People v. Dalton CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Dalton CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yuba)

THE PEOPLE, C104136 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. CRF25- v. 00732, CRCS25-00007)

ANDREW CHARLES DALTON III, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Andrew Charles Dalton III pleaded no contest to criminal threats and was sentenced to four years in state prison. His appointed appellate counsel asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Dalton filed a supplemental brief arguing that his plea was involuntary, that he was improperly denied mental health diversion, that he provided evidence of his innocence and has accumulated additional exonerating evidence since, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having considered these contentions and examined the record as required by Wende, we affirm. BACKGROUND In January 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, a petition for revocation of postrelease community supervision (PRCS) alleged that Dalton attempted to deter and resist an officer in violation of Penal Code section 69, was intoxicated in a public place in violation of section 647, subdivision (f), failed to successfully complete a required 1 rehabilitation program, and failed to report to the probation department as directed.1 Dalton admitted the violations. The trial court reinstated PRCS and sentenced him to 180 days in county jail with 28 days of custody credit (14 actual days and 14 conduct days). On April 2, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, a petition for revocation of PRCS alleged that Dalton made criminal threats in violation of section 422 and failed to report to probation within 48 hours of his release from jail. On April 3, 2025, in case No. CRF25-00732, the People filed a criminal complaint charging Dalton with making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). The complaint alleged that he had a prior strike conviction in 2018 for carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)). It also alleged seven aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. On April 10, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, Dalton admitted the PRCS violations. At the same hearing, in case No. CRF25-00732, Dalton pleaded no contest to the criminal threats charge and admitted the prior strike in exchange for a stipulated prison sentence of four years. The prosecutor stated the factual basis for the plea as follows: “[O]n March 27th, 2025, in the County of Yuba, [Dalton] was calling the victim at 6:40 a.m. when she arrived at work. She answered the phone, recognized [Dalton]’s voice. She told him she did not want to be with him anymore and did not speak with him. And [Dalton] responded, [t]hat, [‘]no, bitch. I’m going to come to your work and kill you. Then I’m going to go to your house and shoot it up.[’] ” On May 7, 2025, in case No. CRCS25-00007, the trial court terminated PRCS and sentenced Dalton to 77 days in county jail, concurrent with the sentence in case No. CRF25-00732, and awarded him 77 days of custody credit (39 actual days and 38 conduct days). At the same hearing, the court denied Dalton’s motion to withdraw his 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 no contest plea in case No. CRF25-00732. The court then sentenced him to the middle term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior strike. It awarded him 77 days of custody credit (39 actual days and 38 conduct days) and imposed mandatory minimum fines and assessments. On June 30, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order construing a handwritten letter from Dalton as a timely notice of appeal in case Nos. CRF25-00732 and CRCS25- 00007. We granted Dalton’s application to seek a belated certificate of probable cause, which the trial court granted. DISCUSSION Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the background of the case and requests that this court review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Dalton was advised by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date the opening brief was filed. Dalton filed a supplemental brief raising several issues. First, Dalton contends that he did not voluntarily plead no contest to the charges in case No. CRF25-00732, sign the plea agreement, or admit the allegations. He maintains that he told defense counsel he was “high” on the day he signed the plea agreement, and he also had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, which counsel and the trial court failed to take into consideration. Dalton, however, points us to nothing in the record supporting these contentions. Moreover, during the plea colloquy, Dalton confirmed in response to the trial court’s questions that he had not recently consumed controlled substances or alcohol and was not taking any medication that interfered with his ability to understand the plea proceeding. He also initialed a statement on the written plea agreement representing: “I am not taking any medication that affects my ability to understand this form and the consequences of my plea, have not recently consumed any alcohol or drugs, and am not suffering from any medical condition … .”

3 In addition, when Dalton sought to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, defense counsel stated as grounds for the request that “essentially, he feels that he entered his plea too quickly and that he has since changed his mind.” The trial court observed that “buyer’s remorse is not legal grounds for withdrawing his plea.” Dalton did not disagree, telling the court, “I just didn’t feel right taking it, but I guess I should have thought about it. It was just kind of quick.” He further explained, “Just felt like I was forced to take the deal under the circumstances with priors used as a threat.” When the court followed up saying, “you did take the deal,” “nobody forced you to,” and it was “buyer’s remorse,” Dalton responded “Yeah” to each statement. On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow Dalton to withdraw his plea. (See People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [“ ‘[a] plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his [or her] mind’ ”]; ibid. [standard of review].) Next, Dalton claims that he was improperly denied mental health diversion. There is, however, no indication in the record that Dalton asked the trial court to consider granting him mental health diversion before he pleaded no contest. (See § 1001.36 [authorizing trial courts to grant mental health diversion to qualified defendants]; People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 799 [diversion “request must be made before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first”].) His current appellate claim is therefore forfeited. (See People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 592, fn. 6.) Dalton additionally contends that he is innocent of the charges. He directs us to nothing in the record to support this contention. And in any event, after a plea of guilty or no contest, as here, “issues going to the determination of guilt or innocence are not cognizable on appeal; review is instead limited to issues going to the jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings, including the constitutional validity of the plea.” (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1178.)

4 Finally, Dalton asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial attorney did not take his mental illness into consideration or respond appropriately when he notified her that he was “high” on the day he signed the plea agreement. He argues that he made the trial court aware of these issues when he moved to withdraw his plea. The reporter’s transcript, however, shows that Dalton sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that he had been hasty in agreeing to it and had since changed his mind. Moreover, as Dalton’s claim of ineffective assistance appears to be premised on matters outside the record, it is more appropriately addressed by a petition for writ of habeas corpus and not by direct appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) In addition to considering the claims in Dalton’s supplemental brief, we have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable error. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/ MAURO, J.