gno.law

Lucas v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal · D007578 · 1988-04-29 · Published · 201 Cal. App. 3d 149 · 247 Cal. Rptr. 59 · 1988 Cal. App. LEXIS 447

DAVID ALLEN LUCAS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest

Area
criminal
Panel
Don R. Work (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T07:40Z · confidence high

The trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear a *Coffey-Sumstine* motion challenging a prior conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, limiting such motions to specific procedural defects. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to entertain the motion, holding that *Coffey* motions are not limited to simple issues and that the trial court was bound by binding precedent.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a *Coffey-Sumstine* motion challenging a prior conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
“The court, however, ruled to the contrary saying that collateral attack on priors based on constitutional claims by way of a Coffey-Sumstine motion is limited to those involving lack of counsel, failure to waive counsel and Boykin-Tahl error.”
de novoerroragree with court
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in limiting *Coffey* motions to specific procedural defects, citing *People v. Sumstine* and *People v. Amaya* to establish that ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid ground for such a motion. The court further noted that the trial court was bound by the binding precedent of *Amaya* under the doctrine of stare decisis.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 — Established the procedure for challenging the validity of a prior conviction via a pretrial motion to strike.
  • relied: People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 — Held that *Coffey* motions are not limited to simple issues and explicitly permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on such a motion.
  • relied: People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 — Cited for the proposition that the validity of a prior conviction based on ineffective counsel can be determined on retrial in accord with *Coffey* procedure.
  • relied: People v. Amaya (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1 — Specifically approved the use of a *Coffey* motion to attack a prior conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — Cited for the doctrine of stare decisis, establishing that the trial court is bound by the precedent set in *Amaya*.
  • misapplied: People v. Superior Court (Gaulden) (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 773 — The trial court relied on this case to limit *Coffey* motions, but the appellate court found this reliance misplaced as *Gaulden* was overruled by *Sumstine*.
  • relied: In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762 — Cited in a footnote to support that the issue may also be raised by habeas corpus but ordinarily should be raised by a motion to strike.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly identifies the controlling authority (*Sumstine* and *Amaya*) that expands the scope of *Coffey* motions to include ineffective assistance of counsel. It properly applies the doctrine of stare decisis to bind the trial court to this precedent and correctly identifies the trial court's reliance on *Gaulden* as misplaced.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:32Z · confidence medium

The superior court, in a capital case, refused to entertain the defendant's pretrial Coffey-Sumstine motion to strike a 1973 rape and assault prior alleged as penalty-phase aggravation, ruling that such motions are limited to denial-of-counsel, waiver-of-counsel, and Boykin-Tahl claims and that an ineffective-assistance challenge must proceed by habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the superior court to entertain the motion, holding that Coffey, Coleman, Sumstine (fn. 6), and Amaya establish that ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised by a Coffey motion and that the trial court's reliance on Gaulden was misplaced because Sumstine overruled it on that point.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Trial court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a Coffey-Sumstine motion to strike a prior conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, limiting such motions to lack of counsel, failure to waive counsel, and Boykin-Tahl error.
“Let a peremptory writ issue directing the superior court to entertain the motion to strike.”
de novoerror (law misapplied)agree with court
The scope of a pretrial motion to strike a prior is a pure question of law and the Court of Appeal resolved it without deference. Coffey established the pretrial motion procedure; Coleman applied it to an ineffective-assistance claim; Sumstine footnote 6 expressly stated that defendants may raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion; and Amaya approved the practice. Under Auto Equity Sales the trial court was bound by Sumstine, and Gaulden, which held otherwise, could not survive Sumstine's footnote. The prosecution had effectively conceded jurisdiction. The opinion's conclusion follows directly from binding authority as it stood in 1988.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 — A defendant may challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction by pretrial motion to strike, and if properly raised at or before trial the issue should be heard and determined then.
  • relied: People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 — Coffey motions are not limited to simple issues; the Supreme Court has permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion (fn. 6).
  • relied: People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 — The validity of a prior conviction attacked on ineffective-assistance grounds can be determined under the Coffey procedure.
  • relied: People v. Amaya (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1 — A Coffey motion may be used to attack a prior conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • relied: Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 — Under stare decisis, trial courts are bound by decisions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal.
  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Gaulden) (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 773 — Held that Coffey motions do not extend to ineffective-assistance claims; the Court of Appeal treated it as overruled on this point, expressly or by implication, by Sumstine footnote 6.
  • relied: In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762 — A challenge to a prior may be raised by habeas corpus but ordinarily should be raised by a motion to strike or a plea denying the prior conviction.
  • relied: United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 — A peremptory writ may issue in the first instance where an alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion identifies the controlling Supreme Court authority (Coffey, Coleman, Sumstine fn. 6) and the Court of Appeal decision (Amaya) squarely supporting use of a Coffey motion for ineffective-assistance claims, and correctly explains why the trial court's contrary authority (Gaulden) no longer controlled under Auto Equity Sales. The reasoning is brief but complete for the narrow procedural question presented, and the peremptory-writ disposition is properly justified by citation to Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 and supporting cases.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Work

Opinion

WORK, J.

Petitioner, David Allen Lucas, is charged in a capital case. He seeks to challenge a 1973 rape conviction and accompanying assault conviction which have been alleged as circumstances in aggravation for the penalty phase of his trial. Petitioner brought a Coffey-Sumstine motion (People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]; People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909 [206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904]) seeking to have the prior stricken as unconstitutional on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court, sua sponte, said it questioned whether it had jurisdiction to hear such a motion thinking that the issue should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner briefed the questions raised by the trial court. The People did not respond. At the hearing, the prosecution in effect conceded the court had jurisdiction to hear the motion as filed. The court, however, ruled to the contrary saying that collateral attack on priors based on constitutional claims by way of a Coffey-Sumstine motion is limited to those involving lack of counsel, failure to waive counsel and Boykin-Tahl error. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U. S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].)

The question here is not whether one can challenge a prior conviction on the basis counsel was ineffective. Rather the question is how one *151 may do so. In People v. Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204, the defendant contended his prior conviction was invalid because he did not have nor did he waive counsel in the earlier proceedings. The court concluded the trial court should have heard a pretrial motion to strike. If the issue is properly raised at or before trial, it should be heard and determined then. (Id . at p. 215.) 1 Real party suggests that Coffey is limited to situations where lack of counsel is alleged. However, in People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 [80 Cal.Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248], the defendant alleged a prior conviction was invalid because his counsel had been ineffective. The court reversed on other grounds, commenting “the validity of the prior conviction can be determined on retrial in accord with the procedure set forth in People v. Coffey . . . .” (Id. at p. 1169.) In that the statement was made in the context of the upcoming retrial, one might question its use as precedent. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the practice when in People v. Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d 909, it said that Coffey motions were not limited to simple issues. “For example, we have permitted defendants to raise inadequate assistance of counsel on a Coffey motion,” citing Coleman. (Id. at p. 919, fn. 6.) In People v. Amaya (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1 [225 Cal.Rptr. 313], the court specifically approved the use of a Coffey motion to attack a prior on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the trial court is bound by this precedent (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937]). Its reliance on People v. Superior Court (Gaulden) (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 773 [136 Cal.Rptr. 229], which holds to the contrary, is misplaced as Gaulden was overruled on this point either expressly or by implication in Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 919, footnote 6.

An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the presentation. A peremptory writ is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; United Nuclear Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 359 [169 Cal.Rptr. 827]; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [96 Cal.Rptr. 165].)

Let a peremptory writ issue directing the superior court to entertain the motion to strike.

Wiener, Acting P. J., and Todd, J., concurred.

The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 11, 1988.

1

The question may also be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus but ordinarily should be raised by a motion to strike or a plea denying the prior conviction. (In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 [69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933].)

Cites, in this corpus

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