Mangine v. Grossbaum CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 Mangine v. Grossbaum CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). Ther opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MARIE MANGINE, B345963

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. v. No. 22STRO02060)

MENACHEM MENDEL GROSSBAUM,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura D. Cohen, Commissioner. Affirmed. Marie Mangine, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. —————————— Plaintiff and appellant Marie Mangine appeals the trial court’s February 13, 2025 order denying her request to renew an elder abuse restraining order (EARO) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03,1 protecting her from defendant and respondent Menachem Mendel Grossbaum. Mangine contends the trial court erred in denying her request to renew the EARO. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Initial EARO It is undisputed that Mangine is a tenant in a property owned by Grossbaum, and so the two have a landlord tenant relationship. Based on statements by the trial court at the renewal hearing, we understand that during the hearing on Mangine’s initial EARO request, videos showed Grossbaum and a number of other people banging on Mangine’s door violently, and some of them had a firearm. The trial court granted Mangine’s initial EARO request in February 2023, for a period of two years, expiring on February 15, 2025. The terms of the restraining 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 We disregard any factual assertions or arguments that are unsupported by proper record citations. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 248; Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5.)

2 order prohibited Grossbaum from continuing any abuse, but permitted Grossbaum to contact Mangine at her address on landlord tenant issues only.

B. EARO Modification Request On May 22, 2024, Mangine filed a request to modify the February 15, 2023 restraining order to delete the provision permitting Grossbaum to contact Mangine about landlord tenant issues, and to add a 50-yard stay away order. The hearing on the modification request was continued a number of times. At a hearing on January 15, 2025, when Grossbaum’s counsel sought a continuance because of the impact of the fires in Los Angeles, Mangine noted that the restraining order would be expiring soon, and she would be seeking a renewal.

C. EARO Renewal Request On January 22, 2025, Mangine filed a request to permanently renew the EARO. In her renewal request, Mangine alleged that Grossbaum repeatedly and willfully employed formidably large, strange men who attempted to bully and use force to gain entry to her home. Recounting interactions that took place before the initial EARO was issued, Mangine alleged that on July 26, 2022, Grossbaum caused Mangine’s vehicle to be towed from Los Angeles to Gardena, leading her to become so ill she had to be transported to a hospital by ambulance. Describing Grossbaum’s behavior after the initial EARO was issued, Mangine identified specific dates on which Grossbaum “attempted to take financial advantage of me by pressuring me 3 for money that I already paid,” and “employed a formidable in size stranger to come to my home demanding access for illegitimate purposes.” Mangine alleged that on November 15, 2024, “two hefty strange men forced entry inside my home. The perpetrators came to my home with the intent to and did force entry.” Mangine also alleged that Grossbaum caused her emotional harm in 2023 and 2024 by making thuggish demands by email and making disparaging and humiliating remarks. Finally, she alleged Grossbaum filed multiple lawsuits against her in 2024, all of which were either decided in her favor or voluntarily dismissed. The hearing on Mangine’s renewal request took place on February 13, 2025. The trial court explained to the parties that it was considering Mangine’s request to renew the restraining order, and that under section 15657.03 and the cases of Gordon B. v. Gomez3 and Ritchie,4 Mangine had the burden of proving she had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court admitted the statement supporting Mangine’s renewal request as part of her testimony, and reviewed each of the exhibits Mangine had filed with the court. Among the exhibits were a two-day order to repair from the Housing Department and at least two notices of entry that Mangine argued were defective or deficient, as well as a screenshot of an image on a doorbell camera showing two men at Mangine’s door. During the hearing, Mangine objected to being cross- examined before she had the opportunity to examine Grossbaum, 3 Gordon B. v. Gomez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 92 (Gordon B.).

4 Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie).

4 and the court permitted Grossbaum’s attorney to conduct the cross-examination. During the exchange, Mangine argued that the attorney was also abusing her by blocking her entry into the courtroom, and the court stated that the renewal request was only being sought with respect to Grossbaum. In addition, Mangine objected to the documents Grossbaum’s attorney had shown her during cross-examination, arguing that the initial EARO’s carve-out for landlord tenant issues required Grossbaum to follow landlord tenant law, and instead Grossbaum was posting non-compliant notices and sending people to her apartment to harass her. The court clarified that the current hearing was not a forum to address landlord tenant laws. The court recalled that at the initial hearing, there were videos showing people violently banging on the door, and one person with a firearm, and now the court was asking Mangine to explain why she felt she still needed a restraining order. Mangine responded that the initial EARO said Grossbaum had to comply with landlord tenant laws and that he could not abuse the right of access, but he was doing so. When Mangine attempted to recite to the court what it had said at the prior hearing on the initial EARO, the court noted that the parties were not present to dispute what was said at the time the initial order was issued, and the written order spoke for itself. The court again noted its responsibility to consider all the evidence and the original findings, together with whether Mangine’s apprehension was genuine and reasonable. It noted that landlord and tenants’ rights were outside the scope of what the court was considering. Grossbaum’s attorney argued that Mangine’s stated apprehension was not reasonable. He pointed out that Mangine acknowledged that 10 to 15 notices were given, and the evidence 5 before the court included orders from the housing department showing that Grossbaum had valid reasons to give Mangine notices of entry and valid reason to access the apartment to conduct the required repairs. Counsel argued that Grossbaum had not been to the property and had stepped back from involving himself with Mangine. Despite his efforts to coordinate repairs required by the housing department, Mangine had used the EARO to refuse permission to conduct those repairs. According to counsel, the initial EARO had allowed Mangine to perpetrate a vicious cycle of refusing to permit repairs. When counsel argued Mangine had not paid rent, Mangine objected that there was no evidence of nonpayment of rent. After noting that the court had given the parties an hour and a half of time, and that Grossbaum’s counsel had submitted based solely on his questioning of Mangine and presenting argument, the court again reviewed its obligation to consider the evidence and findings behind the initial EARO as well as any significant changes. The court pointed out that the initial EARO had been issued very narrowly, and both sides had made efforts related to the rental agreement. The court agreed with Grossbaum’s argument that Mangine’s apprehension was not reasonable, and that Mangine was using the EARO as a sword rather than a shield. It denied Mangine’s request to modify the restraining order and also denied her renewal request, and Mangine timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Mangine contends on appeal that the trial court erred in a number of ways, including applying an incorrect legal standard 6 in evaluating the EARO renewal request, ignoring evidence of her apprehension, and instead relying on the argument of counsel to conclude Mangine was using the EARO as a sword rather than a shield. Grossbaum has not filed a respondent’s brief, but Mangine still bears the burden to show reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [appellant must demonstrate error justifying reversal].)

A. Standard of Review “[T]he issuance of a protective order under the Elder Abuse Act is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support such a protective order are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. [¶] We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings. [Citation]” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137−1138 [because language of § 15657.03 is identical to language in the Domestic Violence Protection Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), the same standard of review applies].) “However, the question of ‘whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review.’ ” (Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560 (Cueto); see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) The challenging party must show that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order. (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner” ’ [citation] or ‘when its 7 ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason” ’ [citation].” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) The California Supreme Court has emphasized: “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)

B. Elder Abuse Restraining Orders and Restraining Order Renewals For issuing an initial EARO, section 15657.03 authorizes the court to enjoin a party “from abusing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the petitioner, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or household members or a conservator, if any, of the petitioner[.]” (§ 15657.03 subd. (b)(4)(A).) A protective order under this statute “may issue on the basis of evidence of past abuse, without any particularized showing that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.” (Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137; Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 823.) The trial court’s findings are to be made by a preponderance of the evidence.

8 (Gdowski, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 137, see also Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138.) Once issued, an EARO “may be renewed upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. The request for renewal may be brought at any time within the three months before the expiration of the order.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (i)(1).) As the court in Gordon B. explained, “[b]ecause no reported case has addressed the showing required to renew an elder abuse restraining order, we rely on cases applying the statutory provision for renewing a domestic violence restraining order, which is virtually identical to that for renewing an elder abuse restraining order: ‘These orders may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. The request for renewal may be brought at any time within the three months before the expiration of the orders.’ (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).)” (Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) “[B]oth statutes permit a party to request the court to renew a restraining order ‘without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order.’ (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (i)(1).) A leading case interpreting Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a) explained: ‘It would be anomalous to require the protected 9 party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that original order. If this were the standard, the protected party would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order. Indeed[,] the fact a protective order has proved effective is a good reason for seeking its renewal.’ (Ritchie[, supra,] 115 Cal.App.4th [at p. 1284.) Thus, ‘a trial court errs when it requires a party to show a violation of the restraining order as a condition to renewing that order.’ (Cueto, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) [¶] Instead, a ‘trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a “reasonable apprehension” of future abuse. So there should be no misunderstanding, this does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.’ (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.)” (Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 98–99.) Under Ritchie, the inquiry into whether it is more probable than not that there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable begins by considering the “evidence and findings” that supported the issuance of the original restraining order to appraise the risk of future abuse. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290; see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.) The trial court should also consider whether there have been “any significant changes in the circumstances” by asking, for example, “have the 10 restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order?” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.) “ ‘Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job opportunities.’ [Citation.]” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 180; Ritchie, at p. 1292). “In challenging a renewal order, the restrained party is not permitted ‘to challenge the truth of the evidence and findings underlying the initial order.’ ” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333; see also Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.)

C. Analysis Mangine contends that the trial court erred because it applied a framework inconsistent with section 15657.03 and Gordon B., and because she presented evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse; she further contends that the court’s errors were prejudicial. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290; see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.) First, our review of reporter’s transcript assures us that the trial court thoughtfully and correctly applied the standards required under Gordon B. and Ritchie. At least twice, the court explained to Mangine that it was considering the evidence and it was her burden of proof to show that she had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.

11 Second, the court correctly determined that Mangine had the burden to show not just actual apprehension, but that the apprehension was reasonable. Further, while accepting that Mangine was subjectively fearful of continued harassment and abuse by Grossbaum and his agents, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Mangine’s subjective apprehension was not sufficiently reasonable to support granting her renewal request. The court’s decision to deny the renewal took into account the evidence and findings supporting the issuance of the original order, but also the change in circumstances after the original order was issued. The court had before it evidence that the housing department was requiring Grossbaum to make repairs, that he personally stayed away from her, and that his agents came to make those required repairs. Although Mangine acknowledged that notices had been posted on door, she refused to permit workers to enter, claiming she found some inadequacy in the notices. In the court’s view, any apprehension of abuse Mangine was experiencing when Grossbaum was contacting her for landlord tenant issues or when workers were attempting to access the apartment to make repairs, was not reasonable under the circumstances. The question of whether the notices were in technical compliance with landlord tenant law was something the trial court reasonably determined could be presented in a separate landlord tenant dispute, but was not of a nature that supported renewal of a restraining order that had already carved out contact between the parties for precisely such issues. Mangine’s final argument is that the trial court denied her due process. She posits that because the trial court did not formally admit or exclude her exhibits before announcing its decision, it “bypassed the evidentiary phase altogether and 12 resolved a contested renewal request as though no evidence had been presented.” We find no due process violation on the record here. The court heard testimony by both Mangine and Grossbaum, and considered the exhibits offered by Mangine. Grossbaum objected to two videos Mangine attempted to introduce, and those were excluded because they were not exchanged ahead of the hearing. Beyond those exclusions, we can reasonably infer that the court considered all of Mangine’s proffered evidence in reaching its conclusion.

DISPOSITION

The court’s February 13, 2025 order denying plaintiff and appellant Marie Mangine’s request to permanently renew the restraining order against defendant and respondent Menachem Mendel Grossbaum is affirmed. As Respondent Menachem Mendel Grossbaum made no appearance in this appellate court, no costs are awarded on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.