents produced by the motel in response to the subpoena to assist him in locating the motel security guard who witnessed the incident. Although the trial court correctly ruled that personnel records produced by the motel are not discoverable, Teal is entitled to disclosure of the name, address and telephone number of the security guard who witnessed the incident, assuming this information is contained in the materials provided by the motel.
DISPOSITION
Let a writ issue directing the superior court to vacate its ruling of December 3, 2003, insofar as it requires Teal to produce subpoenaed documents to the prosecution and denies his request for the name, address and telephone number of the security guard who witnessed the incident. Our temporary stay of the proceedings is vacated. The original reporter’s transcript of the December 3, 2003 hearing shall remain under seal. This opinion is made final immediately as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(b)(3).)
Nares, Acting P. J., and Aaron, J., concurred.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Superior Court No. D034139 · 2000-05-25
- In Re Littlefield S025426 · 1993-05-20
- People v. Superior Court (Broderick) D014253 · 1991-06-21
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