Wescott v. Wackenhut Corp.

District Court, S.D. California · Civ. 83-130-T · 1983-09-22 · Published

Marjorie Ann WESCOTT, Plaintiff, v. the WACKENHUT CORPORATION, Defendant

Proceeding: district
Area: civil
Panel: Turrentine (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T00:47Z · confidence high

The court considered a motion for partial summary judgment, treated as a motion to reconsider a prior motion to dismiss, regarding the plaintiff's state law claims alongside a federal Title VII claim. The court ordered the dismissal of the state law claims for want of jurisdiction, finding that the state claims predominated over the federal claim and that Congress had negated pendent jurisdiction in this context.

What the court decided	The model
Dismissal of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim (First Cause of Action) and the Second and Third Causes of Action (state common law claims) for want of jurisdiction. “ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim in the plaintiff’s First Cause of Action and the Second and Third Causes of Action are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.”	agree with court The court correctly applied the pendent jurisdiction doctrine as established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger. The court identified that the state claims sought remedies (compensatory and punitive damages, jury trial) unavailable under Title VII, making the state claims predominant. The court also correctly noted that Congress, by limiting Title VII remedies to equitable relief and denying jury trials, impliedly negated pendent jurisdiction over state claims seeking those specific remedies. This aligns with the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equipment and the general principle that pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and should be exercised cautiously when state claims predominate or when federal policy suggests otherwise.

What the court decided

The model

Dismissal of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim (First Cause of Action) and the Second and Third Causes of Action (state common law claims) for want of jurisdiction.

“ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim in the plaintiff’s First Cause of Action and the Second and Third Causes of Action are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.”

agree with court
The court correctly applied the pendent jurisdiction doctrine as established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger. The court identified that the state claims sought remedies (compensatory and punitive damages, jury trial) unavailable under Title VII, making the state claims predominant. The court also correctly noted that Congress, by limiting Title VII remedies to equitable relief and denying jury trials, impliedly negated pendent jurisdiction over state claims seeking those specific remedies. This aligns with the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equipment and the general principle that pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and should be exercised cautiously when state claims predominate or when federal policy suggests otherwise.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the legal framework for pendent jurisdiction (Gibbs and Owen Equipment), applies the specific facts of the case (state claims seeking damages and jury trial vs. federal claim seeking only equitable relief), and concludes that the state claims predominate and that Congress impliedly negated pendent jurisdiction in this context. The court cites appropriate binding authority and persuasive district court cases to support its conclusion. The reasoning is logical and follows directly from the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Turrentine

ORDER

TURRENTINE, District Judge.

On September 19, 1983, the court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Noting the similarity of grounds and supporting arguments between this motion and defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss, the court treats the present motion as a motion to reconsider defendant’s previous motion to dismiss.

Upon reconsideration of the submitted papers, the court concludes that the state law claims in this case constitute the “tail” which wags the federal “dog,” and that an assertion of pendant jurisdiction over them would therefore be ill-advised.

It is a settled principle of law that it is appropriate to dismiss state law claims without prejudice if the state issues would predominate in terms of the comprehensiveness of the remedies sought in federal court.

Cancellier v. Federated Department Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.1982);

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Punitive and compen *10 satory damages are available under the state common law claims which constitute the second and third counts of the present action, and under the Fair Employment and Housing Act claim contained in the first count.

Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 211, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912 (1982). However, the relief available under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act is equitable in nature, including, inter alia, reinstatement and backpay, but not compensatory or exemplary damages.

E.E.O.C. v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 2669, 53 L.Ed.2d 267 (1977); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458 n. 5, 461, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1719 n. 5, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1973). The lion’s share of the relief sought by the plaintiff in the instant case is available only under the state law claims. Therefore, an assertion of pendant jurisdiction over state claims which would predominate in the suit is inappropriate.

Moreover, the Gibbs standard sets forth only the minimum requirements for a constitutional exercise of pendant jurisdiction. The court must also determine that Congress has not expressly or by implication negated the exercise of pendant jurisdiction over a particular nonfederal claim.

Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-73, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2401-02, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). It is dubious that Congress would consider an assertion of pendant jurisdiction over the state claims in this case to be proper, since Congress ruled out both compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII cases, as well as the availability of the jury trial which plaintiff has demanded on her state law claims. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-98, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). Numerous courts have declined to admit the pendant state claims in circumstances such as these. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox, 368 F.Supp. 829, 940 (N.D.Calif.1973);

Grohal v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 385 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (N.D.Calif.1974);

Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Co., 443 F.Supp. 1334, 1340-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);

Lim v. Int’l Institute of Metro. Detroit, 510 F.Supp. 722, 724-26 (E.D.Mich.1981);

Bennett v. Southern Marine Management, 531 F.Supp. 115, 117-18 (M.D.Fla.1982);

Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, 555 F.Supp. 730, 734-35 (D.S. C.1983);

James v. Kid Broadcasting Co., 559 F.Supp. 1153, 1155-57 (D.Idaho 1983).

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim in the plaintiff’s First Cause of Action and the Second and Third Causes of Action are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

Cites, in this corpus

Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court L.A. 31512 · 1982-08-30