Southern Counties Express v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters CA2/8

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 Southern Counties Express v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

SOUTHERN COUNTIES B349435 EXPRESS, INC., Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 25STCV24940 v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 848,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed. Bush Gottlieb, Ira L. Gottlieb, Julie G. Dickinson, Mathew J. Sollett, Jason Wojciechowski, Hector De Haro, and Adrian R. Butler for Defendant and Appellant. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson, Douglas R. Hart, Brian D. Fahy, Joseph R. Lewis, Mason Hattam, and Jacqueline Dack for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________ Amidst a labor dispute, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining a union from blocking ingress and egress at an employer’s facilities. The union challenges both orders, arguing the temporary restraining order was overbroad and violated statutory requirements specific to the labor dispute context and arguing insufficient evidence supports issuance of the preliminary injunction. We affirm both orders. I. Southern Counties Express, Inc. (Southern Counties) operates a fleet of trucks dedicated to commercial shipping, transportation, and delivery services within Los Angeles County. Local 848 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters is the union representing Southern Counties’ truck drivers. The parties began negotiating a successor to their soon-to- expire collective bargaining agreement in Spring 2024 but could not come to terms. In January 2025, Southern Counties presented the union with its “Last, Best, and Final Offer.” The union rejected it. In a February 6, 2025 email, Southern Counties’ negotiator informed the union that the company would implement the terms of its final offer until a new collective bargaining agreement could be reached. The negotiator concluded: “[R]egardless of this implementation, [Southern Counties’] doors remain open for further bargaining with the Union. Please feel free to send us dates for further bargaining.” The union never provided a “substantive response” to this email, nor did it reach out to the Southern Counties negotiator to continue negotiations. Instead, in late February 2025, the union’s members stopped working and began picketing at two Southern Counties facilities in Compton.

2 On February 23, 2025, Southern Counties sent a cease-and- desist letter to the union, stating the picketers at one of Southern Counties’ Compton facilities were blocking trucks and vehicles “by picketing right across the gate entrances.” It described this as unlawful behavior that, if continued, would “result in an injunction.” The letter included pictures showing union picketers walking back and forth in front of a vehicle. The union responded the following day, stating it had “not authorized and [was] not aware of any unlawful blocking of ingress or egress” at the facility. The union described the picketers’ activities as “peaceful picketing and patrolling to exercise their right to publicize their labor dispute.” If Southern Counties had any “specific evidence” that picketers had been blocking ingress and egress, said the union, it would investigate such claims, as it was “committed to continuing to engage only in lawful picketing activity.” Southern Counties replied to the union’s letter on February 26, 2025. It stated the photographs attached to its original cease- and-desist letter had shown union members “obviously blocking the ingress and egress” at Southern Counties’ facility. It also provided additional photographs depicting the same blocking activity across the facility’s gate. Southern Counties asserted the “blocking ha[d] been going on continuously” for nearly a week, ranging “from 6-10 minutes per vehicle.” Southern Counties concluded: “The property rights violations and unlawful conduct are obvious.” In a reply later that day, counsel for the union declared: “[The union] continues to dispute your characterization of the Union’s conduct and does not believe that the conduct you allege is occurring, much less being undertaken by Union agents.” Still, the union was committed to striking “within the 3 bounds of the law — without engaging in any unlawful blocking of ingress or egress — and to stopping any such conduct” that might be occurring. No further communications between the parties are in the record. Several months passed. In June 2025, union members extended their picketing activity to facilities of Southern Counties’ customers. The picketing continued into August 2025. During the week of August 11, a picketer shouted at a Southern Counties employee performing struck work, “ ‘[I]t’d be a shame to end up with a broken leg.’ ” Picketers also blocked the same employee’s personal vehicle, delaying his entry into and departure from Southern Counties’ facilities, and took out their phones to record him and document his license plate number. On August 19, picketers at Yusen Terminals obstructed the ingress and egress of Southern Counties vehicles and non-Southern Counties vehicles alike by “walking back and forth” in front of the entrance and exit to the facility, while “about 80 to 90 trucks” were backed up waiting to enter the terminals and “about 80 to 90 other trucks” were waiting to exit. Southern Counties made various attempts between February and August 2025 to stop the union from blocking vehicles at its facilities, to no avail. On May 22, 2025, a manager, witnessing picketers block trucks attempting to leave one of Southern Counties’ Compton facilities “for approximately 8-9 minutes per truck by walking back and forth in front of the [ ] Facility’s only entrance/exit gate,” called the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The officers who responded “did not do anything to move the picketers or otherwise require the picketers to move out of the way, and a few minutes later, both deputies 4 left.” Similarly, on June 13, 2025, a manager at a facility in Riverside called the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department twice due to picketers’ blocking, trespassing, “aggressive” behavior, and “vulgar” name-calling. Both times, officers responded and told the picketers to vacate the facility’s private property, but after the deputies left, the picketers returned “and continued acting aggressively and threateningly.” Additionally, a director at Southern Counties’ Compton facilities called the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department “at least 20 times” to complain about the union’s picketers at the two Compton locations. According to the director, in each instance, the Sheriff’s Department would send a deputy, but the deputies would never remove the picketers or stop them from blocking trucks from entering or exiting the facilities. The deputies “sometimes helped clear traffic congestion on the streets outside [the] facilities caused by the picketers blocking [the] trucks, but nothing else.” The director was informed by the Los Angeles Port Police that they would not do anything about the picketers at the Yusen Terminals location “unless there was violence.” As a result of the picketing and the ensuing delays in trucking, Southern Counties lost its largest account, with Toyota, on August 21, 2025. That same week, Yusen Terminals cancelled Southern Counties’ pickups at the port, “citing the presence of [union] picketers as the reason” for the cancellation. On August 26, 2025, Southern Counties filed a complaint in superior court for private nuisance, declaratory and injunctive relief, tortious interference, and trespass. That same day, Southern Counties filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction.

5 The next day, August 27, the trial court held a hearing on Southern Counties’ application at which both it and the union appeared through counsel and presented argument. There is no transcript or its equivalent of this hearing in the record. The day after that, August 28, the trial court granted Southern Counties a temporary restraining order enjoining union picketers from “[e]ngaging in breach of the peace, intimidation or coercion, or preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons, or vehicles from freely entering or leaving” Southern Counties’ or its customers’ facilities. The court further scheduled a show cause hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction for September 3, 2025. The trial court, at the show cause hearing, heard argument from counsel and received live witness testimony and documentary exhibits, which we will discuss as relevant below. The court made written findings of fact under the Labor Code provisions governing injunctions in labor disputes and granted Southern Counties’ request for a preliminary injunction. The union timely appealed both the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction. II. We will address the temporary restraining order, then the preliminary injunction. A. Due to an inadequate record, we affirm the grant of the temporary restraining order. Generally, we review the grant of a temporary restraining order for abuse of discretion. (See Biosense Webster, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 827, 834.) “ ‘A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has 6 “ ‘exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Further, the burden rests with the party challenging the [trial court’s order] to make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1251.) The union argues the trial court erred in granting Southern Counties’ request for a temporary restraining order for three reasons. First, the court failed to require the testimony of witnesses in open court, as required to issue injunctions related to labor disputes under section 1138.1, subdivision (a). Second, the duration of the temporary restraining order exceeded by one day the five-day maximum delineated in section 1138.1, subdivision (b). Third, the temporary restraining order was improperly overbroad in directing the union to appoint picket captains and notify its entire membership of the order. A key omission from the record before us, however, hampers our review. The record includes the temporary restraining order itself, which states counsel appeared for both parties at a hearing on August 27, 2025. The order further indicates the trial court heard oral arguments from both parties at the hearing. Yet the union has neither provided a reporter’s transcript of that hearing nor any substitute. And the union did not file a written opposition to Southern Counties’ application for a temporary restraining order. California Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b), states “[i]f an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the following: [¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled 7 statement under rule 8.137.” This requirement reflects a “most fundamental rule of appellate review[:] . . . that the judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833.) To that end, “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the order] on matters as to which the record is silent.” (Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Where, as here, “no reporter’s transcript has been provided . . . it is presumed that the unreported [ ] testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.) Without a record of “ ‘what grounds were advanced, what arguments were made and what facts may have been admitted, mutually assumed or judicially noticed at the hearing,’ ” our ability to review proceedings is severely curtailed. (Snell v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 44, 49.) And when a litigant does “not file any opposition to [a] motion[ ] and no reporter’s transcript [is] provided on appeal, we conclude [that litigant] has waived all arguments against the motions.” (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483, fn. 7.) We cannot know whether the union raised any procedural objection to the alleged absence of live witness testimony, to the six-day period between the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the hearing to show cause, or to the breadth of the order’s provisions. The union briefly addresses the missing reporter’s transcript in its reply brief, arguing it should not suffer for Southern Counties’ failure to arrange a court reporter for the 8 hearing on the temporary restraining order and that, without any record showing what issues were raised at the hearing, there is “no way” for this court “to conclude that [the union] waived any arguments.” This argument erroneously flips the appellant’s burden onto respondent’s shoulders. And it does not address the union’s own ability to obtain a reporter or its later decision to proceed without securing a permissible substitute for the oral proceedings. The union’s designation of record for its appeal of the temporary restraining order elects to proceed “WITHOUT a record of the oral proceedings (what was said at the hearing or trial) in the superior court.” The union’s designation acknowledges it “understand[s] that without a record of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the Court of Appeal will not be able to consider what was said during those proceedings in deciding whether an error was made in the superior court proceedings.” “In numerous situations, appellate courts have refused to reach the merits of an appellant’s claims because no reporter’s transcript of a pertinent proceeding or a suitable substitute was provided.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186.) We do likewise. Without a record of the relevant oral proceedings, we cannot determine the trial court abused its discretion and prejudicially erred concerning the temporary restraining order. Moreover, the temporary restraining order’s brief duration has long since elapsed, making the appeal from that order moot. “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot.” (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004)

9 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144; see Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 520 [applying this rule to a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction]; O’Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207, 210, fn. 4 [applying this rule to a temporary restraining order followed by a three-year injunction].) Although a court has discretion to review moot issues of broad public interest that are capable of repetition but tend to evade review, we would not exercise such discretion given the circumstances here. (Cf. In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23; MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [“[W]e decline to exercise our discretion to resolve the moot questions presented here”].) B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Southern Counties a preliminary injunction. We review a preliminary injunction, like a temporary restraining order, for abuse of discretion. (Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1060; see Code of Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) “Ordinarily an appeal from the granting of a preliminary injunction involves a very limited review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion concerning two factors: (1) the likelihood that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail and (2) the interim harm plaintiffs will sustain if the preliminary injunction is denied compared to the interim harm defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted pending a final determination of the merits.” (Hunter v. City of Whittier (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 588, 595; accord, White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) In applying this standard to a trial court’s factual determinations, “we review the record as a whole and accept all evidence supporting the order.” (Loy v. Kenney (2022)

10 85 Cal.App.5th 403, 406.) We disregard contrary evidence, draw inferences in favor of the order, and do not reweigh evidence. (Ibid.) The particular determinations intrinsic to the trial court’s decision are subject to appellate scrutiny under the standard of review appropriate to that kind of determination; accordingly, the court’s express and implied findings of fact are accepted on appeal if supported by substantial evidence, while its conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1136−1137.) Here, the union argues the trial court’s order issuing the preliminary injunction must be reversed because insufficient evidence supports the findings required for a labor dispute injunction under section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(3) and (5), and section 1138.2. “Enacted by the California Legislature in 1999 (Stats. 1999, ch. 616, § 1, pp. 4343−4345), section 1138.1 was patterned after section 107 of title 29 of the United States Code; the federal provision is part of the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083, 1094−1095 (Ralphs).) Section 1138.1, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “No court of this state shall have authority to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . . except after findings of fact by the court, of all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.” Section 1138.2 provides: “No 11 restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant involved in the labor dispute in question who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle that dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.” Evidence supports each criterion. 1. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Southern Counties would have suffered greater injury from denial of relief than the union suffered in granting relief, as required under section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(3). The union argues the trial court failed to properly weigh the parties’ interests under subdivision (a)(3), declaring the court’s finding that short delays at Southern Counties’ facilities constituted unlawful blocking “fails to appropriately balance [the union’s] constitutional and statutory rights to publicize its labor dispute against Southern Counties’ commercial business needs.” The union contends a “certain amount of disruption is inherent in any labor dispute” and picketing by marching in front of entering and exiting trucks is “the only reasonable way to send the message to the driver[s] that [the union] is on strike against Southern Counties.” The union further characterizes any delay Southern Counties and its employees and customers suffered as a “mild inconvenience” to be “expected from lawful labor protest activities.” This argument does not reflect the weight of the evidence supporting the preliminary injunction. Several witnesses for Southern Counties submitted declarations under oath and testified in court describing the extent of the delays they suffered 12 due to the union’s blocking of ingress and egress at Southern Counties’ and its customers’ facilities. One non-picketing truck driver testified that a union picketer blocked his truck for 10 to 15 minutes at the exit of a facility, that he witnessed a backup of “like, 85 trucks waiting to come in” to the facility, and that, due to the picketers blocking his truck and those ahead of him, he was delayed in leaving the facility by “about an hour — an hour and 15 minutes.” The same driver stated that, at various facilities, his truck had been blocked by union picketers for between two and 20 minutes, and the longest delay he had experienced due to picketing and the resultant extended queues of trucks was five hours. A second non-picketing driver testified that his truck had been blocked “more than a hundred” times by union picketers over a matter of months, and that the picketers tended to block each truck for around 15 minutes before letting one truck enter or exit the Southern Counties facility and blocking the next one. The driver explained the picketing had substantially affected his ability to perform his job, as he was usually able to complete “six or seven” deliveries a day for Southern Counties when not blocked by picketers but was reduced to completing “three or four” per day when the picketers were causing delays in entering and exiting Southern Counties facilities. He further testified that, because he was paid per delivery, the picketing delays and his resultant lower delivery numbers had caused him to lose income. A third non-picketing driver testified union picketers regularly blocked his truck for “around [10] minutes at a time” and the longest single delay he had endured from a truck backup resulting from picketing activity was “an hour and 45 minutes.”

13 A regional director for Southern Counties’ subsidiary, Universal Logistics, submitted a declaration under oath stating Southern Counties lost its largest single account, Toyota, due to delays at Yusen Terminals at the Port of Los Angeles caused by union picketing. Additionally, she declared that on at least two days the port itself cancelled Southern Counties’ pickups at the port, citing the presence of union picketers as the reason. In response, a union “strike captain” testified it is his practice to have union picketers picket across facility entries and exits for “a reasonable amount of time, usually two to three minutes, [then] we let either two trucks in or two trucks out.” The strike captain denied ever seeing individual trucks being blocked for more than two or three minutes at a time. Despite the union’s view that the effect of its picketing on Southern Counties’ business was de minimis, the testimony and declarations of various Southern Counties truck drivers and employees on the record permitted the trial court’s conclusion that they experienced severe delays due to the picketers blocking Southern Counties’ facilities, and those delays had financial consequences not only for Southern Counties’ business but also for the drivers themselves. The long delays described by Southern Counties’ witnesses arose from the cumulative effect of blocking every truck entering or exiting an active facility. If, for example, 80 or 90 trucks were waiting to enter or exit a facility, as one trucker declared, and picketers blocked each truck’s ingress or egress for even a few minutes, the trucks farther back in line would wait for hours. Such delays can have, and in this case appear to have had, serious consequences, as reflected in the truck drivers’ loss of income due to reduced deliveries, Southern Counties’ loss of a lucrative account, and the port’s refusal to 14 allow Southern Counties’ trucks entry due to picketing concerns. The trial court could weigh this accumulation of injuries in favor of Southern Counties, given the union’s means of communicating its message without inflicting them. As the trial court noted, “the preliminary injunction [does] not prevent [the union] from peacefully communicating its message to the public through lawful organized labor activities.” The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the balance of harms under section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(3), favored Southern Counties. 2. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court finding that “the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection” within the meaning of section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(5). Here, the trial court found Southern Counties had presented evidence “that the public officials charged with the duty of protecting [Southern Counties’] access and property rights, despite their best efforts, have been unable to furnish adequate protection. [Southern Counties] has contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and Port Police, but these measures have not prevented [the union’s] unlawful activity. [Citations.] [The union] has not rebutted this evidence.” Accordingly, the court determined Southern Counties had met the requirements of section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(5). The union argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding. The union asserts law enforcement regularly responded to Southern Counties’ calls and “deal[t] with traffic and trespass issues.” The union contends it is unclear 15 what more Southern Counties wanted done or what more law enforcement could have done. In describing the importance of subdivision (a)(5), our Supreme Court has identified law enforcement assistance as “a remedy for unlawful activity” by strikers and asserted “[t]he existence of [subdivision (a)(5)’s] requirement implies that the police are authorized to stop any ‘unlawful acts’ proscribed” by the statute. (Ralphs, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1113.) The inclusion of the law enforcement requirement in the statute was, the court continued, “ ‘ “based upon a recognition of the fact that the preservation of order and the protection of property in labor disputes is in the first instance a police problem.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in Division Three, in interpreting subdivision (a)(5) of section 1138.1, have held: “[W]here law enforcement has been summoned, responds in a timely fashion, protects persons from injury and property from damage, and ensures ingress and egress to and from the premises, there is neither an unwillingness nor an inability to furnish adequate protection. Conversely, where law enforcement is unwilling or unable to afford these protections and services, an injunction may lie.” (United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 566, 580.) Here, the primary purpose for which Southern Counties wanted police assistance was the maintenance of timely ingress and egress of vehicles through its own and its customers’ facilities. There is substantial evidence on the record that the authorities summoned repeatedly for this purpose were either unable or unwilling to stop the picketers from blocking ingress and egress. The Los Angeles Port Police informed one employee they would do nothing about the picketers at the Yusen 16 Terminals location “unless there was violence.” The same employee declared she called the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department “at least 20 times” to stop the picketers from blocking vehicles from entering or exiting Southern Counties’ facilities, yet, from her observation, the deputies who arrived each time “never stopped the picketers from stopping” the trucks, but rather merely “helped clear traffic congestion on the streets outside” the facilities caused by delays from the picketing. Another employee described similar results in a sworn declaration, stating two sheriff’s deputies once cleared traffic on the road leading to the facility due to a large number of blocked trucks but “did not do anything to move the picketers or otherwise require the picketers to move out of the way,” and departed minutes later. Thus, it is evident from the record that the police were repeatedly either unable or unwilling to stop the “ ‘unlawful acts’ ” of blocking proscribed by section 1138.1. (Ralphs, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1113.) The union’s invocation of cases in which police inaction was even more egregious is not persuasive. As explained in the previous section, there was evidence that blocking by picketers caused Southern Counties harm. The police, in failing to stop the blocking, failed to alleviate the harm. They did not ensure “the preservation of order and the protection of property in labor disputes.” (Ralphs, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1113.) The record therefore contains sufficient evidence for the trial court to have determined “ ‘the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection’ ” to Southern Counties, pursuant to section 1138.1, subdivision (a)(5). 3.

17 Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence that Southern Counties made “every reasonable effort” to settle its labor dispute before proceeding to court, as required by section 1138.2. Section 1138.2 requires that, before an injunction can be issued, a complainant must “make every reasonable effort to settle th[e] dispute” via negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. The union argues the record does not support a finding that Southern Counties made “every reasonable effort” to reach a settlement before filing for an injunction. The union contends the “bare fact” that Southern Counties presented a last, best, and final offer and the two cease-and-desist letters from Southern Counties’ counsel is instead an indication of “ ‘my way or the highway’ behavior that fails to evidence any willingness to settle.” The union further suggests Southern Counties failed to take advantage of free governmental mediation services, among other options, evidencing its failure to make every reasonable effort to settle its dispute with the union. We reject the union’s view that the record contains scant evidence of Southern Counties’ negotiation attempts. Southern Counties’ lead negotiator provided a sworn declaration that he had participated in “extensive collective bargaining negotiations” between the parties from early Spring 2024 until January 28, 2025, when Southern Counties presented its last, best, and final offer to the union. After the union rejected Southern Counties’ final offer, the negotiator sent a further email to the union’s secretary treasurer expressing disappointment at the continued failure to reach a settlement and stating Southern Counties’ “doors remain open for further bargaining with the Union.” The negotiator declared he did not receive further substantive 18 communications from the union. And after picketing began, Southern Counties sent two successive cease-and-desist letters to the union, indicating a “prompt cessation” of the picketers’ illegal activity in blocking ingress and egress at Southern Counties’ facilities would “avoid the need for litigation.” The letters contained what could be seen as proof of unlawful activity. While the union responded to both letters, it remained intransigent in the face of Southern Counties’ evidence. When “the positions of the parties remain unchanged, it would not be reasonable to require [plaintiff] to engage in a[nother] round of direct negotiations that are unlikely to succeed where [ ] previous rounds of direct negotiation . . . have failed.” (Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc. v. Bhd. Of Maint. Of Way Employees Div. (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 568, 572; see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (7th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 453, 458 [“the law requires that a party make every reasonable effort, not every conceivable one”].) Southern Counties, furthermore, refrained from suing for several more months, even as picketing continued unabated. Though in some instances an employer may not be entitled to injunctive relief if it rests solely on having pursued one method of reconciliation (see Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. Railroad (1944) 321 U.S. 50, 57, fn. 11), that Southern Counties did not pursue mediated dispute resolution services with the union does not compel reversal. “ ‘[E]very reasonable effort’ to resolve a dispute through nonjudicial means does not necessarily include a prior demand for arbitration.” (United Parcel Service, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (2d Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 100, 106.) Reversal is especially unwarranted here not only given the evidence allowing a 19 conclusion regarding the union’s recalcitrance discussed above, but also because the union never raised a “reasonable efforts” issue with the trial court and there was no indication of a viable dispute resolution program or the union’s willingness to engage in one. (See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy (1st Cir. 1976) 532 F.2d 189, 191 [“[T]he union here is unwilling to commit itself to arbitration, and is thus in a poor position to argue that the company’s failure to suggest that route falls short of ‘every reasonable effort to settle such dispute’ ”].) A case the union cites for support in its briefing, Pulte Homes v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. A. (6th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 295, involved, in comparison, negligible attempts to negotiate. There, a home builder claimed its firing of an employee prompted a laborers’ union to bombard the builder’s offices with thousands of phone calls and e-mails. (Pulte Homes, at pp. 298−299.) Nine days after the employee’s firing, and four days after the phone calls and emails began, the builder issued a single cease-and- desist letter. (Id. at p. 306.) It then filed for an injunction two days later. (Ibid.) On appeal, the court found the builder “made little to no effort to settle. It transmitted the cease-and-desist letter on a Sunday, did not specify a time to respond, did not offer [the union] an opportunity to negotiate, and filed suit less than forty-eight hours after sending the letter without even confirming that [the union] received the letter. This is not ‘every reasonable effort’ to settle the dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the negotiations were not so anemic and there was no rush to court after just a couple of weeks.

20 DISPOSITION We affirm the trial court’s orders and award appellate costs to Southern Counties.

SCHERB, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.