R.V. v. Los Angeles Unified School District CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 R.V. v. Los Angeles Unified School District CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

R.V., B344935 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV40660) v.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Herman Law and Allegra P. Rineer for Plaintiff and Appellant. Vanderford & Ruiz, Rodolfo F. Ruiz and Erin E. Uyeshima for Defendant and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ Appellant R.V. sued respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), alleging negligence and negligent supervision arising out of his claim that, in the early 1980’s, middle school teacher Rodolphe Demordaigle sexually abused him. R.V. claimed that LAUSD knew or should have known of the danger Demordaigle posed to students and failed to respond appropriately. The trial court granted LAUSD’s motion for summary judgment of the complaint on the ground that there was no triable issue of material fact as to LAUSD’s knowledge that Demordaigle posed a foreseeable danger to students. It also granted summary adjudication of R.V.’s negligence causes of action with respect to claims of off-campus abuse, based on Education Code section 44808.1 We conclude R.V. raised a triable issue of material fact and LAUSD was not immune from liability for the off-campus abuse. We therefore reverse the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND LAUSD hired Demordaigle as a science teacher in 1969. At that time, Demordaigle had never been accused of sexual misconduct or inappropriate conduct with children. He did not have a criminal history. Demordaigle satisfied the background check procedures necessary to be hired by LAUSD. Demordaigle taught at Joseph Le Conte Middle School (Le Conte) during the relevant period. According to Demordaigle, “the subject [of taking kids on field trips] never even came up” between Demordaigle and Le Conte’s principal, James Good. Demordaigle testified that he obtained field trip permission slips 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Education Code.

2 for “the 9th grade class or if [he] took a bunch of 8th graders on a field trip in a bus.” He did not obtain permission slips for weekend trips but had a “personal conversation with [the children’s] parents that gave permission.” From 1982 to 1983, R.V. was a student in Demordaigle’s eighth grade science class at Le Conte. R.V. claims that Demordaigle sexually abused him during that period. The first incident occurred at Demordaigle’s home after an unofficial day trip. Demordaigle later molested R.V. at school. At the beginning of one week in late 1982 or early 1983, Demordaigle “started saying that he wanted [R.V.] and [another student] to go on—on the trip to the mountains with him.” Demordaigle had initially asked R.V. to go alone, but R.V. said no. Demordaigle then said he would “ ‘invite [the other student] so [R.V.] could feel more comfortable.’ ” That Saturday, Demordaigle and another man, possibly Demordaigle’s roommate, took R.V. and a classmate on a trip to the mountains to look for rocks. R.V. did not recognize the other man from school. Demordaigle picked R.V. up from his home and obtained permission from R.V.’s mother to take him on the trip. After returning from the mountains, Demordaigle brought R.V. and the other boy to his home. The other man and R.V.’s classmate went into a bedroom. Demordaigle sexually abused R.V., then drove him home. The Monday after the trip, the head school counselor, Aaron Moretzsky, pulled R.V. and the other boy aside in Demordaigle’s classroom and said, “ ‘I never, ever want you to go in the vehicle anywhere with the teacher. I want you to stay away from him, other than activities in class. I never want you to go anywhere with him. Do you guys understand that?’ ”

3 Moretzsky further stated: “ ‘We’ve been telling him to stay away from kids on the weekends, not to take them on any trips, and he’s not listening to us, so please stay away from him.’ ” He also told R.V. and his classmate: “ ‘I don’t want you to tell me what happened. I just want you to stay away from him.’ ” Moretzsky pulled R.V. aside on a few other occasions to remind him to “ ‘stay away’ ” from Demordaigle. R.V. did not tell Moretzsky about the abuse. Moretzsky did not say anything about inappropriate touching.2 Moretzsky monitored a portion of Demordaigle’s class almost every day during the period in which the abuse allegedly occurred. The vice principal also observed Demordaigle’s class on a few occasions. Within a week of the trip to the mountains, Demordaigle stopped at R.V.’s desk during class and rubbed his groin against R.V.’s back. He also rubbed R.V.’s inner thigh with his hand.3 Other students were present but Moretzsky was not in the room. R.V. testified that it was possible a teacher’s assistant was present, but he did not recall one being there. During the next six to eight weeks, similar incidents occurred another three to four times while R.V. was in Demordaigle’s class. In 1997, Demordaigle was convicted of child molestation. The underlying misconduct involved other Le Conte students. Before 1997, Demordaigle had not been accused of child molestation or abuse.

2 Moretzsky died in 2011. 3 R.V. testified that Demordaigle rubbed himself against R.V.’s back for “half a second or a second,” and rubbed the outside of R.V.’s pants for “two, three seconds” before moving his hand.

4 The first time R.V. told anyone about the abuse was when he contacted the law firm that represents him in this action. He had no knowledge of any student or parent reporting Demordaigle to the school. R.V. also had no knowledge that Moretzsky or any member of the Le Conte administration “covered up” information about Demordaigle abusing students. R.V. filed this action in November 2021. The operative complaint asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against LAUSD. The complaint alleged that Demordaigle’s sexual abuse of R.V. and other students was “open and obvious and known to” LAUSD, that the vice principal of Le Conte was aware of prior complaints against Demordaigle, and LAUSD employees at Le Conte “knew [of] or suspected [Demordaigle] of sexual abuse of minors, including [R.V.]” The complaint further alleged that although LAUSD had actual or constructive knowledge that Demordaigle was sexually assaulting students, the school district retained him, failed to properly supervise him, did not investigate reports of misconduct, and failed to take corrective action. In July 2024, LAUSD moved for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, of the operative complaint on four grounds: 1) the negligence cause of action failed because no LAUSD employee had a reasonable suspicion that Demordaigle would abuse any student; 2) LAUSD was immune from any liability arising from Demordaigle’s misconduct off school grounds after school hours; 3) LAUSD was immune from liability for misconduct that occurred on a field trip or excursion; and 4) R.V.’s cause of action for negligent retention, hiring, or supervision failed because LAUSD did not breach any duty in its hiring, training, or supervision of Demordaigle.

5 LAUSD argued that none of its employees had a reasonable suspicion that Demordaigle would abuse any student until he was arrested in 1997 on an unrelated case. It asserted that Moretzsky’s alleged statements to R.V. were inadmissible hearsay and did not prove that Moretzsky or any other LAUSD employee knew or reasonably should have known that Demordaigle would sexually abuse R.V. Similarly, evidence that Moretzsky sat in on Demordaigle’s class did not establish that LAUSD knew Demordaigle would sexually abuse students. LAUSD further argued that it was immune from liability for Demordaigle’s misconduct off school grounds pursuant to section 44808. R.V. opposed the motion. He asserted that triable issues of material fact existed with respect to LAUSD’s negligence. R.V. relied on Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. and his classmate and Moretzsky’s observation of Demordaigle’s classroom. R.V. further asserted that section 44808 did not apply because his off-campus injuries resulted from LAUSD’s negligence while he was on campus. In support of the opposition, R.V. submitted the transcripts from his deposition and the deposition of Demordaigle. In its reply, LAUSD contended the testimony from R.V. and Demordaigle that Principal Good and Moretzsky knew that Demordaigle was taking children on field trips and had asked him to stop did not constitute evidence that they knew or reasonably should have known that Demordaigle was abusing children. LAUSD further argued that R.V. failed to establish that it was not entitled to immunity under section 44808, as there was no evidence that LAUSD assumed responsibility for the trip or that any negligence by a school employee on school 6 premises proximately caused the abuse. LAUSD also objected to some of the deposition testimony R.V. offered in opposition to the motion. The trial court overruled some of LAUSD’s objections to R.V.’s testimony recounting Moretzsky’s and Demordaigle’s statements. The court otherwise sustained LAUSD’s evidentiary objections. The court further concluded LAUSD was immune from liability for the off-campus abuse pursuant to section 44808, as there was no evidence that LAUSD authorized the trip beforehand, undertook to provide transportation, sponsored the activity, or assumed responsibility with regard to it. Quoting Blue Mountain Enterprises, LLC v. Owen (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 537, 549, the court stated: “ ‘[W]here two or more separate and distinct [wrongful] acts are combined in the same cause of action in a complaint, a party may present a summary adjudication motion that pertains to some, but not all, of the separate and distinct wrongful acts.’ ” It therefore granted summary adjudication of R.V.’s causes of action as they related to the off- campus abuse. The trial court noted that it was undisputed that R.V. did not disclose the abuse to anyone before filing his lawsuit and did not make any complaints concerning Demordaigle. There was no admissible evidence that anyone other than Demordaigle and R.V. was aware of the abuse in the classroom. The court observed that Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. after the off- campus abuse occurred could arguably create a triable issue of fact as to whether LAUSD had knowledge that Demordaigle presented a risk of sexual abuse to his students. However, R.V. provided no evidence concerning the reason Moretzsky wanted 7 R.V. to stay away from Demordaigle, or why Moretzsky and the vice principal were observing Demordaigle’s class. The court therefore concluded that a factfinder would have to speculate to find that it was because they knew Demordaigle was sexually abusing or otherwise harming students. The court therefore granted summary judgment of the complaint. R.V. moved for reconsideration of the order. He asserted that additional testimony and evidence showing LAUSD’s negligence in hiring, retaining, and supervising Demordaigle had been left out of the opposition “[d]ue to mistake and inadvertence by [R.V.]’s counsel.” This consisted of deposition testimony and other evidence from an action brought by another alleged victim of Demordaigle, A.S. The A.S. matter had been consolidated with R.V.’s case. After the court entered judgment in LAUSD’s favor, R.V. filed an ex parte motion to advance the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. R.V. timely appealed the trial court’s order entering summary judgment before the court decided his motion for reconsideration. DISCUSSION LAUSD is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication A. Standard of review “A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably 8 supports. (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 612.) In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .’ ” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476–477.) The same process and standard of review apply to a motion for summary adjudication. (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 924.) R.V. asks us to consider evidence obtained in the case another Le Conte student, A.S., brought against LAUSD. R.V. did not submit this evidence with his opposition to LAUSD’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, he attached the evidence to his motion for reconsideration, which is not at issue in this appeal. We therefore do not consider it when determining whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 522 [“ ‘ “ ‘[W]e take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on [the summary judgment] motion’ ” ’ ”]; Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891, fn. 3 [additional evidence presented with motion for reconsideration was “not relevant to [court’s] review of the initial grant of summary judgment and therefore [was] not discussed or considered”].)4 4 R.V. cites George v. Shams-Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, for the proposition that we may consider evidence presented 9 B. Summary judgment of R.V.’s negligence causes of action “ ‘To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court,’ while breach and causation are questions for the fact finder.” (C.F. v. Alternative Family Services, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1229–1230 (C.F.).) Although there is no general duty to control the conduct of another or warn those endangered by such conduct, “ ‘a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘Similarly, a duty to warn or protect may be found if the defendant has a special relationship with the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect protection.’ [Citation.]” (C.F., supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.) “Public entities such as LAUSD are generally immune from liability. (Gov. Code, § 815.) However, ‘a public school district may be vicariously liable under [Government Code] section 815.2 with the motion for reconsideration because it forms part of the record on appeal. George involved an appeal from an award of sanctions and corresponding motion for reconsideration, not a motion for summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 137–138.) It is unclear whether the appellant submitted any new evidence in connection with the motion for reconsideration, which argued that the sanctions request was untimely. (Id. at p. 138.) In any event, the opinion does not discuss whether evidence presented with a motion for reconsideration may properly be considered when the motion is not at issue on appeal.

10 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee’ who harms a student. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879 (C.A.).) This potential liability ‘arises from the special relationship’ between schools and students, ‘which relationship entail[s] the duty to take reasonable measures to protect [students] from injuries at the hands of others in the school environment.’ (Id. at p. 877.)” (Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 769, 774 (Taylor).) “School principals and other supervisory employees, to the extent their duties include overseeing the educational environment and the performance of teachers and counselors, . . . have the responsibility of taking reasonable measures to guard pupils against harassment and abuse from foreseeable sources, including any teachers or counselors they know or have reason to know are prone to such abuse.” (C.A., at p. 871.) “The negligence standard articulated by C.A. for hiring, supervising, or retaining an assaultive employee—‘knew or should have known’ (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875) or ‘know or have reason to know’ (id. at p. 871)—thus imposes liability on a school district on the basis of supervisory personnel’s constructive knowledge that an employee is prone to harm students. Constructive knowledge is knowledge that ‘may be shown by circumstantial evidence “which is nothing more than one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven facts.” ’ [Citation.]” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 26 (Hesperia).) Constructive knowledge exists where there is evidence a “district employee saw [the offending employee] do anything abusive or inappropriate, or giving rise to suspicion of abuse or 11 inappropriate behavior.” (Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Court (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718, 722 (Rancho Cucamonga).) LAUSD presented evidence that it did not have actual knowledge that Demordaigle had sexually abused students. R.V. testified that he did not report Demordaigle’s abuse to anyone at the time it occurred. There is no evidence that the abuse took place in the presence of any other LAUSD employee. Although R.V. speculated that a teacher’s assistant could have been present during the incidents in the classroom, he did not recall one being there. Demordaigle did not have any criminal record at the time and was not accused of sexual abuse until 1997. We therefore consider whether R.V. carried his burden of showing a triable issue of fact. As the trial court observed, R.V.’s testimony concerning Moretzsky’s statements is the only admitted evidence that arguably creates a triable issue of fact. These statements were not direct evidence that LAUSD had actual knowledge that Demordaigle had sexually abused students. However, a trier of fact would not need to speculate to conclude that Moretzsky’s statements demonstrated LAUSD’s constructive knowledge of sexual abuse. Hesperia, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 13, is instructive. The plaintiffs in Hesperia were elementary school students who claimed they were sexually abused by a school janitor. (Id. at pp. 18–19.) They did not allege that the defendant district had actual knowledge of the abuse, but that “two principals, one of whom was also a school district director, and an assistant principal witnessed plaintiffs sitting on [the janitor’s] lap and [the janitor] escorting plaintiffs across campus to empty rooms,” in violation of school policies prohibiting school employees from 12 being alone with a student in a room with a closed door or having physical contact with student in a private setting. (Id. at p. 30; see id. at p. 20.) The Court of Appeal concluded these allegations established that “the District had reason to know or should have known that [the janitor] posed a foreseeable risk of sexually abusing plaintiffs” and were sufficient to state a claim for negligent supervision or retention. (Id. at p. 30.) R.V.’s testimony concerning Moretzsky’s statements likewise creates a reasonable inference that members of the Le Conte administration knew that Demordaigle was taking select students on weekend trips without other employees present and that Demordaigle refused to stop, despite repeated requests. A trier of fact could find that Demordaigle’s insistence on continuing to take students on unauthorized trips should have given rise to suspicion of sexual abuse. (See, e.g., Hesperia, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 [janitor’s repeated violations of school policy by being alone with students in rooms with closed doors and having physical contact with students sufficient to state claim for negligent retention].) When viewed together with this evidence, R.V.’s testimony that Moretzsky observed Demordaigle’s class almost every day during the period in which the abuse allegedly occurred, and that the vice principal sat in on several occasions, further suggests that the Le Conte administration was concerned that Demordaigle was having inappropriate contact with students. Indeed, Moretzsky repeatedly instructed R.V. and the other student who went on the trip to stay away from Demordaigle, which indicates that he was concerned about Demordaigle’s conduct. Moretzsky’s statement that he did not want R.V. to tell him what had happened on the trip also supports an inference 13 that he suspected Demordaigle had engaged in serious inappropriate behavior.5 A trier of fact could conclude that these circumstances were sufficient to “giv[e] rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior” (Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 722), and that LAUSD therefore had constructive knowledge that Demordaigle posed a foreseeable risk of sexually abusing students. There were triable issues of material fact on this 5 At oral argument, counsel for LAUSD argued that it was R.V.’s burden to “present evidence that tends to exclude, although it need not actually exclude, the possibility that” Moretzsky’s statements and conduct did not reflect constructive knowledge of sexual abuse. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 852.) Counsel argued that plaintiff failed to present evidence tending to exclude the possibility that Moretzsky was concerned about automobile accidents during Demordaigle’s trips. The “tends to exclude” language comes from a portion of Aguilar in which our Supreme Court discussed the law “specifically as to an antitrust action for unlawful conspiracy under provisions including section 1 of the Cartwright Act.” (Id. at p. 851.) As “a matter of substantive antitrust law,” “ ‘certain “inferences may not be drawn from circumstantial evidence in an antitrust case.” ’ [Citations.]” (Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 328; see also Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 880, 881 [statement in Aguilar that summary judgment motion should be granted if plaintiff’s evidence suggests “ ‘unlawful conspiracy only as likely as permissible competition or even less likely’ ” was derived from “limited rule concerning evidence in ‘equipoise’ . . . in the antitrust context,” and was inapplicable in other contexts].) The “tends to exclude” language in Aguilar does not apply to our analysis of whether summary judgment of R.V.’s negligence claims was proper.

14 element of R.V.’s claims. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment of the negligence causes of action in the complaint. C. Summary adjudication of liability with respect to claims of off-campus abuse The trial court separately granted summary adjudication of the portion of R.V.’s claims arising out of the abuse that occurred off campus. The court found that LAUSD was immune from liability under section 44808. R.V. argues this too was error. We conclude that section 44808 did not shield LAUSD from liability for off-campus sexual abuse that resulted from its alleged negligence in supervising R.V. while on campus.6 Section 44808 provides that a school district is not “liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district, board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of 6 We question the trial court’s conclusion that summary adjudication of the off-campus claims was appropriate because the on- and off-campus abuse constituted different causes of action. (See Hindin v. Rust (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1258 [summary adjudication improper in malicious prosecution action that asserted two different legal theories, since action “sought to vindicate a single primary right—the right to be free from defending against a lawsuit initiated with malice and without probable cause”].) Here, both claims concerned R.V.’s right to have LAUSD employees protect him from sexual abuse by a foreseeably dangerous person. His injuries purportedly arose from the same employees’ alleged negligence. In any event, because we reverse the grant of summary adjudication on the merits we need not resolve this issue.

15 such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” In Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508 (Hoyem), our Supreme Court considered whether a school district may “be held liable when, as a result of school authorities’ negligent supervision of students on school premises, a pupil leaves the school grounds during school hours and is subsequently injured by a motorist.” (Id. at pp. 511–512.) Our high court concluded that the school district’s “emphasis on the situs of the injury [was] totally misplaced.” (Id. at p. 515.) It observed that “no California decision suggests that when a school district fails to properly supervise a student on school premises, the district can automatically escape liability simply because the student’s ultimate injury occurs off school property.” (Ibid.) The court explained that its decision “merely reaffirm[ed] that school districts must exercise reasonable care in supervising their pupils while the pupils are on school premises” and that “[a] district may be held liable if its breach of that duty proximately causes a student’s injury.” (Id. at p. 516.) The Supreme Court next addressed the school district’s contention that section 44808 supported “that the off-premises situs of plaintiff’s injuries should absolve it of all responsibility.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 516.) The court observed that, “[a]lthough the initial portion of the statute provides that ‘no school district shall be responsible . . . for the conduct or safety of any pupil . . . at any time when such pupil is not on school property,’ the section goes on explicitly to withdraw this grant of immunity whenever the school district, inter alia, ‘has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.’ ” (Id. at p. 517, 16 fn. omitted.) Because the plaintiff in Hoyem had alleged that the school district failed to exercise reasonable care, “section 44808, by its own terms, [did] not bar liability in the present case.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded that “the district is not liable for an injury sustained by a truant under all circumstances, but rather is legally responsible only for those injuries which proximately result from the district’s failure to exercise ‘that degree of care “which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 519; accord, Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School District (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292, 294 [school district not immune when alleged failure to exercise due care in supervising students on school premises led to off- campus injury].) In Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at page 772, this court addressed whether a school district was immune from liability under section 44808 where a student’s mother hired a school district employee to babysit the student during winter break and the student died as a result of injuries sustained in the employee’s care. We reversed on the ground that “[s]ection 44808 squarely applie[d].” (Taylor, at p. 775.) We concluded that the case was “entirely unlike Hoyem” because the mother did not allege that the school district was negligent in supervising the student while he was on school premises, and his “death did not arise from a negligent act directly concerning him while on school premises, which carried over into off campus harm.” (Id. at p. 776.) Most recently, in Victor Valley Union High School District v. Superior Court (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 901 (Victor Valley), the plaintiff alleged that a teacher transported her off campus in his 17 car on one of the three occasions when he sexually assaulted her. (Id. at pp. 903–904.) “When leaving campus, [the t]eacher and [s]tudent walked ‘out through the office, said goodbye to the office lady,’ and went to the parking lot.” (Id. at p. 903.) The plaintiff alleged the school district “breached its ‘duty to use due care to hire, supervise, and retain [staff], and to take other reasonable and necessary measures to supervise and protect [the student]’ from [the t]eacher’s conduct.” (Id. at p. 904.) The school district moved for summary judgment on the ground it had complete immunity because the sexual assaults occurred off campus. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the motion and the district petitioned for a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying summary judgment and enter an order granting summary judgment. (Id. at p. 905.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the circumstances of the case were comparable to those of Hoyem. “The evidence that a teacher openly escorted a student through campus, past another employee, into a parking lot, into his personal vehicle, and transported her off campus, without any measures in place to prevent such conduct could give one reason to conclude the [d]istrict’s ‘supervisory procedures fell below that degree of care which reasonably prudent persons would exercise.’ ” (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 907, quoting Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 519.) “Because the alleged negligent act occurred on campus, the [d]istrict ha[d] not demonstrated that it qualifie[d] for immunity.” (Victor Valley, at p. 907.) The court rejected the argument that the trial court’s application of section 44808 “ ‘ma[de] no sense’ ” because the sexual abuse occurred off campus. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 907.) “[A] trier of fact could determine that the [d]istrict’s failure to have any measures in place to try to prevent employees from transporting teenagers off campus ‘might be an example of the [d]istrict’s negligent supervision of [the student], or [the teacher], or both.’ The trial court’s reasoning reflects it was focused on the [d]istrict’s alleged negligent act having taken place on campus. Thus, far from being nonsensical, the trial court’s analysis follows our Supreme Court’s holding in Hoyem, which is focused on the location of the alleged negligent act.”7 (Victor Valley, at p. 908.) Likewise, here, R.V. contends that LAUSD’s negligence in supervising Demordaigle on campus, and its negligence in supervising students interacting with Demordaigle on campus, allowed him to abuse his position to invite R.V. on a weekend trip and sexually abuse R.V. Moretzsky’s statements to R.V. after the off-campus abuse occurred would support a finding that school 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected its prior decisions in Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260 (Mosley), and LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 910–911.) We express no opinion as to whether Mosley and LeRoy are reconcilable with Hoyem. The Fourth District also distinguished Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, on which LAUSD relies in this case. In Cerna, a motorist killed one child and injured others while they crossed a street on their way to school. (Id. at p. 1344.) The surviving victims and their families brought a lawsuit against the school district, alleging that it was negligent in assuring safe school access. (Ibid.) As the Victor Valley court observed, the case did not involve an act of on-campus negligence that resulted in injury to the plaintiffs off-campus. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 909–910.)

19 district employees knew Demordaigle had previously engaged in similar “grooming” behavior on campus and had taken other students on unauthorized weekend trips. (Cf. Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 772 [mother did not tell anyone she asked district employee to babysit; employee’s supervisors had no prior knowledge of the arrangement].) The evidence further indicates that the only steps the school district had taken to address this ongoing issue were repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, asking Demordaigle to stop and observing his class. A trier of fact could find that LAUSD’s failure to take further action to address Demordaigle’s obstinate refusal to comply with the school administration’s requests that he stop inviting and taking students on weekend trips constituted negligent supervision of Demordaigle and the students interacting with him. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 908 [“trier of fact could determine that the [d]istrict’s failure to have any measures in place to try to prevent employees from transporting teenagers off campus ‘might be an example of the [d]istrict’s negligent supervision of [student], or [teacher], or both’ ”].) In concluding that LAUSD is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of its immunity from liability under section 44808, we do not condone “an expansive approach that would expose a school district to liability for any employee’s off- campus tort that could somehow be ‘traced back to negligent hiring and supervision.’ ” (Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 776, quoting Mosley, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) We determine only that here, R.V. has sufficiently adduced evidence that Demordaigle’s alleged sexual abuse of R.V. “ar[ose] from a negligent act directly concerning him while on school premises, 20 which carried over into off campus harm” and section 44808 therefore does not immunize LAUSD from liability. (Taylor, at p. 776; Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 907 [“Because the alleged negligent act occurred on campus, the District has not demonstrated that it qualifies for immunity.”]; cf. Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 41, 49 [teacher did not owe student a duty of care under § 44808 when, “after school hours and off school grounds,” teacher encountered student, student climbed onto teacher’s car and jumped off, injuring himself].)

21 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court vacate its order granting LAUSD’s motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. The court is to enter a new order denying summary judgment and summary adjudication. Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J.

We concur:

HANASONO, J.

OCHOA, J.* * Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.