United States v. 0.64 Acres of Land in Los Angeles County
UNITED STATES v. 0.64 ACRES OF LAND IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY Et Al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Yankwich (author)
Analysis
The court decided a motion to strike a paragraph of the defendant's answer that claimed moving and relocation costs in a condemnation action. The court granted the motion, ordering the paragraph stricken based on the principle that relocation costs are not an element of just compensation.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to strike paragraph 9 of the answer granted“The said motion is granted, and the whole of said paragraph 9 of said answer is hereby ordered stricken.” | agree with court The court applied the rule that relocation costs are not part of just compensation, citing Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence and Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States. The court reasoned that if relocation costs are not allowed when the fee is taken, they should not be allowed when only a leasehold is taken, especially when the owner is the occupant. This follows the cited authorities and the court's prior memorandum in United States v. Certain Parcels of Land. |
The order itself: sound — The court's reasoning is sound. It correctly identifies the controlling principle from Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent that relocation costs are not part of just compensation for the taking of a fee interest. It logically extends this principle to the taking of a leasehold interest where the owner is the occupant, rejecting the argument that a different rule should apply. The court addresses the contrary authority (General Motors) by noting its concession on the fee-taking issue.
Opinion — Yankwich
YANKWICH, District Judge.
The motion of the plaintiff to strike paragraph 9 of the answer of the defendant United States Gypsum Co., a corporation, heretofore argued and submitted, is now decided as follows:
The said motion is granted, and the whole of said paragraph 9 of said answer is hereby ordered stricken.
The determination of this motion is governed by the memorandum filed by me on February 19, 1944, in No. 274 — S.D., Civil, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 54 F.Supp. 561, in which I ordered stricken from the answer moving and removing costs claimed by a tenant whose leasehold was condemned. In view of counsel’s insistence that a different rule should apply where the owner himself occupies the property and the Government seeks to condemn a leasehold interest only, I have given the matter further consideration. About the only case which I did not have before me when deciding the other matter is the recent opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in General Motors Corporation v. United States, 140 F.2d 873, wherein a majority of the court approves the allowance of moving costs. If it be conceded that the rule is correct when applied to a tenant other than the owner, I cannot see why a different rule should apply where the owner of the fee is the occupant. And if — as even the majority opinion in General Motors Corporation v. United States case, supra, concedes — , the cost of relocation is not an element to be considered in an award on the taking of the fee (see Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 1923, 262 U.S. 668, 43 S.Ct. 684, 67 L.Ed. 1167; Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States, 1936, 66 App.D.C. 77, 85 F.2d 243), no sound reason compels its allowance when less than the fee is taken. The just compensation guaranteed by the Constitution must be just to both sides. Had a principle of law which would allow relocation cost when the owner occupies the premises and deny it when a tenant occupies them would establish a criterion of differentiation which has no reasonable foundation in fact.
Hence the ruling above made.
Cites, in this corpus
- United States v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND, ETC. Civil Action 274-SD · 1944-02-19