Mark Stanley v. Superior Court of California

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 08-55752 · 2011-07-25 · Unpublished

Mark William STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, South County Regional Center; Et Al., Defendants-Appellees

Area: other
Panel: Mary M. Schroeder (author), Arthur L. Alarcon, Edward Leavy

Analysis

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Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 25 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK WILLIAM STANLEY, No. 08-55752 Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01226-H-BLM v. MEMORANDUM * SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, South County Regional Center; et al., Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 12, 2011 ** Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Mark William Stanley, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to courts and related state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stanley’s access-to-courts claim because an inmate’s constitutional right to access the courts is limited to attacks on his or her conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Stanley’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We assume that the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Stanley’s state law claims after dismissing his § 1983 claim, and therefore construe the dismissal of these claims to have been without prejudice.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); cf. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring clarification on remand that dismissal based on declining supplemental jurisdiction was without prejudice).

AFFIRMED.

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