gno.law

Regal Recovery Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal · D008906 · 1989-01-04 · Published · 207 Cal. App. 3d 693 · 255 Cal. Rptr. 34 · 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 53

REGAL RECOVERY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; ASSOCIATED TOWING COMPANY, Real Party in Interest

Area
civil
Panel
Patricia D. Benke (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:39Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Regal Recovery Agency's motion for confirmation of a good faith settlement, ruling it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the issue in the underlying dismissed action. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its denial and hold a hearing, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Denial of motion for confirmation of good faith settlement
“However, the trial court here had jurisdiction and should have heard the motion.”
unclearerroragree with court
The appellate court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motion because the underlying case was dismissed without a verdict or judgment, and Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 do not limit jurisdiction in such circumstances. The court found an actual controversy existed, granting it the power to entertain the hearing.

Authorities

  • relied: American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Division (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 732 — Distinguished on the basis that the settling tortfeasor in that case sought indemnity after the principal action was dismissed with prejudice against a non-cross-complained defendant, whereas here the codefendant had also settled.
  • relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — Cited to support the issuance of a peremptory writ rather than an alternative writ or order to show cause.
  • relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Cited to support the issuance of a peremptory writ rather than an alternative writ or order to show cause.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the statutory language of Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 to establish jurisdiction for confirming good faith settlements even after the underlying action is dismissed without judgment. It appropriately distinguishes the cited precedent based on the specific procedural posture of the indemnity suit.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:32Z · confidence medium

In an indemnity/contribution action brought by a settling towing company against co-settlor Regal Recovery Agency, the superior court refused to hear Regal's motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 for a determination that its settlement in the dismissed underlying wrongful death action was in good faith, believing it lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the superior court to vacate its denial and calendar a good faith settlement hearing, holding that sections 877 and 877.6 impose no time limit that strips jurisdiction once the underlying case is dismissed before verdict or judgment.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Superior court's denial, for lack of jurisdiction, of Regal's motion in the indemnity action for a determination that its settlement of the underlying wrongful death suit was in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6
“However, the trial court here had jurisdiction and should have heard the motion.”
de novoerror (statutory interpretation)agree with court
The question is purely one of statutory interpretation and jurisdiction. Section 877 by its terms applies to any dismissal given in good faith 'before verdict or judgment,' and section 877.6(a) entitles 'any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors' to a hearing on good faith; the indemnity action is such an action and presents a live controversy. Nothing in either statute confines the hearing to the original tort action. American Bankers is fairly distinguished because it concerned whether a settlor could sue for indemnity after dismissal, not whether a settling defendant may raise good faith as a defense. The court's reading of the plain text supports its conclusion.
Refusal by the trial court in the dismissed underlying Mosher action to hear Regal's good faith settlement motion for lack of jurisdiction after dismissal
“However, the trial court properly refused to hear the matter because the suit had been dismissed and the court had no jurisdiction.”
unclearcorrectunsure
The opinion approves this ruling only in passing and without citation. Once the underlying action was dismissed in its entirety in December 1986 with no cross-complaints pending, the court in that case ordinarily retains no jurisdiction to adjudicate collateral motions, so the conclusion is plausible, but the opinion offers no analysis and this ruling was not the subject of the writ petition.

Authorities

  • relied: American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Division (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 732 — Distinguished: addressed whether a settling tortfeasor who paid the full claim could bring a post-settlement indemnity suit after dismissal with prejudice against an unnamed co-defendant; does not bar a settling defendant from raising good faith settlement as a defense in a later indemnity action.
  • relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — A peremptory writ may issue in the first instance without an alternative writ or order to show cause where they would add nothing to the presentation.
  • relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Peremptory writ in the first instance is proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 where the issue is clear and further briefing would add nothing.
  • missed: Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 — Before issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, the appellate court must give notice to the parties that it is considering doing so and afford an opportunity to oppose; the opinion issues a first-instance writ citing only Court of Appeal cases and does not recite that Palma notice was given.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly grounds its holding in the plain text of sections 877 and 877.6, which contain no limitation ousting jurisdiction once the underlying action is dismissed before verdict or judgment, and it fairly distinguishes American Bankers. The opinion is cursory, however: it does not expressly analyze whether the indemnity action qualifies as 'an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors,' and it issues a peremptory writ in the first instance without citing or reciting compliance with the Supreme Court's notice requirement in Palma.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Benke

Opinion

BENKE, J.

The underlying suit arises out of the alleged wrongful death of Ernest Mosher who suffered fatal injuries during the repossession of his car. His estate brought suit against the bank, the towing company and the repossession company, Regal Recovery Agency (Regal) among others. The towing company settled first for $500,000, and had it confirmed as a good faith settlement; the bank settled second for $75,000 and had it confirmed as a good faith settlement; Regal settled for $100,000 but since there were no cross-complaints did not have the settlement confirmed. The suit was dismissed in December 1986.

Thereafter the towing company filed suit against Regal for indemnity or contribution. Regal answered and later amended its answer to add good faith settlement as an affirmative defense. However, Regal has been unable to obtain a confirmation of its settlement. It first sought a determination in the underlying suit brought by Mosher. However, the trial court properly refused to hear the matter because the suit had been dismissed and the court had no jurisdiction. Regal then filed a motion for good faith settlement in this case but the court declined to hear the matter believing it had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of good faith settlement in the underlying *695 case. However, the trial court here had jurisdiction and should have heard the motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section 877, provides: “Where a . . . dismissal with or without prejudice, ... is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, ...[][] (b) [i]t shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.” (Italics added.)

Here no judgment or verdict has been rendered. The case was dismissed. There is nothing in the statute to limit the court’s jurisdiction under these circumstances. Likewise, Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, which sets forth the procedure for bringing a motion for good faith settlement, does not place any time constraints on the court’s jurisdiction. Rather the statute states: “(a) [a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors . . . shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . .” (Italics added.) The present case involves an actual controversy and gives the court jurisdiction to entertain the hearing for a good faith settlement.

Real party suggests that American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Division (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 732 [159 Cal.Rptr. 70], addresses nearly the same issue. However, the issue in American Bankers was whether the settling tortfeasor could file a postsettlement suit for indemnity after the principal action was dismissed with prejudice against a defendant who had not been named in a cross-complaint. There, American Banker had settled for the full amount of the claim and then sought indemnity from its codefendants. In contrast, here the codefendant has also settled. The towing company is not precluded under American Banker from bringing suit against Regal for indemnity. But Regal has the right to defend with its good faith settlement. The court had the jurisdiction and the duty to hear the question of whether that settlement should be confirmed as in good faith.

An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation. A peremptory writ is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 [169 Cal.Rptr. 827]; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [96 Cal.Rptr. 165].)

Let a peremptory writ issue directing the superior court to vacate its denial of the motion for good faith settlement and to calendar at its earliest convenience a hearing as provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 *696 on whether Regal’s settlement was in good faith. The stay issued by this court on October 27, 1988, is vacated.

Kremer, P. J., and Todd, J., concurred.

The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 16, 1989.

Cites, in this corpus

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