gno.law

In Re Page

District Court, S.D. California · 15594 · 1926-03-31 · Published

In Re PAGE

Proceeding
district
Area
other
Panel
Henning (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T01:13Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a naturalization petition filed by an American-born woman who married a Canadian citizen in 1906 and determined that she had lost her U.S. citizenship upon marriage under the Act of March 2, 1907. The court ruled that the petitioner was an alien and that her petition for naturalization was properly before the court.

What the court decidedThe model
The court determined that the petitioner, Florence Bertha Page, is an alien and that her petition for naturalization is properly before the court.
“It follows that petitioner, Florence Bertha Page, is an alien, and her petition is properly before the court as such.”
disagree with court · statutory interpretation
The court's conclusion that the petitioner is an alien relies on the premise that the Act of March 2, 1907, is declaratory of the common law and applies retroactively to marriages occurring before the Act's passage. While the court cites *Kelly v. Owen* to support the interpretation of 'marriage' as a continuing state, it does not cite the specific Supreme Court authority (*Mackenzie v. Smith*, 1925) that explicitly held the 1907 Act was not retroactive and that a woman who married an alien before 1907 did not lose her citizenship. Consequently, the application of the 1907 Act to a 1906 marriage is legally incorrect under the binding precedent existing at the time of the order.

The order itself: questionable — The court's reasoning is flawed because it fails to apply the correct legal standard regarding the retroactivity of the 1907 Act. By declaring the Act 'declaratory of the law' without citing the controlling Supreme Court precedent that explicitly rejected this view for pre-1907 marriages, the court reaches a result that contradicts established law. The reliance on *Fitzroy* is also problematic, as *Fitzroy* actually supported the petitioner's position (that she was not an alien), yet the court distinguishes it on facts that do not change the legal rule regarding retroactivity.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion — Henning

HENNING, District Judge.

The petitioner herein filed her petition in due course, asking that she may be made a citizen of the United States. The matter came on for hearing before the court on March 5,1926. Witnesses were examined and proved satisfactory. It appears from the petition that the petitioner was bom in Thompsonville, Conn.; that she married Joseph Arthur Page, a native of Canada, and a Canadian citizen, on May 28, 1906. She and her husband have resided continuously in the United States, and her status has remained unchanged from the date of her marriage until the present time.

At the hearing, the question was raised whether or not petitioner was competent to file a petition, on the ground that she possibly might be a citizen of the United States and not an alien. The court took the matter under advisement for further consideration. A brief was filed, covering the questions of law involved, by Mr. Frederick Jones, District Director of Naturalization for this district, in the manner of amicus curias.

The sole and only issue involved is the question: Did or not-this petitioner lose her American citizenship by her marriage to the alien, Joseph Arthur Page, on the date given, which was prior to the Act of March 2, 1907 (Comp. St. §§ 3958-3964) ? My attention has been invited to a carefully prepared opinion in the Matter of Fitzroy (D. C.) 4 F.(2d) 541. In that ease an American woman married an alien in 1905. In 1924 she obtained a divorce, and about a year later filed her petition for naturalization. At the time of the hearing, she was an unmarried woman. The court there found that the applicant was no longer an alien.

The Fitzroy Case differs from the ease at bar, in that the petitioner here is still married to her alien husband. It is similar to the Fitzroy Case in that the petitioner and' her husband have continuously resided in the United States from the time of their marriage, prior to the Act of March 2, 1907. The court found, among other things, that the weight of judicial authority in this country is that a woman who was an American citizen did not, at common law, lose her citizenship by marrying an alien in the United States, unless she removed from the country.

There is a conflict, and a sharp one, between opinions written prior to 1907 as to the status of an American woman who married an alien and remained in the United States. It is, however, true that in all common-law countries it has always and consistently been held that the wife and minor children take the nationality of the husband and father. That is the common-law doctrine.

The Act of March 2, 1907, provides that an American-born woman, or a woman, being an American citizen, who marries an alien, shall take the nationality of her husband. No one has seriously questioned the doctrine that an American woman, marrying subsequent to the Act of March 2, 1907, takes the nationality of her husband. The question at bar is whether or not that act was declaratory of the law, and had an effect upon all persons situated at the time of its passage as indicated.

The Congress, by two early statutes, provided that any alien woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the laws of the United States who marries an American citizen shall be an American citizen herself. Section 2, Act Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604; E. S. § 1994 (U. S. Comp. Stat. § 3948). Undoubtedly the converse of the foregoing is true in the ease of an American citizen woman who marries an alien. Any possible doubt on that subject was removed by the provisions of the Act of March 2,1907, above referred to.

For many years, Secretaries of State, and particularly since the Act of March 2, 1907, have consistently refused to reeognize American citizen women married to aliens as citizens of the United States and have refused them passports. The Supreme Court has interpreted the. term “marriage” and the term “who shall be married” as not referring to *136 the time when the ceremony was performed, but as referring to the “state of marriage.” Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. Ed. 283. I am of the opinion that the Act of March 2, 1907, is declaratory of the law, and equally affected those who were married prior to its adoption and those married subsequently.

It follows that petitioner, Florence Bertha Page, is an alien, and her petition is properly before the court as such.

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