People v. Walker CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Walker CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C102534 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 07F09598) v. WILLIE WALKER, JR., Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Willie Walker, Jr., is serving life in prison without the possibility of parole after a jury found him guilty of murder related to the shooting death of the victim during a robbery. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing in which the court found defendant could still be convicted of murder because he was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. 1 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant filed the petition under section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the statute as section 1172.6 in this opinion.

1 On appeal, defendant claims insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s reckless indifference finding. We affirm the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. I. BACKGROUND A. Underlying Facts In October 2007, Craig Cagley was at his friend A.B.’s apartment for a party. (People v. Walker (Jun. 22, 2010, C062543) [nonpub. opn.].)2 After the party ended Cagley decided to stay at the apartment because he was too intoxicated to drive. (Ibid.) Cagley went outside to put his sweatshirt in his car and encountered defendant and Adaryll Weaver armed with guns. (Ibid.) Cagley returned to the apartment, knocked on A.B.’s bedroom door, and told A.B. that someone was there to see him. (Ibid.) When A.B. opened the door, defendant and Weaver pointed their guns at his face and told him to get down. (Ibid.) While on the ground, defendant repeatedly hit A.B. in the face with the butt of his gun. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) A.B. grabbed defendant’s gun and wrestled with defendant, but Weaver struck A.B. on the head with his gun causing A.B. to blackout. (Ibid.) When A.B. came to defendant told him to take off his clothes, pointed his gun at A.B.’s crotch, and threatened to shoot off his penis. (Ibid.) Defendant left the room with Cagley; Weaver remained in the room to guard A.B. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) Weaver threatened A.B., asking him if he wanted to die that night. (Ibid.) Weaver instructed A.B. to put his clothes on, get the biggest bag he could find, and start to fill it. (Ibid.) Weaver then told A.B. to crawl to the living 2 We take judicial notice of our opinion from defendant’s prior appeal (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)). We provide this summary of facts from the prior opinion in defendant’s direct appeal for context. In analyzing the issues, we rely upon the 1172.6 evidentiary hearing transcript and the evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

2 room to repeat the process. (Ibid.) When A.B. was too slow, he was punched, kicked, and hit in the head with a gun, which caused A.B. to blackout again. (Ibid.) A.B. came to in the hallway. (Ibid.) Defendant and Weaver jumped on him and demanded his “PIN” number and wallet. A.B. crawled back to his room and gave defendant and Weaver his wallet. (Ibid.) At some point, defendant asked him, “ ‘Do you want to die today?’ ” (Ibid.) Defendant and Weaver told A.B. to keep his head down, look at the wall, and then draped a blanket over him. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) A.B. had trouble breathing, so he turned his head, which uncovered his face. (Ibid.) He heard defendant or Weaver say, “ ‘stay down, don’t move,’ ” and Cagley say something he could not recall. (Ibid.) Next, A.B. saw feet walking backwards towards the door and heard a loud pop, followed by Cagley exhaling. (Ibid.) A.B. sustained fractures to the right side of the skull, the right back side of his head, and chin; a broken nose; a deviated septum; a cut behind his left ear; a chipped tooth; and post-traumatic stress disorder. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) Cagley died from a single gunshot wound to the forehead. (Ibid.) Weaver admitted to the police that he shot Cagley but said that it was an accident, which occurred as he and defendant were getting ready to leave. (Ibid.) Two months prior to the October robbery, two men entered the apartment of J.T. through an unlocked door. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) They closed and locked the door and one of the men said, “ ‘you don’t want to see what I have because you’ll get dead.’ ” (Ibid.) The men ordered J.T. to his knees and told him to take off his pants. (Ibid.) The men kept asking him, “ ‘Where is the gun?’ ” while rummaging through the apartment. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) The men made J.T. open his safe and they took $2,100, which was stored inside. (Ibid.) One of the men threw CDs at J.T., repeatedly punched him in the face, and directed the other man to destroy J.T.’s 3 computer. (Ibid.) One of the men then ordered J.T. into the living room and told him to kneel down. (Ibid.) The man struck J.T. again. (Ibid.) J.T., thinking the men were going to damage his computer, ran to the door. (Ibid.) Once outside he called for help before getting into a fight with one of the men. (Ibid.) Both men ran away when J.T.’s neighbor came outside. (Ibid.) J.T. did not recognize either man, but defendant’s fingerprints were found on one of the CDs in the apartment. (Ibid.) B. Procedural Background In 2009, a jury found defendant guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)(1)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of robbery (§ 211), two counts of burglary (§ 459), and being a felon in possession of a gun (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the allegation that defendant used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) with respect to the murder and one of the robbery counts. The jury also found true the allegation that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus 16 years. Defendant appealed and, in 2010, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Walker, supra, C062543.) C. Petition For Resentencing In 2022, defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. The People responded that the trial court should deny the petition because defendant was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In reply, defendant conceded he was a major participant in the robbery but claimed he did not act with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant also acknowledged he was aware that both he and Weaver had guns, the robbery was “longer” in duration, and there was “violence during the commission of the robbery.”

4 In June 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the trial transcripts, and hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court took the matter under submission and later filed a written order denying defendant’s petition. The trial court found: Defendant and Weaver were both armed during the robbery and defendant knew Weaver was armed. Both men used their guns throughout the robbery to threaten and control the victims. Defendant threatened to kill and shoot off A.B.’s penis, assaulted both victims, and watched Weaver use his pistol to beat A.B. in the head. Defendant was present at the robbery, was not a passive participant, and could have restrained Weaver’s violence. Defendant was actively involved in controlling, threatening, and beating the victims. The robbery was of a “significant duration,” over 15 minutes in duration. During that time, defendant and Weaver assaulted, threatened with death, and physically controlled the victims. Defendant directed Cagley to stay on the ground and forced A.B. to cover himself with a blanket so he could not see defendant and Weaver’s actions. “The prolonged period of restraint in fact increased the manifestation of violence in the robbery, not the mere potential for violence.” The trial court found no indication that defendant had prior knowledge of Weaver’s likelihood to kill, however, it found defendant used violence throughout the robbery and took no action to minimize the risk; noting one of the victims testified defendant was more violent than Weaver. The court also considered evidence of defendant’s violent actions in a similar previous robbery to inform its analysis as to whether he minimized the risk of violence. The trial court also considered defendant’s age and maturity at the time of the crime: defendant had just turned 22 years old. The court found defendant provided no evidence that his youthfulness had an impact on his recklessness during the commission of the robbery. The court found defendant’s decision-making and conduct were not 5 impulsive but rather the result of a plan. Defendant had ample time and opportunity to reflect on his choices. Defendant’s participation in a similar robbery six weeks prior indicated he was not swept up in circumstances beyond his control that led to the victim’s death. The trial court concluded that defendant “chose to participate in a high risk home invasion robbery with at least one loaded weapon. [Defendant] recklessly disregarded the lives of the victims and did nothing to minimize the danger of lethal force being used. As recounted above, [defendant’s] conduct was violent and there is no evidence that petitioner’s violence throughout the robbery was a product of youthful immaturity. Therefore, based on the totality of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt [found] that [defendant] was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Defendant filed a timely appeal. II. DISCUSSION A. Section 1172.6 & Standard of Review Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f) [amending sections 188 and 189].) Where, like here, the trial court issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the changes to section 188 or 189 made effective by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The parties may offer evidence from a prior trial, or new or additional evidence at the hearing. (Ibid.)

6 We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We examine “ ‘the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925.) B. Reckless Indifference to Human Life When “Senate Bill 1437 amended … section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in” the cases People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.) Banks considered “under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant.” (Banks, supra, at p. 794.) Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence related to the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery, we focus our discussion on the court’s findings of reckless indifference to human life under Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is “ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.

7 616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks known to him. (Ibid.) Objectively, recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would observe.’ ” (Ibid.) The fact that a robbery involved a gun or carried a risk of death is insufficient, by itself, to support a finding of reckless indifference. (Id. at pp. 617-618; see also In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [“ ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life”].) Clark identified various factors to be considered in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.) These include: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in Clark, supra, at pp. 618-623].) The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that no one of the above major participant or reckless indifference factors is necessary, nor is any of them necessarily sufficient. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) There is a recognized overlap between being a major participant and having a reckless indifference to human life. As our 8 Supreme Court acknowledged in Clark, “ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 615.) With these concepts in mind, we turn to defendant’s evidentiary challenge. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Applying the Clark factors, we conclude the totality of the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with reckless indifference to Cagley’s life. The first Clark factor (knowledge of weapons and use and number of weapons) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618) favors finding defendant recklessly disregarded the victim’s life during the crime. The evidence shows defendant planned and intended to use guns during the robbery. Defendant and Weaver used the guns to physically control the victims through violence and intimidation. Weaver struck A.B. in the head with his pistol and defendant beat and threatened to shoot both victims. “A defendant’s use of a firearm, even if the defendant does not kill the victim ..., can be significant in the analysis of reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.) For the second Clark factor (presence at the scene and opportunity to prevent or mitigate the crime or aid the victim) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619), defendant was at the scene of the robbery and was not only an active participant in the violence against A.B. and Cagley but instructed Weaver to control, threaten, and beat the victims. Defendant’s actions escalated the situation and made it more likely that violence would occur. After Cagley was shot, defendant fled the apartment. The third Clark factor (duration of the interaction between the perpetrators and victims) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620) further weighs against defendant. The robbery took at least 15 minutes, in which defendant and Weaver brutally beat A.B. and 9 threatened violence against both victims. It is reasonable to conclude the long period of escalating violence during the robbery increased the risk and likelihood of violence, which ended in Cagley’s fatal shooting. For the fourth Clark factor (knowledge codefendant was likely to kill and minimizing violence) (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621), the trial court acknowledged there was no indication defendant had prior knowledge of Weaver’s propensity for violence or to kill. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that defendant did anything to lessen the risk of violence during the crime. Rather, there is overwhelming evidence that defendant increased the risk of violence by beating the victims and instructing Weaver to be violent. Defendant claims the trial court did not properly consider defendant’s age and maturity. He argues defendant’s realization that it was a “big mistake” after Weaver killed Cagley shows he did not appreciate the risks inherent in the robbery. We disagree. Defendant was involved in the planning and execution of the robbery and had previously participated in a similar robbery six weeks earlier. There is no evidence in the record that the robbery was impulsive or that defendant was a victim of peer pressure. (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.) Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

10 III. DISPOSITION The order denying the petition is affirmed.

/S/ RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/ KRAUSE, J.

/S/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.