Doose Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court
DOOSE LANDSCAPE, INC., Et Al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; PARK ROW COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION Et Al., Real Parties in Interest
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Patricia D. Benke (author)
Analysis
The trial court granted Park Row's motion to determine a good faith settlement and barred Doose's cross-claims for indemnity against Park Row. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ vacating the bar on cross-claims, holding that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 does not protect a settling plaintiff from such claims, while denying the petition regarding the good faith determination.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order barring cross-defendants' cross-complaints for indemnity and equitable comparative contribution against Park Row pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c).“The court was without jurisdiction under the statutory provision to bar cross-claims for equitable indemnity against the settling plaintiff.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c), which explicitly bars claims only against a 'settling tortfeasor.' Since Park Row was the settling plaintiff, not a tortfeasor, the statute does not authorize the trial court to bar cross-claims against it. The court properly distinguished between the statutory bar and the separate issue of legal sufficiency, which must be addressed via other procedural mechanisms. |
Determination that the settlement between Park Row and Pardee was in good faith.“As to Doose’s request this court issue a peremptory writ with respect to the court’s determination the settlement was in good faith, the petition is summarily denied.” | abuse of discretion | correct | unsure The appellate court denied the petition regarding the good faith determination, implying that the trial court's factual finding was supported by the record and not an abuse of discretion. The opinion does not provide detailed reasoning for this specific denial, but the summary denial is consistent with the standard of review for good faith settlement determinations. |
Authorities
- relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — Supports the issuance of a peremptory writ when the lower court acts without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers.
- relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Supports the issuance of a peremptory writ in appropriate circumstances.
- relied: Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439 — Directed to the parties regarding the issue of legal sufficiency of the cross-claim, suggesting it is the relevant authority for that separate procedural issue.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the statutory text of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c), which limits the bar to claims against a 'settling tortfeasor,' and Park Row was a settling plaintiff. It also correctly identifies that the legal sufficiency of the cross-claim is a separate issue not properly resolved in a good faith settlement hearing.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court granted Park Row Community Association's motion to determine that its $3.5 million settlement with developer Pardee was in good faith and barred all cross-complaints for indemnity against Park Row under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c). The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate the bar order because section 877.6 protects only a settling tortfeasor, not a settling plaintiff, while summarily denying the petition as to the good faith determination itself.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order barring Doose's cross-complaints for equitable indemnity and comparative contribution against Park Row, the settling plaintiff, under section 877.6, subdivision (c)“The subdivision only acts to bar claims against a settling tortfeasor. The court was without jurisdiction under the statutory provision to bar cross-claims for equitable indemnity against the settling plaintiff.” | de novo | error (statutory interpretation) | agree with court The question is one of statutory interpretation. Section 877.6, subdivision (c), by its plain terms bars claims against the 'settling tortfeasor or co-obligor,' and Park Row settled in the capacity of plaintiff, not as a tortfeasor paying to buy its peace. The court's textual reading is correct and it properly rejected the argument that Doose's cross-complaint transformed Park Row into a settling tortfeasor. |
Implicit ruling that Doose's cross-claim against Park Row was legally insufficient and could be dismissed in the good faith settlement proceeding“Whether the claim for equitable indemnity is legally sufficient or not is not properly determined under the limited statutory authority for a determination of good faith settlement and resulting bar of claims.” | de novo | error (procedure) | agree with court The court correctly held that a section 877.6 motion is a limited statutory procedure and is not a vehicle to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading; that must be done through demurrer, summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or a similar noticed motion. The court appropriately declined to reach the merits of the Jaffe/Daon dispute. |
Determination that the Park Row–Pardee settlement was in good faith under sections 877 and 877.6“As to Doose’s request this court issue a peremptory writ with respect to the court’s determination the settlement was in good faith, the petition is summarily denied.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The court summarily denied the petition on this issue without analysis, so there is no reasoning to evaluate. The opinion does not disclose the record on the good faith factors. |
Authorities
- relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — A peremptory writ in the first instance is proper where an alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation.
- relied: Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692 — Issuance of a peremptory writ without an alternative writ is appropriate where the matter is adequately presented and the law is clear.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion rests on the plain language of section 877.6, subdivision (c), which bars claims only against a 'settling tortfeasor or co-obligor,' and correctly concludes a settling plaintiff cannot invoke it; it also properly confines the good faith procedure to its statutory scope rather than letting it serve as a vehicle for adjudicating pleading sufficiency. The reasoning is brief and cites no case law on the statutory question, but the textual analysis is complete enough to support the result.
Opinion — Benke
Opinion
BENKE, Acting P. J.Doose Landscape, Inc. (Doose) seeks a writ of mandate after the court granted Park Row Community Association’s (Park Row) motion to determine good faith settlement and bar all cross-complaints for indemnity against Park Row. Because we conclude that Code of Civil *1700 Procedure section 877.6 1 does not afford protection from cross-claims against a settling plaintiff, we grant the petition with respect to the court having barred Doose’s cross-claims against Park Row.
Factual and Procedural Background
In this action Park Row sued the developer, Pardee Construction Company (Pardee), for construction defects at the condominium project. Doose had performed landscaping work on the project pursuant to contract with Pardee. Pardee cross-complained for indemnity against multiple subcontractors including Doose. Doose in turn cross-complained, inter alia, against Pardee and Park Row for indemnity. As to Park Row, it is Doose’s position that if the landscaping contributed to damage at the condominium project, it was caused by the negligence of Park Row through its mismanagement and failure to maintain the landscaping.
Park Row and Pardee stipulated to a settlement procedure whereby they would settle for an amount to be determined by a referee and a reviewing retired judge. The agreement provided for a minimum award of $1.5 million and a maximum award of $3.5 million. The amount awarded was in excess of $3.5 million. The award resulted in a settlement whereby Pardee was to pay Park Row $3.5 million upon a determination the settlement was in good faith.
Park Row moved for a determination of good faith settlement pursuant to sections 877 and 877.6 and to bar all cross-complaints for indemnity against Park Row pursuant to section 877.6, subdivision (c). The court granted the motion. Doose, joined by Christian & Letner Roofing Company, Inc., another subcontractor, petitioned this court for a peremptory writ directing the court to vacate its order determining the settlement to be in good faith and barring cross-defendants’ claims against Park Row for equitable indemnity and equitable comparative contribution.
Discussion
In this action we are confronted with the novel situation where a settling plaintiff seeks the protection of a good faith settlement to protect itself from cross-claims by a cross-defendant for equitable indemnity. Under section 877.6, subdivision (a), any party to an action in which it is alleged two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt is entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into between the plaintiff and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors. *1701 Section 877.6, subdivision (c), provides that a good faith determination by the court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” In this settlement Park Row is the plaintiff and Pardee is the settling tortfeasor. The subdivision only acts to bar claims against a settling tortfeasor. The court was without jurisdiction under the statutory provision to bar cross-claims for equitable indemnity against the settling plaintiff.
Park Row seems to take the position it was entitled to the protection of section 877.6, subdivision (c), because Doose had in its cross-complaint for indemnity, albeit wrongly, made Park Row at least a co-obligor if not a joint tortfeasor with respect to its own damages. Even if we were to assume Doose’s pleading somehow transformed Park Row into a joint tortfeasor, it was certainly not a “settling tortfeasor” in the context of the settlement. Clearly it was settling as the plaintiff. The statute provides no bar for cross-claims against the settling plaintiff.
Park Row argues the court acted correctly in dismissing the cross-claim because it was legally insufficient. 2 Whether the claim for equitable indemnity is legally sufficient or not is not properly determined under the limited statutory authority for a determination of good faith settlement and resulting bar of claims. A determination of the legal sufficiency is properly made through noticed motion for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or other appropriate motion.
As to Doose’s request this court issue a peremptory writ with respect to the court’s determination the settlement was in good faith, the petition is summarily denied.
Disposition
An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation. A peremptory writ is proper. (§ 1088; United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 [169 Cal.Rptr. 827]; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [96 Cal.Rptr. 165].)
*1702 Let a peremptory writ issue directing the court to vacate its order barring cross-defendants’ cross-complaints for total, partial or comparative indemnity and equitable comparative contribution against Park Row and to enter a new order denying Park Row’s motion for such bar. The petition is summarily denied in all other respects.
Nares, J., and Froehlich, J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
Park Row relies upon Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188 [246 Cal.Rptr. 432] and Doose relies upon Daon Corporation v. Place Homeowners Association (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1449 [255 Cal.Rptr. 448] in support of their respective positions as to the legal sufficiency of the cross-claim. We express no opinion on the relative merits of the parties’ positions but direct their attention to this court’s recent opinion Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439 [266 Cal.Rptr. 601] with respect to the issue.
Cites, in this corpus
- Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services D009465 · 1990-02-15
- Daon Corp. v. Place Homeowners Assn. A039038 · 1989-01-19
- Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture D005373 · 1988-04-29
- United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court Civ. 24286 · 1980-12-16
- Goodenough v. Superior Court Civ. 11068 · 1971-07-12
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