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In re J.F. CA1/1

California Court of Appeal · A175783 · 2026-09-29 · Unpublished

Area
dependency
Panel
Langhorne Wilson (author)

Analysis

No analysis yet. When one exists it is a model's reading of this opinion — the rulings it reviewed, whether it agrees with the court, and the authorities it checked — shown beside the court's own disposition, never in place of it. How analyses are made.

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 In re J.F. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.F. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, A175783, A175784 v. (City & County of San Francisco K.J., Super. Ct. Nos. JD25-3217; Defendant and Appellant. JD25-3216/A)

K.J. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s disposition order removing her three children from her custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1).)1 She contends there is no substantial evidence that reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal, and there were reasonable means to avoid removal. Mother also challenges the court’s denial of her request to have unsupervised visitation with her children. After she filed her opening brief, Mother withdrew her latter claim of error, and thus we do not consider it further. Finding no merit to Mother’s remaining arguments, we affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

1 I. BACKGROUND A. Petition and Detention On August 28, 2025,2 the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions as to then ten year old J.F., then seven year old J.J.F, and then four year old R.D. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of a sibling).3 According to the detention report, the Agency received a referral from hospital staff on August 25 regarding J.F., who was transported from school to the hospital via ambulance because he was “unusually lethargic.” He had a bite mark on his tongue, had urinated himself, and could not stay awake. Hospital staff initially suspected that J.F. had a seizure, but lab results later indicated he was suffering from sleep apnea. The staff wanted to admit J.F. for further observation and attempted to speak to Mother regarding the severity of their concerns. Mother said she had to leave to feed her other children and left with J.F. against medical advice. The reporting party informed the Agency that J.F. had ongoing medical concerns, including developmental delays, destructive sleep apnea, and two past seizures. He was brought to the emergency room in May for lethargy and was released shortly thereafter. He had not been seen by a doctor for 12 to 18 months and had gained approximately 110 pounds in that time period. He weighed 277 pounds at the time of the referral.

2 All further dates are to the year 2025 unless otherwise specified. 3 The Agency filed two separate dependency petitions for the children, one in case number JD25-3216/A for J.J.F. and J.F and one in case number JD25-3217 for R.D. Mother filed separate appeals from the dispositional orders in each case. We granted her unopposed motion to consolidate the appeals.

2 After receiving the referral, a social worker went to Mother’s residence, where J.F. answered the door. He said Mother was at the casino and his brothers were asleep. The social worker called Mother and asked for her location. Mother claimed she was at the grocery store with her mother and the children. The social worker told Mother she was currently at Mother’s residence with the children and instructed Mother to return home immediately. Mother “raised her voice,” asserting she had done nothing wrong. The social worker responded that there had been a referral alleging Mother had left the hospital with J.F. Mother claimed the doctors said she could leave, and she demanded that the social worker leave her home. Mother hung up the phone and then called J.F. and yelled at him for answering the door. The social worker subsequently called the police. Police officers arrived and waited approximately 40 minutes for Mother before calling an ambulance to transport J.F. to the hospital. While waiting for the ambulance, the social worker found the two younger boys asleep on a mattress on the floor. They were wearing pull-ups. Mother arrived home approximately an hour and 20 minutes after the social worker had arrived. The social worker overheard Mother tell a police officer that the “nurse had said she could take her son home.” The social worker eventually secured the two younger children in the car, and J.F. was transported in an ambulance to the hospital. The following day, the social worker asked Mother why she left the children home alone. Mother responded that her sister was on the way to her home. The social worker also asked Mother why she left the hospital with J.F. Mother admitted that the hospital wanted to keep him overnight, but she claimed J.F. did not want to stay. Mother said the nurse gave her a form 3 to sign, but she could not fully understand the nurse. Mother refused to safety plan or meet the social worker at her home or at the social worker’s office to discuss next steps. According to medical records, J.F. and J.J.F. had not had well child exams in over two years. J.J.F.’s last exam was in 2022. He was referred for assessment for a speech delay, but no assessment was ever completed. J.F. was last seen in 2023. Subsequent appointments were cancelled or “no shows.” J.J.F. and R.D. were not enrolled in school and had not received any services for their developmental delays. R.D. had also not received services for his speech impairment. At the detention hearing on August 29, the court ordered the children detained, placed them in foster care, and set a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing for November. B. Jursidiction On November 6, the Agency submitted its jurisdiction/disposition report. Per the report, Mother asserted that someone from the hospital allowed her to take J.F. home. Mother also claimed she went to the grocery store on the day she left the children home alone. J.F. reported that Mother went to the casino “like she always goes” and that Mother “always leaves him and his brothers by themselves.” The report described the children’s developmental and medical issues. J.F. was overweight and suffered from “uncontrolled” seizures. J.J.F. and R.D. were not potty trained. J.J.F. was also non-verbal, “but [Mother] never tried to find out why.” She said she did not complete the paperwork to enroll him in school because he was not potty trained. J.J.F. and R.D. both had tooth pain and needed dental treatment. Their resource parents expressed concerns regarding their aggressive behaviors and speech issues.

4 Mother reported that she had a developmental disability affecting her speech. According to the maternal grandmother, Mother struggled with this disability throughout her life. Mother said her mother, sister, and cousin helped care for the children. The social worker concluded that “there appear to be ongoing challenges that interfere with [Mother’s] ability to provide consistent and adequate care. [Mother] stated that she has a support system available to assist her children when she needs help or a break, but she did not utilize this support on the occasion when she left her children alone.” The social worker recommended further assessment of Mother “to better understand the challenges impacting her ability to provide appropriate care for her children, including addressing concerns related to her emotional stability.” After the jurisdiction hearing was continued to December 22, the Agency filed an addendum report on December 16. The social worker had submitted referrals to the Golden Gate Regional Center (GGRC) for Mother and J.F. on October 24. Per the report, on December 1, the social worker sent Mother a “detailed” text with links to complete the GGRC intake application. “The goal is that GGRC can complete an assessment with [Mother] and offer her hands on supportive case management to help her meet her own basic needs and ultimately her sons complex needs as well.” On December 8, the social worker explained to Mother the importance of completing an intake with the GGRC. Mother said her attorney was assisting her with the process and had sent a letter to the GGRC. The social worker e-mailed the GGRC on December 11 to follow up on Mother’s progress. The Agency contacted Mother on October 1 to offer her visitation with J.F. Despite informing her of the importance of maintaining contact with all her children, Mother said she wanted to “focus on visits with her younger 5 sons at that time.” She did not request visitation with J.F. until December 2. Visitation with her younger sons was delayed because Mother declined to visit them in Stockton, where they were placed. She requested that visitation take place in Antioch, but the visitation center there had a waitlist. She had attended three visits in mid-November and early December and had missed two visits. She engaged well with the children during visits, and there were no safety concerns. The children were doing well in their resource homes. J.F. had lost weight and was attending school regularly. The younger boys were being potty trained and were receiving services for their developmental delays. The report acknowledged that Mother loved her children and had maintained communication with the Agency regarding their well-being. Nonetheless, “there appear[ed] to be ongoing challenges that interfere[d] with her ability to provide consistent and adequate care.” At the jurisdiction hearing, Mother submitted to the allegations in a first amended petition. The juvenile court found the children came within subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300 and set the disposition hearing for February 23, 2026. C. Disposition 1. Second Addendum Report The Agency filed a second addendum report, dated February 23, 2026, recommending out-of-home placement for the children and reunification services for Mother. Per the report, on January 7, 2026, a GGRC representative informed the social worker that it needed a release to provide the social worker information regarding the status of Mother and J.F.’s services. The following day, the social worker obtained a signed release from Mother and asked for an update regarding her and J.F.’s progress with 6 GGRC. Mother said she had completed the GGRC intake in person. On January 21, 2026, the social worker submitted the signed release and obtained contact information for Mother’s GGRC caseworker. On January 26, 2026, the social worker contacted the caseworker, who informed the social worker that Mother had missed an appointment earlier that month. The caseworker said Mother must provide the GGRC with documentation related to her disabilities so that it could determine her eligibility for adult services. The social worker relayed this information to Mother and the maternal aunt. The social worker also connected Mother with her GGRC caseworker, and an intake appointment for J.F. was scheduled. On January 20, 2026, school staff told the social worker that Mother needed to apply for middle school enrollment for J.F. The following day, the social worker informed Mother that the deadline to complete an application to enroll J.F. in middle school was January 30, 2026. A few days later, Mother went to the school district office to complete the application. However, she did not list any preferred schools on the application. When asked why she failed to do so, Mother said “no one told her to list the schools.” A comprehensive autism evaluation was completed for J.J.F., and it showed he had “significant cognitive impairment, severe deficits in adaptive functioning, global developmental delays, marked speech and language impairment, and clear autism-related social and behavioral symptoms.” His impairments would require ongoing, intensive support. R.D. was doing well in his resource home; he was speaking more and was being potty trained. An individualized education plan (IEP) indicated that R.D.’s speech and language difficulties would have “an adverse impact on his ability to fully 7 participate in the general education setting toward grade level standards.” (Italics omitted.) Noting Mother’s “need for continued support,” the report concluded that Mother may be unable to adequately meet the children’s basic needs “[w]ithout appropriate services.” Specifically, Mother had not connected to services to address her developmental delays, which the Agency believed was “essential for her to receive this support to safely and effectively care for her sons long-term.” 2. Disposition Hearing The juvenile court held the contested disposition hearing on February 23, 2026. It admitted into evidence all Agency reports filed in this matter. The court also heard testimony from the maternal aunt, Tashell Jackson, and the social worker that had been assigned to the matter in October 2025. Social worker Martin testified the Agency was still recommending out- of-home placement. Before returning the children to Mother’s care, the Agency wanted Mother to have services with the GGRC “in place.” Additionally, the Agency was “open” to a safety plan but wanted the “safety plan to actually be active before returning the kids.” Martin testified that Mother’s attorney sent the Agency a proposed safety plan in December. The proposed safety plan included unannounced visits, Mother sharing her real- time location with the Agency, and Jackson providing support with supervision and caretaking. Martin testified that since receiving the proposed safety plan, the Agency has “been trying to work with the relatives that [are] already a part” of the proposed plan, specifically Jackson. However, Mother was “a little bit not willing” to have Jackson support her, so the Agency wanted to ensure Mother would permit her sister to support her. Martin said, “If her sister . . .

8 is able to assist Mother with making sure that she has completed intakes with the regional center, [and] making sure she is on top of a schedule of appointments, . . . we can see that this safety plan will be actually useful.” A safety plan meeting was scheduled for that Thursday. On cross-examination, Martin confirmed she never conducted a home visit. She explained that when she asked Mother if she could meet her at her home, Mother said she would rather meet at Martin’s office. Martin also acknowledged that Mother had signed a letter to enroll the two younger children in school and start IEP assessments, provided the GGRC with J.F.’s special education records, and never refused any educational or developmental assessments for the children. Mother’s visits with the children were generally positive; the children were happy to see Mother and there had been no safety concerns. The Agency also recommended that Mother engage in a parenting program like SafeCare. Mother did not need to complete the program before the children would be returned to her; she just needed to show positive engagement. However, SafeCare could not work with the family because R.D. was placed too far away, and the Agency was unable to identify a similar program near R.D.’s placement. The Agency was working on finding another parenting program. Jackson testified Mother was a good parent and knew how to take care of her children. However, despite being “very involved with the boys prior to their removal,” Jackson did not know “what was going on.” When she visited Mother and the children, “everything seemed like it was okay.” She knew the younger children were not enrolled in school but claimed her and Mother were in the process of enrolling J.J.F. in school at the time the children were removed. She said the children wore diapers because they were lazy. When 9 told that J.F. was urinating in his pants during the day, Jackson said he was being lazy. She denied that R.D. and J.J.F. had dental decay. She acknowledged that J.F.’s sleep apnea could be fatal if he did not use a machine while sleeping. Jackson lived close to Mother and would be willing to co-parent with her. She could help get the children ready for school, ensure they did not miss their medical appointments, and help Mother fill out applications. According to Jackson, she was unable to help Mother before the children were removed because Mother would not communicate her needs and would let her pride get in the way of asking for help. Jackson said that if there was paperwork Mother did not understand, “she would have [come] to [her] and said something about it.” However, she did not know that Mother failed to correctly fill out J.F.’s middle school enrollment application. She was also unaware that the GGRC had called Mother and that the social worker had to remind Mother to call them back. 3. The Court’s Ruling After the matter was submitted, the juvenile court found that “the safety plan [was] not sufficient to protect the[] children today and that it [was] reasonable to require [Mother], who . . . is very cooperative, to participate in services, to get connected to GGRC, and for the agency to see the safety plan in action before it returns these children to her.” The court further found that Jackson had “a limited understanding of [Mother’s] abilities, what [Mother] needs, and how best to assist her,” and it was concerned that Mother “might not know to reach out for help when she needs it or might not think to reach out for help when she needs it or might let her pride get in the way.” The court found that other potential options to prevent removal, i.e., the safety plan, home visits, and a public health nurse, were 10 insufficient. It noted that the children were “very high needs and require[d] a high level of supervision and care.” Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the Agency had offered reasonable services and that removal was warranted. II. DISCUSSION Mother challenges the juvenile court’s removal order on three grounds: (1) the court taking jurisdiction over the children was a reasonable protective measure, given that Mother was cooperating with the Agency; (2) the Agency failed to consider other reasonable alternatives to removal; and (3) the Agency failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Section 361 provides that a child who has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court “shall not be taken from the physical custody of their parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances listed in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive . . . : [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c).) The statute also directs the juvenile court to “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their home.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) On a challenge to the juvenile court’s disposition order, we review the evidence to determine whether substantial evidence supports it. We do so bearing in mind the clear and convincing burden of proof at the disposition phase and accordingly determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it 11 highly probable” that the challenged facts were true. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) We must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below” (i.e., the Agency) and give “due deference” to the juvenile court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence. (Id. at p. 996.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal order. The issue that led to the children’s removal was Mother’s inability or unwillingness to meet the children’s complex medical and developmental needs. The social worker later learned that Mother may have a developmental disability that affected her ability to adequately care for the children. Accordingly, the social worker attempted to safety plan with Mother, referred Mother to a parenting program and to the GGRC to obtain services, and maintained regular contact with her to track her progress. However, despite cooperating with the Agency, Mother continued to struggle with taking basic steps to meet the children’s needs. For example, the social worker had to remind Mother to enroll J.F. in middle school and of the deadline to submit the enrollment application, but Mother failed to complete the application correctly on her own or ask for help in completing the application. Mother also failed to obtain services that would help address the problems that led to the children’s removal, even though the social worker made repeated efforts to connect her to the GGRC. (See In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212 [“failure to engage in services” can “support removal from parental custody at disposition”].) The portions of the record Mother cites do not support her assertion that she, as opposed to the children’s resource parents and the Agency, “took the most important steps to protect the children.” Given these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably 12 conclude the risk of serious harm to the children had not been alleviated by the court taking jurisdiction over the children.4 Mother also claims the Agency failed to consider a safety plan and a family maintenance plan as less drastic alternatives to removal. She suggests that prompt implementation of her proposed safety plan and/or a family maintenance plan that included “in-home services, structured check- ins and in-home parenting services for children with disabilities” would have led to the return of the children to her custody. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the Agency reports and the disposition testimony showed the Agency considered these alternatives to removal. Per the detention report, Mother initially refused to safety plan. Then, in December, her attorney sent the Agency a proposed safety plan that included unannounced visits, Mother sharing her real-time location with the Agency, and Jackson providing Mother support and assisting her with obtaining services. Thereafter, the Agency began the process of creating a safety plan by “work[ing] with the relatives that [were] already a part of” the proposed plan, specifically Jackson. The Agency’s second addendum report showed that the social worker enlisted Jackson in early January 2026 to assist Mother with obtaining services. Additionally, the social worker testified that 4 In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 962, on which Mother relies, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there was “unchallenged testimony from the social worker [] that it was safe to return the Children to Father,” and the evidence showed that the father had engaged in services and had “ ‘exceed[ed]’ expectations.” (Id. at pp. 962–963, italics omitted.) Under those circumstances, the appellate court concluded that neither the social worker’s “ ‘subjective belief’ ” nor the court’s “ ‘subjective perception’ ” that the father had not “ ‘sufficiently “internalized” ’ lessons from the events that led to dependency” was not clear and convincing evidence that the children could not safely be returned to the father’s care. (Ibid.)

13 the Agency recommended denying family maintenance because it was concerned that Mother did not have the capacity to successfully engage in services. Further, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit denial of family maintenance and its conclusion that the safety plan was insufficient to prevent removal. The effectiveness of the safety plan largely depended on Mother relying on Jackson for support, but the social worker and Jackson’s testimony indicated that Mother was unwilling to have Jackson (or anyone else) help her. Jackson’s testimony further showed that Jackson herself lacked insight into the seriousness of the children’s issues and the problems that led to their removal. Moreover, “[u]nannounced visits can only assess the situation . . . at the time of the visit” and thus would not mitigate the risk to the children, considering they required a high level of care. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293, disagreed with on another ground in In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218–219.) And Mother’s failure to connect with the GGRC and engage in services prior to disposition made it difficult for the Agency to trust she would successfully engage in services under a family maintenance plan. (See In re E.E., at p. 212.) Since the focus of the removal statute is to avert harm to the child (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163), the juvenile court did not err in finding safety and family maintenance plans insufficient to prevent removal. Mother does not explain how structured check-ins or other measures would have eliminated the risk to the children absent her willingness to rely on others and obtain services. Nor does she explain what in-home services would mitigate the risks to the children. She merely concludes that in-home services would have increased the number of mandated reporters, citing In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139. Hailey T. is distinguishable. There, 14 an infant sustained an injury to his eye that emergency room doctors concluded was nonaccidental. (Id. at p. 142.) Hailey was the infant’s four- year-old sister. (Ibid.) The court issued disposition orders removing the children from their parents’ custody after concluding that no alternative to removal was available given the young ages of the children and the unknown identity of the perpetrator of the infant’s injury. (Id. at p. 145.) The appellate court reversed the order pertaining to Hailey. (Id. at p. 147.) The appellate court emphasized that Hailey had “good language skills and an outgoing and social nature,” had not suffered any harm, and “attended school where she had regular contact with teachers and other mandated reporters of any suspected abuse.” (Ibid.) The court also noted there was “abundant evidence that [the parents] were good parents who enjoyed a healthy relationship” and had engaged in services. (Id. at pp. 147–148.) Here, in contrast, there is no dispute that all three children were harmed by Mother’s inability or unwillingness to adequately care for them. The children also have developmental delays and/or speech impairments that likely limit their capacity to recognize and report neglect. Moreover, unlike the parents in Hailey T., Mother has not participated in services. Lastly, Mother contends the Agency failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal because (1) it did not conduct a home visit or a child and family team meeting prior to disposition, resulting in the failure to timely create and implement a safety plan; (2) it was requiring Mother to participate in a parenting program despite none being available near R.D.’s placement; and (3) there was no evidence the Agency helped Mother complete an application for the GGRC. Her contentions lack merit. First, the Agency had started the process of creating and implementing the safety plan prior to disposition, as 15 discussed above, but Mother had not yet connected with the GGRC. The Agency’s efforts were reasonable in light of the ample evidence that a safety plan would be ineffective absent Mother obtaining and engaging in services. Second, the Agency inquired early in the case whether SafeCare, a parenting program, could work with the family, but SafeCare was unable to do so because R.D. was placed too far away. The Agency continued to look for a similar parenting program but was unable to identify one that could work with Mother and R.D. prior to disposition. “[R]easonable efforts, like reasonable services, need only be reasonable under the circumstances, not perfect.” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725, italics added; see id. at pp. 725–726 [rejecting the mother’s argument that the agency did not make reasonable efforts to prevent removal where the agency was unable to secure a psychological evaluation prior to disposition].) Third, the record shows that efforts to help Mother connect with the GGRC were repeatedly made. Nearly three months before the disposition hearing, the social worker sent Mother a detailed text with links to complete an intake. A week later, the social worker explained to Mother the importance of completing an intake for the GGRC. Mother said her attorney was assisting her with the process. The social worker e-mailed the GGRC a few days later to follow up on Mother’s progress. A GGRC representative subsequently informed the social worker that it required a release to provide her information on the status of Mother’s progress. The social worker promptly obtained a release from Mother. At that time, Mother told the social worker that she had completed the GGRC intake. The social worker then contacted Mother’s GGRC caseworker, who informed the social worker that Mother had missed an appointment and that Mother must submit a new application with documentation regarding her disabilities. The social worker 16 relayed this information to Mother and Jackson and connected Mother with the caseworker. Mother nonetheless asserts the social worker should have done more to ensure she completed a new GGRC application. However, despite maintaining regular contact with Mother and the GGRC in the three months leading up to disposition, the social worker did not learn that Mother was required to complete a new application until about a month before the disposition hearing. Although the record does not indicate whether the social worker followed up on the application in the four weeks prior to disposition, “a lacuna of that length does not render the overall finding of reasonable efforts unsupported.” (In re H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 726; see ibid. [delay of five weeks in three months of ongoing efforts to obtain a psychological assessment insufficient to make finding of reasonable efforts unsupported].) Mother relies on In re L.G. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1208 and In re H.B. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 219 in arguing that the Agency failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal. These cases, however, do not suggest reversal is required here. In L.G., the record contained little to no evidence that the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal beyond submitting some referrals for the mother, even though “an alternative to removal would have been to help mother” engage in the recommended services. (In re L.G., at p. 1234.) The agency’s reports did not indicate when the referrals were made, whether the agency followed up with the mother to ensure she could access the referred services, or whether the agency worked with the mother to develop a safety plan that would not require the children’s removal from her physical custody. (Id. at pp. 1233–1234.) Similarly, in H.B., the agency did not promptly refer the father to relevant services and 17 failed to follow up on the referrals to ensure the father was enrolled and making progress. (In re H.B., at pp. 246–247.) In comparison, here, the Agency presented substantial evidence to support findings that it made reasonable efforts to help Mother obtain parenting and GGRC services and that the safety plan alone was not a reasonable alternative to eliminate or prevent removal. Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there were no reasonable means to protect the children without their removal from Mother’s care and that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate removal. III. DISPOSITION The disposition orders are affirmed.

_________________________ LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________ SMILEY, J.

San Francisco Human Services Agency v. K.J. / A175783, A175784

Cites, in this corpus