People v. Dean CA1/4

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Dean CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172552 v. LAMONT ALEXANDER DEAN, (Mendocino County Super. Ct. Nos. Defendant and Appellant. SCUKCRCR2020365561, SCUKCRCR2020371031)

Lamont Alexander Dean was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code,1 § 220, subd. (a)(1)) and a separate offense of bringing drugs into a jail (§ 4573.6, subd. (a)). He admitted one prior strike allegation. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12).) The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison and imposed various fines and fees. On Dean’s first appeal, we reversed and remanded for resentencing due to an intervening change in the sentencing law. (People v. Dean (June 29, 2022, A162706) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court sentenced Dean to a total of nine years in prison and imposed various fines and fees. On the second appeal, we reversed and remanded 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 because the trial court failed to give Dean the proper admonitions when it accepted his admission of the strike allegation. (People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 393 (Dean II).) We also instructed the trial court to recalculate Dean’s custody credits and reconsider the imposition of fines in light of Dean’s indigency. (Ibid.) On remand, the trial court again imposed a sentence of nine years in prison and stayed or suspended all fines and fees. Dean appeals for a third time, arguing the trial court erred by failing to consider mitigating developments since the second sentencing. He also argues the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the stay of all fines. We agree that the abstract of judgment must be corrected but find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentence. We will therefore affirm the judgment and order the correction of the abstract of judgment. BACKGROUND In our opinion in Dean’s second appeal, we agreed with him that his pre-trial admission of the prior strike allegation was flawed because the trial court failed to properly admonish him regarding his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront his accusers, and the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed because of the admission. We therefore set aside that admission and remanded for further proceedings. We also instructed the trial court to recalculate his custody credits and allow the parties to address Dean’s ability to pay certain fines and fees.

2 In April 2024, at the first hearing following issuance of the remittitur, the sentencing judge presided and announced that “[b]y agreement of the parties,” the court was continuing the case for about two months “for resentencing.” The court also referred the matter to the probation department to recalculate Dean’s actual credits.2 The second hearing was before a different judge than the sentencing judge, so the court continued the matter for about three weeks. At the third hearing, the sentencing judge again presided and continued the matter for three weeks so that Dean could appear by video “for judgment and sentencing.” Dean’s counsel predicted that Dean would want to hold a Marsden3 hearing, but the trial court said it thought that issue was “off the table” because the court was “ultimately going to be striking the strike.” In August, the trial court began the hearing by saying the matter was “on for resentencing.” The trial court said the remittitur directed the trial court “to strike a previously imposed strike” and the only thing to be addressed was “whether or not the court should sentence Mr. Dean to the term recommended in the credit memo based on the Court of Appeal’s direction to strike the strike.” Dean’s counsel said he could no longer represent Dean because he believed Dean had accused him of providing ineffective assistance in connection with Dean’s earlier admission of the strike. The trial court reluctantly agreed to appoint 2 All subsequent events occurred in 2024 unless otherwise stated. 3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

3 alternative counsel, telling Dean, “I’m sorry, Mr. Dean, I’m going to have to find other counsel for you.” The court relieved Dean’s counsel and continued the hearing for three weeks. Dean’s new counsel was not available at the next hearing date, and Dean had not been transported to the video room. The trial court continued the matter again until early October. At the October hearing, the court said that the direction after the prior appeal was to set aside Dean’s admission of the strike, which the court intended to do. The court mentioned having discussed the issues in chambers and that it appeared Dean would be entitled to a jury trial on the strike allegation after the court set aside his admission of it. The People affirmed that they were asking the court to set a jury trial on the strike allegation. Dean’s counsel said, “I didn’t anticipate that the People would want to prove the prior strike, but they do.” Dean’s counsel asked the court not to transport Dean to the courthouse until the very last moment because Dean had significantly compromised health conditions from a couple of strokes. The trial court noted that Dean could waive his right to jury trial on the allegation, but the court said it was not suggesting he do so. At a pretrial hearing in November, the trial court began by stating its understanding that Dean was in hospital care in the Department of Corrections and, if he were transported to the courthouse, would need to be housed in a medical facility that the jail did not have the capacity to provide. Dean’s counsel affirmed that this was correct and said that Dean was willing to waive his jury trial because of the importance of keeping his medical care.

4 The People announced that they intended to amend the strike allegation to change the date and specific Penal Code section alleged for Dean’s prior conviction for assault with a firearm. At the date set in December for motions in limine, with Dean appearing by video, the People filed the amended information. Dean then admitted the strike allegation as amended. The court continued the matter for about two and a half weeks for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing later in December, Dean’s counsel argued that the trial court’s sentencing needed to take into account Dean’s current circumstances, not just his position at the time of the original sentencing. He said that Dean was 54 years old, in a hospital facility, with medical issues and declining health requiring daily professional care with durable medical equipment. He asserted that Dean was partially disabled and at high risk for medical crisis intervention. Dean’s counsel also told the court that Dean had participated in all of the rehabilitative programs that were available at the Department of Corrections. Dean’s counsel further argued that Dean had admitted the prior strike at an early stage of the process, “sort of.” Emphasizing that recent amendments to the Penal Code made clear the Legislature’s desire to reduce prison populations and maximize rehabilitation and restorative justice, Dean’s counsel asked the court to impose the lower term of two years on the primary count of assault with intent to commit rape, doubled because of the strike, and a concurrent one year on the separate charge of bringing drugs into the jail, for a total of four years. As to fines 5 and fees, Dean’s counsel told the court that Dean had zero income due to his incarceration and lacked employment before his incarceration. The People asked the court to impose the middle term of four years on the principal charge as recommended by the probation department, doubled for the prior strike, and run the additional one-year term consecutively for a total of nine years. The prosecutor argued that the circumstances in aggravation related to Dean’s numerous prior felony and misdemeanor convictions, prior prison terms, and violations of parole and probation outweighed any of the mitigating factors Dean’s counsel had suggested. The People also said the court could consider the vulnerability of the victim, who was in an unresponsive state due to drug use at the time of the offense. The trial court said that the probation department’s recommendation was appropriate for the reasons the People mentioned, which the court had cited at the prior sentencing. The court specifically said it considered Dean’s counsel’s arguments about Dean’s physical health. But the court explained that “in evaluating all the factors that go to the appropriate term,” it was satisfied that the middle term was appropriate on the assault with intent to commit rape conviction. The court imposed a total sentence of nine years based on doubling that middle term and adding one year for the charge relating to bringing drugs into the jail. It stayed all restitution fines, court security fees, and criminal conviction assessments, and suspended the $300 parole revocation fee. Before concluding the 6 hearing, the trial court asked Dean’s counsel if he wanted to put anything on the record. Dean’s counsel said, “No, thank you.” DISCUSSION I. Sentencing Discretion Dean contends the trial court erred by imposing the middle term on the assault with intent to commit rape count without considering mitigating developments since the prior sentencing, including certain procedural developments after the remand from his second appeal. Dean admits the trial court recognized his health issues but faults the court for not crediting him for his rehabilitative efforts and achievements despite those health challenges. He charges the trial court with failing to consider his cooperation in admitting the prior strike despite the injustice of his former attorney’s breach of loyalty and the People’s abandonment of their agreement not to retry the strike allegation. He also accuses the trial court of forgetting the Legislature’s policy favoring rehabilitation and the reduction of prison populations. Dean forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. “ ‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not object to the sentence at trial,’ ” unless the sentence is legally unauthorized. (People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100.) This rule applies here because Dean did not object on the bases he now raises when the trial court gave him an opportunity after announcing his sentence. Had he done so, the trial court 7 could have obviated his claims of error by addressing the facts that Dean now contends it ignored. Dean resists this conclusion by pointing out that his counsel raised his health issues, participation in rehabilitation programs, cooperation, and the Legislature’s policy preferences in argument before the trial court announced his sentence. He then claims it would have been futile to object after the trial court announced its sentence, citing the statement in People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1176 that “[f]ailing to object to an erroneous ruling after the court has rejected your argument is not forfeiture.” But Dean cannot have it both ways. If Dean raised his arguments about mitigating circumstances and the trial court rejected them, then it did not fail to address them as Dean now argues. If the trial court did not address any mitigating circumstances because Dean did not raise them, then he forfeited the argument that it failed to do so. In any event, even if we exercise our discretion to consider Dean’s argument on the merits as he requests in the alternative, the argument fails. “We review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 764.) “We presume that the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. [Citation.] The burden is on the party challenging the sentencing decision to show that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] We may not presume error from a silent record. [Citation.] ‘Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set 8 forth in the rules.’ ” (Id. at p. 765; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409 [relevant sentencing factors “will be deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].) The presumption that the trial court considered all relevant sentencing factors defeats Dean’s contentions. The trial court itself remarked that it imposed its sentence after “evaluating all the factors that go to the appropriate term.” As Dean’s counsel stated in the trial court, the trial court could see via video that Dean was in a hospital facility. Dean’s counsel told the court that Dean had participated in rehabilitation programs in prison. Dean cites nothing in the record to overcome the presumption that the trial court considered the significance of the latter fact in light of the former. Dean’s counsel told the court of the Legislature’s policy preferences for rehabilitation and reduction of prison populations. Dean cites nothing to suggest the trial court was somehow unaware of those considerations when it announced its sentence moments later. Likewise, the trial court accepted Dean’s admission of the strike, so it must have been aware of the extent of Dean’s cooperation and whether that cooperation came early or late in the development of the case. We further reject Dean’s assertion that the People originally agreed not to retry the strike allegation and later changed course after a change in the deputy district attorney handling the case. The strongest evidence supporting Dean’s contention is the trial court’s statement at the first post-remand hearing that “[b]y agreement of the parties” the court would 9 continue the matter “for resentencing” at a future date after the probation department had calculated Dean’s actual credits. This statement is ambiguous at best. The trial court did not explain whether the parties had agreed that the People would not retry the strike or simply agreed that the probation department needed to recalculate credits. Any support this statement lends Dean’s position disappears in light of the trial court’s repeated remarks at subsequent hearings that our remittitur required it to strike the strike allegation. Those remarks reveal that the trial court, at least initially, believed it was obligated to strike the strike allegation, which is quite different from the People choosing not to retry it. The trial court was mistaken, as it later realized, since our opinion said only that Dean’s admission of the strike allegation was set aside, not that the trial court was required to strike the strike. The other evidence supporting Dean’s position is the statement by Dean’s new counsel, in his initial appearance, that he had not anticipated that the People would want to prove the prior strike. But Dean’s counsel did not explain the basis for his expectation or accuse the People of changing their position. Considering that Dean’s counsel had just joined the case, he had no apparent basis from which to conclude that the People had changed their approach. Even if we leave aside this factual issue and assume the People changed their position, it would not affect the outcome here. Dean never suggests, much less proves, that the People were legally precluded from changing their position. Nor does he cite any authority for his implicit position that the People’s 10 change of position or delay in choosing to retry the strike allegation is a mitigating circumstance supporting a lower sentence. Finally, assuming further that the change of position is a mitigating circumstance, we would have to presume that the trial court considered it, like any other mitigating circumstances. II. Abstract of Judgment Dean points out that the trial court struck or stayed all fines at the sentencing hearing, including the restitution fines under section 1202.4 in both cases. But the abstract of judgment lists $300 fines under section 1202.4 in each case. As the People concede, the trial court’s oral pronouncement controls, so the abstract of judgment must be corrected. (People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 15.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The trial court clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect that the $300 section 1202.4 restitution fines imposed in both case no. SCUKCRCR2020365561 and case no. SCUKCRCR2020371031 are stayed. The trial court clerk shall transmit a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. BROWN, P. J. WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J. GORDON, J. People v. Dean (A172552)

 Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.