People v. Davis
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ISABELLA VAELUA DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Trial judges
- No. T022029; Louis E. Boyle; Raymond Edwards Jr.
- Outcome
- other — D009485. Fourth Dist., Div. One.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Howard B. Wiener (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence without an evidentiary hearing, finding no disputed issues of fact after the People identified their justification and the defendant failed to respond. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that local rules requiring specific arguments are valid and that an evidentiary hearing is not required when facts are undisputed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of the motion to suppress evidence without an evidentiary hearing.“Accordingly, the municipal court did not err in denying the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (c), which mandates receiving evidence only on issues of fact 'necessary' to determine the motion. Since the defendant failed to dispute the People's statement of facts or file a responsive pleading as required by local rule, no factual dispute existed to necessitate a hearing. The court's reliance on federal analogues and the companion case Hallman supports the conclusion that procedural requirements for specificity are valid and that the trial court acted within its discretion. |
Authorities
- relied: Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90 — The court distinguished this case, noting that while Wilder suggested specific pleading requirements, the current local rule and the defendant's failure to respond justified the denial without a hearing, effectively limiting Wilder's application in this context.
- relied: People v. Lewis (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 817 — Local rules may legitimately provide procedures which facilitate the resolution of a suppression motion.
- relied: United States v. Ledesma (1974) 499 F.2d 36 — Evidentiary hearings are not required as a matter of course but only when moving papers are sufficiently definite to show contested issues of fact.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly interprets the statutory language of Penal Code section 1538.5 to require evidence only for necessary factual disputes and validates the local rule requiring specific arguments. It effectively addresses the defendant's argument by pointing to her failure to respond to the People's identified justifications, thereby eliminating any factual dispute.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego municipal court denied Davis's Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress without taking evidence, finding that the pleadings raised no disputed issue of fact after Davis, relying on Wilder v. Superior Court, failed to file the specific argument required by local rule 31 and did not respond to the People's pleaded justification for her warrantless DUI detention. The Court of Appeal affirmed, following its companion decision in People v. Hallman rejecting Wilder, and holding independently that section 1538.5, subdivision (c) requires evidence only on disputed factual issues, so no evidentiary hearing was needed where Davis never contested the People's statement of facts.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Enforcement of local rule 31 requiring the moving defendant to state with specificity the theories and authorities supporting a section 1538.5 suppression motion, notwithstanding Wilder v. Superior Court“The majority opinion in Hallman declining to follow Wilder necessarily requires that we reject Davis’s arguments here.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court does not articulate a standard of review, but the question is one of law resolved by the companion Hallman majority, which held local rules may require specificity in suppression motions. The opinion also offers an independent ground: even under Wilder, once the People plead a justification the defendant must file a responsive pleading. The result is defensible and consistent with the court's authority to enforce local procedural rules under People v. Lewis, though the opinion depends on Hallman for its full reasoning. |
Denial of the section 1538.5 motion without an evidentiary hearing on the ground that the pleadings raised no disputed issue of fact, even though the seizure was concededly warrantless“Common sense suggests that an evidentiary hearing only be required where there are disputed issues of fact to be resolved. The express language of Penal Code section 1538.5 supports this result.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court reads subdivision (c)'s command that the judge 'shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion' as requiring evidence only where facts are disputed, and supports that reading with federal decisions construing nearly identical language in Rule 41(e). That textual reading is reasonable. The gap is that the opinion does not engage the established California rule that the prosecution bears the burden of proving justification for a warrantless search or seizure (Badillo v. Superior Court); it treats the defendant's silence as effectively conceding the People's pleaded facts without explaining how that squares with the allocation of the burden of proof. The opinion also does not describe what facts the People pleaded, so the reader cannot verify that they sufficed to establish a lawful detention. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hallman (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1330 — Trial courts may by local rule require the moving party in a section 1538.5 motion to set forth with specificity the grounds and theories supporting suppression, contrary to the procedure adopted in Wilder.
- relied: Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90 — Procedure for warrantless-search suppression motions under which the People identify their justification and the defendant may file a responsive pleading; the court declines to follow Wilder but holds that even under it a defendant cannot ignore local rule requirements once the People have identified their justifications.
- relied: People v. Lewis (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 817 — Local rules may legitimately provide procedures that facilitate the resolution of suppression motions.
- relied: United States v. Ledesma (1974) 499 F.2d 36 — Under Rule 41(e), evidentiary hearings need not be held as a matter of course; a hearing is required only when the moving papers are sufficiently definite and specific to show contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search.
- relied: United States v. Poe (1972) 462 F.2d 195 — An evidentiary hearing on a suppression motion is required only where there are disputed factual issues.
- relied: Grant v. United States (1960) 282 F.2d 165 — An evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress is not required where the papers raise no disputed issue of fact.
- missed: Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269 — Once the defendant shows a search or seizure was made without a warrant, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove justification; the opinion affirms denial of the motion without evidence from the People and without addressing this burden-of-proof rule.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court's textual reading of section 1538.5, subdivision (c), supported by federal decisions construing identical language, reasonably supports the conclusion that no evidentiary hearing is required where the defendant does not dispute the People's pleaded facts, and the companion Hallman decision supplies the authority for enforcing the local specificity rule. The opinion, however, does not address the Supreme Court's rule placing the burden of justifying a warrantless seizure on the prosecution, and it never recites the facts the People pleaded, so it leaves unexplained how an unanswered pleading alone discharges that burden.
Opinion — Wiener
Opinion
WIENER, J.In a companion case decided today (People v. Hallman, ante, p. 1330 [264 Cal.Rptr. 215]), this court concluded that “contrary to the procedure adopted in Wilder v. Superior Court [(1979)] 92 Cal.App.3d 90, . . . trial court[s] can, by local rule, require the moving party in [Penal Code] section 1538.5 motions to set forth with specificity the grounds and theories to support the motion to suppress evidence.” (Ante, at p. 1333.) Like the defendant in Hallman, defendant Isabella Vaelua Davis here relies on Wilder to justify her failure to file detailed legal and factual arguments in support of her suppression motion. 1 The majority opinion in Hallman declining to follow Wilder necessarily requires that we reject Davis’s arguments here.
Even had Hallman reached a different conclusion, however, reversal of this case would not be required. Here, in contrast to Hallman, the People *1350 assumed Wilder applied and did plead a theory of justification for the warrantless detention of Davis on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Davis chose not to respond to the People’s submission. Finding that the pleadings “raised no disputed issue of fact,” the court denied the motion without requiring the People to present any evidence.
Relying on the People’s concession and the trial court’s finding that there was a warrantless seizure in this case, Davis contends the People failed to meet their burden of proving an applicable exception to the warrant requirement because they presented no evidence at the Penal Code section 1538.5 hearing. She suggests that the defendant’s responsive pleading referred to in Wilder, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at page 97 is an optional exercise which, if not filed, should obligate the People to conduct a full-scale evidentiary hearing at which all facts necessary to demonstrate the justification are proved. In short, Davis argues, there is no section 1538.5 equivalent to a civil judgment on the pleadings.
We do not view the Penal Code section 1538.5 procedures in as procrustean a fashion as does Davis. As we recognized in Hallman, local rules may legitimately provide procedures which facilitate the resolution of a suppression motion. (Ante, at p. 1341; see People v. Lewis (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 817, 820 [139 Cal.Rptr. 673].) Here, rule 31 of the local Municipal Court Rules for the San Diego Judicial District required a movant to “specifically state the theory or theories which shall be relied upon and urged for the suppression of evidence; and cite the specific authority or authorities which will be offered in support of the theory or theories upon which suppression of the evidence is urged.” Even under Wilder, a defendant cannot totally ignore local rule requirements which mandate specific argument supported by authorities. Certainly where, as here, the People have identified the justifications on which they will rely, such specific argument must be provided in a responsive pleading filed by the defendant.
Common sense suggests that an evidentiary hearing only be required where there are disputed issues of fact to be resolved. The express language of Penal Code section 1538.5 supports this result. Subdivision (c) provides in part that the judge “shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion.” Obviously where there is no dispute as to the facts, the receipt of evidence is not “necessary” to decide the motion.
Federal courts have reached a similar conclusion interpreting virtually identical statutory language in rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal *1351 Procedure (18 U.S.C.). 2 Referring to the statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: “Evidentiary hearings need not be set as a matter of course, but if the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question, an evidentiary hearing is required.” (United States v. Ledesma (9th Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 36, 39; accord United States v. Poe (5th Cir. 1972) 462 F.2d 195, 198; Grant v. United States (2d Cir. 1960) 282 F.2d 165, 170.)
Here, Davis never disputed the People’s statement of facts nor alleged a different set of facts which would have entitled her to relief, despite being given the opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the municipal court did not err in denying the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Disposition
Judgment affirmed.
Kremer, P. J., and Huffman, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 14, 1989, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 15, 1990. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Also as in Hallman, we asked the Attorney General to file a letter brief on the matter and to include a discussion of the applicability and persuasiveness of Wilder as it concerns suppression motions alleging a warrantless search and seizure.
Rule 41(e) provides in relevant part: “A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court. . . for the return of the property . . . . The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. . . .”
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Hallman D009402 · 1989-11-21
- Wilder v. Superior Court Civ. 4522 · 1979-04-18
- People v. Lewis Crim. 30180 · 1977-07-19
Cited by
- People v. Williams S063512 · 1999-05-12
- Cox v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SHASTA CTY. C016269 · 1993-10-26