United States v. Lua-Bermejo
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sergio LUA-BERMEJO, Defendant-Appellant
- Proceeding
- appeal
- Trial court
- United States District Court for the Southern District of California
- Trial judge
- Thomas J. Whelan (district judge)
- Outcome
- affirmed — AFFIRMED.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Joseph J. Farris (author), Jay S. Bybee, Edward Leavy
Analysis
No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 14 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 07-50435 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. CR-06-02515-TJW v. MEMORANDUM * SERGIO LUA-BERMEJO, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 8, 2011 ** Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Sergio Lua-Bermejo appeals from his conviction for attempted entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Lua-Bermejo contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment because the prior removal alleged in the indictment was the product of a fundamentally unfair deportation proceeding. First, Lua-Bermejo contends that his appeal waiver was invalid. The record reflects that his waiver was “considered and intelligent.” United States v. Estrada-Torres, 179 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Second, Lua-Bermejo contends that he was not adequately advised of possible eligibility for discretionary relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). There was no possibility that Lua-Bermejo was eligible for relief because he did not have the requisite seven years of unrelinquished domicile. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994);
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896-901 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accordingly, the immigration judge did not have a duty to inform him of such relief. See Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 901.
Finally, Lua-Bermejo contends that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary. This contention was not raised in the district court and 2 07-50435 we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 501 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED.
3 07-50435