Opinion

1 2 3 4

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JACKIE LEE WILIAMS, individually Case No.: 26-cv-03374-H-JLB 12 and on behalf of all others similarly 13 situated, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 14 Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 15 v. [Doc. No. 4.] 16 COVE DRINKS, INC., a Delaware corporation, 17 Defendant. 18 19 On August 3, 2026, Defendant Cove Drinks, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff 20 Jackie Lee Williams’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 21 failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 4.) On September 6, 2026, the Court took the matter 22 under submission. (Doc. No. 8.) On September 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response in 23 opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 9.) On September 21, 2026, 24 Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 10.) For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and 25 denies in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Background 2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in □□□□□□□□□□□ 3 |}complaint. Defendant Cove Drinks is a manufacturer and seller of probiotic sodas. (See 4 No. 1, Compl. at 1.) The labeling for Defendant’s sodas state that the products contain 5 Artificial Sweeteners.” (See id. 9] 23, 25-28.) 6 As an example of such a statement, Plaintiff provides in her complaint the following 7 |\|image depicting the packaging for Defendant’s Dr. Cove soda that Plaintiff purchased:

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1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s “No Artificial Sweeteners” representation is false 2 because the soda Plaintiff purchased contains 10 grams of erythritol and uses it as a 3 sweetener. (See id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff further alleges that the erythritol used in Defendant’s 4 products is commercially manufactured through industrial fermentation and multi-step 5 processing, and, therefore, it is a “synthetic sweetener,” and no reasonable consumer would 6 understand such an ingredient to be consistent with the representation of “No Artificial 7 Sweeteners.” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 36, 37.) 8 On June 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging claims for: 9 (1) violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 10 1750 et seq.; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of express warranty; (4) violations of the 11 unfair prong of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business and 12 Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (5) violations of the fraudulent prong of California’s 13 UCL; (6) violations of the unlawful prong of California’s UCL; and (7) violations of the 14 California False Advertising Law (“FAL”), California Business and Professions Code §§ 15 17500 et seq. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 71–124.) By the present motion, Defendant moves 16 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of the claims in 17 Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 1, 14.) 18 Discussion 19 I. Legal Standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 20 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 21 sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 22 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 23 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 24 2001)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading that states a claim 25 for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 26 entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is to “‘give the defendant fair 27 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 28 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 1 A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough 2 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 3 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 4 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 6 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 8 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “While legal conclusions 9 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” 10 Id. at 679. Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper where the claim 11 “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 12 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see Los 13 Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). 14 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must “‘accept the 15 factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable 16 to the plaintiff.’” Los Angeles Lakers, 869 F.3d at 800 (quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 17 Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). But a court need not accept “legal 18 conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Further, it is improper for a court to assume 19 the claimant “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated 20 the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. 21 v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 22 In addition, a court may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by 23 reference and items that are proper subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. 24 Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). If the court dismisses a complaint for 25 failure to state a claim, it must then determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe 26 v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 27 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). 28 / / / 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL, and FAL Claims 3 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges against Defendant claims for violations of 4 California’s CLRA, UCL, and FAL. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 71–79, 94–124.) Defendant 5 argues that these claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that 6 the “No Artificial Sweeteners” representation on Defendant’s product misleads reasonable 7 consumers. 8 Claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are governed by the “reasonable consumer” 9 standard. McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing 10 Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)). Under that standard, a 11 plaintiff “must ‘show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Becerra v. 12 Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Williams, 552 13 F.3d at 938). 14 The reasonable consumer standard requires “more than a mere possibility that [the 15 defendant’s] label ‘might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing 16 it in an unreasonable manner.’” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) 17 (quoting Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (2003)). Rather, a 18 plaintiff must plausibly allege “a probability ‘that a significant portion of the general 19 consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could 20 be misled.’” Id. (quoting Lavie, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 508); see also McGinity, 69 F.4th at 21 1097 (“The touchstone under the ‘reasonable consumer’ test is whether the product 22 labeling and ads promoting the products have a meaningful capacity to deceive 23 consumers.”). Put another way, “‘[a] representation does not become “false and deceptive” 24 merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and 25 unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed.’” 26 Lavie, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 507 (citation omitted). “Indeed, a plaintiff’s unreasonable 27 assumptions about a product’s label will not suffice.” Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 28 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2021); see also La Barbera v. Ole Mexican Foods Inc., No. 1 EDCV202324JGBSPX, 2023 WL 4162348, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2023) (“The bottom 2 line is this: under Moore, the reasonable consumer does not approach purchasing decisions 3 with a professorial genius or inclination toward exhaustive research, but she is also not a 4 chump, too doltish or careless to engage [a] simple analysis.” (citation omitted)). 5 Plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims are based on her contention that the “No 6 Artificial Sweeteners” representation on Defendant’s sodas is false because the product 7 contain erythritol, which is a synthetic sweetener. (See Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 29–38.) 8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s statutory claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff 9 “fails to plausibly allege (1) that the Products contain ‘artificial’ erythritol, or (2) that 10 reasonable consumers would even consider a sugar alcohol such as erythritol an ‘artificial 11 sweetener.’” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 6.) Defendant is wrong, and the complaint contains these 12 precise allegations. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the soda she purchased contains 13 10 grams of erythritol and uses it as a sweetener. (See id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff further alleges 14 that the erythritol used in Defendant’s products is commercially manufactured through 15 industrial fermentation and multi-step processing, and, therefore, it is a “synthetic 16 sweetener,” and no reasonable consumer would understand such an ingredient to be 17 consistent with the representation of “No Artificial Sweeteners.” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 36, 37.) These 18 allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would likely be 19 deceived by the “No Artificial Sweeteners” labeling on Defendant’s soda.1 See Iglesias v. 20 21 1 Defendant notes that “‘conclusory allegations that [an ingredient] is artificial are 22 insufficient to state a claim.’” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 6 (quoting Robie v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 23 20-CV-07355-JSW, 2021 WL 2548960, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2021))). Although this is true, it is of no consequence here. Rather, than containing mere conclusory allegations, 24 Plaintiff’s complaint contains detailed allegations explaining why commercial 25 manufactured erythritol would be considered a synthetic sweetener and that commercial manufactured erythritol is the type of erythritol in Defendant’s soda. (See Doc. No. 1, 26 Compl. ¶¶ 29–38.) See Carbine v. Target Corp., No. CV 24-03721-MWF (AJRX), 2025 27 WL 501829, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025) (“And neither are the allegations here conclusory in the fashion barred by Twombly and Iqbal. Plaintiff does not merely say that 28 1 Arizona Beverages USA, LLC, No. 22-CV-09108-JSW, 2023 WL 4053803, at *3 (N.D. 2 Cal. June 16, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to establish that a reasonable 3 consumer could plausibly conclude that a beverage labeled as “All Natural” should not 4 include . . . erythritol . . . .”); Ringler v. J.M. Smucker Co., 783 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1238–41 5 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (finding allegations sufficient to establish that a reasonable consumer 6 could plausibly conclude that a product labeled as “all natural” should not contain artificial 7 citric acid); Carbine, 2025 WL 501829, at *4. 8 Defendant asserts that the FDA and the National Cancer Institute do not consider 9 erythritol to be an artificial sweetener, and Defendant requests that the Court take judicial 10 notice of certain documents from those two entities. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 8–9; Doc. No. 10 at 11 6; see Doc. No. 4-7.) Defendant’s request for judicial notice is improper. Although a court 12 can take judicial notice of matters of public record at the motion to dismiss stage, “a court 13 cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Khoja v. 14 Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). As such, the Court cannot 15 take judicial notice of the disputed fact of whether erythritol is an artificial sweetener as 16 requested by Defendant. Whether erythritol actually is an artificial sweetener is a question 17 of fact that the Court cannot decide at the motion to dismiss stage. See Cook, Perkiss & 18 Liehe, Inc. v. N. California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is 19 well-established that questions of fact cannot be resolved or determined on a motion to 20 dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); see also Fried v. 21 Snapple Beverage Corp., 753 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1153 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (“‘[Q]uestions 22 regarding how consumers interpret terms or phrases on product labels are factual inquiries 23 best suited for resolution at a later stage of the litigation and not on a motion to dismiss.’”). 24 Rather, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must “‘accept the factual allegations of 25 26 27 goes several steps further in alleging the specific preservative that is artificial, the chemical process that renders it artificial, its use in Defendant’s products, and its prevalence in the 28 1 the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Los 2 Angeles Lakers, 869 F.3d at 800; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. In the complaint, Plaintiff 3 alleges that the erythritol used in Defendant’s products is a “synthetic sweetener,” and no 4 reasonable consumer would understand such an ingredient to be consistent with the 5 representation of “No Artificial Sweeteners.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 30, 36, 37.) At the 6 motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept these factual allegations as true.2 7 In sum, Plaintiff has adequately alleged claims for violations of California’s CLRA, 8 UCL, and FAL against Defendant. As such, the Court declines to dismiss those claims.3 9 B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Unjust Enrichment and Breach of Express Warranty 10 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges against Defendant claims for unjust enrichment 11 and breach of express warranty. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 80–93.) Defendant argues that 12 Plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty should be 13 dismissed because these claims fail for the same reasons as Plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL, and 14 FAL claims. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 10; Doc. No. 10 at 8.) Plaintiff has adequately stated claims 15 for violations of the CLRA, UCL, and FAL against Defendant, and the Court has declined 16 to dismiss those claims. As such, the Court rejects this basis for dismissal of Plaintiff’s 17 18 19 2 On reply, Defendant contends that “the mere fact that commercial erythritol is 20 commercially produced using yeast and corn starch does not establish that the resulting 21 compound is artificial.” (Doc. No. 10 at 3.) Again, whether erythritol actually is an artificial sweetener is a question of fact that the Court cannot decide at the motion to 22 dismiss stage. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept as true Plaintiff’s 23 factual allegations that the erythritol used in Defendant’s products is a synthetic sweetener.

24 3 In its motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to plead with particularity any 25 claim based on the advertisements identified in paragraphs 26 through 28 of the complaint. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 9–10.) In her opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that her CLRA, UCL, and FAL 26 claims are based on the label on the soda she purchased alone, and no claim depends on 27 those online advertisements. (Doc. No. 9 at 18–19; see Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 40–41.) With that clarification, there is nothing to dismiss. As explained above, Plaintiff properly 28 1 claims for unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty, and the Court declines to 2 dismiss those claims. 3 C. Standing to Bring Claims for Injunctive Relief 4 In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as a form of relief under her UCL, 5 FAL, and CLRA claims. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 77–79, 101, 109, 117, 124.) Defendant 6 argues that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed because Plaintiff has 7 failed to adequately allege that she has Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief. (Doc. 8 No. 4-1 at 3–5.) 9 “A plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional standing separately for each form of 10 relief requested.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) 11 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 12 (2000)). Prospective injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to show a threat of future injury 13 that is “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island 14 Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that 15 ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that 16 ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 17 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 18 “[A] previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction against 19 false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or suspects that the 20 advertising was false at the time of the original purchase, because the consumer may suffer 21 an ‘actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’ threat of future harm.” Davidson, 22 889 F.3d at 969 (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 493). This is because “[k]nowledge that 23 the advertisement or label was false in the past does not equate to knowledge that it will 24 remain false in the future.” Id. at 1115. To establish standing, the previously deceived 25 consumer must sufficiently allege “an imminent or actual threat of future harm caused by 26 [the] allegedly false advertising,” such as a desire to purchase the product again in the 27 future. Id. at 970. 28 1 In the complaint, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that she seeks or intends to 2 purchase Defendant’s product again risking an imminent or actual injury. In the complaint, 3 Plaintiff alleges: “Plaintiff would purchase the Products again if the labeling were corrected 4 or if Defendant ceased using misleading representations, but presently cannot rely on 5 Defendant’s labeling.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 67.) This allegation is insufficient to allege 6 an imminent or actual threat of future harm. If the labeling is correct, and Defendant ceases 7 to use the representations at issue, then there is no imminent or actual alleged injury that 8 would occur if Plaintiff purchased the product in the future. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations 9 are insufficient to demonstrate Article III standing for injunctive relief. 10 Plaintiff cites to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Davidson and argues that it supports 11 her contention that she has standing to bring claims for injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 9 at 12 19–21.) Davidson is distinguishable. Unlike in Davidson, in which the plaintiff faced a 13 future injury because she still could not rely on the defendant’s claims about its products’ 14 “flushability” without first purchasing and using the flushable wipes again, 889 F.3d at 15 971–72, Plaintiff in this case admits that she now has the knowledge that enables her to 16 make an appropriate choice with respect to Defendant’s soda – that the soda contains 17 erythritol, as stated on the product’s labeling, and that the erythritol used is a synthetic 18 sweetener.4 (See Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 29–38.) “Since Davidson, courts in this Circuit 19 20 4 Plaintiff argues that there is a risk of future injury because the product’s labeling just 21 states that it contains erythritol and does not specifically disclose that it is manufactured erythritol. (Doc. No. 9 at 20.) The Court does not find this argument persuasive. In her 22 complaint, and in her briefing, Plaintiff represents that “no commercial manufacturer uses 23 the natural form of erythritol in processed foods.” (Doc. No. 9 at 1; see also Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 32 (“Because of the extraordinarily high cost of natural erythritol extracted from 24 fruits, the erythritol used in mass-produced foods such as the Products—often at high 25 levels, much higher than found naturally in fruits—is manufactured rather than extracted from naturally occurring sources.”), ¶ 31 (“[I]t is not economically feasible to use erythritol 26 extracted from fruits in commercial food products.”); Doc. No 9 at 4, 7.) As such, 27 according to Plaintiff’s own representations, the label need not specifically disclose that it is manufactured erythritol in order for Plaintiff to know that the product contains 28 1 have held that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek injunctive relief for claims under 2 California law involving deceptive product labels where, unlike the plaintiff in Davidson, 3 the plaintiffs could verify the products’ descriptions merely by looking at the labels and 4 thus could not show a likelihood of being deceived in the future.” Lozano v. Walmart, 5 Inc., No. CV 23-4500-SPG-MAR, 2024 WL 412606, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2024) 6 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Ringler, 783 F. Supp. 3d at 1247 (“[T]he Court agrees with the 7 reasoning in Squeo, Rahman, and Jackson, and finds that Plaintiff can easily determine 8 whether the Products contain citric acid by simply looking at the ingredients label.”); 9 Rodriguez v. Natures Path Foods, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-01735-SPG-E, 2025 WL 3691807, at 10 *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (“Plaintiffs now know the amount of added sugar in the 11 Products. Therefore, they will ‘not be misled next time.’” (quoting Fernandez v. Atkins 12 Nutritionals, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01628-GPC-WVG, 2018 WL 280028, at *15 (S.D. Cal. 13 Jan. 3, 2018)). 14 In sum, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims for injunctive relief under the 15 UCL, CLRA, and FAL and those claims for relief are dismissed. See, e.g., Stewart, 537 F. 16 Supp. 3d at 1128; Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3691807, at *4; Nacarino v. KSF Acquisition 17 Corp., 642 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Further, because this is not an issue 18 that can be cured by amendment of the pleadings to include additional factual allegations, 19 the Court’s dismissal of the claims for injunctive relief is without leave to amend. 20 D. Plaintiff’s Equitable Claims 21 In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks equitable relief as part of her UCL and unjust 22 enrichment claims. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 87, Prayer for Relief.) Defendant argues that 23 Plaintiff’s equitable restitution claims should be dismissed because she has failed to 24 adequately plead inadequate remedies at law. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11–14.) Defendant 25 contends that Plaintiff’s equitable claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s legal claims 26 (her CLRA claim and her breach of express warranty claim) seek damages for the exact 27 same conduct, meaning that equitable relief is precluded. (Id. at 11.) To support this 28 argument, Defendant relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sonner v. Premier Nutrition 1 Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). (Doc. No. 4-1 at 11–13; Doc. No. 8 at 8–10.) In 2 response, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s argument should be rejected because it is 3 based on a misreading of Sonner, and Sonner does not require a Plaintiff to demonstrate 4 anything at the pleading stage. (Doc. No. 9 at 22–23.) 5 “[E]quitable relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy exists at law.” 6 Schroeder v. United States, 569 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff “must establish 7 that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm 8 under the UCL and CLRA.” Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844. 9 Defendant’s reliance on Sonner is unpersuasive. In Sonner, on the eve of trial, the 10 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her CLRA claim for damages in order to avoid the jury and 11 seek the same amount as restitution at a bench trial. Id. at 837–38. The resulting amended 12 complaint, seeking only equitable relief, was dismissed because the plaintiff could not 13 show that damages were unavailable to her. Id. at 838, 844. 14 This case is at the pleading stage (not the eve of trial) and at the pleading stage, a 15 plaintiff can plead conflicting theories in the alternative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). See 16 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762-63 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, many 17 district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that Sonner does not prohibit plaintiffs from 18 pleading claims for equitable relief in the alternative at the pleading stage. See, e.g., 19 Sullivan v. Built Brands LLC, No. 24-CV-04565-JST, 2026 WL 2475783, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 20 Aug. 24, 2026) (“[T]his Court, along with the majority of courts in this district, understands 21 Sonner to require far less at the pleading stage.”) (collecting cases); Murphy v. Olly Pub.

22 Benefit Corp., 651 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“A number of district court 23 cases since Sonner have concluded that it has minimal application at the pleading stage.”); 24 Wysocki v. Chobani, LLC, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2026) (“Due to the 25 challenge courts face when attempting to determine the adequacy of legal remedies at the 26 outset of litigation, courts may permit unjust enrichment claims to survive at the pleading 27 stage.”). 28 1 Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that 2 ||her legal remedies are inadequate. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 12-14.) In the complaint, Plaintiff 3 ||alleges: “To obtain a full refund as damages, Plaintiff must show that the Products she 4 || received have essentially no market value. In contrast, Plaintiff can seek restitution without 5 || making this showing.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. § 48.) Plaintiffalso alleges: “winning damages 6 || under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act requires additional showings not required under 7 || equitable causes of action,” such as Plaintiff's UCL claims. (Id. {] 49.) These allegations 8 sufficient to adequately allege that legal remedies are inadequate. See, e.g., Chebul v. 9 || Tuft & Needle, LLC, No. 2:24-CV-02707-JLS-MAR, 2024 WL 5257021, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 10 9, 2024) (finding similar allegations sufficient); Murphy, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 1129 11 (same); Salvestrini v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-1556-W-DDL, 2024 WL 3626695, 12 *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2024). As such, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff's claims 13 || for equitable restitution. 14 Conclusion 15 For the reasons above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion 16 |/to dismiss. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief without leave to 17 |}amend. The Court declines to dismiss the remainder of the complaint. Defendant must 18 || file an answer to the complaint within thirty (30) days from the date this order is filed. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || DATED: September 28, 2026 | | ul | | | : 21 MARILYN W. HUFF, Distri ge 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 23 24 25 26 27 28