In re B.L. CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 In re B.L. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B350086 In re B.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00190A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.O., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed. Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Eden Oxford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ In this appeal, M.O. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction over minor B.L. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 364 and the juvenile custody order limiting mother to monitored visits.1 Mother argues that since B.L. and E.L. (father) were uncooperative with the court’s visitation orders while the case was pending, a custody order awarding mother visitation after the case closed was “illusory,” and the court should not have terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by indicating on the juvenile custody order that mother was to have only monitored visits due to her “lack of insight.” We find no error and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Initial Investigation In April 2023, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) received a referral concerning eight-year-old B.L. and her five-month-old maternal half sibling M.D. B.L. was living in Tustin with mother, M.D., and M.D.’s father. The reporting party stated B.L. had disclosed that mother hit her “repeatedly, almost daily”; mother “drinks a lot and acts weird”; and mother and M.D.’s father frequently fought in front of B.L. A social worker visited the home to interview the family. B.L. said mother frequently hit her. Mother hit her with a sandal or belt and pulled her hair if she did not finish her chores on time, did not complete her homework, or “for minimal things,” like misplacing a jacket or, once, for vomiting on her bed when 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 she was sick. On at least one occasion, mother hit B.L. so hard she bled. Mother told B.L. not to tell anyone that mother hit her. B.L. also witnessed domestic violence between mother and M.D.’s father. Mother gave B.L. “a lot of chores,” which prevented her from completing her homework, and B.L. often took care of M.D. B.L. was afraid of mother and believed mother “hate[d]” her. Mother denied the claims of physical abuse, domestic violence, and substance abuse. She initially claimed she accidentally caused B.L.’s injuries but also complained that B.L. had behavioral problems. Mother eventually admitted hitting B.L. with a belt because B.L. overslept and did not go to school. Mother said she could not handle B.L.’s behavior and “asked what would happen if she just sent [B.L.] to Guatemala to eliminate the problems.” B.L. was present in the home during mother’s interview with the social worker. She overheard mother’s negative remarks about her. Father had not seen B.L. in about a year because mother became “ ‘very aggressive’ ” with him during visitation exchanges. B.L. told father that mother hit her and she asked to stay with him, but father did not believe mother was actually hitting B.L. because he did not see any marks or bruises on her. Mother was arrested for felony child abuse. SSA placed B.L. temporarily at Orangewood Children and Family Center. Petition and Detention SSA filed a dependency petition on behalf of B.L. and M.D.2 The petition alleged that mother physically abused B.L., emotionally abused B.L., and engaged in domestic violence with M.D.’s father in B.L.’s presence. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The 2 M.D. is not a subject of this appeal. We summarize only the allegations and proceedings concerning B.L.

3 petition also alleged that father failed to protect B.L. by leaving her in mother’s sole care despite being aware of mother’s aggressive behavior and being told by B.L. that mother hit her. The juvenile court detained B.L. and ordered monitored visits for the parents. Mother agreed to participate in individual counseling, anger management classes, a parenting education program, and random substance use testing. Father agreed to participate in individual counseling and a parenting education program. Mother visited B.L. twice at Orangewood. The social worker observed that their interactions during the first visit were positive. During the second visit, mother told B.L. that since B.L. left, the house was cleaner, they had more food, and mother no longer had to scold her. Mother told B.L. that she had “ ‘left the home disorganized ’ ” and had “ ‘left a bunch of dirty clothes.’ ” B.L. told a social worker that mother was nice to her during their visits, and she was confused by the change in mother’s behavior toward her. Although she expressed wanting to live with both parents, she said she felt safe in father’s care, but “not really” in mother’s care. Nevertheless, she thought mother had changed and “ ‘wanted to give her a second chance.’ ” Jurisdiction Hearing At a May 2023 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained an amended petition based on mother’s failure to protect and inability to provide regular care for B.L. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). The sustained amended petition included allegations that mother had subjected B.L. to physical abuse and caused her serious emotional damage (id., subd. (c)).3 The court 3 On SSA’s motion, the juvenile court dismissed the allegations of physical harm under section 300, subdivision (a).

4 also sustained allegations that father failed to protect B.L. from mother’s abusive behavior. The court released B.L. to father’s custody pending the disposition hearing. SSA was ordered to evaluate mother for supervised visits. In the following weeks, father regularly failed to respond to SSA’s attempts to contact him to schedule mother’s visits, and he canceled or failed to transport B.L. for visits. The social worker facilitated two virtual visits and one telephonic visit for mother and B.L between May and July 2023. SSA expressed concerns about father’s “ability to co-parent effectively” with mother. SSA submitted “an ex parte” regarding visitation. During this period, B.L. reported that she was doing well. She felt safe and “ ‘love[d] being with’ ” father. However, she sometimes had difficulty sleeping when she remembered things that happened when she was living with mother. In June 2023, B.L. told a social worker that she wanted to visit mother and see M.D. But, the following month, B.L. said she did not want to visit mother in person and was only comfortable having telephonic visits. She explained that mother sometimes became “ ‘crazy’ ” and would tell her about things she was missing out on since she left, which made B.L. cry after the calls ended. Disposition Hearing and Review Period In July 2023, the juvenile court declared B.L. a dependent of the court and ordered that custody remain with father. The court ordered family maintenance services for father and enhancement services for mother. The court further ordered telephonic visitation between mother and B.L. in the evenings on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and directed SSA to submit an 5 update in 30 days regarding father’s cooperation with the schedule. Throughout the review period, SSA informed the court that father did not facilitate B.L.’s visitation with mother and did not respond to the social worker’s attempts to arrange visitation. In submissions to the court, SSA stated that throughout July 2023, father facilitated only one visit via Zoom between B.L. and mother. He declined to make B.L. available for the second visit, and he did not respond to the social worker’s text messages scheduling the remaining visits or ensure B.L. logged into Zoom at the times set by the social worker. Father told a social worker that he did not want B.L. to have contact with mother after he learned from B.L. how mother had treated her. He also stated that he could not facilitate visits because of his work schedule, and no one else in his family would be able to do so. In September 2023, after SSA facilitated a telephonic visit between mother and B.L. at B.L.’s school, father “became hostile” and accused SSA of “forcing” B.L. to speak with mother and interfering in his family’s life. The social worker stated that as a result of father’s noncooperation, she could not assess whether it was appropriate to liberalize mother’s visits with B.L. Initially, in response to SSA’s concerns, the court ordered SSA “to make best efforts” to facilitate telephonic visits on Sundays at noon and virtual visits after school on Wednesdays “at a neutral location.” After SSA’s interim updates indicated father continued to be noncooperative, the court encouraged father to comply with its orders and stated that it would “review the file and consider an appropriate remedy or sanction.” In early November 2023, the court held a hearing and provided a tentative ruling “regarding contempt and visitation.”

6 The court ordered “sibling visitation 1 time per week without mother being present” and set a show cause hearing for November. SSA was directed to prepare a report “as to at least 1 sibling visit” and “1 virtual visit for minor and mother.” The court further ordered SSA “to speak with father and minor if minor refuses visits and includ[e] information in next report.” According to the next report, father stated B.L. did not want to visit mother, and B.L. was apprehensive about visiting M.D. and declined to go to his baptism. The court subsequently withdrew the show cause order regarding father’s compliance and ordered visitation orders to remain in effect. Meanwhile, B.L. repeatedly refused visits with mother. She said she did not feel safe with mother. She was afraid of mother and did not feel comfortable being alone with her. Mother made her feel bad by talking about things she and M.D. were doing without B.L. Mother told B.L. she was missing out because she was not with them. B.L. said that mother had “ ‘hurt [her] a lot.’ ” Despite father’s recalcitrance about visits and B.L.’s refusals, social workers continued to contact B.L. to attempt to facilitate visits with mother. In September 2023, social workers arranged a call between B.L. and mother at B.L.’s school. Subsequently, however, B.L. declined further calls with mother. Eventually, B.L. grew frustrated with the social worker’s inquiries about visitation with mother and the social worker’s continued attempts to schedule visits despite B.L.’s wishes. She stopped accepting gifts from mother and maintained that she would speak to mother when she felt ready. During this time, SSA consistently reported that B.L. was safe and happy in father’s care. There were no threats to her 7 safety and father provided for her basic needs. In June 2024, B.L. began consistently receiving therapy. By July 2024, B.L.’s therapist reported that B.L. had “made significant progress” and displayed “a range of positive emotions and a joyful demeanor.” She had “a strong and affectionate relationship with her father, frequently expressing her love for him.” B.L. reported “a positive improvement” in her well-being due to her new living arrangements. The therapist stated that B.L. “ha[d] chosen not to engage with her mother at this time, a decision not influenced by the father.” SSA informed the court of its concern that B.L. might “become a victim of a contentious custody dispute between the parents, potentially causing emotional distress.” However, B.L. “consistently communicated her desire to remain in [father’s] care.” SSA reported “no concerns regarding the child being in the father’s care, and despite the father not having completed any services, the Agency believes the child is safe with him.” On this basis, SSA recommended termination of jurisdiction.4 4 In August 2024, SSA received a child abuse report from the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The report indicated that a relative of the stepmother molested B.L. and her stepsister at home. The ensuing investigation substantiated the allegation. Citing the sexual abuse report, father’s noncompliance with court orders, and a third party report that B.L. was mistreated by her stepfamily, mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to modify its orders and place B.L. with maternal relatives. The court denied the request.

8 Transfer to Los Angeles County In January 2025, the juvenile court transferred the case to Los Angeles County, where B.L. and father had moved.5 At a March 2025 progress hearing, mother’s counsel requested that DCFS assess the case for closure. He stated that B.L. expressed to mother that she wanted to “put this behind her,” and mother was supportive of B.L.’s wishes. Counsel also stated that mother was “happy with phone visits” in the hope that they would lead to in-person visits. The court set a section 364 review hearing date for July 2025 and ordered DCFS to assess the matter for closure. In March 2025, a social worker from DCFS spoke with B.L. about visitation with mother. B.L. “immediately refused to have any visits with mother. Minor stated her mother had hurt her and although she held no grudges, she was not ready to have any contact with her, especially after the last time mother showed up and tried to manipulate her to return. Minor stated that she did not want to have any contact with mother for the moment because she was sure mother had not changed as she had demonstrated it.” The social worker discussed visitation with B.L. “on a monthly basis” and B.L.’s response was the same. In a report submitted for the July 2025 hearing, DCFS identified no threats to B.L.’s safety in father’s custody and recommended closing the case. B.L. was “thriving” and “appear[ed] comfortable and confident in the home.” DCFS 5 At the stipulation of the parties, the Orange County juvenile court had continued the six-month review hearing several times to allow the agency to provide updates on B.L.’s progress in therapy, for completion of the child abuse investigation, and for consideration of mother’s section 388 petition.

9 observed a “strong bond” between B.L. and father and noted that “she seeks comfort and guidance from him.” Father did not report any behavioral issues. B.L. stated that father was supportive and patient. DCFS observed that father “has ensure[d] that minor feels the security and love that he has for her and that she understands that she has a voice and choice in the home. That is something that the minor has embraced in a positive manner and that is why for the moment, she does not want visits with mother because she feels that mother still wants to have control [over] her.” B.L. continued to express discomfort with visiting mother “due to mother trying to manipulate her.” The social worker noted that from February to June 2025, B.L.’s response about visitation with mother was consistent every month: “She will request visits with mother when she feels ready.” At the July hearing, minor’s counsel asked for a brief continuance because father had not brought B.L. to court. Mother’s counsel expressed concern that father had not brought B.L. to the hearing and indicated she would contest the recommendation to close the case due to father’s “pattern” of refusing to cooperate. Section 364 Hearing and Juvenile Custody Order In August 2025, the juvenile court held the continued section 364 hearing. B.L.’s counsel stated that B.L. had been very clear that she did not want visits with mother. B.L. found court-ordered visitation “very stressful.” Mother’s counsel objected to closing the case due to father’s past noncooperation with court orders. Counsel further argued that if the court was inclined to close the case, it should order that mother be provided with B.L.’s address. Mother was concerned father would “cut her 10 out of [B.L.’s] life” if the case was closed and she was not provided that information. The court found the conditions justifying jurisdiction no longer existed and terminated jurisdiction. The court awarded the parents joint legal custody and ordered father to have sole physical custody of B.L. The court further ordered monitored visits for mother once a month for two hours. The order permitted the parents to mutually agree upon a monitor. In the absence of agreement, the order authorized father to select a professional monitor at mother’s expense. Mother’s counsel objected, arguing that visitation “should be more frequent than that and treated as an opportunity for visits in the event [B.L.] has a change of heart.” The court overruled the objection. The court considered mother’s “severe physical abuse” of B.L. and how “her mental health issues and lack of anger management had emotionally damaged” B.L. The court explained that “even though [mother] has checked all the boxes that has completed her case plan, she has not gained any insight, and she continues to manipulate [B.L.] to return to her. . . . I have no doubt that [B.L.] was truthful in her statements that the mother has not changed at all, and she is being manipulative.” The court believed the order for monthly visits was appropriate because “[B.L.] is not emotionally ready to visit with the mother. And that is because of mother’s manipulation, and that the mother has not changed; and also due to the severe physical abuse and emotional harm that [B.L.] suffered when this case was opened.”6 6 At the hearing, father testified that mother always had his contact information and knew his whereabouts. B.L. did not 11 Mother timely appealed. DISCUSSION Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating dependency jurisdiction and abused its discretion in limiting mother to monitored visits based on a purported lack of insight. We disagree. I. Termination of Jurisdiction “Section 364 governs review hearings for dependent children who have not been removed from one or both parents.” (In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459, 469.) When a child remains in at least one parent’s physical custody, the court must review the matter within six months of the disposition hearing, and every six months after. Under section 364, subdivision (c), at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must terminate dependency jurisdiction unless the child welfare agency “establishes by a preponderance of [the] evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.”

testify but directly addressed the court after it had announced its ruling and mother objected. B.L. said she was “tired of this case already” and father was not telling her what to say; instead “it’s by me, my own words.” B.L. explained: “[M]other started saying I wasn’t behaving good and that I always told her stuff and that she never hit me and stuff. And she is saying that she never told me anything. She never said she wished she never had me, but she does say that. And when she said that, I was . . . like, I had a little hate for her because I was – but I never did nothing to her. She is the one who did everything, and I don’t know why she saying she isn’t saying nothing or she wants my address. I don’t want her to know nothing about me, and I don’t want to know nothing about her.”

12 “Thus, ‘[w]here, as here, the social services agency recommends termination of jurisdiction, termination will be the “default result” unless either the parent, the guardian, or the child objects and establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions justifying retention of jurisdiction exist or are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 110–111 (J.M.).) Mother did not meet this burden below. “We therefore review ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law,’ by examining ‘whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 111.) Mother has not demonstrated that the evidence compels a finding in her favor as to the termination of jurisdiction. It was undisputed that B.L. was safe and thriving in father’s care. Although B.L. expressed a continuing unwillingness to have visits with mother and father did not encourage visitation, mother does not offer any authority to suggest that these would have been bases for the assumption of jurisdiction under section 300, or proper grounds to continue dependency jurisdiction. “When proceeding under section 364, because the child is in placement with a parent, the court is not concerned with reunification, but with determining whether continued supervision is necessary in the family home. (§ 364, subd. (c).)” (In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Mother does not argue that circumstances continued to exist that placed B.L. at substantial risk of suffering serious physical or emotional 13 harm or were likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. That B.L. and father might fail to comply with court-ordered visitation after the termination of jurisdiction was not a valid basis to continue juvenile court and DCFS supervision over the family. To support her argument on appeal, mother relies on cases considering visitation in other dependency contexts. These cases are inapposite. In In re Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654, the child was removed from both parents and the juvenile court selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan. Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), the juvenile court was thus required to issue a visitation order unless it found that visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child. (Ethan J., at p. 661.) The child refused to visit the mother, but the juvenile court nonetheless ordered a legal guardianship and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed, finding that the child’s refusal of visitation was an exceptional circumstance warranting continued judicial oversight under section 366.3. (Ethan J., at p. 660.) The court noted that by terminating jurisdiction without a finding that visitation would be detrimental, and while recognizing a visitation order would not be honored, “the juvenile court virtually guaranteed that visitation would not occur” and impermissibly delegated its authority over visitation to the minor. (Id. at p. 661; see id. at p. 662.) Here, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction under section 364, not section 366.3. “[S]ection 362.4 governs the court’s authority to issue exit orders determining custody and visitation of a child when terminating jurisdiction at a section 364 hearing.” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.) “Unlike section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), which mandates 14 visitation between child and parents when legal guardianship has been ordered, absent a finding that visitation would be detrimental to the child, when dependency jurisdiction is terminated with the child in the custody of one of his or her parents, section 362.4, subdivision (a), commits to the sound discretion of the juvenile court the authority to make an order determining a noncustodial parent’s visitation.” (In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 638 (C.S.).) The reasoning of the Ethan J. court is inapplicable here. In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310 (S.H.), is equally inapt. S.H. concerned a mother’s right to visitation as a component of a reunification plan. The appellate court concluded that a visitation order providing that the children would not be forced to visit the parents “grant[ed] the child de facto veto power to ensure no visitation will occur absent the child’s consent.” (Id. at p. 318.) The order did not set forth a minimum number of visits. The S.H. court therefore reasoned that the “the [juvenile] court’s abstract recognition of [mother’s] right to visitation is illusory, transforming the children’s ability to refuse ‘a visit’ into the practical ability to forestall any visits at all.” (Id. at pp. 318– 319.) Here, mother was not receiving reunification services and the juvenile court’s order was not abstract. The court concretely preserved mother’s right to visitation with B.L. by establishing the frequency and length of visitation, and it did not make visitation conditional on the cooperation or consent of B.L. or anyone else. There was no impermissible delegation. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799–800 [order that father choose monitor for visitation if parents could not agree was not 15 delegation to father of right to determine whether visitation would occur].) “Under these circumstances, with [B.L.] safe in the care and custody of her father, terminating dependency jurisdiction was entirely appropriate. Any future issues regarding visitation can be addressed by the family court, which has ongoing jurisdiction over custody and visitation now that dependency jurisdiction has been terminated.” (C.S., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.) Under section 364, B.L.’s refusal to visit mother and father’s previous failures to facilitate mother’s visits were not grounds for continued dependency jurisdiction. (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112; C.S., at p. 638; In re Alexandria M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096 [when child safety issues are resolved, family court is the proper forum for adjudicating custody and visitation disputes].) II. The Juvenile Custody Order Limiting Mother to Monitored Visits Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by limiting mother to monitored visits on the ground that she “lacked insight.” We find no abuse of discretion. When “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a).) “[T]he court must define the rights of the parties to visitation. The definition of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if 16 so, the frequency and length of visitation. The court may, of course, impose any other conditions or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756, 757.) “We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision ‘ “ ‘unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356 (Brittany C.).) As we understand mother’s argument, she appears to contend that the order’s reference to mother’s “lack of insight” as a reason for monitored visits was an abuse of discretion because it was “not true.” Mother argues that she had little contact with B.L. during the case, therefore the charge that she continued to attempt to manipulate B.L. must be false. Mother notes that she completed her case plan and “the issue was that [B.L.] did not want to visit her.” Mother thus asserts it will be difficult for her to demonstrate a change of circumstances in family court. The juvenile court could reasonably credit B.L.’s statements to the social workers in determining whether monitored visitation was appropriate. The juvenile court has the discretion to believe information in DCFS reports, including a minor’s statements. (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 10; see In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1095 [court may credit minor’s out-of-court statements about abuse without live testimony].) “As a reviewing court, we have no power to revisit the credibility of witness[es] or reweigh the evidence.” (Maya L., at p. 104, fn. 6.)

17 The record indicates that mother completed court-ordered services in or around October 2023. However, DCFS reports suggested that during the review period, mother had tried to manipulate B.L. by telling her what she was missing while living with father. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude based on the evidence that mother’s physical and emotional abuse deeply affected B.L.; during the time they were communicating, mother failed to acknowledge the abuse and engaged in behavior that made B.L. unwilling to have any contact with her; and, under these circumstances, only monitored visits were appropriate. (See In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204 [juvenile court may reasonably determine that continued supervision is not necessary but monitored visitation is needed to eliminate risk of physical abuse or emotional harm].) The court’s decision to order limited visitation on this basis was not “an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” (Brittany C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319 [when two or more reasonable inferences are deducible from facts, reviewing court cannot substitute trial court’s conclusion for its own].)

18 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J.

We concur:

HANASONO, J.

ASHWORTH, J.* * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.