Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3

4 PEDRO JUAN CORTEZ TRUJILLO, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04665-LEK-MSB 5 Petitioner, 6 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART PETITION 7 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 8 SCOTT MARQUARDT, CEO of MTC, acting Warden of Imperial Regional Adult 9 Detention Facility; PATRICK DIVVER, 10 Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE; 11 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, 12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney 13 General; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 14 HOMELAND SECURITY; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 15 REVIEW, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Before this Court is Petitioner Pedro Juan Cortez Trujillo’s (“Petitioner”) 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), filed on August 14, 2026. [Dkt. no. 1.] 20 The respondents, identified in the Petition as Scott Marquardt, CEO of Management and 21 Training Corporation (“MTC”), acting Warden of Imperial Regional Adult Detention 22 Facility; Patrick Divver, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, 23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S. 24 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Todd Blanche, U.S. Attorney General; 25 DHS; and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (collectively “Respondents”), 26 27 1 filed a response to the Petition (“Response”) on August 24, 2026. [Dkt. no. 4.] Petitioner 2 filed a reply in support of the Petition (“Reply”) on August 31, 2026. [Dkt. no. 5.] 3 Petitioner, a citizen of Peru, entered the United States on June 27, 2001. 4 [Petition at ¶¶ 2, 66-67.] Petitioner alleges that he was detained by ICE on July 13, 2026, 5 and was transferred to the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility, where he remained 6 through the filing of the Petition. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 4. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to, 7 inter alia, immediate release. See id. at pg. 24. In his Reply, Petitioner requests that this 8 Court order Respondents to provide him a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See 9 Reply at 6. 10 Respondents acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 11 “held and clarified that unadmitted aliens present in the interior of the United States are 12 subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and not subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225.” See Response at 1; see 13 also Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2026) (holding that 14 noncitizens “present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United 15 States are subject to the detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A)”). Respondents 16 therefore admit that “Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” 17 [Response at 1.] Respondents admit that “Petitioner also appears to be a member of the 18 Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz.” Id. at 1 n.1; see also 19 Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2025).1 20 Respondents argue that, because Petitioner’s detention is subject to Section 1226(a), the 21 Petition is moot because “Petitioner is able to request a bond hearing before an 22 23 24 25 1 This Court notes that, on March 6, 2026, the Ninth Circuit administratively stayed the Maldonado Bautista decision “insofar as the district court’s judgment extends beyond 26 the Central District of California.” Maldonado Bautista et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 27 Sec. et al., No. 26-1044, Order, filed 3/6/26 (dkt. no. 5), at 1. Therefore, this Court resolves the instant Petition without reliance on Maldonado Bautista. 28 1 immigration judge.” [Response at 2.] Respondents therefore assert the Petition should be 2 denied or stayed until Petitioner requests and receives a bond hearing. [Id. at 3.] 3 “The party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing that there is no effective relief remaining that the court could 4 provide.” S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 5 (9th Cir. 2004). “That burden is always ‘heavy,’ as a case is not moot where any effective relief may be granted[.]” Wild Wilderness v. 6 Allen, 871 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Forest Guardians v. 7 Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2006)). . . .

8 Castaneda v. Lyons, Case No. 1:26-cv-01866-JLT-SAB-HC, 2026 WL 1623336, at *2 9 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2026) (some alterations in Castaneda).2 The mere fact that a bond 10 hearing can be scheduled is insufficient to carry Respondents’ heavy burden to establish 11 that the Petition is moot at this time. 12 Respondents also argue that this Court should deny the Petition because 13 Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies in seeking a bond hearing. 14 [Response at 2-3.] 15 While administrative exhaustion is not a jurisdictional 16 requirement for habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, courts typically “require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available judicial 17 and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241” as a 18 “prudential matter.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency 19 expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper 20 record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; 21 and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct 22 its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 23 quotations omitted). Because exhaustion is not jurisdictional, courts 24 “have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.” Laing v. 25 26 2 The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in Castaneda was adopted by 27 the district judge. 2026 WL 1865440 (June 29, 2026).

28 1 Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). A court may waive the exhaustion requirement when “administrative remedies are inadequate 2 or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 3 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. at 1000 (internal quotations and 4 citations omitted). 5 Miguel Pedro v. Mullin, Case No. 5:26-cv-04303-MBK, 2026 WL 2677303, at *4 (C.D. 6 Cal. Sept. 11, 2026). 7 Here, the record indicates that Petitioner has not yet received a bond hearing. 8 To the extent that Respondents argue Petitioner must first request a bond hearing to 9 exhaust his administrative remedies, this Court finds that, in this instance, such 10 exhaustion puts form over substance and would unnecessarily delay a remedy that 11 Respondents concede is currently available to Petitioner. Cf. Cong v. Mullin et al., Case 12 No. 5:26-cv-04899-DFM, 2026 WL 2692173, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2026) 13 (concluding that exhaustion did not bar the petitioner’s claim because exhaustion 14 appeared futile). 15 Accordingly, this Court grants Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing.3 In 16 addition, this Court makes the following orders regarding the bond hearing: 17 -the hearing must be held within seven days after the filing of this order; 18 -the hearing must be before a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration judge; 19 20 21 22 23 3 In light of this Court’s determination that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, 24 this Court need not address Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment 25 claims, [Petition at pgs. 21-23]. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009) (“normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if 26 there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case” (quotation marks and 27 citation omitted)).

28 1 -the immigration judge shall determine whether Petitioner is a danger to the community 2 or a flight risk and what bond conditions, if any, would be appropriate to ensure 3 Petitioner’s appearance; 4 -the immigration judge shall consider whether alternatives to detention are appropriate 5 and, if a bond is considered, the immigration judge shall consider Petitioner’s 6 ability to pay; 7 -if the immigration judge denies bond, the immigration judge must make specific 8 findings as to why Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 9 -if Petitioner believes that Respondents or the immigration judge violated this order and 10 the writ, Petitioner can apply to this Court for appropriate sanctions. 11 Petitioner has also requested that this Court award him attorney’s fees and costs. See 12 Petition at pg. 24. This Court will consider an application requesting reasonable 13 attorney’s fees and costs that is filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment. This 14 Court, therefore, denies Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs without 15 prejudice. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Pedro Juan Cortez Trujillo’s Petition 18 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed August 14, 2026, is GRANTED IN PART AND 19 DENIED IN PART. The Petition is GRANTED insofar as Respondents are ORDERED 20 to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing under Title 8 United States 21 Code Section 1226(a) within seven days of the filing of this Order. Respondents are 22 FURTHER ORDERED to conduct the individualized bond hearing consistent with the 23 terms of this Order. The Petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Petitioner’s 24 request for immediate release from custody. Further, the Petition is DENIED WITHOUT 25 PREJUDICE as to Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 26 The parties are DIRECTED to file a joint status report informing this Court 27 of the outcome of the bond hearing by October 12, 2026. 28 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 25, 2026. 3 ss — 4 oy) /s! Leslie E. Kobayashi 5 Leslie E. Kobayashi 6 ais ig Senor U.S. District Judge , Taga 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 || PEDRO JUAN CORTEZ TRUJILLO V. SCOTT MARQUARDT ET AL.; CASE NO. 3:26-CV-04665-LEK-MSB; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 26 27 28