gno.law

People v. Wood

California Court of Appeal · D034595 · 2000-09-14 · Published · 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 · 83 Cal. App. 4th 862 · 2000 Daily Journal DAR 10247 · 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7743 · 2000 Cal. App. LEXIS 723

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE WAYNE WOOD, Defendant and Appellant

Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:21Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike a prior hit-and-run conviction as a serious felony under the Three Strikes law, sentencing him to six years for corporal injury upon a spouse. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a hit-and-run conviction is not a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) because the gravamen of the offense is the flight from the scene, not the initial impact that caused the injury.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to strike prior Vehicle Code section 20001 conviction as a serious felony under Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).
“We believe Braz is controlling in this case and reverse the true finding on the serious/violent felony prior conviction.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the principle from People v. Braz that the gravamen of a hit-and-run offense is the failure to stop and render aid, not the initial collision. Since the record indicated the injury resulted from the driving (the impact) rather than the flight, the prior conviction did not involve the 'personal infliction' of great bodily injury as required by Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The court's reliance on the legislative omission of Vehicle Code section 20001 from Penal Code section 1192.8 further supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend such convictions to be automatically classified as serious felonies.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425 — The gravamen of a Vehicle Code section 20001 offense is leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid, not the initial injury; enhancements for serious injury apply only if the flight causes the injury.
  • relied: People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217 — A court may examine the entire record of a prior conviction to determine if it qualifies as a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7.
  • relied: People v. Bartow (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1573 — The record of a prior conviction, including preliminary hearing transcripts, can be used to determine the nature of the offense for sentencing enhancement purposes.
  • relied: People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611 — Vehicle Code section 20001 describes a standard of conduct for drivers involved in accidents causing injury, regardless of whether they are responsible for the accident.
  • relied: People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 — The gravamen of a section 20001 offense is leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid, not the initial injury.
  • relied: People v. Comers (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139 — The act made criminal under Vehicle Code section 20001 is the 'running' (flight), not the 'hitting' (impact).
  • relied: Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227 — Legislative omission of a specific offense from a statutory list can demonstrate an intent to exclude it from the definition.
  • relied: Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442 — Legislative omission of a specific offense from a statutory list can demonstrate an intent to exclude it from the definition.
  • relied: In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952 — Legislative omission of a specific offense from a statutory list can demonstrate an intent to exclude it from the definition.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established legal principle from People v. Braz that the gravamen of a hit-and-run offense is the flight, not the impact, and logically extends this to the 'personal infliction' requirement of Penal Code section 1192.7. It further strengthens its conclusion by noting the legislature's specific exclusion of Vehicle Code section 20001 from the list of serious vehicle felonies in Penal Code section 1192.8.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The trial court denied Wood's motion to strike a prior Vehicle Code section 20001 (hit and run) conviction, found it to be a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) because the victims were seriously injured, and doubled his three-year term for spousal corporal injury under the three strikes law. The Court of Appeal reversed the true finding on the prior, holding that because the gravamen of hit and run is the flight rather than the collision, a section 20001 conviction qualifies as a serious felony only if the flight itself caused the great bodily injury, and remanded for resentencing while otherwise affirming.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion to strike the prior and finding that a Vehicle Code section 20001 hit-and-run conviction, where the victims were seriously injured in the collision, is a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) and thus a strike under section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).
“We hold, therefore that where the defendant causes serious bodily injury by the manner of the original impact with the victim while driving and thereafter fails to stop as required by Vehicle Code section 20001, such conduct does not qualify as a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).”
de novoerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
The opinion does not expressly state a standard, but it independently construed sections 1192.7(c)(8) and 1192.8 and Vehicle Code section 20001, a question of law. Its core reasoning is sound: section 1192.7(c)(8) requires a felony 'in which' the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury, and settled authority (Escobar, Corners, Braz) establishes that the criminal act under section 20001 is the leaving, not the hitting. The record of conviction showed the injuries were caused by the crash, before the criminal conduct (flight) began, so the injury was not inflicted in the commission of the felony of conviction. The secondary inference drawn from section 1192.8's omission of section 20001 is weaker, because section 1192.8 was a clarifying addition and (c)(8) by its terms reaches 'any felony,' but the result does not depend on it.
Acceptance, without the preliminary hearing transcript, of the prosecutor's representations that Wood was the driver and that his driving caused the injuries in the prior case.
“The trial court did not have the transcript of the preliminary examination for the prior conviction at the time of its ruling. We have since taken judicial notice of the transcript and the record of the conviction.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
Under Reed and Bartow the trier may look to the entire record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript on a plea. The appellate court cured the gap by taking judicial notice and found the record confirmed that the injuries resulted from the driving, not the flight, so it never had to decide whether the trial court erred in relying on unsupported representations. Given the disposition, any deficiency was immaterial.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425 — The gravamen of Vehicle Code section 20001 is the failure to stop, identify, and render aid, not the collision; the subdivision (b)(2) enhancement applies only where the flight itself causes the permanent, serious injury.
  • relied: People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217 — In determining whether a prior conviction for an unlisted offense is a serious felony, the court may examine the entire record of that conviction.
  • relied: People v. Bartow (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1573 — Where the prior conviction rests on a guilty plea, the record of conviction may include the preliminary hearing transcript.
  • relied: People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 — The gravamen of a section 20001 offense is not the initial injury of the victim but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.
  • relied: People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139 — Although called hit-and-run, the act made criminal by section 20001 is not the hitting but the running.
  • relied: People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611 — Section 20001 sets a standard of conduct for drivers involved in injury accidents regardless of fault for the accident.
  • relied: Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227 — Expression of certain items in a statute implies exclusion of others not mentioned.
  • relied: Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442 — Legislative enumeration supports an inference that omitted items were intentionally excluded.
  • relied: In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952 — Expressio unius canon of statutory construction.
  • missed: People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 — The 'any felony' language of section 1192.7, subdivision (c) (personal use of a deadly weapon/personal infliction of great bodily injury) reaches felonies not otherwise enumerated, which bears on the court's negative inference from section 1192.8's omission of Vehicle Code section 20001.
  • missed: People v. Gonzales (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1684 — Held that vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence was not a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8); the Legislature responded by enacting section 1192.8, which explains that section's purpose and limits the inference to be drawn from its list.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly answered the dispositive question by applying settled authority that the criminal conduct in hit and run is the flight, so injury caused by the preceding collision is not inflicted 'in' the felony of conviction, and it properly confined its holding to the record before it. It did not, however, address Equarte's reading of the 'any felony' language in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), or the origin of section 1192.8 in response to Gonzales, which weakens its alternative expressio unius argument, and it did not state its standard of review.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Huffman

Opinion

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

This case presents the question of whether a conviction for violation of the “hit and run” statute (Veh. Code, § 20001), during which the victim is seriously injured, automatically qualifies as a *864 serious felony. We follow the principle that the gravamen of the offense of hit and run is the flight of the defendant from the scene of the accident, Thus we determine that such conviction can only be a serious felony where the defendant’s flight is the cause of the serious injury. Such was not the case in the prior conviction before us.

Lawrence Wayne Wood entered a guilty plea to corporal injury upon a spouse (Pen. Code, 1 § 273.5, subd. (a)). He also admitted a prior conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, which had been alleged as a serious/violent felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Wood reserved the right at sentencing to argue the prior conviction did not qualify as a “strike.”

The trial court denied Wood’s motion to strike the serious/violent felony prior and sentenced Wood to a determinate term of six years, consisting of the middle term of three years for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, doubled pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(1).

Wood appeals contending the trial court erred in finding his conviction for hit and run under Vehicle Code section 20001 constituted a serious felony. We agree and remand the case for resentencing. 2

Discussion

Wood suffered a prior conviction for hit and run in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001. The prosecutor alleged in the current case that the victim of the incident was seriously injured. Accordingly, the prosecutor argued that such conviction constituted a felony in which the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). Based on such reasoning the prosecution persuaded the trial court that the prior felony conviction constituted a “strike.” Relying on the reasoning of People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 531], Wood contends the trial court erred in its application of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) to this case. We believe Braz is controlling in this case and reverse the true finding on the serious/violent felony prior conviction. We will remand for resentencing.

Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) provides: “(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of *865 Sections 20003 and 20004.” Vehicle Code sections 20003 and 20004 essentially require drivers to render reasonable aid to the injured person and to furnish identification to that person and law enforcement authorities. In lay terms, Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) describes the crime of hit and run. Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) defines a serious felony as: “(8) Any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm.”

In order to determine whether a prior felony conviction for an offense not specifically listed in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) is a serious felony a court may examine the entire record of that conviction. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 226 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184].) Such record can include the transcript of the preliminary hearing on cases such as this where the conviction arises from a guilty plea. (People v. Bartow (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1573 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].)

The trial court did not have the transcript of the preliminary examination for the prior conviction at the time of its ruling. We have since taken judicial notice of the transcript and the record of the conviction. The court accepted the representations that Wood was the driver at the time of the prior offense and that his driving was the cause of the injury. 3 Thus, the court concluded the prior conviction involved the personal infliction of great bodily injury.

The record of the prior conviction shows that the victims were injured in the car crash. Apparently Wood and his companion were fleeing from the police when their car rammed into the victims’ vehicle. Wood fled from the crash scene and was apprehended within a minute of his flight. Thus, the record of the prior conviction shows the injury to the victims was the result of the driving and not of the flight. Apparently Wood was charged with various driving offenses in connection with that event, but was only required to plead to hit and run.

In People v. Braz, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 425, 431-433 the court discussed the hit and run statute. There the court dealt with the question of whether the sentence-enhancing provisions of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2) were applicable to the conviction before it. The enhancing section increases punishment for violations of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) that result in permanent, serious bodily injury to the victim. In determining whether the enhancement applied the court was required to *866 review the law regarding the nature or gravamen of hit and run. It said: “Section 20001, subdivision (a) describes a standard of conduct for drivers who are involved in accidents causing injury to other persons, whether or not the drivers are responsible for the accident. (See People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1625-1626 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, [427], fn. 7 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027].) ‘The gravamen of a section 20001 offense ... is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.’ (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579]), italics added; see also People v. Comers (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148 [221 Cal.Rptr. 387] [‘Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated “hit-and-run,” the act made criminal thereunder is not the “hitting” but the “running.” ’] It thus follows that a court may not impose the penalties set forth in subdivision (b)(2) unless the defendant’s failure to stop and present identification and render aid causes permanent, serious injury to the accident victim. [Citations].” (People v. Braz, supra 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 432, fn. omitted.)

We distill from People v. Braz, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 425 and the cases cited therein that Vehicle Code section 20001 does not make criminal the actual accident or event which causes the physical contact with the victim. It merely addresses the duties of a driver, however otherwise innocent, once the accident and its attendant injuries have occurred. Thus the court in Braz concluded the enhancement it was considering could apply only where the flight was the cause of the permanent, serious bodily injury or death. We agree with the reasoning of Braz and the cases upon which it relies. We reject the Attorney General’s contention that Braz was wrongly decided.

Our inquiry must continue beyond the boundaries of the decision in People v. Braz supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 425. Here we must determine if the violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, under circumstances where the victim was seriously injured, constitutes a serious felony as defined in Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). We are guided in that analysis first by the reasoning in Braz which makes clear Vehicle Code section 20001 focuses on flight, not the physical contact with the victim. We are further guided by Penal Code section 1192.8 in which the Legislature sought to clarify which crimes involving vehicles constitute serious felonies. That section provides, in part: “(a) For purposes of subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7, ‘serious felony’ also means any violation of Section 191.5, paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (c) of Section 192, paragraph (a) or (c) of Section 192.5 of this code, or Section 2800.3, subdivision (b) of Section 23104, or Section 23153 of the Vehicle Code, when any of these offenses involve the personal infliction of great bodily injury on any person other *867 than an accomplice, or the personal use of a dangerous or deadly weapon, within the meaning of paragraph (8) or (23) of subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7. ” (Ibid.)

Vehicle Code section 20001 is not mentioned in Penal Code section 1192.8, nor has any case to our knowledge found such offense to be a serious felony. We think the absence of legislative recognition of hit and run as a serious felony when it has specifically included other driving offenses in section 1192.8 demonstrates an intent to exclude it from the definition of serious felony .under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). (See Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 231-232 [273 P.2d 5]; Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 461-462 [279 Cal.Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 957 [196 Cal.Rptr. 348, 671 P.2d 852].) Such exclusion makes sense in light of the judicial interpretation of the hit and run statute because it does not seek to make criminal the conduct which causes the physical contact with the victim, as contrasted with the other violations enumerated in section 1192.8.

We hold, therefore that where the defendant causes serious bodily injury by the manner of the original impact with the victim while driving and thereafter fails to stop as required by Vehicle Code section 20001, such conduct does not qualify as a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). 4 We do not address the question of whether causing such injury by leaving an injured victim could constitute a serious felony. Such circumstances are not presented by this record.

Disposition

The true finding on the alleged prior conviction under section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the principles expressed in this opinion. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

Haller, J., and McIntyre, J., concurred.

1

All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.

2

Given the limited nature of this appeal we will omit the traditional statement of facts.

3

In his statement to the probation officer in the prior offense Wood denied he was the driver of the car.

4

The prosecution is not without remedy to address drivers who, through unlawful conduct, cause injury by their driving. Section 1192.8 gives clear examples of how the prosecution may obtain a conviction of a serious felony in such instances. For reasons not discussed in this record the prosecution chose not to pursue such options. While we share the view the conduct of Wood in both the prior offense and the current offense is despicable, the prior conviction in this case simply does not qualify as a serious felony.

Cites, in this corpus

Cited by