People v. Campos-Castillo
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HECTOR CAMPOS-CASTILLO, Defendant and Appellant
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Gerald J. Lewis (author)
Analysis
The trial court denied the defendant conduct credits for time spent in county jail and Patton State Hospital prior to his commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the defendant was not similarly situated to other committed patients for equal protection purposes and that the Legislature specifically excluded such credits from the calculation of the maximum term of commitment.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of conduct credits for time spent in Patton State Hospital and county jail prior to commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5.“The trial court properly denied the conduct credit for Campos-Castillo’s state hospital and county jail time before his commitment under section 1026.5.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court held that the denial was proper because the defendant was not similarly situated to MDSOs or CRC patients, and the Legislature explicitly excluded conduct credits from the maximum term calculation in section 1026.5. The court relied on the therapeutic nature of the commitment and statutory interpretation to affirm the trial court's decision. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223 — MDSOs are not denied equal protection by the inability to earn conduct credits because such credits interfere with therapeutic programs and are inconsistent with the goals of hospital treatment.
- relied: People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 — The distinction between detainees who serve no presentence time and those who do raises equal protection problems, but this disparity does not exist when neither group receives conduct credits against a maximum term of commitment.
- relied: People v. Smith (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 817 — There is no equal protection violation in denying precommitment conduct credits to reduce the maximum term of a defendant committed under section 1026, as both detainees and non-detainees receive no such credits.
- relied: People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148 — Supports the denial of good time/work time credits for pretrial time spent in a state mental hospital.
- relied: People v. Brunner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 761 — A section 1370 confinement is treatment, not punishment, and thus does not render a person similarly situated to an MDSO or CRC patient.
- relied: In re Bender (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 380 — Section 2931 allows for reduction of imprisonment terms for good behavior, but the Legislature specifically excluded such credits from the maximum term calculation in section 1026.5.
- relied: People v. Wasley (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 344 — Supports the proposition that there is no equal protection problem in denying precommitment conduct credits for jail time to reduce the maximum term of a defendant.
- relied: People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689 — Cited by the appellant as holding that denial of conduct credits violates equal protection, but distinguished by the court because the appellant was not similarly situated to the defendants in that case.
- relied: People v. Richard (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 559 — Cited by the appellant as holding that denial of conduct credits violates equal protection, but distinguished by the court because the appellant was not similarly situated to the defendants in that case.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly distinguishes the appellant's situation from prior equal protection cases by noting the lack of a guilt determination and the specific statutory exclusion of conduct credits from the maximum term calculation under section 1026.5. The court provides a clear statutory and policy-based rationale for affirming the trial court's denial of credits.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteThe trial court, after finding Campos-Castillo not guilty by reason of insanity and committing him to Patton State Hospital under Penal Code section 1026.5 with a 12-year maximum term, awarded him credit for 455 actual days of precommitment custody but denied section 4019 conduct credits for both his 252 days in Patton (on a section 1370 incompetency commitment) and his 203 days in county jail. The Court of Appeal rejected his equal protection challenge, relying on People v. Saffell, People v. Sage, People v. Jennings and People v. Smith, and affirmed the order; the Supreme Court denied review with Justice Reynoso voting to grant.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 4019 conduct credits for 252 days spent in Patton State Hospital on a section 1370 incompetency commitment, as applied against the section 1026.5 maximum term of commitment“On the basis of the reasons set forth in Saffell, supra, the trial court properly denied the good time/work time credits for the pretrial time spent at the state mental hospital.” | de novo | correct | unsure The question is a pure legal one (equal protection and statutory construction), so independent review is appropriate though the court never states a standard. The court applies Saffell's therapeutic-setting rationale and reads section 1026.5's instruction to disregard sections 2930-2932 credits as showing legislative intent to deny all conduct credits. The result follows the then-controlling Supreme Court reasoning in Saffell and Sage, but the court acknowledges contrary decisions in Jobinger and Richard and does not actually engage with their reasoning, and its 'not similarly situated' discussion of section 1370 patients is somewhat conclusory since the operative commitment here was under section 1026.5. The inference from the prison-credit provisions of sections 2930-2932 to precommitment section 4019 credits is also a step the court asserts rather than demonstrates. |
Denial of section 4019 conduct credits for 203 days of precommitment county jail time against the section 1026.5 maximum term“Moreover, in connection with the time spent in county jail, there is no equal protection problem in denying precommitment conduct credits for jail time to reduce the maximum term of a defendant.” | de novo | correct | unsure The court adopts Smith's reasoning that Sage condemned disparity between detainee/felons and non-detained felons, and that because no section 1026 committee receives conduct credits whether or not he served jail time, no such disparity exists. That is a coherent application of Sage as understood at the time, and Wasley is cited in support. However, the court does not address the argument that the detainee held in county jail is similarly situated to any other jail detainee who later earns section 4019 credits, which was the thrust of Jobinger and Richard, and the opinion simply notes that those cases held 'contrary' without distinguishing them. The result is defensible on the cited authority, but the reasoning skips the contrary appellate decisions appellant relied on. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223 — An MDSO is not denied equal protection by being unable to earn conduct credits available to prison inmates because good-time incentives are inconsistent with a therapeutic hospital setting and the commitment term is extendable.
- relied: People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 — Followed Saffell on MDSO conduct credits; held that the disparity between detainee/felons and felons serving no presentence time raises equal protection problems requiring presentence conduct credits for felons.
- relied: People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148 — Fourth District decision applying Saffell to deny conduct credits for time spent in a state hospital.
- relied: People v. Smith (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 817 — No equal protection violation in denying precommitment jail conduct credits against a section 1026 maximum term because no NGI committee, detained or not, receives such credits.
- relied: People v. Brunner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 761 — Confinement in a mental hospital is treatment, not punishment, so the committee is not similarly situated to prisoners for conduct-credit purposes.
- relied: People v. Wasley (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 344 — Cited in support of denying precommitment conduct credits for jail time against a maximum commitment term.
- relied: In re Bender (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 380 — Section 2931 reduces prison terms for good behavior and participation and has inmate productivity and rehabilitation as its purpose.
- relied: People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689 — Appellant's contrary authority holding conduct credits must be awarded; acknowledged by the court as contrary to Saffell, Sage and Jennings but not substantively distinguished.
- relied: People v. Richard (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 559 — Appellant's contrary authority on equal protection and conduct credits; acknowledged but not substantively analyzed by the court.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court reaches a result consistent with Saffell, Sage, Jennings and Smith, and its statutory point about section 1026.5 disregarding prison credits supports the conclusion. But it acknowledges an appellate split with Jobinger and Richard and never explains why those cases are wrong, and its inference that the Legislature's exclusion of sections 2930-2932 credits also excludes section 4019 precommitment credits is asserted rather than reasoned.
Opinion — Lewis
*928 Opinion
LEWIS, J.—HectorCampos-Castillo appeals the denial of conduct credit for time spent in county jail and Patton State Hospital before the trial of the criminal charges against him.
On June 1, 1983, before a preliminary hearing for charges of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, Campos-Castillo was declared mentally incompetent and committed to Patton State Hospital pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 1370. On February 14, 1984, he was certified to have regained mental competency and criminal proceedings were resumed.
On June 6, 1984, Campos-Castillo was found not guilty of the charges by reason of insanity. On June 29, 1984, he was determined to not have regained his sanity and, on July 5, 1984, was committed to Patton State Hospital for treatment until such time as he recovered his sanity, with the maximum term of commitment under section 1026.5 set at 12 years. On July 2, 1984, the probation department had submitted a report to the court indicating Campos-Castillo had spent a total of 252 days in Patton State Hospital and 203 days in county jail, for a total of 455 days precommitment custody. Campos-Castillo was awarded credit for the actual 455 days served and denied section 4019 good time/work time, or “conduct,” credits for both the time in Patton and the time in county jail.
I
Campos-Castillo contends denial of the 227 days of conduct credit for the time spent in Patton and county jail constitutes a denial of equal protection. He relies on People v. Jobinger (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 689 [200 Cal.Rptr. 546], and People v. Richard (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 559 [207 Cal.Rptr. 715], which held contrary to the decisions in People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223, 233-235 [157 Cal.Rptr. 897, 599 P.2d 92], People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 506 [165 Cal.Rptr. 280, 611 P.2d 874], and the more recent decision of this court in People v. Jennings (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 148, 150 [191 Cal.Rptr. 592], Saffell, followed by Sage, held “an MDSO [mentally disordered sex offender] is not denied equal protection of the laws because he cannot earn the conduct credit available to inmates of correctional facilities.” (People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d 506-507.) Saffell reasoned: “First, the very concept of ‘giving’ or ‘taking away’ time credits might materially interfere with other principles central to the operation of a therapeutic program. We cannot presume that hospital programs in general, and staff-patient relationships in particular, *929 will benefit from a procedure in which patients are threatened with varying lengths of commitment dependent upon their in-hospital behavior. MDSOs are, by statutory definition, individuals who suffer from a ‘mental disease, defect, or disorder. ’ The rationale of ‘good time ’ credit as a reward for behavioral conformity does not readily fit the company of the mentally disturbed. The ‘carrot or stick’ approach represented by the extension or withdrawal of credit as reward or punishment seems inconsistent with the goals of a hospital treatment facility.
“Second, if a patient intentionally acts in a disruptive manner in a hospital setting, he may be determined to be unamenable to treatment and transferred to state prison. This consequence, readily perceived, itself acts as a deterrent to intentional criminal conduct in the hospital setting.
“Third, at least part of the ‘good time’ may be earned by participation in prison rehabilitative and educational programs. It is not clear whether state hospitals currently even provide such ‘work, educational, vocational, [or] therapeutic ’ activities.
“Fourth, denial of ‘good time’ credits (pursuant to Pen. Code, § 2932) involves a whole panoply of administrative requirements, including a hearing. It is questionable whether hospital administrators have either the ability or the time, given an already burdensome workload, to comply with these additional procedures or whether the type of adversary proceeding which might result, contemplating written notice, investigation, hearing, etc., would assist in furthering the treatment program of the patient.
“Finally, it seems pointless to give an MDSO ‘good time’ credit against his medical commitment period because section 6316.2 allows extension of the treatment period if found to be necessary. The concept of ‘good time’ credit only has meaning within the context of a fixed criminal sentence which may not be so extended.” (People v. Saffell, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 234; italics added.)
Within the context of a section 1370 commitment, Campos-Castillo is not similarly situated to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) committee or MDSO patient either before Jobinger or after. Section 1370 requires a defendant found mentally incompetent to be sent to a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered. At this point in the proceeding, there has been no determination of guilt or innocence. The defendant is instead placed in a medical facility until such time as he has regained mental competency to stand trial. Both the CRC patient and the MDSO, however, face potential commitment to the penal facility after undergoing treatment. The section 1370 patient having been found neither *930 guilty nor innocent does not face this same problem of commitment and therefore cannot be said to be similarly situated.
There are two sound reasons for not awarding good time/work time credits. First, a section 1370 confinement is not punishment but treatment. Accordingly, confinement to a mental hospital does not render a person similarly situated to an MDSO or CRC patient. (See People v. Brunner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 761, 765 [195 Cal.Rptr. 367].)
Second, and more importantly, the Legislature has specifically denied conduct credits for those committed under section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1). During all relevant periods that section provided, in pertinent part: “For the purposes of this section, ‘maximum term of commitment’ shall mean the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted . . . disregarding any credits which could have been earned under sections 2930 to 2932 inclusive.” Section 2931 allows for reduction of the term of imprisonment for good behavior and participation and has inmate productivity and rehabilitation as its purpose. (In re Bender (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 380, 388 [196 Cal.Rptr. 801].) It follows, the Legislature also did not intend a reduction for ^recommitment conduct credits. (See People v. Smith (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 817, 824, fn. 3 [175 Cal.Rptr. 54].)
On the basis of the reasons set forth in Saffell, supra, the trial court properly denied the good time/work time credits for the pretrial time spent at the state mental hospital. (See also People v. Jennings, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d 148, 150.) Moreover, in connection with the time spent in county jail, there is no equal protection problem in denying precommitment conduct credits for jail time to reduce the maximum term of a defendant. (P eople v. Smith, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 817, 826; see also People v. Wasley (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 344 [184 Cal.Rptr. 25].) Smith explains: “ ‘Zf is the distinction between the detainee/felon and the felon who serves no presentence time that raises equal protection problems. ’ (People v. Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 507, italics added.)
“In the instant case, the disparity condemned by Sage does not exist. The defendant who serves no jail time prior to his Penal Code section 1026 commitment to state hospital receives no conduct credits against his maximum term of commitment. The detainee ultimately committed to state hospital under Penal Code section 1026 likewise does not receive conduct credits. On the other hand, to hold that equal protection requires an award of precommitment conduct credits to defendants ultimately committed to state hospital under Penal Code section 1026 would turn Sage on its head and reintroduce a disparity whereby only the detainee had his maximum term of *931 commitment reduced by conduct credits.” (People v. Smith, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 826.)
The trial court properly denied the conduct credit for Campos-Castillo’s state hospital and county jail time before his commitment under section 1026.5.
The order is affirmed.
Wiener, Acting P. J., and Kintner, J., * concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 3, 1986. Reynoso, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Richard B003809 · 1984-11-01
- People v. Jobinger F001890 · 1984-03-26
- In Re Bender Crim. 17167 · 1983-11-30
- People v. Brunner Crim. 6456 · 1983-07-13
- People v. Jennings Crim. 13694 · 1983-05-19
- People v. Wasley Crim. 11292 · 1982-06-30
- People v. Smith Crim. 4485 · 1981-06-23
- People v. Sage Crim. 20997 · 1980-02-19
- People v. Saffell Crim. 20837 · 1979-09-05
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