Rusconi v. United States
RUSCONI Et Al. v. UNITED STATES
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Mathes (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion by three insurance companies to intervene as plaintiffs in a Federal Tort Claims Act action. The court denied the motion, holding that the FTCA does not expressly grant consent to suit by subrogees and that sovereign immunity waivers must be strictly construed.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to intervene as parties plaintiff denied“it is now ordered that the motion of Employers’ Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, a corporation, and Westchester Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, for leave to intervene as parties plaintiff in this action be and is hereby denied.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed. In 1947, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was interpreted to require an express grant of consent to be sued. Since the FTCA did not explicitly authorize suits by subrogees (insurance companies standing in the shoes of the injured party), the court was correct to deny the intervention. This aligns with the prevailing legal view at the time that the FTCA did not waive immunity for subrogation claims unless expressly stated. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound for its time. It correctly identifies the core legal barrier: the lack of express statutory consent for subrogees to sue the United States under the FTCA. It relies on the well-established canon of strict construction of sovereign immunity waivers. The reasoning directly answers the motion by applying the relevant statutory interpretation principle to the specific status of the movants (subrogees).
Opinion — Mathes
MATHES, District Judge.
This cause having heretofore come before the court for hearing on motion of Employers’ Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, a corporation, and Westchester Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, for leave to intervene as parties plaintiff, and the motion having been heard and submitted for decision, and it appearing to the court that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 931, does not expressly grant consent to suit by the subrogee of a claimant, See 31 U.S.C.A. § 203, and that consent of the Government to be sued, being a relinquishment of sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted (United States v. Sherwood, 1940, 312 U.S. 584, 590, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058; Defense Supplies Corporation v. United States Lines Co., 2 Cir., 1945, 148 F,2d 311, 312) ; it is now ordered that the motion of Employers’ Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, The Automobile Insurance Company of Hartford, a corporation, and Westchester Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, for leave to intervene as parties plaintiff in this action be and is hereby denied.
It is further ordered that the Clerk this day forward copies of this order by United States mail to the attorneys for the parties appearing in this cause.