gno.law

HOVEIDA v. Scripps Health

California Court of Appeal · D044445 · 2005-01-26 · Published · 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667 · 125 Cal. App. 4th 1466 · 2005 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 732 · 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 87

KEVIN H. HOVEIDA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCRIPPS HEALTH Et Al., Defendants and Respondents

Proceeding
appeal
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County
Trial judge
S. Charles Wickersham
Outcome
dismissed — The appeal is dismissed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the judgment and stipulation on which it is based.
Area
civil
Panel
Judith D. McConnell (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:13Z · confidence high

The trial court entered a stipulated judgment dismissing the plaintiff's remaining breach of contract claim without prejudice to allow an immediate appeal of prior summary adjudication orders. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the stipulation did not create a final judgment disposing of all causes of action.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Entry of a stipulated judgment dismissing the remaining breach of contract claim without prejudice to facilitate an appeal of summary adjudication orders.
“We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the judgment does not dispose of all causes of action at issue between the parties.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the one final judgment rule, which prohibits appeals from judgments that do not dispose of all causes of action between the parties. The court properly rejected the argument that a stipulation could create appellate jurisdiction where none exists, citing binding authority that such 'artifices' are invalid. The dismissal was necessary because the breach of contract claim, though dismissed without prejudice, remained a live cause of action that could be reinstated if the appeal succeeded, meaning the judgment was not final.

Authorities

  • relied: Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 — An appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action between the parties.
  • relied: Don Jose's Restaurant, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 115 — Parties cannot create by stipulation appellate jurisdiction where none otherwise exists; dismissing remaining causes of action without prejudice to facilitate an appeal of summary adjudication is an invalid artifice.
  • relied: Four Point Entertainment, Inc. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 79 — Stipulated 'final' judgments that do not dispose of all causes of action do not confer appellate jurisdiction.
  • relied: Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810 — The court noted this case was implicitly overruled by Morehart regarding the exception to the one final judgment rule for consent judgments facilitating appeals.
  • relied: Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422 — Supports the proposition that Morehart implicitly overruled the exception to the one final judgment rule found in Building Industry.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the well-established one final judgment rule and relies on binding California authority (Morehart, Don Jose's, Four Point) to reject the stipulation-based jurisdictional argument. It effectively distinguishes the plaintiff's reliance on Building Industry by noting its implicit overruling.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The trial court granted the defendants summary adjudication on all of Dr. Hoveida's non-contract causes of action and on the duty issue within his breach of contract claim, then entered a stipulated judgment after Hoveida dismissed the remaining breach of contract claim without prejudice with a tolling agreement so the summary adjudication rulings could be appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the one final judgment rule, holding the parties could not create appellate jurisdiction by stipulation, and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and the stipulation.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Entry of a stipulated 'final' judgment after plaintiff dismissed his remaining breach of contract claim without prejudice, with a stipulation tolling the statute of limitations and allowing revival of the claim if the appeal succeeded
“We lack jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the judgment does not dispose of all causes of action between the parties.”
de novoerror (procedure)agree with court
Appealability is a jurisdictional question of law the reviewing court decides independently; the opinion states no standard but resolves the issue on its own after requesting supplemental briefing. Morehart holds a judgment that does not dispose of all causes of action between the parties is not appealable, and Don Jose's, Jackson, and Four Point squarely condemn the device of dismissing remaining claims without prejudice with a waiver of time bars to manufacture an appealable judgment. The stipulation here expressly preserved the breach of contract claim for later litigation if the appeal succeeded, so the claim remained pending in substance and the judgment was not final. The court's conclusion follows directly from binding and persuasive authority; its added statement that Morehart 'implicitly overruled' Building Industry is broader than necessary because Building Industry addressed consent to a genuinely final judgment, but that does not affect the result.
Summary adjudication of the non-contract causes of action (intentional interference with economic relations, Business and Professions Code section 2056, common law fair procedure, interference with right to practice profession) and of the duty issue within the breach of contract claim
“The merits of Dr. Hoveida’s causes of action will be addressed later, if and when this case is timely appealed after the entry of one final judgment.”
unclearnot reachedunsure
Because the court found it lacked appellate jurisdiction, it expressly declined to address the merits of the summary adjudication orders and disclaimed any view on them. Nothing in the opinion permits evaluation of whether those rulings were correct; they may be reviewed on appeal from a true final judgment.

Authorities

  • relied: Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 — An appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action between the parties, even if the adjudicated claims are separate and independent from those remaining.
  • relied: Don Jose's Restaurant, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 115 — Parties cannot create appellate jurisdiction by stipulation; dismissing remaining causes of action without prejudice with a waiver of time bars to appeal a summary adjudication is an impermissible artifice, even if the dismissed claims would not revive should the defendant prevail on appeal.
  • relied: Jackson v. Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 240 — A judgment entered after dismissal without prejudice of remaining claims, with an agreement preserving them, is not a final appealable judgment.
  • relied: Four Point Entertainment, Inc. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 79 — Permitting stipulated 'final' judgments that leave claims pending would allow parties to confer appellate jurisdiction where none exists; the court will not do so, and Building Industry's exception does not survive Morehart.
  • relied: Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422 — Morehart implicitly overruled the Building Industry exception to the one final judgment rule.
  • misapplied: Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810 — A party who consents to entry of a judgment merely to facilitate an appeal after an adverse ruling on a critical issue does not thereby waive the right to appeal; the rule concerns consent-judgment waiver where the judgment is actually final, and is distinguishable from (rather than necessarily overruled by) the finality holding of Morehart, since here the dismissed claim remained alive by stipulation.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied Morehart and the Don Jose's line of cases to hold that a judgment leaving a breach of contract claim dismissed without prejudice and preserved by tolling and revival terms is not final, and it directly answered plaintiff's reliance on Building Industry and the with-prejudice-if-unsuccessful feature of the stipulation. The opinion's assertion that Morehart 'implicitly overruled' Building Industry is broader than needed and rests only on Court of Appeal characterizations; the case could have been distinguished on the ground that Building Industry involved consent to a genuinely final judgment, but that gap does not undermine the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — McConnell

Opinion

McCONNELL, P. J.

Plaintiff Kevin H. Hoveida, M.D., purports to appeal a stipulated judgment for defendants Scripps Health, Davis Cracroft, M.D., and Emergency and Acute Care Medical Corporation. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the judgment does not dispose of all causes of action at issue between the parties.

FACTS

The dispute in this case arose out of the defendants’ termination of two contracts for the payment of medical services Dr. Hoveida was to render. Dr. Hoveida sued the defendants for breach of contract, “intentional interference with economic relations,” violation of Business and Professions Code section 2056, “violation of right to common law fair procedure” and “intentional interference with right to practice profession.” The defendants moved for summary adjudication of all causes of action except breach of contract, and the court granted their motion.

The court also granted Dr. Hoveida’s request for leave to amend the remaining breach of contract claim, to allege the defendants breached certain contractual duties in conjunction with terminating his services. Subsequently, *1468 the defendants obtained summary adjudication on the issue of duty encompassed within the breach of contract cause of action.

In an effort to make the summary adjudication orders immediately appeal-able, the parties then entered into a written stipulation under which Dr. Hoveida dismissed without prejudice his remaining breach of contract claim. The stipulation provides, “[Dr.] Hoveida shall promptly dismiss without prejudice the remaining claims for breach of contract ... so that a judgment may be entered with respect to those claims and issues that have been summarily adjudicated; Defendants agree that any and all statutes of limitations with respect to the remaining claims for breach of contract . . . shall be tolled while any appeal(s) in this matter is pending.” The stipulation further provides that Dr. Hoveida may maintain his breach of contract cause of action if the appeal is successful, but not if it is unsuccessful. The court entered a judgment pursuant to the stipulation.

DISCUSSION

An appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action between the parties. (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143].) 1 This one final judgment rule does not allow “contingent causes of action to exist in a kind of appellate netherworld. ... It makes no difference that this state of affairs is the product of a stipulation, or even of encouragement by the trial court. Parties cannot create by stipulation appellate jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.” (Don Jose’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 115, 118-119 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 370] (Don Jose’s Restaurant).) In Don Jose’s Restaurant, the court “condemned] the artifice of trying to create an appealable order from an otherwise nonappealable grant of summary adjudication by dismissing the remaining causes of action without prejudice but with a waiver of applicable time bars.” (Id. at p. 116; see also Jackson v. Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 240, 243-245 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 679]; Four Point Entertainment, Inc. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 79, 83 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 82] (Four Point Entertainment).)

Dr. Hoveida relies on Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 817 [226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68] (Building Industry), in which our high court held that if consent to a judgment “was merely given to facilitate an appeal following adverse determination of a critical issue, the *1469 party will not lose his [or her] right to be heard on appeal.” According to Dr. Hoveida, although the second summary adjudication ruling did not fully dispose of the breach of contract action, it “left open only a small portion” of the cause of action and “truncated” it, and “it would have been a waste of court time to require a likely unsuccessful trial merely to obtain a final judgment.” In Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 743, however, the court implicitly overruled Building Industry’s, exception to the one final judgment rule. (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1429-1430 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 574]; Four Point Entertainment, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 83, fn. 5.)

Dr. Hoveida points out that under the stipulation the breach of contract cause of action would be dismissed with prejudice if the defendants prevailed on appeal. In Don Jose’s Restaurant, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at page 118, the court rejected the notion a similar stipulation solved the jurisdiction issue. The court explained: “The stipulation here virtually exudes an intention to retain the remaining causes of action for trial. True, the dismissed causes of action would not be brought back to life if the defendants prevailed. That scenario, however, is functionally indistinguishable from the conventional situation in which the trial court’s disposition of one cause of action has the practical effect of substantially weakening a plaintiff’s case, but other, weaker, causes of action still remain to be tried. The plaintiff might still possibly prevail on those causes of action. If the effect of the summary adjudication on two causes of action here really was to eliminate the remaining causes of action, then the defendant should have been able to bring another summary adjudication motion to mop up the rest of the plaintiffs’ case. And if not, then it is clear that all issues between the parties on appeal have not been adjudicated.” (Fn. omitted.)

We lack jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the judgment does not dispose of all causes of action between the parties. (Don Jose’s Restaurant, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) “If we permitted stipulated ‘final’ judgments in every case like this one, we would in effect be permitting the parties to confer jurisdiction upon us where none exists. [Citation.] That we will not do.” (Four Point Entertainment, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 79, 83.) The merits of Dr. Hoveida’s causes of action will be addressed later, if and when this case is timely appealed after the entry of one final judgment. (Don Jose’s Restaurant, supra, at p. 119.) “Nothing we say in this opinion should in any way be construed as bearing on the merits of [his] causes of action, either those already adjudicated, or those which, in substance, remain to be adjudicated.” (Ibid.)

*1470 DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the judgment and stipulation on which it is based. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

Benke, J., and Irion, J., concurred.

1

After the parties’ initial briefing, we requested that they provide supplemental briefing on the issue of whether we should dismiss the appeal because of lack of jurisdiction. We have taken Dr. Hoveida’s response into consideration. The defendants did not respond.

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