People v. Williamson CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Williamson CA3 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Shasta)

THE PEOPLE, C098771 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 10F0209) v. OPINION ON TRANSFER VANESSA KAY WILLIAMSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Vanessa Kay Williamson challenges the trial court’s summary denial of her petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. This matter is before us on transfer from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, which held that, to be liable for murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, the nonkiller who acts with the intent to kill must have aided and abetted in the killing itself. (Id. at pp. 678, 693.) In accordance with the direction of our Supreme Court, we vacated our earlier decision, and the parties submitted supplemental briefs. We previously affirmed the trial court’s order. Having now considered our high court’s decision in Morris and the parties’ supplemental briefs, we conclude the trial court’s order must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The events that gave rise to defendant’s convictions are summarized in People v. Williamson (June 10, 2015, C073738) (nonpub. opn.). Although we do not rely on the factual summary in Williamson to conduct our review, we recount some background facts to provide context. In October 2009, defendant began dating Daniel K. Daniel drove a route from Sacramento to Redding and Williams delivering prescription medications. Defendant began driving that route with him and sharing his paycheck. At the end of November 2009, defendant moved to Redding, and in January 2010, she renewed a dating relationship with her former boyfriend Robert Lee James IV. On January 7, 2010, defendant suggested to James they rob Daniel on his route. James refused. The following day, defendant told James that Daniel was threatening her family. She told James to get a gun; he got a semiautomatic firearm from his father’s bedroom and defendant loaded bullets into the magazine. Initially, defendant carried the gun, but James took it from her and held it while defendant drove him around looking for Daniel. When they found Daniel, defendant drove after him. The brief car chase ended when Daniel’s car spun around, and defendant maneuvered her car to put James directly across from Daniel. James opened fire on Daniel killing him. The prosecution charged defendant and James with murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle. The prosecution alleged numerous sentencing enhancements including the special circumstance that defendant and James committed the charged murder by discharging a firearm from a vehicle. The prosecution also alleged a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the charged crimes. At trial, the prosecution offered the jury two alternate theories of liability for first degree murder: (1) felony murder (either robbery or attempted robbery was the underlying felony), or (2) premeditation and deliberation. The jury found defendant 2 guilty of first degree murder without specifying the theory of liability. The jury also found defendant guilty of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury found true the allegation that a principal was armed during the commission of the murder and the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed by discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for her murder conviction, plus 10 years in prison. Defendant appealed; this court modified the determinate term to nine years and affirmed the judgment as modified. (People v. Williamson, supra, C073738.) In May 2019, defendant filed her first petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court denied the first petition without appointing counsel. Defendant filed a second petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on October 4, 2021. The trial court denied her second petition without appointing counsel. On April 17, 2023, this time with the assistance of counsel, defendant filed her third petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Defendant argued she was entitled to a hearing on the third petition due to recent changes in the law brought about by the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). Without briefing or a hearing, the trial court denied the third petition as well. The trial court explained its decision to deny the third petition in a written order: “The first petition was such an order after judgment and affected the substantial rights of [defendant]. Ignoring two previous rulings and filing a third petition seeking identical relief is not an appropriate method to have a ruling of a [s]uperior [c]ourt [j]udge challenged. Akin to successive writs of habeas [corpus] on the same subject matter being an abuse of the writ process, this court views this tactic as improper.” To act on the petition, the court concluded, would be an act in excess of its jurisdiction. Defendant appeals from the order denying her third petition.

3 DISCUSSION I Successive Petitions Defendant contends the trial court erred by summarily denying her resentencing petition on the ground it was a successive petition. The People concede the error. We accept the People’s concession. “Neither the express language of section [1172.6] nor the stated purpose of the legislation supports limiting access to relief under section [1172.6] … where … the subsequent petition rested on new legal authority [that] challenged the basis for the superior court’s summary denial of the previous petition.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 946-947.) The parties here agree that section 2 of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) was new legal authority that entitled defendant to “a second bite at the apple.” Therefore, the trial court erred by denying her third petition on the ground that it was procedurally improper. II Harmless Error Analysis Defendant asserts she was prejudiced by the trial court’s error because if she was convicted on a felony-murder theory, the jury did not make a specific finding that she aided and abetted in the killing itself. In light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Morris, the People agree and so do we. A defendant whose resentencing petition is denied before an order to show cause issues must “ ‘demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he[, she, or they] … would have obtained a more favorable result.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 974.) As explained more fully below, the record of conviction here fails to establish that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is apparent that but for the trial court’s error, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.

4 A Additional Procedural Background The trial court instructed defendant’s jury on two theories of first degree murder: premeditated and deliberate murder, and the former felony-murder rule. The trial court also instructed the jury that a person may be guilty of a crime as either the perpetrator who “directly committed the crime” or as an aider and abettor of the perpetrator. Using CALCRIM No. 540B, the trial court instructed the jurors on aiding and abetting in a felony murder: “The defendant is charged in [c]ount 1 with [m]urder, under a theory of felony murder. The defendant may also be guilty of [m]urder, under a theory of felony murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death. I will call the other person the perpetrator. “To prove that defendant is guilty of [f]irst [d]egree [m]urder under this theory, the [prosecution] must prove that: “1. The defendant committed, attempted to commit, or aided and abetted [r]obbery; “2. The defendant intended to commit, or intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing [r]obbery; “3. If the defendant did not personally commit or attempt to commit [r]obbery, then a perpetrator, whom the defendant was aiding and abetting, personally committed or attempted to commit [r]obbery; “4. While committing, or attempting to commit [r]obbery, the perpetrator caused the death of another person; “AND “5. There was a logical connection between the cause of death and the robbery or attempted robbery. The connection between the cause of death and the robbery or attempted robbery must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place.

5 “A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent. “[¶] … [¶] “The defendant must have intended to commit, or aid and abet the felony of [r]obbery before or at the time that she caused the death.” Relative to the special circumstance allegation, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of [c]ommitting [m]urder by [s]hooting a [f]irearm [f]rom a [m]otor [v]ehicle in violation of … section 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(21). “To prove that this circumstance is true, the [prosecution] must prove that: “1. Robert Lee James shot a firearm from a motor vehicle, killing [the victim]; “2. Robert Lee James intentionally shot at a person who was outside the vehicle; “AND “3. At the time of the shooting, the defendant intended to kill.” B Application To Defendant’s Resentencing Hearing Defendant contends the jury’s finding that she acted with the intent to kill does not render her ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. In order to find her liable for aiding and abetting a felony murder, she contends section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires the jury to find not only that she acted with the intent to kill but that she also aided and abetted the actual killer in the lethal act itself. Here, the instructions did not require the jury to make that finding. Our Supreme Court held in Morris, that a nonkiller must intend to kill and must assist the actual killer in the lethal act itself to be guilty of felony murder. (People v. Morris, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 678.) Thus, our Supreme Court decided the proper interpretation of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in defendant’s favor. Accordingly, as the People now concede, the record of conviction does not establish that defendant is 6 ineligible for relief as a matter of law and the trial court’s error in dismissing her petition for resentencing as an invalid, successive petition was not harmless. DISPOSITION The postjudgment order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

/s/ ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/ EARL, P. J.

/s/ MESIWALA, J.