gno.law

People v. Adams

California Court of Appeal · D010239 · 1990-11-07 · Published · 224 Cal. App. 3d 1540 · 274 Cal. Rptr. 629 · 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 1158

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHANNON MICHAEL ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant

Area
criminal
Panel
Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:35Z · confidence high

The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in prison after he entered a guilty plea, despite the defendant's failure to object to the presence of a different judge at the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant waived his right to be sentenced by the original judge by failing to object at the time of sentencing.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Waiver of Arbuckle right due to failure to object to sentencing by a different judge
“Because Adams failed to object below to sentencing by a judge other than the one who took his plea, he waived his Arbuckle right.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the rule from People v. Serrato and People v. Guerra that a defendant must object at sentencing to preserve an Arbuckle claim. The court properly rejected the contrary rule from People v. Rosaia, which required a showing of the defendant's knowledge of the right. The reasoning is consistent with the principle that the Arbuckle right is a matter of law implicit in the plea bargain, making contemporaneous objection necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 — Establishes the implied term in plea bargains that the judge who accepts the plea will impose the sentence, and that the defendant's expectation of this is a significant factor in the decision to plead guilty.
  • relied: People v. Guerra (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1067 — Expresses a strong preference for the rule that a defendant must register an objection when a second judge presides over sentencing, and that knowledge of the Arbuckle right should not be a prerequisite for finding waiver by silent conduct.
  • relied: People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761 — Holds that failure to object to sentencing by a new judge results in a waiver of the Arbuckle right, and rejects the rule from People v. Rosaia that requires a showing of the defendant's knowledge of the right.
  • relied: People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 — Held that fairness dictates the court must satisfy itself from the record that the defendant knew he had the right to be sentenced by the same judge before accepting silence as a waiver. This rule was explicitly rejected by the court in this opinion.
  • relied: People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987 — States that a defendant does not have the option of taking his chances before a different judge and then demanding the original judge if the result is unfavorable.
  • relied: People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701 — Maintained that a defendant's failure to object to sentencing by a different judge does not waive the Arbuckle right. This view was explicitly rejected by the court in this opinion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established rule from People v. Serrato and People v. Guerra that a defendant must object at sentencing to preserve an Arbuckle claim. The court provides a clear and logical rationale for rejecting the contrary rule from People v. Rosaia, which would have required a showing of the defendant's knowledge of the right.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:32Z · confidence medium

After Adams pleaded guilty to forcible sodomy under People v. West, a judge other than the one who accepted the plea sentenced him to the upper term of eight years without any objection from Adams. The Court of Appeal held that although the record showed Adams had an Arbuckle right to be sentenced by the plea judge, he waived it by failing to object before the second judge, and affirmed the judgment.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Whether the record established an implied Arbuckle term giving Adams a reasonable expectation that the judge who accepted his plea would also sentence him
“Here, we conclude Adams did have an Arbuckle right.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The court did not state a standard but examined the plea colloquy itself, relying on the judge's statement about the maximum sentence 'I could impose' and the clerk's reference to sentencing in 'this department.' Under Arbuckle, Mark L., Guerra and James H., the record must affirmatively show a reasonable expectation; the indicia here are thinner than the repeated personal pronouns in Arbuckle, but the conclusion is defensible and favorable to the defendant, so it does not undermine the result.
Sentencing by a judge other than the one who took the plea, where the defendant made no objection at the sentencing hearing (waiver of the Arbuckle right)
“Because Adams failed to object below to sentencing by a judge other than the one who took his plea, he waived his Arbuckle right. We therefore affirm the judgment.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court decided a pure question of law, adopting the Third District's Serrato rule and rejecting the Fifth District's Rosaia/Horn view that a knowing waiver must appear on the record. The reasoning tracks Arbuckle's own premise that the sentencing judge's identity is a bargained-for term the defendant relies upon, so the defendant necessarily knows of it and should not be permitted to gamble on the second judge and then complain on appeal (People v. West, 107 Cal.App.3d 987). The court candidly acknowledged the split and explained its choice; the position is a reasonable application of ordinary forfeiture principles, though the opinion uses 'waiver' loosely for what is really forfeiture by failure to object.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 — When a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion, an implied term of the bargain is that the same judge will impose sentence.
  • relied: In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 — An Arbuckle right arises only where the record affirmatively shows a reasonable expectation of sentencing by the judge who took the plea.
  • relied: People v. Guerra (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1067 — Same-court precedent criticizing Rosaia and expressing a strong preference for requiring a defendant to object before the second judge at sentencing.
  • relied: People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761 — Failure to object to sentencing by a different judge waives the Arbuckle right; knowledge of the right is implicit in Arbuckle's reasoning, so no record showing of knowledge is required.
  • relied: In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 — The record must show a reasonable expectation of sentencing by the plea judge; failure to object supports waiver.
  • relied: People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987 — A defendant assigned to a different sentencing judge may proceed or withdraw the plea but may not take his chances with the new judge and then demand the original judge if dissatisfied.
  • relied: People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 — Authorizes negotiated guilty pleas without admission of factual guilt; the basis of Adams's plea.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion squarely identifies the Arbuckle issue, finds the right existed on the record, and then resolves the waiver question by openly choosing between the conflicting Serrato and Rosaia/Horn lines, explaining why the knowledge-on-the-record requirement contradicts Arbuckle's own rationale. It cites the relevant Supreme Court and Court of Appeal authority and answers the defendant's argument directly, leaving no significant argument unaddressed.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Huffman

Opinion

HUFFMAN, J.

Shannon Michael Adams entered a negotiated guilty plea to forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)) pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]. The court sentenced him to the upper term of eight years in prison. This appeal squarely raises the question of whether a defendant sentenced by a judge other than the one who accepted the guilty plea may withhold objection to the new judge and *1542 raise Arbuckle 1 error for the first time on appeal. We hold such claim has been waived by the defendant’s failure to make a timely objection.

Factual Background

Seventeen-year-old Emily M. met Adams, whom she knew as Mike Smith, in the spring of 1988. They had one date near the end of the 1988 school year. She did not see him again until he came to her door on the evening of September 29, 1988, when her mother was out. She let him in the house. They drank a couple of cans of beer and smoked two pipes of marijuana. They went to Emily’s room and undressed. After about a half hour of sexual contact, she became distressed, arose from the bed, and went into the bathroom. She returned and put on a T-shirt and shorts. She asked Adams to leave, explaining she was romantically involved with someone else, felt guilty, and did not wish to continue. He got up and asked permission to hug her. They fell back on the bed. Adams tried to have intercourse with Emily through her shorts. When she pushed him away, he became angry, slapped her, verbally assaulted her, and ripped off her shirt. They had intercourse. Adams instructed Emily to get on her hands and knees, sodomized her, and left. She called the police and was taken to Children’s Hospital for medical treatment.

Adams later said: “I don’t know why I sodomized her. No, I didn’t think at the time I would hurt her. After it was all done and she was crying, I felt sorry and apologized.” However, when asked why he went to Emily’s house, he responded: “Well, hell, I’d been locked up for a long time, I was hornier than hell, and I was out to fuck anything I could.”

Discussion

Adams contends he was denied the right to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea, and his failure to object at sentencing did not constitute a waiver of this right.

“As a general principle, . . . whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.” (People v. *1543 Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 756-757.) In order for era. Arbuckle right to arise, the record must affirmatively show the defendant had a reasonable expectation of sentencing by the judge who took the plea. (People v. Guerra (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1067, 1071-1072 [246 Cal.Rptr. 392]; In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911, 919-920 [212 Cal.Rptr. 61]; In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 177 [193 Cal.Rptr. 165, 666 P.2d 22].)

Thus, the Arbuckle rule is for the benefit of the defendant who believes some agreement has been reached with a particular judge; where that is not the case, there is no reason why a different judge should not sentence. Here, we conclude Adams did have an Arbuckle right. The judge at the change of plea hearing asked “Do you understand that the maximum sentence I could impose in this case is up to eight years in state prison and $20,000 fine?” The clerk later suggested a date for sentencing in “this department.” While the judge who took the plea did not make “repeated use of the personal pronoun when referring to sentencing” as in People v. Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 756 or in In re Mark L., supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 177, the circumstances nevertheless lend credence to the conclusion Adams had a reasonable expectation of sentencing by that judge (see People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 764 [247 Cal.Rptr. 322]; In re Thomas S. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 934, 939 [177 Cal.Rptr. 742]). We must therefore consider whether he waived his Arbuckle right.

In Guerra, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1067, we criticized the Fifth District’s opinion in People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 [203 Cal.Rptr. 856], stating “our strong preference for the rule that a defendant who by implication from the plea is expecting sentencing by the same judge register his objection as he stands before a second judge for sentencing. It is unreasonable to allow such an ‘unsatisfied’ defendant to stand idly before the second judge all the way through the sentencing process and then raise the Arbuckle issue for the first time on appeal.

“A record showing knowledge by the defendant of his or her Arbuckle right, while desirable, should not be a necessary prerequisite to finding a waiver by silent conduct at sentencing.” (People v. Guerra, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1073.) We did not determine the waiver issue in Guerra because we concluded the defendant there had no Arbuckle right. (Ibid.)

In People v. Serrato, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 761, the Third District held failure to object to sentencing by a new judge results in a waiver of the Arbuckle right. (Id. at pp. 764-765, citing In re James H., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 918.) The Serrato court stated: “In People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 . . . , the Fifth District created an exception to the *1544 requirement of an objection when it held, ‘fairness dictates that before accepting silence or acquiescence in sentencing by a different judge as a waiver, the court must satisfy itself from the record that defendant knew he had the right to be sentenced by the same judge who took his plea.’ (Id., at p. 840.) Thus, under Rosaia, Arbuckle rights are not waived by a lack of objection unless the record demonstrates the defendant knew of the rights. (Ibid.) Because we find such an approach contradicts the logical underpinning of Arbuckle, we decline to follow Rosaia.

“In Arbuckle, the court stated, ‘Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.’ (22 Cal.3d at p. 757.) Thus, when a defendant enters a bargain, ‘in expectation of and [in] reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge’ (id. at p. 756), the defendant must be aware he is entitled to this part of the bargain as a matter of right once he enters his plea of guilty. Knowledge by the defendant of his Arbuckle right as a part of the plea bargain is implicit in the reasoning of Arbuckle. Thus, we conclude, when faced with a different sentencing judge, a defendant must object at that time or waive his Arbuckle rights.” (People v. Serrato, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at pp. 764-765.)

We agree with Serrato's rejection of Rosaia and now adopt the Serrato rule. 2 A defendant who has an Arbuckle right must object if a different judge presides at sentencing.

“Arbuckle recognizes that if a defendant’s case is assigned to a different judge for sentencing, the defendant can proceed before that judge or withdraw his plea. [Citation.] [A] defendant . . . does not have the option of taking his chances before the different judge and, if the result is unfavorable, then demand the original judge.” (People v. West (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [165 Cal.Rptr. 24], italics omitted.)

Because Adams failed to object below to sentencing by a judge other than the one who took his plea, he waived his Arbuckle right. We therefore affirm the judgment.

*1545 Disposition

Judgment affirmed.

Kremer, P. J., and Benke, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied November 27, 1990, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 24, 1991. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

2

We similarly reject the modified Fifth District view set forth in People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701 [261 Cal.Rptr. 814], In Horn, the court disapproved Rosaia to the extent it suggested “the Arbuckle term is implied in all plea bargains even in the absence of an affirmative showing on the record supporting a reasonable expectation that the judge who accepted the plea will also impose sentence.” (Id. at p. 708.) The Horn court maintained, however, a defendant’s failure to object to sentencing by a different judge does not waive the Ar-buckle right. (Id. at p. 709.)

Cites, in this corpus

Cited by