People v. Miranda CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Miranda CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE, C102476 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. v. STKCRFE20230008078)

MANUEL MIRANDA, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Manuel Miranda began having sex with the victim, a middle-school child who viewed him as a grandfather figure, shortly after she turned 14 years old. A jury convicted him of two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and one count of a lewd act on a child. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of five years, eight months, which included the upper term of four years for defendant’s first count of unlawful sexual intercourse. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term. We disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background The victim’s family lived with defendant in his home for about eight years. The victim felt like she grew up with defendant. The victim and her mother both viewed defendant as a grandfather figure to the victim.

1 The December before the victim turned 14 years old, defendant began to flirt with her. The victim felt like a loner at school and found a confidant in defendant. They texted and called each other frequently and would spend hours together on the couch, talking until 4:00 in the morning. They started asking her mother if the victim could drink alcohol with defendant. One night, the victim’s mother saw defendant slowly rubbing the victim’s upper thigh as the two lay together on the couch. In late January, the victim’s mother moved the victim out of defendant’s house and into the victim’s father’s house. It had been 10 years since the victim last lived with her father, and the move included a school change. The victim was not happy about the move and told defendant she wanted to run away. Although her mother had told her to stop talking to defendant and had also separately asked defendant to stop advising the victim, the victim and defendant kept in close contact and spoke with each other every day. Two months later, when the victim was 14 years old and defendant was 59 or 60 years old, she returned to defendant’s home for spring break. The morning after the victim’s first night back, defendant woke her up, led her upstairs to an unoccupied bedroom, and had sex with her. He had sex with her again on each of the following three mornings. Two weeks later, the victim returned to defendant’s house for the family Easter celebration. While defendant’s wife and the victim’s mother were out shopping, defendant met the victim upstairs in his bedroom. There, defendant rubbed the victim’s vagina over her pants and then had sex with her. One week later, after the victim returned home to her father’s house, the victim’s mother went through the victim’s call logs and discovered numerous texts between the victim and defendant and a phone number she did not recognize. Although the victim said the number belonged to a boy from school, defendant answered when her mother 2 called it. When her mother confronted the victim, the victim cried and confessed to having sex with defendant. Her mother then called the police. II. Procedural History A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d)) and one count of a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)). Prior to sentencing, the parties filed briefs and the probation department submitted its report. Defendant’s brief included letters in support from family members. The probation report recommended against probation. It identified three aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable, (2) the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism, and (3) defendant took advantage of a position or trust or confidence to commit the offenses. It identified as the sole circumstance in mitigation defendant’s lack of a significant prior record. The prosecution asked the court to find at least one of those aggravating circumstances true and impose the upper term on one of the counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. Defendant asserted multiple additional factors in mitigation, including that the victim was an initiator of, willing participant in, or aggressor or provoker of the incident, and asked the court to impose the lower term. After considering the briefs, letters, probation report, impact statements from the victim’s parents, and facts of the case, the trial court found that defendant’s lack of a significant prior record was the only mitigating circumstance. The trial court also found that the prosecution had established two aggravating circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3); further rule references are to the California Rules of Court and (2) defendant took advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)). The court noted the victim “[did 3 not] have a large group of social acquaintances, which is unfortunate at that age,” had testified “she relied greatly on her grandfather as a sounding board and as a confidant,” and had been hurt by “someone who [wa]s expected to be above board … and a role model” but was not. The court then imposed the upper term of four years on the first count of unlawful sexual intercourse and consecutive terms of one year for the remaining count of unlawful sexual intercourse and eight months for the lewd act, for an aggregate term of five years, eight months. Defendant timely appeals. DISCUSSION On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term because the victim’s willing participation in the crimes committed against her was an additional applicable mitigating factor. Although he failed to object, defendant contends his counsel had no meaningful opportunity to object and alternatively contends counsel was ineffective. In light of defendant’s alternative argument, we address the merits. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146.) We review a trial court's sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) An abuse of discretion occurs when, for example, the trial court “fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves significant weight … or makes a decision so arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) Where, as here, a statute specifies three possible terms, a court may impose the upper term only when there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of that term. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b); Rule 4.420(b).) A sentencing court has wide discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors when selecting a term (People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1580) and may impose the upper term on a single aggravating circumstance (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 (Osband)). A trial court is not required to articulate its reasons for rejecting a circumstance in 4 mitigation. (People v. Salazar (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 799, 813.) Unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise, we presume the trial court considered all relevant factors. (Rule 4.409.) Here, the trial court imposed the upper term after finding two aggravating circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable and (2) defendant took advantage of a position of trust to commit the offense. Although that was more than sufficient for the court to impose the upper term (Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 728), defendant nevertheless argues the court abused its discretion in imposing that term because it erred in not finding or weighing the victim’s willing participation as an additional mitigating circumstance under rule 4.423(a)(2). Defendant offers no support for his position that a child victim may be a “willing participant” in sexual offenses perpetrated against them. In any event, there was no error here. The trial court reviewed defendant’s sentencing brief and thus considered his position that the victim’s willing participation was an additional mitigating circumstance. The record also supports the trial court’s implicit rejection of that argument. Defendant exploited the victim’s loneliness and his position of trust as her grandfather figure and confidant to commit sexual offenses against her. The court could reasonably infer that defendant used these same circumstances to groom the victim. In this context, the trial court acted well within its discretion in rejecting defendant’s argument that the victim was a “willing participant” within the meaning of rule 4.423(a)(2).

5 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/ MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/ WISEMAN, J.* * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.