Marriage of Zahi and Ouchene CA1/5

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 Marriage of Zahi and Ouchene CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re the Marriage of LAMIA ZAHI and ABDELWAHAB JAMEL OUCHENE. A175157 LAMIA ZAHI, (San Francisco City & Respondent, County Super. Ct. No. v. FDI-24-800489) ABDELWAHAB JAMEL OUCHENE, Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 In this marital dissolution action, Abdelwahab Jamel Ouchene appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside a purported judgment entered in his wife’s favor (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b) [hereafter § 473(b)]).2 Although his wife, Lamia We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant 1 to standard 8.1 of the California Standards of Judicial Administration, and Court of Appeal, First District, Local Rules, rule 19.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 2 Procedure. Section 473(b) provides, in relevant part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other 1 Zahi, has not filed a respondent’s brief, we affirm because Ouchene fails to present an adequate record on appeal and is wrong on the merits.

Ouchene and Zahi married in 2001 and separated in 2023. When Zahi filed her petition for dissolution, in November 2024, she asked the trial court to void an interspousal deed that had granted real property in San Lorenzo to Ouchene as his separate property. Although the filing does not appear in the record before us, she later asked the court to also characterize the San Lorenzo property as community property and order Ouchene to immediately place the proceeds from the property’s sale into an interest-bearing bank account in both parties’ names.

In an order dated April 29, 2025—which is again not in the record before us—the trial court granted Zahi’s requests to void the interspousal transfer deed and to recharacterize the San Lorenzo property as community property. The court also ordered (inter alia) Ouchene to deliver a cashier’s check for 50 percent of the net proceeds to Zahi’s attorney by May 9, 2025.

Between April 29, 2025, and November 20, 2025, Ouchene did not comply with the April 29 order (or subsequent orders) to provide Zahi’s attorney with 50 percent of the net proceeds (determined to be $408,957.61) or a July 7 order to pay $27,180 in sanctions.

Zahi filed requests for issuance of writs of execution, which were eventually heard on November 20, 2025. On that same day, the court also heard Ouchene’s motion to set aside the April 29, 2025 order and “the judgment dated June 13, 2025,”3 pursuant to section 473(b), and his motion to remove the freeze on his bank proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” 3No order or judgment bearing that date appears in the record before us. 2 account—both of which were filed by Ouchene’s recently substituted counsel. The court denied both of Ouchene’s motions and granted Zahi’s requests for writs of execution in the amounts of $408,957.61 and $27,180.

In his notice of appeal, Ouchene’s counsel indicates his appeal is taken from an order entered on November 20, 2025, which he states is appealable as a “request for order to revive interspousal transfer deed; vacate judgment of 06/13/2025; release funds from bank account.” Although his opening brief is not entirely clear, Ouchene appears to challenge both the order entered after the November 20 hearing and the April 29 order. He suggests these orders are appealable as an order after final judgment (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2)) and a final judgment (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1)) or under the collateral order doctrine.

We assume, without deciding, that the order entered after the November 20, 2025 hearing is appealable as an order after final judgment. (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see also Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 857, fn. 3 [“[a]n order denying a motion to set aside the judgment is appealable, regardless of whether the time to appeal from the underlying judgment has expired”].)

However, it appears likely that we lack jurisdiction to review the April 29 order because any appeal is untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104(a)(1)(C) [notice of appeal must be filed (at latest) by 180 days after entry of judgment], 8.108(c)(3) [time to file notice of appeal is extended by motion to vacate judgment to 180 days after entry of judgment]; Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 [appellate court lacks jurisdiction over untimely appeal].) The notice of appeal, which did not indicate it was from the April 29 order in any event, was not filed until November 20, 2025—205 days after April 29.

3 Assuming any appeal from the April 29 order is timely and properly before us, we conclude the order must be affirmed because Ouchene failed to include the order in the appellate record. (See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296 [appellant bears burden of providing record adequate for task of determining whether error occurred]; Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, “ ‘the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed’ ”].)

As to the order denying Ouchene’s request to set aside the judgment, Ouchene’s position is not supported by the record. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion, and violated due process, by denying his motion without giving him the opportunity to testify regarding his whereabouts at the time he failed to appear for a June 12, 2025 hearing he had requested. He is wrong.

When Ouchene’s motions were heard, on November 20, the trial court announced that the dispositive question was whether Ouchene was in Algeria on June 12, 2025 and without reliable internet access to appear at the hearing by video—as he had asserted in his June 10, 2025 email to the court. The court reviewed travel receipts on Ouchene’s phone, which showed that he was in Paris, France, on June 12, 2025—not in Algeria. Ouchene was sworn to testify and, although he initially claimed to not remember, eventually admitted that he was in Paris. The court found that Ouchene’s claim of inadvertence or excusable neglect was not credible, took judicial notice of internet availability in Paris, and found that Ouchene intentionally chose not to appear remotely on June 12, and to violate the court’s orders.

Ouchene presents no other reasoned and intelligible legal argument, supported by references to the record and pertinent authority, to challenge that decision. (See Hernandez v. First 4 Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)–(C).)

DISPOSITION The trial court’s April 29, 2025 order and order denying Ouchene’s motion to set aside the judgment, under section 473(b), are affirmed. Zahi may recover her costs on appeal.

BURNS, J.

WE CONCUR: JACKSON, P. J. CHOU, J.

Zahi v. Ouchene (A175157)