gno.law

Price v. United States Navy

District Court, S.D. California · 89-1526-IEG (CM) · 1992-10-21 · Published

Gloria PRICE, Et Al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES NAVY, Et Al., Defendants. and Related Counter-Actions

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Irma E. Gonzalez (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T00:44Z · confidence high

The court considered the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for medical monitoring costs under CERCLA § 107(a). The court dismissed the claim, finding that medical monitoring costs are not recoverable as response costs under the statute.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for medical monitoring costs is granted.
“The plaintiffs’ claim for the medical costs set forth in paragraph 48 of the first claim of the first amended complaint is hereby dismissed.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co. was persuasive authority on the issue of whether medical monitoring constitutes a recoverable response cost under CERCLA § 107(a). The court adopted the reasoning of Daigle, which rejected the broader interpretation found in Brewer v. Ravan. Since the order recites the legal basis for the dismissal and applies a persuasive circuit court decision that aligns with the statutory interpretation, the decision follows from the law and the record presented.

The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound. It correctly identifies the relevant statute (CERCLA § 107(a)), acknowledges the lack of binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit, and relies on the persuasive authority of the Tenth Circuit's Daigle decision. The court explicitly rejects the contrary district court precedent (Brewer) in favor of the more recent and detailed circuit court analysis. The reasoning directly answers the motion to dismiss by establishing that the claimed costs are not recoverable under the cited statute.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion — Gonzalez

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this case have brought a claim for medical monitoring costs against the defendants apparently under Title 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)

, which provides that certain responsible parties may be sued for “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan ... ”. Whether response costs include medical monitoring under this section is an issue that, until recently, had been only addressed by district courts. However, the Tenth Circuit recently decided the issue of medical monitoring in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.1992). In Daigle, plaintiffs sought the establishment of a fund to finance long-term “medical monitoring” or “medical surveillance” designed to detect the onset of any latent disease that had been caused by exposure to toxic fumes. Plaintiffs relied on the language contained in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).

In the present case, plaintiffs, in argument to the court and in their memoranda of law in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, rely on this same section.

Plaintiffs also rely on the case of Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F.Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D.Tenn.1988) in support of their claim that they are entitled to medical monitoring costs. In that case, the district court held that “removal” and “remedial” costs encompass medical monitoring.

*1323 In Daigle, the court expressly rejected the analysis in Brewer as overly broad, stating that the “Brewer court [went] awry in affording a broad sweep to the ‘public health and welfare’ language in the definitions.” 972 F.2d at 1535. I agree.

In reaching its conclusion, the Daigle court went through a very detailed analysis of the language contained in the response costs definitions and the history and structure of CERCLA in arriving at its conclusion that costs are not recoverable under CERCLA § 107(a). Although this decision is not binding on this court, I believe its reasoning is sound and therefore persuasive.

The plaintiffs’ claim for the medical costs set forth in paragraph 48 of the first claim of the first amended complaint is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA”) § 107(a).

. In the first claim of their first amended complaint, plaintiffs seek to recover the costs of medical care and testing pursuant to § 9604(i)(4) of CERCLA. In none of plaintiffs' other arguments to the court, nor in their memoranda, do they refer to this section of CERCLA as a basis for their claim for medical monitoring costs. Moreover, § 107(a) of CERCLA is the only provision under which plaintiffs can seek response costs in this case. Therefore, it appears that plaintiffs reference to § 9604(i)(4) of CERCLA in the first claim of their complaint is misplaced.

. Plaintiffs in Brewer relied on § 107(a) in seeking costs of medical testing and screening as "necessary costs of response”, which further supports this court's assumption of plaintiffs’ reliance on § 107(a) and not § 104(i)(4).

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