Johnson v. Superior Court
CURTIS JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Edward T. Butler (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied the petitioner's motion to transfer his murder trial from the North County branch to the downtown superior court, finding that the state had a compelling interest in keeping the case in North County despite a significant disparity in the racial composition of the jury venire. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and provide a jury venire more representative of the community, rejecting the trial court's reliance on convenience as a compelling state interest.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to transfer trial from North County branch to downtown superior court based on jury venire composition“The trial court found there was an overwhelming discrepancy in the jury venire for North County when compared with the countywide venire but ruled the case should not be transferred, because the state had a significant interest in trying the case in North County.” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court determined that the trial court erred by defining the 'community' as the Fifth Supervisorial District rather than the entire judicial district, and by accepting 'convenience' as a compelling state interest without factual support. The court held that the disparity in the venire was substantial and not justified by the state's interests as presented in the record. |
Authorities
- relied: Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 — Establishes the three-part test for assessing whether a jury venire is representative of the community: distinctiveness of the group, reasonable relationship between venire and community representation, and systematic exclusion.
- relied: People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 — Supports the finding that a disparity in the percentage of blacks in the jury venire compared to the community is substantially disparate and requires justification.
- relied: People v. Pervoe (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 342 — States that a disparity in jury representation can be justified only if there is a compelling state interest.
- relied: People v. Taylor (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 513 — Provides precedent for considering a judicial district as the community for jury composition purposes, which the court distinguishes because North County is a branch court, not a separate judicial district.
- relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — Cited as authority for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate.
- relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Cited as authority for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the Duren test to determine that the 'community' for a branch court is the entire judicial district, not the smaller supervisorial district from which jurors are drawn. It properly rejects the trial court's finding of a compelling state interest based on convenience due to the lack of factual support in the record.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court found an overwhelming disparity between the percentage of blacks in the North County branch venire (drawn from the Fifth Supervisorial District) and the countywide venire, but denied the murder defendant's motion to transfer his trial downtown because the state had a significant interest in trying the case in North County. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate the denial and enter an order providing petitioner a venire more closely representative of the community, by transfer downtown or some other procedure.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Definition of the relevant 'community' for the Duren fair-cross-section test: the trial court treated the entire judicial district (county) rather than the Fifth Supervisorial District as the community; the People argued the Fifth was the community.“As such, it cannot be considered the community for purposes of assessing the composition of the jury venire.” | de novo | correct | unsure The court reasoned that Code Civ. Proc. § 206a permits drawing branch-court jurors from a supervisorial district but does not convert that district into a judicial district, and distinguished People v. Taylor because neither the Fifth nor North County is a separate judicial district. The reasoning is plausible under then-existing authority, but the opinion does not confront the argument that under Duren the 'community' is ordinarily the area from which the venire is lawfully drawn, nor does it address the third Duren prong (systematic exclusion). Reasonable jurists could differ on this legal question, so I cannot say the court erred, but the analysis is thin. |
Finding that the underrepresentation of blacks in the North County venire compared with the community was substantial.“This finding is amply supported by the statistics showing the eligible black voter population is three times as great in the community as it is in North County.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Given the court's premise that the county is the community, the uncontested statistics (1.5 percent versus 4.5 percent of age-eligible voters) support a finding of substantial disparity, and the court cited People v. Wheeler for the representative cross-section principle. The conclusion follows from the premise, though the opinion does not discuss which statistical measure (absolute versus comparative disparity) governs. |
Denial of the motion to transfer on the ground that the state had a compelling (significant) interest in the administration of justice and in the convenience of witnesses, the district attorney, and jurors in keeping the case in North County.“Here, there are no facts to support the court’s assertion that convenience is a compelling state interest.” | mixed | error (fact finding unsupported) | agree with court The appellate court held the trial court's justification finding was unsupported because the record contained no facts showing witnesses lived or worked in North County or that the venue was especially convenient for the prosecutor, and expressly declined to decide whether convenience alone could ever suffice. Under Duren, once a prima facie case is shown the state bears the burden to justify the disparity; a justification resting on no record facts cannot carry that burden, so the conclusion is supported. The court cited People v. Pervoe for the 'compelling state interest' formulation, which is stricter than Duren's 'significant state interest' language, but the result would be the same under either standard given the empty record. |
Authorities
- relied: Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 — Three-part test for a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement: distinctive group, unreasonable underrepresentation in venires relative to the community, and systematic exclusion; state must then show a significant interest justifying the disparity.
- relied: People v. Taylor (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 513 — A judicial district may be treated as the community for assessing jury venire composition; distinguished because neither the Fifth Supervisorial District nor North County is a separate judicial district.
- relied: People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 — California constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community; cited for assessing significance of disparity.
- relied: People v. Pervoe (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 342 — A substantial disparity in venire representation can be justified only by a compelling state interest.
- relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — A peremptory writ of mandate may issue in the first instance without further briefing and argument under Code Civ. Proc. § 1088.
- relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Authority for issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.
- missed: People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 — California Supreme Court's then-recent application of the Duren framework to a representative cross-section challenge to a branch-court venire, including the showing required for underrepresentation and systematic exclusion and the burden on the state to justify the disparity; binding authority the court should have addressed.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly framed the issue under Duren and reached a defensible result because the state's asserted justification rested on no record facts, and its distinction of Taylor is reasonable. It skipped the third Duren prong (whether drawing from the supervisorial district under § 206a is 'systematic exclusion'), did not address the Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Harris, and applied Pervoe's 'compelling interest' label without reconciling it with Duren's 'significant interest' standard.
Opinion — Butler
Opinion
BUTLER, J.Petitioner is charged with murder and wishes a trial by jury. He seeks to have his trial transferred from the North County Branch of the San Diego Superior Court (North County) to the downtown superior court on the basis the number of blacks in the venire of North County is not reasonably related to the number of blacks in that community. The trial court found there was an overwhelming discrepancy in the jury venire for North County when compared with the countywide venire but ruled the case should not be transferred, because the state had a significant interest in trying the case in North County.
North County is within the Fifth Supervisorial District (Fifth). The Fifth is not'exactly coterminous with the geographic area served by North County but prospective jurors are drawn from those persons on the county’s master jury list who reside in the Fifth. (Code Civ. Proc., § 206a.) Black persons comprise about 1.5 percent of the age eligible voters in the Fifth; they comprise about 4.5 percent of the age eligible voters in the County as a whole. 1
The test to be used in assessing whether the jury venire is representative of the community is set out in Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664], The three parts of the test are: (1) is the excluded group “distinctive”; (2) is the representation in the venire reasonably related to the representation in the community; and (3) is there systematic exclusion which causes the underrepresentation? Whether the disparity in representation here is significant hinges on defining what constitutes the community. The People argue the community is the Fifth since the jurors come from the Fifth and can only properly be compared with the Fifth. Thus, the argument continues, since there are 1.5 percent blacks in the Fifth and 1.5 percent blacks in the venire, there is no discrep *88 ancy. Although there is precedent for considering a judicial district as a community for purposes of reviewing the composition of the jury (People v. Taylor (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 513 [120 Cal.Rptr. 762]), neither the Fifth nor North County is a separate judicial district. With a branch court such as North County, selection of the jury from a supervisorial district is proper (Code Civ. Proc., § 206a), but it does not mean the supervisorial district is thereby converted into a judicial district. Here, the supervisorial district is considerably smaller than the North County area both in geographic size and in population. The ethnic distribution of the population is not the same. The Fifth does not even include all the geographic areas included within the area served by North County. As such, it cannot be considered the community for purposes of assessing the composition of the jury venire.
The trial court found if the entire judicial district were deemed to be the community, then the disparity in the percentage of blacks in the jury venire between the community and North County was substantially disparate. This finding is amply supported by the statistics showing the eligible black voter population is three times as great in the community as it is in North County. (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 277-278 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) Such a disparity can be justified only if there is a compelling state interest. (People v. Pervoe (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 342, 349 [207 Cal.Rptr. 622].) The court found the state had a compelling interest in the administration of justice suggesting it was not feasible to transfer juries from downtown to North County. In addition, the court found that the state had an interest in the case remaining in the community for the convenience of witnesses, the district attorney, and the members of the jury. However, there are no facts in this particular case to show that North County is any more convenient. There is no showing the witnesses live or work in the area. There is nothing said about North County being especially convenient for the district attorney. It is not necessary for us to rule on whether convenience of witnesses and jurors alone is sufficient to justify depriving the petitioner of his right to a venire that reasonably reflects the composition of the community. Here, there are no facts to support the court’s assertion that convenience is a compelling state interest.
Petitioner is entitled to a jury venire which is more representative of the community as a whole. We do not dictate how this might best be accomplished. The trial court is a more suitable forum to remedy the disparity. Petitioner wishes to have his case transferred downtown which seems to be a reasonable solution. However, it is not the only possible solution.
The issue can be determined without further briefing and argument. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; United Nu *89 clear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359, 361 [169 Cal.Rptr. 827]; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [96 Cal.Rptr. 165]), directing the Superior Court of the County of San Diego to vacate its order denying the motion to transfer downtown and to enter a new and different order which provides petitioner with a jury venire more closely representative of the community. This may entail transferring the case downtown or may involve some other procedure. The stay issued by this Court on November 30, 1984, is vacated.
Brown (Gerald), P. J., and Work, J., concurred.
Not included in either statistics are blacks stationed here in the Armed Forces since they are exempt from jury duty.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Pervoe A021560 · 1984-10-30
- United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court Civ. 24286 · 1980-12-16
- People v. Wheeler Crim. 20233 · 1978-09-25
- People v. Taylor Crim. 25376 · 1975-03-26
- Goodenough v. Superior Court Civ. 11068 · 1971-07-12
Cited by
- O'HARE v. Superior Court L.A. 32209 · 1987-01-02