People v. Artis
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHESTER CRITON ARTIS, Defendant and Respondent
- Proceeding
- appeal from Superior Court of San Diego County, No. ECR5587, Elizabeth A. Riggs, Judge. [fn*] [fn*] Judge
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County
- Trial judge
- Elizabeth A. Riggs
- Outcome
- reversed — The judgment is reversed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Don R. Work (author)
Analysis
The trial court dismissed the information charging petty theft with a prior conviction, ruling that the specific statute for embezzlement by a tenant (Pen. Code, § 507) precluded charging the offense under the general theft statute (Pen. Code, § 484). The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because there is no conflict in elements or punishment between the two statutes, the general statute applies and allows for felony enhancement under § 666.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Dismissal of information for petty theft with a prior conviction based on the specific statute controlling over the general statute.“the court granted his motion to set aside the information (§ 995) on the ground his crime could not be charged under the general theft statute because it factually fell within a specific statute defining tenant conversions as embezzlements (§ 507).” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21 — Section 490a requires that references to larceny or embezzlement be interpreted as 'theft,' allowing specific theft definitions to be charged under general burglary or theft statutes if elements align.
- relied: In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 — The specific statute controls over the general statute only when the two contain conflicting provisions regarding the same subject matter.
- relied: People v. Silk (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 899 — Distinguished as involving a conflict where a specific statute declared an offense a misdemeanor while a general statute allowed felony elevation.
- relied: In re Joiner (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 250 — Distinguished as involving a conflict between specific and general statutes regarding offense classification.
- relied: People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475 — Distinguished as involving a conflict between specific and general statutes regarding offense classification.
- relied: People v. Mayers (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 809 — Distinguished as involving a conflict between specific and general statutes regarding offense classification.
- relied: People v. Fiene (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 305 — Distinguished as involving a conflict between specific and general statutes regarding offense classification.
- relied: People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 — Distinguished as involving a statute of limitations issue and a lack of the necessary element of intrustment for embezzlement.
- relied: Gasaway v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 545 — Distinguished as involving a conflict between a specific welfare fraud statute's limitations period and the general embezzlement limitations period.
- relied: People v. Frazier (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 99 — Cited in footnote to show that converters of bailed property have been convicted of theft under section 484, though not discussing the specific vs. general conflict issue.
- relied: People v. Maulucci (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 301 — Cited in footnote to show that converters of bailed property have been convicted of theft under section 484, though not discussing the specific vs. general conflict issue.
The appellate opinion: sound — sound
The trial court granted Chester Artis's Penal Code section 995 motion and dismissed a charge of petty theft with a prior (sections 484/666) for selling a refrigerator taken from his rented apartment, reasoning that the specific tenant-embezzlement statute (section 507) displaced the general theft statute under the Williamson special-over-general rule. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because section 490a makes embezzlement a form of theft and section 514 punishes section 507 embezzlement exactly as theft of the same value, there is no conflict between the statutes and the prosecution may charge under section 484 and seek the section 666 felony elevation.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order granting section 995 motion and dismissing the information on the ground that section 507 (tenant embezzlement), as a specific statute, precluded charging the conduct as petty theft with a prior under sections 484 and 666“Because there is no conflict between these statutes, Artis currently may be charged under section 484 and thus is subject to the felony enhancing provisions of section 666.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The opinion does not expressly state a standard, but the question (whether one statute preempts another) is purely one of statutory construction that the court decided independently. The court's result is supported: In re Williamson turns on whether the general and special statutes conflict, and here section 490a expressly converts every statutory reference to embezzlement into theft and section 514 punishes section 507 embezzlement in the manner prescribed for theft of the value embezzled, so a first offender faces identical misdemeanor exposure however charged. That textual scheme is strong evidence the Legislature intended section 507 to define a species of theft within section 484 rather than to carve out a lesser, exclusive offense, which is the opposite of the Williamson/Gilbert pattern where the special statute prescribed lighter punishment. The court did not, however, address People v. Jenkins or People v. Ruster, the Supreme Court decisions holding that preemption can apply even absent a punishment conflict when violation of the special statute necessarily results in violation of the general one; a violation of section 507 necessarily violates section 484, so that line of authority needed an answer (the answer being that sections 490a and 514 show the Legislature intended both to apply). The omission is a gap in reasoning rather than a misreading that changes the result. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 — Where a general statute and a specific statute cover the same subject matter and conflict (there, the specific statute made the conduct a misdemeanor while the general statute permitted felony treatment), the specific statute controls and the prosecution may not proceed under the general statute.
- relied: People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21 — Under section 490a, statutory references to larceny, embezzlement, or stealing are read as 'theft,' so an intent to commit a specifically defined theft-type offense satisfies the burglary statute's intent-to-commit-larceny element.
- relied: People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475 — Distinguished as a case where the special statute (welfare fraud) conflicted with the general theft statute by prescribing different treatment, triggering the Williamson rule; cited to show the conflict element missing here.
- relied: People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 — Distinguished: thefts of welfare funds by false affidavit lacked the entrustment element and so could not be treated as embezzlement of public moneys to escape the general felony statute of limitations; held irrelevant to whether a true embezzlement may be charged as theft.
- missed: People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690 — A special statute may preempt prosecution under a general statute based on legislative intent even where the general statute carries different punishment; the Williamson rule is a tool for discerning legislative intent and is not limited to cases of direct conflict in elements or penalty.
- missed: People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494 — The special-over-general rule applies when each element of the general statute corresponds to an element of the special statute, or when it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute; binding Supreme Court authority the court should have reconciled with its no-conflict analysis.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly anchored its analysis in section 490a and section 514, which show the Legislature treated section 507 embezzlement as theft punished identically to theft, defeating the conflict premise on which Williamson and the cases Artis cited rested. It nonetheless framed the Williamson rule narrowly as requiring a conflict in elements or punishment without addressing People v. Jenkins and People v. Ruster, binding Supreme Court decisions applying the rule where a violation of the special statute necessarily violates the general one, so the result is defensible but the reasoning skips controlling authority.
Opinion — Work
Opinion
WORK, J.The People appeal a judgment of dismissal after the court determined an embezzlement by a tenant could not be charged under Penal Code 1 section 484, the general theft statute, because the rule that a specific statute controls over general statutes requires prosecutors to charge such offenses as violations of section 507. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment.
I
After Chester Criton Artis sold a refrigerator he took without permission from the apartment he was renting, he was charged with petty theft with a *1026 prior conviction of a theft-related offense. (§§ 484/666.) After being held to answer, the court granted his motion to set aside the information (§ 995) on the ground his crime could not be charged under the general theft statute because it factually fell within a specific statute defining tenant conversions as embezzlements (§ 507).
In People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 29-30 [219 Cal.Rptr. 707], we reviewed the significance of section 490a which states: “Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor.” There, we concluded that the burglary (§ 459) statute’s requirement of an entry to commit larceny, must be interpreted as if the stated requisite intent were theft, regardless of how defined. Thus, an entry to obtain telephone services by deception, otherwise defined by section 502.7, could be properly charged as burglary.
Here, the issue is whether tenants who fraudulently convert property with which they have been intrusted may be charged with theft under the general provisions of section 484 or only by the specific statute factually defining that offense.
Section 507 states: “Every person intrusted with any property as bailee, tenant, or lodger . . . who fraudulently converts the same or the proceeds thereof to his own use ... is guilty of embezzlement.”
Although Artis refers to his crime as a mere conversion, the Legislature has expressly declared it to be a form of embezzlement. As embezzlement, it is theft. (§ 490a.) As theft it is chargeable as a violation of section 484 and, critical to Artis, it is an offense which may be elevated to felony status when charged as petty theft with a prior (§ 666).
Artis cites numerous decisions to bolster his contention that the specific statute (§ 507) precludes charging him under the general (§ 484). None are in point.
The starting point is whether the general and special statutes which include the same subject matter contain provisions which conflict. (In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [276 P.2d 593].) In Williamson, a conflict existed because a specific statute declared an offense to be a *1027 misdemeanor, while a general statute would permit the People to elevate the exact crime to a felony. Several cases cited by Artis were decided on similar facts. (See, e.g., People v. Silk (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 899 [291 P.2d 1013], In re Joiner (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 250 [4 Cal.Rptr. 667], People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580], People v. Mayers (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 809 [168 Cal.Rptr. 252], and People v. Fiene (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 305 [37 Cal.Rptr. 925].
Artis is equally incorrect in relying on People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615 [41 Cal.Rptr. 219], where a defendant was charged with multiple counts of grand theft, each based on a separate “theft” of welfare funds through the filing of false affidavits. Four counts were beyond the three-year general felony statute of limitations. The People attempted to save these stale counts by relying on sections 799 and 800 which provide that embezzlements of public moneys have no prosecutorial time bar. The decision regarding specific versus general statutes related only to whether the general felony limit could be avoided by characterizing these thefts by false representation as embezzlements. The court determined they lacked the necessary element of intrustment and thus could not be embezzlements of public moneys. This decision has no relevance to Artis’s case. A similar limitations issue was the focus of another Artis citation, Gasaway v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 545 [139 Cal.Rptr. 27], which was decided favorably to the defendant because the welfare fraud statute (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11483, not in existence when Darling was decided) contained a three-year statute of limitations which conflicted with the expanded limitation in section 800.
Unlike the cases Artis cites, there are no conflicts between the elements to prove, or the punishment for, embezzlement under section 484 and embezzlement defined in section 507. Each is punished “in the manner prescribed for theft of property of the value or kind embezzled." (§ 514.) Thus, had Artis been a first-time theft offender, he would face a misdemeanor sentence for this “petty” theft regardless of how it was charged. Because there is no conflict between these statutes, Artis currently may be charged under section 484 and thus is subject to the felony enhancing provisions of section 666. 2
*1028 Disposition
The judgment is reversed.
Wiener, Acting P. J., and Froehlich, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 10, 1994.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Unlawfully converted bailments are also defined as embezzlements by section 507. Several decisions involve cases where converters of bailed property have been convicted of theft charged under section 484. (See, e.g., People v. Frazier (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 99, 102 [198 P.2d 325], and People v. Maulucci (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 301, 303 [22 Cal.Rptr. 924].) However, they contain no discussion of the issue Artis raises.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Dingle D002281 · 1985-11-06
- People v. Mayers Crim. 11212 · 1980-10-01
- Gasaway v. Superior Court Civ. 41306 · 1977-06-09
- People v. Gilbert Crim. 12696 · 1969-12-23
- People v. Darling Crim. 1675 · 1964-11-13
- People v. Fiene Crim. 9225 · 1964-04-13
- In Re Joiner Crim. 7145 · 1960-04-25
- In Re Williamson Crim. 5651 · 1954-11-24
- People v. Frazier Crim. 4246 · 1948-10-20
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