In re E.D. CA1/4

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 In re E.D. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re E.D., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

DANIELLE D., Petitioner, v. A176849 MENDOCINO COUNTY (Mendocino County SUPERIOR COURT, Super. Ct. No. Respondent, 25JV0029902 )

MENDOCINO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Real Party In Interest.

Danielle D. (mother) filed this writ petition after the juvenile court terminated family maintenance and reunification services for Michael D. (father) and set a permanency planning 1 hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code1 section 366.26. She requests that we reverse the juvenile court’s orders reducing her visitation with minors C.D.2 and E.D., and transferring her educational rights for these children. We reverse the juvenile court’s order reducing her visitation and remand for further proceedings on visitation consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm. BACKGROUND Alameda County Dependency Proceedings A petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) was filed in Alameda County in September 2023 on behalf of minors C.D., E.D., and their brother, A.D.3 The children were returned to mother’s care in February 2024 and placed with mother at the June 2024 disposition hearing with family maintenance services. The children were detained from mother’s care pursuant to a section 387 petition filed on November 12, 2024. At the contested April 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing on the section 387 petition, the court ordered family reunification services for mother and father and supervised visits for mother at least once per week for up to four hours each visit. The court also 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Consistent with the parties’ briefing, we refer to mother’s eldest child using the first initial of the child’s preferred name, C.D., rather than the first initial of the child’s given name. 3 The court’s orders with respect to A.D. are not at issue in this writ petition.

2 ordered the parents to submit to hair follicle testing. On September 29, 2025, the children began a trial visit with father in Mendocino County. At the six-month review hearing on October 30, 2025, the court adopted the social service agency’s recommendations, placed the children with father with family maintenance services, and terminated mother’s reunification services after finding she made no progress on her case plan. The social service agency’s report for this hearing stated that mother had not been in contact since August 2025, she had not engaged in services, and she had not engaged in regular or consistent visits with the children. The court ordered mother to have visitation “as frequently as possible, consistent with the children’s well-being and consistent with the last orders of this Court.”4 The court determined that father resided in Mendocino County and transferred the case.5 Mendocino County Dependency Proceedings The juvenile court held a transfer hearing on November 13, 2025, and appointed counsel for mother, father, and the children, and set a review date the following week. At the November 20, 2025, hearing, mother told the court that she had not seen her children in five months, and the court ordered the Mendocino County Department of Social Services (the Department) to 4 The minute order omits the phrase “consistent with the last orders of this [c]ourt,” but the reporter’s transcript controls. (In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 800.) 5 Mother appealed this order, and her appointed counsel submitted a brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, and In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. This court dismissed the appeal.

3 comply with the last Alameda County visitation order. The court set a hearing for December 16, 2025, for receipt of the case plan. At the December 16, 2025, hearing, the Department informed the court that a social worker had just been assigned and the case plan was not ready. Mother’s counsel raised visitation, stating that she had hoped the case plan would be ready with a plan for visitation. Mother’s counsel argued that the prior order allowed visitation but did not specify a frequency, however, a four-hour minimum was normal; mother’s counsel requested that mother meet with the Department to be assessed to start visitation. The court expressed concern that it had not received notice of a request to change a visitation order and stated that the prior order had been for visitation as frequently as possible consistent with the children’s well-being with a hair follicle test. The Department’s counsel stated that, should mother reach out to the Department, the Department would “be requesting testing and arranging for a visit as ordered.” The minors’ counsel asked that the Department assess mother for visitation with testing and requested that the children not be forced to visit. Father’s counsel also agreed that the prior order included an order for a hair follicle test and requested the Department verify mother’s sobriety before visitation. The court stated that the Alameda County visitation order would stand, but ordered the Department to work with mother and mother to present herself to the Department for a visitation assessment. The court stated it would not order a hair follicle test (those were not provided in Mendocino County) but granted 4 the Department’s request for a urine analysis test. The court also stated that it would consider mother to have requested to change the visitation to order some type of minimum, which the court would address at the next hearing. The court concluded the hearing by ordering mother to get in touch with the Department and said that the court would like to see some visitation before the next hearing. On January 6, 2026, counsel for the Department represented that the social worker was still working on a case plan, father had recently allowed mother to visit the children unsupervised, and father had an emergent housing issue and was staying in a hotel. The court inquired whether anyone wanted to be heard, and mother’s counsel requested that the court modify mother’s restraining order against father to allow her to co- parent the children peacefully. The court granted the request to amend the restraining order and set another hearing for January 20, 2026. For the January 20, 2026, hearing, the Department submitted a case plan. For mother, the Department recommended that the children have in-person or online (Zoom) visits with mother for a minimum of four hours per week. The case plan did not mention drug testing for mother and proposed that mother would be responsible for getting to visitation. Visitation frequency could change if mother entered a rehabilitation program, and visits could become unsupervised and expanded at the discretion of the social worker, not to exceed three overnight visits per week without a further court order.

5 At the hearing, the court stated that it had reviewed the case plan and received it into evidence. The Department informed the court that it was investigating father’s recent arrest for drunk driving. Mother’s counsel stated that mother was concerned about the situation and the fact that the children were currently residing with a paternal aunt. Counsel stated that mother had not had visits with the children since the case was transferred, mother had only one phone call with the social worker, and mother wanted therapeutic visitation with the children. Mother’s counsel represented that mother did not think that she had a substance abuse problem, but mother was willing to test for the Department. The court ordered that a substance abuse assessment and services be added to the case plan for father and ordered the Department to file a detention petition if appropriate. Regarding visitation, the court said, “Mother’s visitation has been ordered. It’s a matter of both sides meeting. So the [D]epartment needs to set a date and time for visitation, and supply a bus pass or some way for mother to get there. But both sides need to work to make sure that visitation is happening.” The court adopted the Department’s proposed case plan “with the modifications stated.” The Section 387 Petition A. Detention and Jurisdiction The Department filed a section 387 petition on February 9, 2026, alleging that father was unable to provide regular care for the children due to his ongoing alcohol abuse; the children were suffering from and/or were at substantial risk of suffering serious 6 emotional damage as a result of father’s conduct; and family reunification services had been terminated for mother, mother was only allowed supervised visits with the children, but father was allowing mother unauthorized access to the children. The Department’s detention report stated, among other things, that father had been arrested for drunk driving on January 9, 2026, and he violated a court order by transporting the children to visit with mother and allowing mother to stay in his home. The children told the social worker that they did not wish to visit with mother, but father continued to allow mother to see the children. At the February 10, 2026, detention hearing, mother’s counsel requested that the children be placed in mother’s care and said mother was clean and sober. Regarding visitation, mother’s counsel asked that formal visitation be scheduled with mother and the children. Counsel argued that mother had seen the children unintentionally, and she had been trying to contact the Department to set up visitation, but visitation had not been arranged. Further, if C.D. did not want visitation with mother, mother requested that conjoint therapy be ordered. Counsel for the Department responded that the Department had been trying to set up visitation. She continued, “There was some difficulty with the social worker and not calling back, refusing to test. Mom’s services were previously terminated in Alameda before the transfer. We would like to set up visits, but there needs to be some cooperation.” Mother’s counsel responded, “The thing about this is that was exactly what was set up the last court hearing about the visits. I do have some 7 text messages that she provided and there’s some disconnect. We are asking that at least Zoom visits be set up. And I would like an email sent to myself as well because I don’t know exactly what is going on, but I did get a text from the mother that the social worker, that she had a lot of concerns about what was going on with the father. So if I can be part of that conversation to help, please.” Counsel for the children agreed that the Department needed to facilitate visits and conjoint therapy for C.D., who adamantly did not want to see mother. The court ordered the children detained. The court ordered supervised visitation for father at a minimum of two hours a week and said mother’s visitation “remains the same.” The court ordered the Department to schedule a Zoom visit for mother and include mother’s counsel in the discussion about setting up visits within a week. The court continued the jurisdiction hearing from March 5, 2026, to March 17, 2026, because the Department did not file a jurisdiction report. At the March 5, 2026, hearing, Mother said she was having “strong difficulty” communicating with the social worker and the Department had not set up a meeting that mother had been requesting since the case transfer. Mother’s counsel stated that mother had just started visitation, but counsel had to get the Department’s director involved to ensure it happened. Counsel represented that the social worker had not had a “one-on-one” with mother and requested that the court order the social worker to speak to mother. Father’s counsel added that she had the “same issues.” The court ordered the 8 social worker to communicate with mother directly one-on-one in advance of the next child family team meeting (CFTM). In its jurisdiction report, the Department recommended that the court find that prior placement with father had not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the children. The Department reported that father allowed mother to see the children, he was observed to be under the influence on more than one occasion, he had alcohol in the home, he had dropped off C.D. at a friend’s house in San Francisco and had not returned to pick her up, he failed to provide for C.D.’s medication and therapy, and fought with C.D. in front of the other children. The children were in placements in different locations. The Department’s service logs stated that the social worker attempted to contact mother numerous times on December 17, 2025, but she could not reach mother. The next day, mother told the social worker that her children were taken because of her medication, and the social worker requested a medication list. The social worker requested the medication list again on January 7, 2026, and told mother she needed to complete testing before visitation. Mother provided an undated pharmacy screenshot and said she would provide more information later. Also on January 7, 2026, the social worker emailed the attorneys stating that mother had not provided her medication list, mother had informed the social worker that she could not provide a urine analysis test in December 2025 because of prior “ false positives,” and mother indicated in December 2025 that she did not plan to test because Mendocino would not provide a hair follicle test. A 9 February 10, 2026, entry stated that the social worker “will be communicating” with mother regarding visitation. An early March 2026 entry indicated C.D. refused to visit with mother on March 3, 2026, and March 5, 2026. Supervised Zoom visitation was scheduled for two hours every Tuesday and Thursday. C.D. said she would like to have visits with mother “when she feels ready.” The social worker and resource parents intended to coordinate with C.D.’s therapist so the therapist could participate in a future visit. The social worker contacted mother about visitation on March 13, 2026. Another entry on March 17, 2026, stated that the social workers were working to schedule in-person visitation, but it had been challenging because of the children’s schedules and mother’s delayed responses. That same day, mother told the social worker she was going to send her negative urine analysis tests from out of county, and she provided one dated March 13, 2026. The service logs also showed that the Department and mother met on March 11, 2026. After 40 minutes, mother logged off but said she would log back on; the social workers waited for 10 minutes, but mother did not return. The social worker sent mother a text, but mother did not respond. At the March 17, 2026 jurisdiction hearing, mother submitted an offer of proof that she was having Zoom visits with the children, she was testing of her own accord, she had an Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, and had engaged in services and therapy. Mother’s counsel informed the court that mother wanted in-person visitation and had requested it at a March 12, 10 2026 CFTM; counsel requested that in-person visitation be set up at the court hearing and raised the issue of mother receiving gas vouchers for visitation. Mother’s counsel stated that she understood that this matter had exceeded statutory timelines, but the parents were doing their best and the Department needed to fairly evaluate mother. The Department’s counsel stated that she had invited mother to submit dates for an in-person visit, and the social worker was trying to coordinate a date during spring break in a couple of weeks so that the visit with the children could take place at the same time for four hours. Mother’s counsel argued that mother should be receiving weekly in-person visitation, not just a visit over spring break. The children’s counsel objected to forcing visits on C.D. because she needed the Department to investigate a recent report that C.D. made to police about mother, but counsel had no objection regarding the other children. The court sustained the jurisdictional allegations and set a disposition hearing for April 21, 2026. The court said, “I think visitation with both parents is important and should be facilitated and encouraged by the Department, with the caveat that [C.D.] is of an age where her opinions should be taken into account.” Mother requested therapy with C.D., and the court indicated that it would consider this to be an option at the disposition hearing.

11 B. Disposition On April 21, 2026, the court continued the disposition hearing because the Department did not file a disposition report. Mother’s counsel requested on the record that the Department get back to her regarding in-person visitation and said those visits had not been set up. On April 30, 2026, the disposition report was not ready and the court continued the matter again. On May 28, 2026, the disposition report again was not ready, and the court continued the matter. At that hearing, the court addressed a request for psychotropic medication for C.D. and A.D., and mother’s counsel objected to the late disposition report and stated the Department had not been keeping mother informed about medical appointments or the children’s education. Mother requested that the court order the Department to comply with its obligations to notify mother of medical appointments, treatments, educational meetings, school issues, and related issues. The social worker informed the court that mother was not always responsive, and the court ordered the Department to keep mother involved in all medical and educational issues. Father’s counsel reported that father was also having some difficulty communicating with the social worker. In the June 2026 disposition report, the Department recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing. The Department learned that mother had been arrested for driving under the influence in November 2025. Neither parent had demonstrated the ability to safely reunify with the children. C.D.’s current 12 placement was considering permanent placement for C.D. and E.D. The report recommended minimum visitation with mother for one hour a month and minimum visitation with father for two hours a month, with the parents being responsible for getting to visitation. Delivered services logs submitted along with the disposition report stated that, on March 17, 2026, the social worker learned that mother had recorded a Zoom visit. On March 18, 2026, the social worker began coordinating an in- person visit for mother during the children’s spring break. On March 19, 2026, the social worker emailed mother that the Department was still waiting to hear back from her to confirm the visit. The children had an in-person visit with mother on April 6, 2026. During the visit, C.D. was upset that mother had changed the password to her email. C.D. and E.D. had weekly visits with mother, but C.D. did not attend every visit. At the disposition hearing on June 25, 2026, father’s counsel announced that father reached an agreement with the Department and father was “conceding today.” As part of the agreement, father would receive visitation for three hours per week for each child. Mother requested family maintenance or additional reunification services. Mother also opposed the recommendation to reduce visitation, requested therapeutic visits with C.D., and requested no change in her educational rights. The social worker testified that mother had one in-person visit in April 2026, and the Department scheduled another in May 2026, but mother could not attend because she did not have 13 transportation. The social worker knew mother had trouble getting to Mendocino County for visitation, but the Department did not provide transportation assistance because mother did not have services. The social worker testified that the Department did not provide mother with in-person visitation in January, February and March because “for a certain time period we were trying to get them scheduled, and then we had the holidays, and then we didn’t have the staff.” The Department made no attempt to schedule in-person visitation in June 2026, but mother received two hours of Zoom visits per week. The social worker testified that E.D. wanted to visit with mother. Mother was asked to drug test to support visitation, but mother did not drug test for the Department until April 2026. Mother provided out-of-county drug tests, but the social worker testified that she did not know if the tests were random. The social worker recommended reducing visits because C.D. did not want to visit with mother in general, and mother did not always attend visits. The Department had not started therapeutic visitation for C.D. because C.D.’s service provider was going to let the social worker know when such visitation with mother would be appropriate. Mother’s visits were supervised because mother vaped sometimes and brought unauthorized people into the visits. The social worker recommended limiting mother’s educational rights because mother did not attend a February 2026 IEP meeting for C.D., and mother was not always available. The social worker testified that she texted mother about the IEP 14 meeting about a week in advance, but mother never responded or followed up. The social worker admitted that she primarily spoke to father about educational issues. Mother testified that she did not have issues with substances and she had not used methamphetamine in the last year. Mother was in substance abuse treatment programs, she was drug testing, and her tests were negative. She also participated in parenting education, anger management, domestic violence classes, and relapse prevention. Mother confirmed that the Department had said she needed to drug test before in-person visitation. She had not refused to drug test, but she expressed concerns because she was taking medication and wanted to ensure the testing was accurate. Mother requested information about drug testing but never heard back from the Department. Mother’s doctor set up a series of urine analysis tests for her starting in February 2026, but the tests were not random. Regarding the April 2026 drug test that she did with the Department, mother went into the Department requesting to test. Mother testified that she had visitation three days a week on Zoom for about an hour. Visits with E.D. went great, and C.D. had “been coming around more and more.” Mother testified she visited consistently, but she had missed a few visits due to a prior appointment and, on one occasion, a lack of cell service. Mother was interested in her children’s education, and she did not recall the social worker inviting her to the IEP meeting. Mother contacted the school a “few times” about the children, but 15 she mostly caught up with the visitation supervisor and did not call because father had been told he needed to stop calling the school. The court took judicial notice of “all prior findings and orders” after reviewing the complete case file, and found mother’s testimony to be “not credible,” especially her denial of ever having a substance abuse problem, which was interwoven throughout the proceedings. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children if they were returned to father or mother and there was not a substantial probability that the children would be returned within the initial 18-month period from removal. The court found the parents had histories of extensive or chronic use of drugs or alcohol and resisted treatment during the three-year period before the filing of this latest petition. As to C.D. and E.D., the court found that a permanent plan of placement with specific people and a goal of adoption or legal guardianship was necessary and appropriate. The court found that visitation with mother would not be detrimental to the children. The court stated, “I will order two hours monthly in person, telephone, or video chat, supervised by the Department or its designee. With at least one-week advance notice, one of these visits can be in person if mother travels to Mendocino County.” The court gave the Department discretion to expand visitation if mother remained in her treatment program and engaged in visitation. Father received three hours per week of visitation with each child.

16 The court transferred education rights for C.D. and E.D. from both parents. The court found evidence that both parents had missed regularly participating in the children’s ongoing daily needs as to education. Mother’s counsel asked for the court’s reasoning regarding the reduction in mother’s visitation but not father’s visitation. The court asked the Department to put its reasons for the recommendation on the record. The Department’s counsel stated that the reason for father was the bond he had with the children and he had consistent in-person visits; for mother, C.D. usually did not want to visit, and E.D. “seem[ed] not to care too much one way or another.” Counsel continued that mother “tends to not always attend visits and is not appropriate sometimes. She has been observed vaping during a Zoom visit. She had recorded a Zoom visit. Mom brings random people into visits without approval.” The court concluded that its “orders remain.” A section 366.26 hearing was set for October 22, 2026. Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450) as to C.D. and E.D. DISCUSSION In this writ proceeding, mother argues that the juvenile court erred by reducing her visitation and limiting her educational rights, and she requests that we reverse those orders. For the reasons explained herein, we agree that the court abused its discretion when ordering the reduction in mother’s visitation, but we affirm the court’s order transferring education rights.

17 I. Visitation “Meaningful visitation is pivotal to the parent-child relationship, even after reunification services are terminated.” (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504 (Hunter S.).) “Courts have long recognized that, in the context of dependency proceedings, a lack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[ ] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship’ between mother and child. [Citation.] Even after family reunification services are terminated, visitation must continue unless the court finds it would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (h).)” (Hunter S., at p. 1504.) The juvenile court, however, has the discretion to determine the terms and conditions of visitation. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48–49.) We will not reverse such an order unless the record clearly shows that the trial court abused its discretion. (See ibid.) Only if “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination,” will we reverse such an order. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (Id. at pp. 318–319.) We start our analysis with a discussion of Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 because we find it instructive. The mother in Hunter S. appealed from orders terminating her parental rights and denying a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services based on the juvenile court’s failure to enforce a visitation order. (Id. at p. 1500.) The mother was 18 incarcerated for much of the reunification period, and her reunification services were terminated the month she was released to a rehabilitation center. (Id. at pp. 1500–1501.) At that time, the court ordered the social services agency to set up “visitation for [the mother] as can be arranged through her program.” (Id. at p. 1501.) The child thereafter persistently refused to visit, and the court refused to order therapeutic visitation or require the child to visit for over two years. (Id. at pp. 1501–1503.) During that period, the permanent plan for the child changed from guardianship to adoption, and the mother filed a section 388 petition seeking to vacate the selection and implementation hearing and reinstate reunification services. (Id. at p. 1503.) The trial court found that the mother had shown a substantial change of circumstances, but she failed to demonstrate that it was in the child’s best interest to be returned to her custody. (Id. at pp. 1503–1504.) The appellate court reversed the denial of the section 388 petition. (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.) The court concluded that the child had complete discretion to veto visitation, and the court had failed to do anything to enforce its visitation order. (Id. at p. 1505.) Next, the court found that the juvenile court had relied on the child’s lack of bond with the mother to conclude that granting the section 388 petition would not be in the child’s best interest, which “stood section 388 on its head.” (Id. at pp. 1506–1507.) “The juvenile court applied the incorrect test. It focused on the absence of contact or current bond between [the mother] and her son. But, it was unfair to 19 apply this standard when [the mother] had been denied any chance to satisfy the contact requirement. The primary thrust of the petition was that, by virtue of three years of error and judicial inattention, she had been deprived of the opportunity to revive her relationship with her son, even though, during that entire period, a valid visitation order remained in effect and she had repeatedly raised the issue with the court.” (Id. at p. 1507.) Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 concluded that it served the child’s bests interest to reverse the order denying the section 388 petition and to remand for the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing on the petition in light of the fact that mother had been denied visitation. (Id. at p. 1508.) The court continued, “We are cognizant of the difficulties posed in a case such as this when a great deal of time has passed and a child refuses to visit with a parent who sincerely — but belatedly — wishes to maintain contact in an effort to rebuild a damaged relationship. Even under such admittedly problematic circumstances, absent a finding of detriment it is incumbent on the juvenile court to discharge its duty to ensure the parent’s right of visitation is preserved, under conditions consistent with the child’s well-being. In conducting a new section 388 hearing, given the passage of time and the consistent intensity of [the child’s] resistance, it may be appropriate for the juvenile court to further consider if, under the circumstances and in light of current information, visits would be detrimental to [the child].” (Hunter S., at p. 1508.)

20 Here, the Department erred by not providing in-person visitation for most of the review period. The visitation order was for visits “as frequently as possible consistent with the children’s well-being” with a minimum of one visit a week for up to four hours with drug testing (first hair follicle and then urine analysis) until January 20, 2026.6 Thereafter, the order was for visitation in-person or by Zoom with a minimum of four hours weekly, with the court orally ordering the Department to provide mother with assistance in getting to in-person visits. The juvenile court accepted this case on November 13, 2025, but the Department did not assign a social worker until shortly before the December 16, 2025, hearing. The Department did not contact mother until December 17, 2025. The Department thus undisputedly did nothing to set up visitation for mother for over a month after the case transferred. The Department’s evidence shows that the social worker could not reach mother when she first called, but the two spoke the next day. On December 18, 2025, mother told the social worker that she would not drug test because the Department could not do a hair follicle test. However, on January 20, 2026, mother’s counsel represented that mother wanted visits set up “as soon as possible,” and mother was willing to test for the Department. The court said, “Mother’s visitation has been 6 Mother states in her petition that the visitation order from Alameda County did not require drug testing. Mother, however, never objected on this basis when the court discussed drug testing and granted the Department’s request for a urine analysis test.

21 ordered. It’s matter of both sides meeting. So the department needs to set a date and time for visitation, and supply a bus pass or some way for Mother to get there. But both sides need to work to make sure that visitation is happening.” It also appears that the Department was responsible for the lack of visitation following the January 20, 2026, hearing. At the February 10, 2026, hearing, mother again requested visitation, and the Department’s counsel said there had been issues contacting mother and with mother refusing to test. Mother’s counsel responded that she was unsure “exactly what is going on,” and there was some “disconnect.” Zoom visitation started in early March 2026, but the court had to order the Department to set up a meeting with mother’s counsel to start those visits, and mother’s counsel informed the court that she had to involve the Department’s director to get Zoom visitation started. And when asked why the Department did not provide in-person visitation in January, February, and March, the social worker testified, “So for a certain time period we were trying to get them scheduled, and then we had the holidays, and then we didn’t have the staff.” (Italics added.) Mother asked for in-person visitation, the court ordered the Department to assist her in getting to visitation at the January 20, 2026, hearing, and the court ordered the Department to encourage and facilitate visitation at the March 17, 2026, 22 hearing.7 Mother had only one in-person visit with the children, and the Department knew that mother could not make the only other scheduled in-person visit in May 2026 because she did not have transportation. The social worker also conceded that the Department knew mother needed transportation assistance to get to in-person visitation but the Department did not provide this assistance. In sum, the Department failed to provide mother with visitation for the first month of the review period and thereafter failed to provide court-ordered transportation assistance for in- person visitation. This case differs from Hunter S. in that the period of missed visitation at issue is shorter, mother had Zoom visits staring in March 2026, and mother was responsible for some of the missed visitation (in that she initially refused to drug test).8 Mother had only one in-person visit in seven months, however, and we cannot countenance the Department’s failure to provide in-person visitation for a majority of the review period. “Courts have long recognized that, in the context of dependency proceedings, a lack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[ ] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship’ between mother and child.” (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) And video meetings are not an adequate substitute 7 The Department did not argue that the court did not have the power to order it to provide transportation assistance to mother. 8 Mother testified that she did not refuse drug testing, but the court found that mother’s testimony at the disposition hearing was not credible.

23 for meeting in person, even for adults. (In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355, 377.) The Department contends that any failure to provide visitation bears no relation to the challenged order reducing mother’s visitation, but we disagree. Mother asked the court to maintain the status quo regarding the frequency of her visitation as the Department intended to do for father, and she requested that the court state its reasons for reducing visitation for her but not father. The court asked the Department to state its reasons for the record, and the Department’s first justification was that father had consistently attended in-person visits with the children during the review period and the children had a strong bond with father but not mother. The court accepted the Department’s explanation. Similar to Hunter S., the court’s ruling here contained flawed logic in that a main reason for the ruling was the absence of contact or current bond, but it was unfair to apply this standard when the Department denied mother the chance for meaningful in-person contact for most of the review period.9 (See Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1506–1508.)

9 The Department argues that this court should uphold the juvenile court’s order because of mother’s inappropriate conduct during visitation. But much of the assertedly inappropriate conduct occurred before the Alameda court’s April 2025 determination that mother should have visitation at least once per week for up to four hours each visit. The Department further contends that the trial court appropriately reduced visitation based on the children’s lack of bond with mother. As stated, remand is appropriate because it was unfair to rely on the children’s lack of bond with their mother when the Department 24 Furthermore, the evidence does not support the Department’s justification that E.D. did not care “one way or another” about visiting mother. Early in the review period, the social worker reported that E.D. responded ambivalently when asked about visitation with mother. However, at the disposition hearing, the social worker testified that E.D. was visiting consistently with mother and wanted to visit her, and E.D.’s counsel agreed. The Department urges us to disregard its failure to provide in-person visitation, claiming that mother forfeited her claim and her own violations of the visitation orders afforded her sufficient visitation. We disagree on both fronts. At the disposition hearing, mother specifically argued that it was unfair to reduce her visitation based on the children’s different relationships with their parents because father had been afforded in-person visitation and mother did not have that opportunity.10 And failed to provide appropriate visitation. (See Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) 10 For the first time at oral argument, the Department cited In re Sophia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046, for the proposition that mother forfeited her claim by failing to file a formal motion. We agree with Sophia M. that if a child refuses visitation “it is the parent’s burden to request a specific type of enforcement, or a specific change to the visitation order.” (Ibid.) However, Sopia M. did not hold that a parent must file a formal, written motion to seek the court’s assistance in enforcing a visitation order, and Sophia M. approved of the juvenile court’s grant of the parent’s oral request for a visitation enforcement mechanism. (Id. at pp. 1043, 1047.) Mother raised the issue of visitation and requested visitation below, and she orally requested in-person visitation after Zoom visits commenced.

25 mother’s violations of court orders could not excuse or cure the Department’s error in failing to provide proper visitation where the very purpose of court-ordered visitation is to promote a healthy parent-child relationship. (See In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) Finally, we briefly address and reject mother’s remaining contentions that the court erred by delegating complete discretion to C.D. regarding visitation and not ordering conjoint therapy. Mother’s first argument is forfeited due to her failure to specifically raise the issue below, and it is also inaccurate. The court stated that C.D.’s opinions “should be taken into account” for purposes of visitation, not that C.D. had the power to determine visitation. C.D. was angry at mother, expressed her desire not to visit until she was ready, and refused to attend some visits. However, the record also shows that mother did have visitation with C.D. despite C.D.’s general reluctance; hence, C.D. did not exercise complete discretion to refuse visitation.11 We are similarly unpersuaded by mother’s claim that the court erred by failing to order a form of conjoint therapy with C.D. C.D. had mental health issues, including a history of thoughts of self-harm, and her therapist was engaged and apparently held the opinion that therapeutic meetings with 11 We need not address mother’s suggestion that the Department erred in not making up for missed visitation (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319), as we have already found that the Department’s failure to provide meaningful in-person visitation for mother constitutes reversible error.

26 mother would not yet be beneficial. In the meantime, although C.D. missed some visits, she was visiting with mother. On this record, we cannot conclude that the failure to order conjoint therapy exceeded all bounds of reason. (Cf. In re F.P. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 966, 973, 975 [parent has no legal right to conjoint therapy even during reunification period and no abuse of discretion to order such therapy when therapist deemed it appropriate].) Because the juvenile court erred for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that this matter should be remanded for the court to conduct a new hearing on the Department’s request to reduce mother’s visitation in light of the fact that mother was denied in-person visitation for much of the review period. (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) “[A]bsent a finding of detriment it is incumbent on the juvenile court to discharge its duty to ensure the parent’s right of visitation is preserved, under conditions consistent with the child’s well- being.” (Ibid.; see also § 366.21, subd. (h).) On remand, the court shall consider the fact that mother was improperly denied in- person visitation during much of the review period when assessing the evidence and determining whether a reduction in mother’s visitation is consistent with the children’s well-being. (See Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) We acknowledge that the Department advanced additional reasons in support of its recommendation to reduce mother’s visitation, and the court may consider those reasons and current information on remand.

27 II. Transfer of Educational Rights With respect to educational rights, the court ruled: “At this time, I am transferring educational rights of [C.D.] and [E.D.] from both parents. I am making that finding that we are proceeding to permanency as to both girls. They have been removed for quite some time. There is evidence that both parents have missed regularly participating in their ongoing daily needs as to education.” Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion with this ruling. We disagree. “Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their children’s education. [Citations.] However, when a child is a dependent child, a court may limit a parent’s ability to make educational decisions on the child’s behalf by appointing a responsible adult to make educational decisions.” (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276; § 361, subd. (a)(1).) Any such limitation must be based on the best interests of the child and may not exceed what is necessary to protect the child. (§ 361, subds. (a)(1) & (6).) We review an order limiting a parent’s educational rights for abuse of discretion, “bearing in mind ‘[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the child, not the parent.’ ” (In re R.W., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) Under that standard, we may not substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court and may reverse only if the court’s order exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.) The juvenile court’s order did not exceed the bounds of reason. The court took judicial notice of the prior findings and 28 orders in the case, and there had been a prior sustained allegation that the children had poor school attendance while in mother’s care, which was supported by the record evidence despite mother’s denial. The social worker testified that she invited mother to an IEP meeting in February 2026 for C.D. during the review period, but mother never responded or followed up. Mother made only “a few” efforts to contact the children’s schools, and the children had missed school days during the review period because they were impermissibly with mother in Alameda County. Additionally, the delivered service logs and reporter’s transcript reflect multiple instances where mother was difficult to reach or delayed communications with the Department about other issues, the social worker testified mother is not always responsive, and mother also logged off of the March 2026 meeting she requested and never followed up. On this record, the court could reasonably have concluded that transferring educational rights to a responsive adult was necessary and in the children’s best interests. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s June 25, 2026, order reducing mother’s visitation is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to conduct a new hearing on the issue of visitation, assessing the historical and current circumstances in a manner consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the court’s June 25, 2026, order is affirmed. Mother’s request for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing is moot, and this decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

29 BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J. GORDON, J. In re E.D. (A176849)

 Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.