People v. Roza CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Roza CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Shasta)

THE PEOPLE, C103223 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23F1336) v. JOSEPH EDWARD ROZA, Defendant and Appellant.

In this appeal from his conviction for second degree murder, defendant Joseph Edward Roza contends reversal is required because the jury was erroneously instructed on the elements of implied malice. We disagree and will affirm the judgment, and we will direct the trial court to correct several errors in the abstract of judgment. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Roza’s claim on appeal is limited to his instructional error claim, and therefore the underlying facts are irrelevant to the issue on appeal. It suffices to say that Roza shot and killed the victim, Gregory Galusha. On December 17, 2024, a jury found Roza guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and found true a firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022.53, 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 subd. (d)) and multiple aggravating factor allegations. The trial court sentenced Roza to 40 years to life in prison. Roza timely filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION I. Instructional Error Claim Roza contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it instructed the jury on the required elements of second degree implied malice murder without modifying the pattern jury instruction — CALCRIM No. 520 — to include certain language from People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes). He claims that while the portion of the instruction given to the jury regarding the actus reus required to prove implied malice properly defined “dangerous to human life” to mean “a high degree of probability that [the act in question] will result in death,” the court erred by not also including that definitional language as to the mens rea portion of the instruction. As we will explain, Roza’s claim lacks merit. A. Procedural and Legal Background Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Roza was convicted of second degree murder, which is “ ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) Malice “may be express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “[I]mplied-malice murder has a physical component: an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to life. And it has a mental component: [the] defendant’s deliberate performance of the act with conscious disregard for life, knowing the act endangers another’s life.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 604.) “The mental component calls for a subjective inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind and requires ‘a determination that the defendant actually 2 appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.’ ” (Id. at p. 604, italics omitted.) By contrast, the physical component requires an objective determination as to whether the natural consequences of the act in question were “dangerous to life,” which means the same thing as a high degree of probability that the act will result in death. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989; see also People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 157 (Knoller).) Historically, California courts have used two different standards (or tests) for implied malice, reflecting judicial attempts to translate the “ ‘abandoned and malignant heart’ ” element into a tangible standard a jury can apply. (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103 (Nieto Benitez).) The first standard provided that malice can be implied where “ ‘the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.’ ” (Id. at pp. 103-104, quoting People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).) The second standard provided that malice can be implied where the killing was proximately caused by “ ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Nieto Benitez, at p. 104, quoting People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587.) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the two tests are equivalent and reflect the same standard. (See, e.g., Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 104; see id. at p. 111 [rejecting claim that jury instruction misstated the law because it omitted the requirement that the defendant commit the act with a high degree of probability that death will result, explaining that the instruction correctly distilled the correct law as it required an act with natural consequences that are dangerous to life]; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219 [the two tests (or definitions) of implied malice “articulated one and the same standard”]; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 [two definitions of implied malice articulated the same standard].) In Knoller, our high court directed trial courts to instruct juries on implied malice as 3 follows: “Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Knoller, at p. 143 [explaining that “implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another — no more, and no less”].) In 2023, the Reyes court discussed the meaning of the phrase “dangerous to human life” in the context of the denial of a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6), which claimed there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of the defendant under any valid theory of murder, including implied malice murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 984, 986-987, 989-990.) In reversing, the Reyes court explained: “To suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree of probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.) In March 2024, the Judicial Council modified CALCRIM No. 520 to incorporate the Reyes court’s definition of “dangerous to human life” into the elements required for a finding of implied malice. At the close of trial in December 2024, the jury was instructed (without objection) with the postReyes version of CALCRIM No. 520 as follows: “The Defendant is charged with murder in violation of Penal Code Section 187. To prove that the Defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that, number one, the Defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person. Number two, when the Defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought. And number three, he killed without lawful excuse or justification. “There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder. The 4 Defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. The Defendant had implied malice if, number one, he intentionally committed the act. “Number two, the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life in that the act involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death. Number three, at the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life. And number four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (Italics added.) In October 2025, the instruction was revised to move the “high degree of probability of death” language to a standalone paragraph at the end of the instruction. B. Analysis Roza argues that the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error by instructing the jury with the “high degree of probability” of death language as to the actus reus component of the instruction, but failing to do so as to the mens rea component. Roza did not object to the implied malice instruction at trial. “Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the error affects [the] defendant’s substantial rights. [Citations.] The question is whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.” (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927.) But if the instructions accurately stated the law, a defendant may not claim that the court erred by failing to issue additional or clarifying instructions unless he or she requested the instruction from the trial court. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1134, disapproved on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) We need not address forfeiture because Roza’s claim fails on the merits. The jury was instructed on second degree murder with a version of CALCRIM No. 520 current at the time, and consistent with Reyes. As to the actus reus required for implied malice, the jury was instructed that Roza harbored implied malice if he intentionally committed an act, the natural and probable consequences of which were 5 dangerous to human life, and the act involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death. That is a correct statement of law. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143; People v. Fay (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 767, 774 [CALCRIM No. 520 defines implied malice correctly].) As to the mens rea component of implied malice, the jury was instructed that Roza harbored the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of implied malice murder if, at the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life, and he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life. This formulation of the requisite mens rea is a correct statement of the law. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143; People v. Fay, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 774 [CALCRIM No. 520 defines implied malice correctly].) Contrary to Roza’s contention, the Reyes court did not clarify the implied malice standard or hold or suggest that the version of CALCRIM No. 520 given to the jury in this case was an incorrect statement of the law. In Reyes, our Supreme Court reiterated the long-held precedent that “under the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989, quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.) The high court’s decision in Reyes, which did not involve a claim of instructional error but rather a substantial evidence challenge to a conviction for second degree implied malice murder in the context of a gang-related homicide committed by a person other than the defendant, did not clarify, question, or overturn its prior decisions holding that the “dangerous to human life” standard and the “high degree of probability” that death will result standard are equivalent and embody the same standard. (See Reyes, at p. 989; Knoller, at p. 152.) Because the instruction given was a correct statement of law, we find no error. II. Abstract of Judgment Roza argues there are errors in the abstract of judgment that must be corrected. The Attorney General agrees; we agree with the parties.

6 First, the abstract of judgment includes an “x” in boxes 6(b) and 6(d), which appear to have been checked in an attempt to reflect the sentence of 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). But boxes 6(b) and 6(d) are intended to reflect indeterminate sentences imposed on crimes, not enhancements, and the sentence for the firearm enhancement is reflected in the “Enhancements” section of the abstract of judgment. Second, the abstract of judgment reflects that a $1,000 restitution fine was imposed in “Case B.” The trial court imposed a $1,000 restitution fine under section 12024, subdivision (b), which is reflected on the abstract of judgment, but there is no “Case B” here. Finally, the abstract of judgment does not reflect that the trial court imposed a suspended $1,000 parole revocation fine. (§ 1202.45.) The trial court is directed to correct these errors. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate courts may “order[] correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts”].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. We direct the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

/s/ EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/ HULL, J.

/s/ ROBIE, J.