People v. Rose CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Rose CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Siskiyou)

THE PEOPLE, C101557 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CF02373) v. DAWN LYNETTE ROSE, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Dawn Lynette Rose pled guilty to carjacking, kidnapping, assault, and driving under the influence. On appeal, Rose contends the trial court abused its discretion by exercising its residual discretion to deny mental health diversion because the court’s reasons were inconsistent with the statutory goals of diversion and it misapplied the statute. We will affirm. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background1 The victim reluctantly agreed to let Rose drive them in the victim’s car on a short drive. Instead, Rose entered the freeway and drove erratically at over 100 miles per hour for more than 100 miles. The victim pleaded with Rose to stop driving and to let her out, 1 The facts are derived from the preliminary hearing transcript, police reports, and probation report, which the parties stipulated to as the factual basis of Rose’s plea.

1 but Rose hit her face and shoulder and continued driving over 110 miles per hour and recklessly weaving in and out of traffic. Eventually, Rose braked hard because of traffic, and the victim got out of the car while it was still moving, taking “quite a tumble.” The victim yelled that Rose was trying to hurt, kill, and kidnap her. Witnesses restrained Rose and took the car key, but Rose kicked, hit, and bit one of the witnesses, drawing blood and leaving a bite mark on the witness’s hand. Rose unsuccessfully attempted to get a ride away from the scene. She appeared to be under the influence of drugs. California Highway Patrol officers responded to the scene. Rose walked towards the officers, ignoring commands to stop walking until an officer aimed his gun at her. Rose was detained and transported to a medical center for a blood draw pursuant to a warrant. Rose refused to cooperate for the blood draw, so officers held her down. Observing “objective signs of drug use,” an officer attempted to perform a drug recognition evaluation, but Rose kicked his left shoulder and torso, preventing a complete evaluation. Based on his observations and experience, the officer believed Rose was under the influence of drugs and unsafe to drive. Rose was arrested and provided false identifying information. An information charged Rose with kidnapping for carjacking (Pen. Code, § 209.5, subd. (a); count 1), carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 2), kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a); count 3), false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code, § 236; count 4), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5), driving under the influence of a drug (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f); count 6), giving false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a); count 7), and resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 8). It was 2 further alleged as to counts 1 through 6 that Rose was ineligible for probation (Pen. Code,2 § 1203, subd. (e)(4)). Various factors in aggravation were alleged II. Mental Health Diversion Proceedings A. Written motions Rose sought pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Her written motion alleged that she met the criteria for eligibility and suitability and provided a mental health evaluation by Jeremy Goldsmith, a licensed clinical social worker. In preparing his report, Goldsmith reviewed the complaint; initial discovery; a crisis evaluation, dated March 26, 2023;3 Dana Anderson’s competency evaluation, dated July 31, 2023;4 and Dr. Kent Caruso’s evaluation, dated August 9, 2023.5 Rose reported she had been previously diagnosed at Shasta Community Health Center with PTSD, anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. She further reported that she had previously undergone residential addiction treatment twice,6 methadone treatment for one year, and mental health treatment from Shasta Community Health Center.

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 The crisis evaluation did not include any diagnoses of Rose. 4 Anderson opined that Rose suffers from a stimulant use disorder, “an underlying mood disorder possibly Bipolar Disorder,” “an unspecified personality disorder,” and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 5 Dr. Caruso noted that Rose “was very much aware that there is a significant association if not cause and effect relationship between her use of street drugs and her mental health problems.” Dr. Caruso opined that Rose presented as “at least a moderate Borderline personality,” highly prone to addiction, driven by chronic PTSD in decisionmaking, and exhibits various psychotic symptoms when under the influence or overly stressed. 6 Rose subsequently reported the same to the probation officer.

3 Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with “Schizoaffective Disorder, Depressive Type,” PTSD, and “Amphetamine-Type Substance Use Disorder,” which was noted as in “unstable remission” based on Rose’s incarceration. Goldsmith recommended “teasing out a timeline further during treatment” for the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. The report provided the following treatment plan: “Attend psychiatric appointments”; “Take medication as prescribed”; “Attend outpatient therapy as prescribed”; “Complete SUD assessment”; “Attend diversion groups”; and receive case management services. Rose attached a letter of acceptance to a 12-month residential relapse prevention program. In a written opposition, the People listed Rose’s various mental health diagnoses, including five disorders between 1998 and 2010 and 10 disorders between April 2023 and November 2023, and argued Rose was neither eligible nor suitable for diversion. The People further maintained that the proposed treatment plan did not meet Rose’s specialized mental health needs because it did not address all of her diagnoses and was similar to substance and mental health treatments she underwent in the past. The People also cited Rose’s lack of success in these previous treatments as evidence diversion under the proposed treatment plan would not meet the statutory purpose of mitigating Rose’s reentry into the criminal justice system. The People attached documentation of Rose’s prior diagnoses and attempted treatment plans, which included dual diagnosis treatment in the form of receiving mental health services from Shasta County Mental Health while in an addicted offender program until being sentenced to prison following a probation violation for driving under the influence. The documentation also included hundreds of pages of records documenting various substance and mental health treatments since 1999.

B. Hearing The court held a hearing on the request for diversion at which Goldsmith was the sole witness. Goldsmith assessed Rose and diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder depressive type, PTSD, and substance use disorder stimulant type, specifically 4 methamphetamine, though he noted she was not currently using while incarcerated. As to his diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, Goldsmith explained that he was unable “to specifically tease out any two-week period of time” in which Rose experienced “delusions or hallucinations for two or more weeks in the absence of a major episode,” one of the diagnostic requirements for the disorder. However, he “still felt fairly confident” with the diagnosis and recommended further assessment. Goldsmith described his recommended treatment plan as “a starting point psychiatric and medication management,” in which Rose would meet with a psychiatrist to monitor medication and participate in medication management services; complete a substance use disorder assessment and adhere to the resultant recommendations; engage in individual therapy and a mental health diversion group; and have case management services for her day-to- day needs. Goldsmith did not see enough evidence in support of Dr. Caruso’s borderline personality disorder diagnosis of Rose but acknowledged that he did not have time to go through all the borderline personality disorder criteria with Rose. Based on the information he had and the time limitations of his assessment, Goldsmith did not think it appropriate to include Dr. Caruso’s borderline personality diagnosis in the mental health diversion assessment. He disagreed that inclusion of a borderline personality disorder diagnosis to the proposed treatment plan meant someone would not respond to the treatment recommendations. Goldsmith noted that a borderline personality disorder diagnosis “can be uniquely difficult” to address, and some treatments are specialized for this disorder. He further noted that some treatments overlap for borderline personality disorder and schizoaffective disorder. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court invited the parties to submit additional briefing and documentation for the court’s consideration.

5 C. Supplemental motions The People’s supplemental opposition asserted that Rose had previously failed to avail herself of dual treatment. The motion outlined Rose’s previous substance and mental health treatments. The People urged the court to scrutinize the adequacy of Goldsmith’s proposed treatment plan because Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with schizoaffective disorder despite not meeting all diagnostic criteria. Nor did Goldsmith indicate which symptoms led to Rose’s crimes, further calling into question the suitability of the proposed treatment plan and whether it would abate those symptoms. Rose submitted a reply, again arguing she was both eligible and suitable for diversion and that her alleged prior failures in drug treatment did “not support a conclusion that a comprehensive treatment program for co-occurring conditions would not yield different and more positive results at this time.” Rose urged the court to consider the remoteness of the People’s evidence.

D. Ruling The trial court found Rose eligible and suitable for diversion but exercised its residual discretion under section 1001.36, subdivision (a) to deny diversion. It noted “concerns about … Rose’s past failures to complete mental health treatment, maintain medication compliance, engage in self-medication, and her prior failure to complete the dual diagnosis programs she has entered.” The court further noted that “Rose has been diagnosed by multiple mental health professionals over the years for a myriad of mental illnesses,” finding that she “most likely does suffer from PTSD” but that “the remaining diagnoses are all across the map and it is uncertain whether Siskiyou County Behavioral Health can establish a medication regimen that will assist … Rose, given the different diagnoses.” Addressing Goldsmith’s admission “that he could not establish that … Rose suffered from hallucinations for two weeks prior to the arrest or the assessment,” the court found it put one of Rose’s mental health diagnoses “at risk.” The court indicated that it “lack[ed] any information as to whether treatment modalities for one of these 6 diagnoses are effective for a different disorder.” It expressed concern that Rose only had two years to complete diversion and obtaining an accurate diagnosis could take a long time and might require modifying the treatment modality. The court questioned whether Rose could remain medication compliant, even if a medication regimen addressing her symptoms could be established, noting her previous medication noncompliance and her self-medication with various controlled substances. The court noted that Rose had previously “engaged in residential treatment twice in the past for her addiction issues.” She was enrolled in an addicted offender program and “provided mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment” and was subsequently terminated from the program. The court further found that “[i]n 2014, she enrolled in a dual diagnosis program, but was dropped for non-compliance.” The court noted that as Rose’s tolerance for prescription drugs increased, she began using heroin for one year, subsequently received methadone treatment, and shortly after began using methamphetamine until shortly before her arrest. The court denied diversion, finding that Rose was “not a good candidate for mental health diversion” based on her “history of mental illness, failure to maintain medication compliance, coupled with her illicit street drug use — even after being offered dual diagnosis assistance, and her failure to successfully complete any program for mental health or substance abuse.” It further found that it could not “be satisfied that the proposed treatment will meet the specialized needs of the defendant, given the numerous and various diagnoses over the past twenty-[f]ive years.” III. Plea and Sentencing Rose pled guilty to carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 2), kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd (a); count 3), assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5), and driving under the influence of a drug (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f); count 6) and admitted various aggravating factors. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Rose to 11 years eight months in prison as follows: nine years (upper term) on count 2 plus consecutive terms of one year 7 eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 3 and one year (one-third the middle term) on count 5. For count 6, the court imposed 10 days in county jail with credit for time served. Rose timely appealed. DISCUSSION Rose contends the trial court abused its residual discretion by denying diversion because it gave reasons inconsistent with the goals of the statute, and it misapplied the statute in finding the proposed treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs. I. Legal Standards Section 1001.36 “authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 (Whitmill).) Section 1001.36 prescribes a two-step analysis in which the trial court first considers whether a defendant is eligible for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b).)7 Second, if a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the court also must find that the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)8 Here, 7 The trial court must find eligibility if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).) “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) 8 The trial court considers the following to assess a defendant’s suitability: “(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial … . [¶] (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion … . [¶] [and] (4) The defendant will not pose an 8 the trial court found that Rose was both eligible and suitable for diversion, but as the trial court noted, that doesn’t end a trial court’s analysis. “Ultimately, … diversion under section 1001.36 is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are met.” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) Even when the statutory requirements are met, the trial court retains “residual discretion” to deny diversion. (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135; see id. at pp. 134-135; § 1001.36, subd. (a).) In order to place a defendant in pretrial diversion, the trial court must be “satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see Vaughn, at p. 134.) This provision “is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet. Rather, subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892 (Sarmiento).) In exercising its discretion, the trial court “must consider the primary purposes of the mental health diversion statute as set forth in section 1001.35.” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) The purpose of diversion is to promote all of the following: “(a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. [¶] (b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings. [¶] (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)-(c).)

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)

9 Furthermore, “[T]he Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149.) If the court denies pretrial diversion as an exercise of its residual discretion, “ ‘its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690.) We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) We review the trial court’s factual findings as to the enumerated statutory criteria for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Moine, at p. 449.) Under this deferential standard of review, “ ‘we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Gerson, at p. 1079.) II. Analysis Arguing the trial court improperly exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion, Rose first asserts the trial court, after finding Rose suitable for diversion, “essentially found that [Rose] was not suitable for [diversion]” based on her “history of failed attempts at sobriety” and medication noncompliance “as well as the court’s concerns that the treatment program will be effective.” In so finding, Rose argues the trial court “creat[ed] a new requirement for suitability — that the applicant not have a prior, unsuccessful history of mental health and addiction treatment — that was not enumerated in the statute.” Rose supports her contentions by citing Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 882.

10 We disagree. As this court stated in People v. Russo (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 134, 139-140: “The court in Sarmiento acknowledged a trial court analyzing its discretion under section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) ‘might reject diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis.’ [Citation.] But this was not satisfied in Sarmiento because the defendant’s proposed treatment for underlying mental health diagnoses, coupled with substance abuse treatment, differed from prior failed drug treatment. [Citation.] The court in Sarmiento explained: ‘[T]he alleged failure of prior drug treatment programs [said] nothing about any inadequacy of the proposed plan to address [the defendant’s] mental health needs. Indeed, [the doctor’s] evaluation specifically explain[ed] why the current proposal [was] significantly different from [the defendant’s] prior substance abuse-only treatment efforts.’ ” Thus, this court held in Russo that the defendant “failed to establish the proposed treatment plan was any different than the plan that originally failed to address his specialized health treatment needs.” (Russo, at p. 140.) Here, the record does not establish that the proposed treatment plan addresses Rose’s specialized mental health needs and is “significantly different from” her prior treatment. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895; see id. at pp. 894-895.) Instead, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Rose had previously engaged in treatment programs like the proposed treatment plan. The record shows that Rose had twice engaged in residential treatment programs similar to the 12-month residential relapse prevention program Rose had been accepted into here. Rose received mental health treatment while in an addicted offender program, which she was subsequently terminated from following a probation violation for driving under the influence. Similarly here, Goldsmith’s treatment plan afforded dual diagnosis treatment, including psychiatric appointments, taking medication as prescribed, attending outpatient therapy, completing a substance use disorder assessment, and attending diversion groups. Thus, 11 the proposed treatment plan is not “significantly different from” previous treatment plans from which Rose had engaged in without success. Further, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the proposed treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs based on her many and varied diagnoses over the last 20 years. The record shows that Rose had been diagnosed with at least 10 different mental health conditions over the course of decades. Most recently, Goldsmith diagnosed Rose with schizoaffective disorder despite stating he was unable to establish Rose suffered hallucinations during the two weeks leading to her arrest. The court found this put the diagnosis “at risk.” Rose had two years to complete diversion, and given the doubt cast upon her diagnoses, we agree with the trial court that it could take time to properly diagnose her and possibly modify the treatment modality. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying diversion based on Rose’s unsuccessful attempts with similar treatment programs, including her previous inability to maintain medication compliance as part of those programs, and the concern that the proposed treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized mental health needs. Rose further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing “to provide an explanation for why [diversion] would not meet the statute’s goal.” We reject this assertion. First, Rose claims the trial court did not explain how its exercise of discretion was consistent with legislative intent. Rose misstates the law. As we have discussed, if the trial court exercises its residual discretion to deny diversion, “ ‘its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.’ ” (Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690, italics added.) Second, aside from noting the trial court did not explain how its ruling was consistent with the statutory purpose of diversion, Rose points to nothing that demonstrates that the court failed to follow the law. Absent a contrary showing, “the trial court is presumed to have known and followed the applicable law and to have properly exercised its discretion.” (People v. Bradford (2010)

12 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1355.) Finally, the court’s conclusion that the proposed treatment plan would not meet Rose’s specialized needs is consistent with the statutory purpose of diversion as stated in section 1001.35, including that “diversion … meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (c).) Rose also claims the court misapplied the law, using section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) as “a new requirement for determining eligibility or suitability.” As mentioned, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) looks at whether the court is “satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” While we agree with Rose that Sarmiento indicates “[t]his is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892), that is not what the court did here. Rather, the court’s analysis of this subdivision focused on the adequacy of Rose’s proposed treatment — not whether Rose was suitable or eligible for diversion. The court emphasized that while Rose previously underwent treatment programs that are similar to the proposed treatment plan, ultimately she was terminated from those programs for noncompliance. This analysis “establishes [the court] was not satisfied the [proposed] treatment program would meet [the] defendant’s needs,” which “is an appropriate basis to deny diversion, assuming there is no abuse of discretion with the analysis.” (People v. Russo, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) As discussed, we detect no such abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis. On this record, Rose has not met her burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

13 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/s/ FEINBERG, J.