People v. Mendez CA1/4

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Mendez CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172244 v. SANTIAGO TORRES MENDEZ, JR., (Napa County Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 21CR000920)

A jury convicted Santiago Torres Mendez, Jr. of committing 17 sexual assault offenses against three women and two minors. Mendez raises numerous claims on appeal. Mendez challenges the trial court’s admission of statements that he claims law enforcement obtained from him in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated kidnapping convictions and kidnapping sentencing enhancement findings related to two of the victims. He also contends that the trial court committed two independent instructional errors. We find no prejudicial error and affirm. BACKGROUND A. The Charges In 2024, the Napa County District Attorney filed a third amended information charging Mendez with 17 counts of felony sexual assault offenses and alleged multiple sentencing enhancement allegations committed against five unrelated women: Stephanie Doe, Hayleigh Doe, Guadalupe Doe, Jorga Doe, and Violet Doe. As to Stephanie, the information alleged: kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1);1 three counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 2–4); two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 5–6); sexual penetration by a foreign object on an unconscious victim (§ 289, subd. (d); count 7); and two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 8–9). As to Hayleigh, the information alleged: forcible oral copulation of a child over 14 (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 10); forcible rape of a child over 14 (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 11); and assault with the intent to commit a specified sexual offense on a victim under 18 (§ 220, subd. (a)(2); count 12). As to Guadalupe, the information alleged assault with the intent to commit a felony (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 13). As to Jorga, the information alleged: forcible rape of a child over 14 (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 14); kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 15); and sexual penetration by a foreign object by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 16). As to Violet, the information alleged forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 17). As to counts 2 through 6, the information further alleged Mendez inflicted great bodily injury (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6)) and kidnapped Stephanie (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1)), substantially increasing the risk of harm (§ 667.61, 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 subd. (d)(1)).2 As to count 8, the information also alleged that Mendez inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The information further alleged Mendez kidnapped Jorga (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1); counts 14, 16), a child 14 or older (§ 667.61, subd. (l); count 14), substantially increasing the risk of harm (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(1); counts 14, 16). The information also alleged various aggravating factors and other circumstances under the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subds. (e)(4), (m); California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(8), (a)(11), (b)(1). B. The Crimes Against Stephanie and the Initial Investigation Stephanie met Mendez when they were 15 and 24 years old, respectively. They developed a friendship that centered on smoking marijuana. Mendez confessed his “feelings” to Stephanie multiple times, but she made it clear that she wanted to remain friends. In April 2021, Mendez picked up Stephanie from her house to go to San Francisco. In San Francisco, they consumed a large amount of alcohol and smoked marijuana. They set out to return home at night, and Stephanie fell asleep on the ride home. Mendez dropped off Stephanie at her house, and the next morning they agreed to go out again to continue drinking and smoking. Mendez picked Stephanie up from her house and drove to Napa to a place with “a view.” Eventually, Stephanie asked to be taken home because she felt tired and intoxicated. Stephanie fell asleep on the ride back. At some point, though, she awoke and did not recognize where they were, and she asked where they were going. She also asked multiple times to be taken 2 The information and verdict forms refer to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1) instead of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) as the aggravated kidnapping circumstances related to counts 2–6, 14, and 16. As discussed post, this is a patent typographical error.

3 home. She began to get scared as they proceeded down an unfamiliar road in the dark in a “very rural” area with few houses. Mendez pulled over after driving about a mile and a half to two miles down the rural road, ostensibly to help Stephanie find her misplaced phone. Mendez parked in a large dirt area with “not much around it.” Stephanie did not know where they were. They both exited the car, and Mendez choked Stephanie until she lost consciousness. When Stephanie regained consciousness, she was on the ground lying on her back. Mendez was on top of her, their pants were off, and his penis was inside her vagina. She screamed at Mendez to stop, but he continued. At some point, he told her to “shut up and take it” and may have put his hand over her mouth. Stephanie—who was five feet six inches tall and weighed about 130 pounds—unsuccessfully tried to push away Mendez—who was six feet tall and outweighed Stephanie by well over 100 pounds. Mendez removed his penis from Stephanie’s vagina so that she could orally copulate him. Stephanie “didn’t want him to keep raping [her], so [she] did.” Mendez also put his mouth on her vagina. Mendez next instructed Stephanie to get into the front passenger seat of his car, and she complied. As Stephanie lay on her back with her legs outside the car, Mendez stood over her, put his penis inside her vagina, and ignored her repeated pleas to stop. She was in pain; she “went blank, dissociated.” Mendez raped Stephanie a third time in the backseat of the car. He choked her three times during the assault. When Mendez finally stopped, and as she got dressed, Stephanie asked Mendez to take her home and said that she would not tell anybody about what had happened. Mendez “froze up” but eventually started the car and drove into a ditch on the other side of the road, causing the car to get stuck.

4 Stephanie then discovered that Mendez had her phone “the whole time,” and she ran away as soon as he handed it over. Stephanie texted an ex-boyfriend, telling him that she had been raped. Then she called 911 and reported the assault. A sheriff’s deputy found Stephanie walking down the road away from the reported rape scene. Stephanie “was sobbing, crying, she had debris all in her hair, all over her clothes, she wasn’t wearing any shoes, just extremely distraught, sobbing and crying.” Five hundred yards further down the road, another deputy found Mendez standing next to the car, which was still stuck in an embankment. He had scratches on his face that appeared fresh. Mendez was detained and handcuffed. When brought to the scene, Stephanie “began sobbing even louder, crying pretty hysterically” and said, “That’s him. That’s the one that did it to me.” Stephanie’s throat was sore, her voice raspy, and it hurt her to speak. About 30 minutes after Stephanie was picked up by the sheriff’s deputy, a nurse performed a sexual assault response team examination on Stephanie. Stephanie had injuries in the four areas of the vagina that are considered sexual assault related findings. A DNA expert later performed DNA analysis on swabs taken from Stephanie’s vagina and neck and compared them to DNA samples taken from Mendez. The vaginal swab had a mixture of DNA from three individuals, with very strong support that Mendez was a contributor to the mixture. Likewise, the neck swab had a mixture of DNA from three individuals, with very strong support that Mendez was a contributor to the mixture. Mendez was arrested and taken to the Napa County Sherriff’s Department. There, Detectives Joshua Coleman and Cecil Brown read 5 Mendez his Miranda rights and interviewed him. The detectives placed Mendez in a holding cell after he appeared to invoke his Miranda rights, but 15 minutes later Mendez told a deputy that he “could probably talk to [the detectives]” again. After being re-read his Miranda rights, Mendez admitted that he choked, raped, and orally copulated Stephanie, and had her orally copulate him at the scene where he was arrested. A forensic analysis of Mendez and Stephanie’s cell phones revealed that their cell phone records “matched the timeline and locations” and “sequence of events” that Mendez and Stephanie had described. There was also a video on Mendez’s cell phone created on December 18, 2020, taken by the person who was driving a vehicle at the time of the recording. The phone was positioned inside the passenger compartment, and the video showed a sleeping or passed out Stephanie whose legs were bouncing as the car was moving. The driver placed his hand on her leg, patted her, and shifted the phone over to show a penis. Mendez also had a note in the Notes application of his cell phone titled “Count,” containing a list of nine female names. In 2021, Detective Coleman met four of the women, Guadalupe, Jorga, Hayleigh, and Violet. None of the women appeared to know one another. C. The Crimes Against Guadalupe Guadalupe testified that she saw Mendez almost daily in 2017 because he bought lunch where she worked. They began dating in the summer of 2018 after matching on Tinder but broke up after a couple months. In October 2018, shortly after the breakup, Guadalupe and Mendez agreed to meet. Mendez drove them to a lake and parked on a dead-end road without anyone around. As they walked toward the water, Mendez was “[v]ery huggy,” but Guadalupe pulled away. After smoking marijuana, they 6 walked back to Mendez’s truck and sat on the truck’s tailgate. Mendez tried hugging Guadalupe again and tried to kiss her multiple times, causing her to lean back until she was laying supine in the truck bed. Mendez got on top of Guadalupe and begged for a kiss; she told him “ ‘[n]o.’ ” She became “really angry” and tried to push Mendez away but he was too heavy. He put his leg between Guadalupe’s and “kept putting his weight on [her],” and he tried to kiss her from this position for about 5 minutes. Mendez stopped and got off Guadalupe only after she threatened to punch him. Mendez drove Guadalupe home. Guadalupe did not disclose the sexual assault until she spoke with Detective Coleman, and she initially told him that she had not been a victim of sexual assault. D. The Crimes Against Jorga Jorga testified that Mendez contacted her on Facebook in 2019 when she was 16 years old. Jorga responded to his message and they engaged in “normal conversation” and generally “small talk.” Eventually the tenor of the conversation changed as Mendez began complimenting Jorga’s looks and asking for photos. She sent him some, including sexually explicit ones. Jorga also told Mendez that she was 16 years old. Even though Jorga told Mendez that she did not want to hang out in person—in part because she thought their age difference “was a little bit weird”—he drove several hours to her rural town anyway. He arrived late at night with alcohol for Jorga. Jorga started drinking a little as they drove to a river bar. Mendez had a THC oil pen and insisted that Jorga try it, but she refused. Mendez also insisted that Jorga drink more, but she did not. After a couple hours of hanging out at the river bar, Jorga told Mendez that she wanted to go home.

7 Mendez asked Jorga to show him other parts of the area. Jorga again asked Mendez to take her home. Mendez complained that he was hungry and wanted to get food, but Jorga informed him the nearest city with food was Eureka, which was an hour and 30 minute drive away. Jorga maintained that she did not want to go, but Mendez “made a promise that [they would] go out there and get food or something and that he would bring [Jorga] back and that he would figure out his own sleeping situation.” Jorga felt “a little hesitant, but [she] also felt that he wasn’t gonna let [her] out of the car.” Indeed, when Jorga told Mendez where she wanted to be dropped off, he ignored her and eventually started driving to Eureka. By this point, Jorga had asked Mendez to take her home many times, but because she felt like she had no choice but to stay in the car, Jorga told Mendez that she “didn’t really wanna go that late at night, but if he really wanted to go get food, then that was his choice.” Mendez was significantly bigger than Jorga; she also could not drive and did not have anyone willing to pick her up. On the drive, Mendez repeatedly asked Jorga if something was wrong, and Jorga stated “again and again” that she wanted to go home. Mendez unsuccessfully tried to get Jorga to use his THC pen and drink more alcohol. At some point along the way, Mendez said that he was tired and he wanted to sleep in a motel. Jorga told Mendez that she did not want to stay in a motel and asked him to take her home, but he said that he was too tired to do so and would take her home in the morning. Jorga became “pretty upset” and insisted that Mendez get a room with two beds, which he did. Mendez and Jorga initially sat on separate beds. But as the night progressed, Mendez “complained and whined” about wanting to “cuddle,” climbed in and out of Jorga’s bed dozens of times, pulled on her 8 clothes, touched her all over her body, and tried “to convince [her] to have sex with him.” Jorga told him no “continuously and repeatedly for hours,” said that she was “repulsed that he would even still try to do that,” and slapped his hands away. But Jorga became exhausted from “protecting [her]self” and felt she would be in greater danger if she left the motel room at night. Once Mendez unhooked Jorga’s bra, she “pretty much just gave up and let him take the articles of clothing off of [her].” Jorga “checked out” and did everything Mendez asked of her for hours. Mendez put his penis in Jorga’s vagina. He directed her to lay on top of him so that they could simultaneously copulate each other. Because of Jorga’s “lack of participation,” Mendez masturbated. The next day, Mendez drove Jorga around for more sightseeing even as Jorga insisted that he take her home. He eventually agreed to take Jorga home, but he requested that she give him her bra and more nude photos. She did what he asked. Jorga felt like the situation was her fault. Jorga later messaged Mendez, saying that what he did was wrong and that she never wanted to see him again, and he apologized. Sometime after March 2020, when Jorga was 18 years old, Mendez contacted her to apologize again and offered to take her on a trip. Jorga agreed, explaining that at that time she was engaging in self-destructive behaviors. Mendez picked up Jorga from her home to go to San Francisco. During the drive, Mendez took a wrong turn into a “very rural area” with no phone service. Jorga asked Mendez to turn around, but he refused. More than once, Mendez asked Jorga to touch him, but she told him she “had no interest in doing that.” Mendez then touched Jorga’s legs and thighs several times while driving. Each time, Jorga told Mendez no and shoved his hands away.

9 But eventually Mendez pried her legs apart and digitally penetrated her vagina. Jorga cried, causing Mendez to pull over and cry too. When they arrived in San Francisco, Mendez paid for a room with two beds and said he “kinda felt like he was owed” since he had driven so far and had spent so much money. Jorga told him it “wasn’t gonna happen.” Several times during the night, Mendez got into Jorga’s bed and unsuccessfully tried to take her clothes off. Despite feeling intimidated and pressured, Jorga resisted. Jorga did not disclose the sexual assaults until she spoke to Detective Coleman because she “didn’t feel like [she] had anybody in particular that [she] could trust to tell” and because, having grown up in the foster care system, she was afraid that she would be sent away from her home. Jorga was scared when Detective Coleman first contacted her because she thought that she had done something wrong. E. The Crimes Against Hayleigh Hayleigh testified that she met Mendez on a dating site around January 2020 when she was 17 years old; he was 26 years old. Hayleigh told Mendez her age. In March 2020, Hayleigh and Mendez sat in his car outside her house to talk and smoke marijuana. Mendez began kissing Hayleigh’s neck and grabbing her. Hayleigh told Mendez that she was “not in the mood,” but he continued kissing her and placed his hand inside her shirt. Mendez asked Hayleigh to orally copulate him. When Hayleigh refused, Mendez grabbed her by the back of her neck and pushed her head down toward his exposed penis. She bit his penis “[hard] [e]nough to get him to understand that [she] wasn’t going to do that.” Mendez “called [Hayleigh] a bitch,” got out of the car, went to the back seat, pulled off Hayleigh’s shirt, and dragged Hayleigh to the back seat as 10 well. Mendez unbuttoned Hayleigh’s pants while holding her wrists and as Hayleigh tried to “fight” and “kick” Mendez. Hayleigh cried as Mendez undressed her and then undid his own pants. Mendez put his penis inside Hayleigh’s vagina and raped her. After he ejaculated, Hayleigh got dressed and ran inside her house. Hayleigh initially did not tell anyone about the rape because she “didn’t feel like being exposed like that again.” But about a month after it happened, Hayleigh disclosed the sexual assault to her stepbrother. Hayleigh’s stepbrother convinced her to report the rape, but when they arrived at the police station, she was instructed to file a report online because the station was closed due to COVID. Being turned away from the station discouraged Hayleigh from filing a report. F. The Crimes Against Violet Violet testified that Mendez reached out to her on Facebook in the spring or summer of 2020 when she was 18 years old. She engaged in a conversation with Mendez because she felt that “sometimes the best people to talk to are strangers,” and she confided in Mendez that that she had been drugged and raped the night before. Mendez “seemed like he genuinely cared,” and Violet agreed to hang out with him. She told Mendez her age, and Mendez lied and told her that he was 23 or 24 years old. Mendez picked Violet up. He was drunk, and they smoked marijuana together. Mendez invited Violet to his place in Napa, and she agreed. They arrived in Napa after dark and, with her permission, Mendez drove to an area to show her “how Napa looks from the top.” After a circuitous mountain drive, Mendez parked and informed Violet that they would be sleeping in the car.

11 Violet told Mendez that she wanted to go home. She was scared, lacked cell phone service, and thought that Mendez was going to kill her. Mendez moved his belongings from the trunk to the front seats, preventing Violet from being able to drive off in the car. Mendez made a makeshift bed by placing blankets in the trunk and told Violet that he would take her home the next day. They smoked more marijuana and Violet declined Mendez’s request “to do stuff.” Mendez persisted in grabbing Violet and trying to convince her to have sexual intercourse. After telling Mendez “no” multiple times, she asked herself whether he would “keep asking” or “do what he wants, because who is going to stop him?” She was unhealthy and skinny, and he was much bigger than her. Violet told him that she would be his girlfriend if he took her home, and she was prepared to “do whatever he wanted just to take [her] home. She relented to his entreaties. Violet lay on her back while Mendez stood outside the open trunk. Mendez put his penis into Violet’s vagina. She told Mendez, “It hurts. I don’t want to do this,” and she repeatedly told him to stop, but he “just kept going” until he ejaculated. Violet blamed herself for being raped by Mendez, especially since she had been raped the prior night. Violet did not disclose the sexual assault until she spoke with Detective Coleman. G. The Jury Verdict and Sentencing The jury found Mendez guilty of every offense, found all circumstances under the One Strike law true, and found nearly all special aggravating 12 circumstances true.3 The trial court sentenced Mendez to a determinate term of 14 years plus life without the possibility of parole plus an indeterminate term of 215 years to life. Mendez appealed. DISCUSSION Mendez contends the trial court erred in admitting his statements to law enforcement, there was insufficient evidence in support of his kidnapping convictions and aggravated circumstances, and the court made two instructional errors. We address each argument in turn. I. Mendez’s Statements to Law Enforcement Were Admissible Mendez argues that law enforcement obtained statements from him in violation of his Miranda rights and therefore the trial court erred by admitting those statements into evidence. We disagree. A. Relevant Background Mendez was arrested at the scene on Crystal Springs Road after he committed the crimes against Stephanie and was transported to the Napa County Sheriff’s Office and placed in a holding cell. A few hours later, Mendez was brought to an interview room where Detectives Coleman and Brown introduced themselves, and Detective Coleman provided a Miranda admonition. Mendez asked two inchoate questions: “can I get an attorney or 3 The jury found not true the special allegations that Mendez carried out counts 8 and 13 against Stephanie and Guadalupe, respectively, with planning, sophistication, and professionalism within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8). And the jury found not true the special allegations that Mendez committed count 13 against Guadalupe with acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) and that Guadalupe was particularly vulnerable within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).

13 somebody just to--”; and “Or can I get an appointed one if anything?” Detective Coleman affirmed that Mendez could get an attorney and asked, “are you saying to me that you don’t want to answer any of the questions that I have for you?” Rather than directly answer the question, Mendez replied that he did not “know what’s going on. That’s the thing.” After some back and forth, Detective Coleman again asked, “are you okay answering some questions?” To which Mendez answered, “I’d prefer an attorney [here] if that’s okay.”4 Detective Coleman then explained to Mendez that they could not facilitate having an attorney “here” during the questioning. Detective Brown jumped in, and the following back and forth took place: “[Detective Brown]: Well, what we would like is to talk to you and share some information with you, get some information back from you. “[Mendez]: Mm-hmm. “[Detective Brown]: But, um, we also want to respect your rights. If you’re saying you want to talk to an attorney, okay. “[Mendez]: Yeah. “[Detective Brown]: But with us respecting your rights and being as fair as we can be, that means we can’t talk to you right now. “[Mendez]: All right.

4 The transcript omits the word “here,” which is difficult to hear over background noise. However, it can be faintly heard in the video recording, which also shows Mendez mouthed the word “here.” The recording controls. (See People v. Giron-Chamul (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 932, 946, fn. 15 [“an appellate court generally must assume that the reporter’s transcript is accurate” but “the video recordings are ‘ “entitled to greater credence” ’ than the reporter’s transcript and therefore ‘ “prevail” ’ to the extent there is a conflict between them and it”]; see also People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 611 [no inference of unfairness by relying on hard to hear video recording if it is “clear enough”].)

14 “[Detective Brown]: So, um, he’s right. When you go to court, they’re going to appoint an-an attorney, and you’re going to get to talk to them. “[Mendez]: Mm-hmm. “[Detective Brown]: But that’s down the road a little ways. “[Mendez]: Mm-hmm. “[Detective Brown]: That-that doesn’t happen right now. So -- “[Detective Coleman]: It also means that you, uh -- it also means that we take whatever information that we have on face value. And we-we arrest you and book you without your side of the story. “[Mendez]: Oh. “[Detective Brown]: So the-the issue right now -- your decision -- and it’s 100 percent your decision -- is if you want to have this conversation with us now – “[Mendez]: Uh -- “[Detective Brown]: -- or if you don’t.” Detective Coleman then interjected, analogizing the situation to a poker game in which he would “put the cards out there” to help Mendez “decide whether or not [he] want[ed] to wait and talk to an attorney.” Detective Coleman then relayed that Stephanie had called 911, reported a rape, and identified Mendez as the perpetrator. During this exposition, Mendez began to speak and Detective Coleman cut him off, saying: “You don’t have to say anything because this is you deciding whether or not you want to talk to-to us, okay?” When Detective Coleman finished summarizing the current state of the investigation, Mendez stated that he was overwhelmed and he would “probably prefer to have someone here, I guess.” Detective Coleman reiterated that Mendez could either speak to them without an attorney or get 15 booked and speak with an attorney later. Mendez then stated: “All right. I’ll probably just wait for my attorney then.” Detective Coleman responded, “[o]kay,” but then Mendez expressed uncertainty about his decision. The detectives informed Mendez that they could not give him legal advice and that it was his decision to make. Detective Brown further stated that “in [his] experience” there were “almost always” two sides to a story, and they would hear Mendez’s side “if [he] want[ed] to tell [them] about it.” Mendez began to give a version of events, vaguely denying the accusations. However, Detective Brown came back to the Miranda issue, saying he did not want to “skip past the issue of whether or not [Mendez] want[ed] an attorney,” concluding, “if you want to tell us your side, then we’re here. This is the time to do it.” Mendez replied: “Well, I’ll wait for an attorney. But I like -- so I’m going to go to, like -- put in jail, like -- or booked or something?” The detectives confirmed that Mendez would go to jail “[b]ased on what [they] [knew]” and “[h]aving one side of the story.” Detective Coleman provided a hypothetical scenario in which Mendez falsely accused Detective Coleman of killing his cat and Detective Coleman chose not to speak with the police or provide evidence proving that Mendez killed his own cat. Detective Coleman explained that in such a situation the police would “have to go forward with the only evidence they ha[d],” and he stated, “That’s the situation that we’re in right now.” Detective Coleman expounded that Mendez was “in this limbo land of whether or not [he] wanted to talk to an attorney,” concluding that “if” Mendez wanted to invoke his right to an attorney that was his “prerogative.” Mendez then began tell his side of the story again. As Mendez’s voice trailed off, Detective Brown said that they had “specific questions” but reiterated that they did not “want to trample on [Mendez’s] rights” and that 16 Mendez was “at that point where [Mendez] just need to decide if [he] want[ed] to answer [the detectives] questions and help [them] understand what happened or if [Mendez] want to invoke [his] right to an attorney. And then [the detectives] just can’t talk to [Mendez].” Mendez reaffirmed: “I’ll get an attorney, then, I guess.” As the detectives got up to leave, Mendez asked how long he would be locked up. Detective Coleman explained he was being charged with rape and he did not know what bail would be; and when Mendez affirmed that he wanted to know “what’s coming,” Detective Coleman stated that “the consequences are, they’re very steep. Like 15, 20 years steep.” Mendez then began to restate his version of events, and Detective Coleman cut him off, explaining “this is a very dicey situation of, like, where we -- like we cannot violate your rights.” The conversation circled back to the fact that no attorney was currently available to be present for Mendez’s questioning. Detective Coleman laid out that Mendez would be “booked, charged, arraigned” and “probably” would not make bail and therefore would “be in jail” until a preliminary hearing. Detective Coleman continued: “in this case, without your statement and all of the information that we have, it’s likely that a judge would hold that there is probable cause to hold you” and it would “[p]robably” take “a year or two” for Mendez to get a trial because his “attorney would have a lot of work that they want to do on their side. And then we have a lot of work that we need to do on our side.” At this point, Mendez asked what answering the detectives’ questions would “do.” Detective Coleman replied, “If you’re sitting on the truth -- your truth -- that this -- none of this occurred, you could potentially leave here,” and he continued, “If we find out that a rape did not occur, then you’re not going to be charged.” Detective Coleman then informed Mendez, “that has 17 actually happened,” and gave an example where someone accused of rape “gave [the police] a statement” and “[i]t turn[ed] out based on the evidence that a rape did not occur” so “he went free” later “that day.” Detective Coleman emphasized, “But that-that was that circumstance.” Detective Brown then directed Mendez back to the holding cell, telling Mendez that if he “change[d] [his] mind” and decided that he did want to talk to the detectives, then Mendez could let somebody know and they would re- Mirandize him at that time. As he placed Mendez back in the holding cell, Detective Coleman reminded Mendez to tell “the guys who will be watching [him] . . . . if [he] want[ed] to talk with [them again] . . . .” Mendez then said, “I guess I’ll just answer your questions. All right?” Detective Coleman told Mendez that he would come back and left him in the holding cell. Approximately 15 minutes later, Mendez asked a deputy to use the restroom. After using the restroom and once back at the holding cell, Mendez said, “I could probably talk to them,” in response to a deputy asking if she could get him anything. The deputy informed Detective Coleman that Mendez wanted to speak to him. Shortly thereafter, Detectives Coleman and Brown escorted Mendez back to the interview room and again read Mendez his Miranda rights. Mendez affirmed that he understood his rights and then proceeded to speak with the detectives for about two hours with a few breaks in between. Over the course of the interrogation, Mendez admitted that he digitally penetrated Stephanie on the way back from San Francisco while she was passed out. And he also admitted that he choked, raped, and orally copulated her, and had her orally copulate him in a secluded area in Napa. The trial court denied Mendez’s Miranda motion to exclude his statements. The court found that Mendez “never . . . unambiguously stat[ed]

18 that he wanted a lawyer” and that “law enforcement was correct in attempting to clarify the defendant’s statements and questions and determining whether or not he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right.” The court described the detectives’ decision to end the initial interrogation as giving Mendez “time to think about whether or not he was asserting” his Fifth Amendment rights. Turning to the circumstances of the second interrogation, the trial court found that Mendez asked a deputy to talk to the detectives again on his own accord. It stated that Mendez was re-Mirandized without any “coercion . . . promises[,] or any other exertion of improper influence by the officers to extricate the statement.” Addressing Detective Coleman’s reference during the initial interrogation to another case in which a rape suspect was released after talking to the police, the court expressly found the detectives did not promise Mendez that he would go free if he talked to them. While acknowledging that Mendez was “very nervous,” the court noted that the interrogations had a “conversational tone” and Mendez did not “appear to be overwhelmed or distraught with emotion when [he was] speaking” or mentally impaired. And the court determined that Mendez implicitly and validly waived his Miranda rights after being re-Mirandized. Only Mendez’s statements after he was re-Mirandized were admitted into evidence. B. Legal Standards Pursuant to Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 and its progeny, “a suspect cannot be subjected to custodial interrogation unless there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to the appointment of counsel.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 585.) “No particular manner or form of Miranda waiver is required, and a waiver may be implied from a defendant’s words 19 and actions. [Citations.] In determining the validity of a Miranda waiver, courts look to whether it was free from coercion or deception, and whether it was ‘ “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ [Citations.] Both aspects are tested against the totality of circumstances in each case, keeping in mind the particular background, experience and conduct of the accused.” (People v. Davis, at pp. 585–586.) If the suspect requests counsel, “ ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ ” (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482, quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474.) Moreover, “ ‘he may not be approached for further interrogation “until counsel has been made available to him . . .” . . . . If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.’ ” (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 590.) This prophylactic rule (the Edwards rule) is “ ‘ “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” ’ ” (People v. Davis, at p. 590.) However, “[t]he applicability of the ‘ “rigid” prophylactic rule’ of Edwards requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ” (Davis v. U.S. (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458.) Thus, a suspect “must articulate his [or her] desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney” before the police 20 must cease a custodial interrogation. (Id. at p. 459.) In short, “the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” (Ibid.) “After a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers may nonetheless resume their interrogation if ‘the suspect “(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” ’ ” (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 596.) “[T]o be valid, a defendant’s initiation cannot be the product of the authorities’ coercion.” (People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 584 (Johnson).) Rather, it must be voluntary, meaning the “ ‘ “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension” ’ ” for a valid Miranda waiver. (Id. at pp. 591–592.) “ ‘[W]e review independently the trial court’s legal determinations of whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary [citation], whether his Miranda waivers were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made [citation], and whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his [rights] [citation]. We evaluate the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s statements and waivers, and “ ‘accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” ’ [Citation.] When ‘an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.’ ” (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158.) C. Analysis Mendez contends that he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel at the start of the initial interrogation and “drove the point home” with his next five requests. Mendez also argues that the detectives utilized coercive tactics 21 by extending an “offer of a release ‘that day,’ ” rendering his subsequent Miranda waiver involuntary. Mendez also denies that he initiated the second interrogation, stating he merely “inform[ed] [the deputy] that he had agreed to speak with the detectives” and was waiting for their return. We need not resolve whether or when Mendez unequivocally invoked his right during the initial interrogation because the record—specifically, the video recordings of the initial interrogation, Mendez’s interaction with deputies at the holding cell, and throughout the second interrogation—show that Mendez voluntarily re-initiated contact with the detectives, was validly advised of his rights again, and intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights. First, the deputies’ video recordings affirm that Mendez initiated further discussions with the detectives 15 minutes after the initial interrogation ended. “[A] suspect initiates ‘further communication, when his words or conduct “can be ‘fairly said to represent a desire’ on his part ‘to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 591.) While in the holding cell after the initial interview, Mendez asked a deputy for a blanket and to use the bathroom, and the deputy retrieved a male deputy to escort Mendez to the bathroom. After being escorted back to the holding cell from the bathroom, the deputy handed Mendez a blanket and asked if he “need[ed] anything else.” Mendez replied, “Umm no. Uh [unintelligible] maybe -- yeah, I could probably talk to them.” His demeanor was calm and relaxed. And when the deputy repeated Mendez’s request back to him, Mendez eagerly nodded and confirmed he wanted to talk to the detectives again. Mendez did not inform the deputy that he was waiting for the detectives to continue their 22 interview. And at no point did either deputy ask Mendez any investigative questions. We also have no trouble discerning that Mendez’s choice to initiate further communication was uncoerced. “[T]he operative question is whether, when [Mendez] began talking to [the detectives], he did so freely, or he did so because of undue coercion.” (Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 590.) Based on the whole record, we conclude he did so freely. The relatively brief initial interrogation by Detectives Coleman and Brown “did not add up to ‘ “ ‘badger[ing]’ ” ’ that effectively wore down [Mendez’s] will to remain silent.” (Id. at p. 586.) The entire exchange lasted about 17 minutes, which was prolonged each time Mendez asked the detectives a question. Throughout the initial interrogation, the detectives repeatedly emphasized to Mendez that that they “want[ed] to respect [his] rights” and that it was “a hundred percent” his “decision” whether to answer their questions. The tone was cordial, Mendez was given a snack and water, and while Mendez expressed anxiety about his situation, he was not overwhelmed by emotion and spoke clearly. There were no signs that Mendez was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or otherwise mentally impaired. Although Detective Coleman’s poker analogy and his hypothetical story about the killing of a cat were perhaps ill-conceived, he did not promise or threaten Mendez with anything. Rather, Detective Coleman was attempting to explain to Mendez that he could choose to talk to them without an attorney present, and if he did not do so then the evidence as they understood it required them to book him immediately and he would have to wait to speak to an attorney. Likewise, there was nothing untoward about Detective Coleman answering Mendez’s questions about the possible sentencing consequences. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1044 [no coercion 23 based on detective’s comments about what may happen to the defendant and “reference to the broad spectrum of possible places of incarceration would not reasonably be understood as a promise”] (Bradford).) Nor did Detective Coleman’s account of another suspect who walked free after talking to the police amount to an impermissible promise. Mendez had asked what answering the detectives’ questions “would . . . do,” and the detectives answered that if his answers revealed that “a rape did not occur” then Mendez would not be charged. Detective Coleman then relayed that “from experience that that has actually happened,” where “a guy gave . . . a statement” and “went free that day.” Detective Coleman immediately emphasized: “But that-that was that circumstance.” The detectives then told Mendez that if he wanted to talk to them after deliberating then he could ask to do so, and they ended the interrogation. There was no “offer of release,” as Mendez contends. Mendez’s assertion that “there was no possibility that [Mendez] would be freed by virtue of his statements to police” is only true in retrospect; if Mendez had shared exculpatory information, then there was a possibility he would have been let free that day. Mendez’s reliance on People v. Russo (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1172 is misplaced.5 There, the detective “induce[d] an unsophisticated suspect to give up an important constitutional right based on the faulty premise that only the guilty need counsel” by stating, “ ‘If you didn’t do this, you don’t need 5 We observe that People v. Russo, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 1172 has been superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds “because adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution requires California’s appellate courts to apply federal standards to Miranda issues, Davis [v. U.S., supra, 512 U.S. 452] now provides the standard by which we assess whether a defendant’s reference to counsel constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125.)

24 a lawyer, you know.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1177–1178.) By contrast, Detective Coleman’s remark did not mislead Mendez that he did not need counsel if he was innocent, especially in light of the detectives’ repeated statements that Mendez was entitled to counsel. Mendez’s other authorities are also factually distinguishable and inapposite. (E.g., People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 234 [“before appellant was advised of his rights, the detectives deliberately misled appellant concerning his right against self-incrimination” by “twist[ing] the required advisement: ‘[Anything] you say doesn’t necessarily held [sic] against you, it can be held to help you, depending on what happened.’ ”]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1080 (conc. opn. Liu, J.) [disagreeing with majority opinion that the ambiguous nature of defendant’s invocation controls where detective misleadingly says “ ‘at this point, no you’re not being charged with this’ ”].) Mendez was not coerced after the initial interrogation either. When requested, he was made comfortable with a blanket and given bathroom access. And he was in the holding cell for only 15 minutes when he initiated further communication with the detectives. (Compare Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1041 [no indication of coercion from fact that defendant was held in a cell less than 12 hours before re-initiated interrogation] with People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 84 [statement was involuntary in part because, after an initial interview, the defendant was placed in a cell without a toilet or sink and “he was not taken to a bathroom or given any water until the next morning, and he was not provided with any food until some time following the third interview, after more than 24 hours in custody and more than 36 hours since his last meal”].) Nor was Mendez coerced during the second interrogation. After being re-Mirandized, the tone was again calm and cordial. Mendez was initially 25 nervous but grew more comfortable and spoke freely. (See Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1041 [lack of “nervousness” evidenced voluntariness].) The interrogation was broken into three distinct discussions with breaks. The first session was “cordial,” and—after being confronted with the possibility of forensic evidence—Mendez allowed that his DNA may be found in Stephanie’s vagina because of digital penetration on the drive back from San Francisco and consensual vaginal sex in San Francisco. The second session was more confrontational, as Detective Coleman noted that Mendez had lied about whether he had sexual contact with Stephanie until he was informed that a forensic search may turn up his DNA. Yet Detective Coleman was not hostile. He offered Mendez water again. Moreover, Detective Coleman stated that he believed Mendez lied because Mendez “made some mistakes in decision-making, and [he was] trying to find a way [the] fuck out.” Detective Coleman offered, “the way out is the truth. . . . Because I think deep down inside of you, you’re a good person. And hiding it, holding onto it, makes you feel anxious . . . .” Mendez began to give a new version of events in which he and Stephanie had consensual sexual contact. Detective Coleman interjected to say that Mendez was “like, a pot of boiling water” who was “boiling over with the truth” but only saying enough to relieve a little stress. He told Mendez that “the truth itself will actually make [him] feel better.” Then Detective Coleman surmised the truth. Detective Coleman said that it sounded like Stephanie “treat[ed] [Mendez] like shit,” despite Mendez’s love and affection for her, and that when Stephanie did not reciprocate Mendez’s love, he “took it from her.” Detective Coleman’s exposition moved Mendez to tears, but he retained his composure and was not distraught when he admitted that Detective Coleman’s account was accurate. The rest of the session had a 26 similar back and forth in which Detective Coleman would beseech Mendez to be truthful whenever Mendez denied aspects of Stephanie’s statement, and Mendez was pensive as he gradually admitted to assaulting Stephanie numerous times. We find significance in Mendez’s ostensible remorse as he admitted to his misdeeds against Stephanie, who he claimed to love. For example, Mendez said at various points: “I fucked up,” “I never thought I ever would do shit like that,” and “I don’t know what the hell made me like this,” and he averred that he would say “ “I’m sorry’ ” if Stephanie was present. Having viewed the video recordings, we conclude Mendez’s confession was voluntary and motivated by a guilty conscience, not undue coercive pressure by the detectives. (See Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 587 [“most importantly, the record indicates that defendant was aware he was providing information that might be used against him, yet he viewed the tradeoff a worthwhile one”].) Second, Mendez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before the second interrogation. Even assuming Detectives Coleman and Brown violated Edwards during the initial interrogation, “[a] prior Edwards violation is not by itself dispositive of whether a suspect knowingly and voluntary waived his or her rights.” (Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 591.) The admissibility of a statement that the defendant initiates turns “ ‘ “solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made” ’ ” based on the totality of circumstances. (Ibid.) Here, Mendez was well educated in the initial interview that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and end the interrogation. Mendez was afforded time to deliberate about his choice. After Mendez re-initiated further communication, Detective Coleman properly re-Mirandized Mendez. Indeed, less than three minutes into the third session, Mendez said he would “rather” get an attorney than 27 answer further questions, and the detectives ended the interrogation. Thus, there is no question Mendez’s earlier waiver was knowing and intelligent. The People have carried their burden to demonstrate that Mendez’s statements were admissible. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the evidence obtained in the asserted violations of Miranda and Edwards was prejudicial to the defense. II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Findings Concerning Kidnapping Offenses and Aggravated Circumstances Mendez contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated kidnapping with the intent to commit unlawful sexual conduct as to count 1 or the aggravated kidnapping circumstance as to counts 2 through 6. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction as to count 15 and the aggravated kidnapping of a child over 14 sentencing enhancement findings as to count 14. We disagree. A. Legal Standards “In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence, ‘ “we review the whole record to determine whether . . . [there is] substantial evidence to support the verdict . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, we must affirm ‘ “ ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever 28 is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.’ ” [Citation.]” (People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 576 (Waqa).) Both aggravated kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) and the aggravated kidnapping circumstance (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)) “require the jury to find that defendant kidnapped the victims.” (People v. Alvarez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 989, 1001.) “ ‘Generally, to prove the crime of kidnapping, the prosecution must prove three elements: (1) a person was unlawfully moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the movement was without the person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person was for a substantial distance. (§ 207, subd. (a).)’ ”6 (People v. Dalerio (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 775, 781.) “[O]rdinarily, the force element in section 207 requires something more than the quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement of the victim from one location to another.” (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 606.) There is no kidnapping unless “ ‘a person’s free will was . . . overborne by the use of force or the threat of force’ ” or other method that instills fear. (People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 895–896 (Lewis).) “For simple kidnapping, the asportation element requires that the defendant moved the victim ‘a “ ‘substantial distance’ ” [citation], not a distance that is “ ‘trivial.’ ” ’ ” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) Kidnapping to commit rape “requires a simple kidnapping in which the movement ‘increase[d] the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in . . . the intended underlying offense.’ ” (Ibid., citing § 209, subd. (b)(1)–(2).) “The aggravated kidnapping circumstance requires 6 Section 207, subdivision (a) defines “kidnapping” as “forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steal[ing] or tak[ing], or hold[ing], detain[ing], or arrest[ing] any person in this state, and carr[ying] the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county . . . .”

29 that ‘[t]he defendant kidnapped the victim of the present [sexual] offense and the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense.’ ” (Waqa, at p. 577, citing § 667.61, subd. (d)(2), italics added.) Thus, there are two prongs to asportation for both kidnapping to commit rape and the aggravated kidnapping circumstance: (1) movement of a substantial distance, which (2) increases (to varying degrees) the risk of harm. The movement must be “ ‘ “more than that which is merely incidental to the commission or attempted commission of [the associated crime].” ’ [Citations.] ‘[I]ncidental movements are brief and insubstantial, and frequently consist of movement around the premises where the incident began. [Citations.] By contrast, relatively short distances have been found not to be incidental where the movement results in a substantial change in “the context of the environment.” ’ ” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) The increased risk of harm must be “beyond that inherent in the underlying offense.” (Ibid.) The two elements “ ‘are not distinct, but interrelated, because a trier of fact cannot consider the significance of the victim’s changed environment without also considering whether that change resulted in an increase in the risk of harm to the victim.’ ” (Id. at p. 579.) B. Analysis 1. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding That Mendez Kidnapped Stephanie Mendez claims the People failed to prove any element of kidnapping— force, lack of consent, or asportation—as to the kidnapping to commit rape offense against Stephanie (count 1) or the aggravated kidnapping circumstances found true as to the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation offenses against Stephanie (counts 2–6). Specifically, he contends Stephanie consented to the movement which took her to the area where she was raped, 30 that there was no force or fear associated with asportation, and that no movement substantially increased the risk of harm to Stephanie. We find his contentions meritless.7 Stephanie’s testimony regarding consent was unequivocal: she did not give Mendez permission to take her down the road where he raped her. After becoming inebriated and tired in Napa, she asked Mendez to take her home and she fell asleep during the ride. She woke up and saw Mendez was driving in an unfamiliar place and was not driving her home. She asked him repeatedly to take her home. Mendez maintains Stephanie consented because of an exchange that took place after Stephanie asked where they were going, and Mendez replied, “Hold up,” and Stephanie said, “Okay.” But Stephanie told Detective 7 Mendez also asserts that “what movement of the victim had taken place occurred prior to any unlawful intent,” but he does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his unlawful intent, forfeiting such an argument. (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 929.) In any event, there is sufficient evidence of unlawful intent. Not only did Mendez ignore Stephanie’s pleas to go home and instead take her to an isolated spot where he raped her, but Mendez hid Stephanie’s phone before he stopped the car. Under the pretense of helping Stephanie find her phone, Mendez pulled over, which induced Stephanie out of the car, and Mendez choked and sexually assaulted her. A rational juror could conclude Mendez had planned the assault before he took Stephanie to the remote rape scene. Moreover, the evidence regarding the circumstances of Stephanie’s assault coupled with the detailed testimony of the other victims—which depicted a “pattern” in which Mendez gained his victims’ trust to get in his car, drove to a place where they were isolated, and then sexually assaulted them—further supports the conclusion that Mendez had formed an unlawful intent before he had completed the drive to the spot where he raped Stephanie. The jury found Mendez guilty of every offense against each victim, entitling the jury to consider whether Mendez was disposed to commit sexual offenses. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a); People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161.)

31 Coleman that the exchange occurred before Mendez reached the rural area where he raped her. Stephanie testified that she asked Mendez to take her home at least once more after Mendez turned off the main road onto the rural road. Therefore, even assuming Stephanie freely assented to Mendez’s request to “[h]old up,” the jury could conclude she withdrew her consent when Mendez turned off the main road.8 For many of the same reasons, there is substantial evidence that Mendez forcibly moved Stephanie. Case law establishes that, “ ‘[e]ven if the victim’s initial cooperation is obtained without force or the threat of force, kidnap[p]ing occurs if the accused “ ‘subsequently restrains his victim’s liberty by force and compels the victim to accompany him further.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1017.) “Imprisonment for any substantial distance in a moving vehicle is forcible asportation. Thus, where the victim expresses the desire to leave the car, or not to accompany the defendant in the direction he is going, but the defendant ignores the plea and continues to drive so fast that the victim cannot escape, force or fear is established.” (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 622, abrogated by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911; see also 8 Mendez also asserts—seemingly in the alternative—that Stephanie was “in no condition to voice dissent.” This contention fails on two grounds. One, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we presume the jury found that Stephanie could and did dissent. (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 576.) Two, even assuming Stephanie was unable to consent (or dissent), that would not help Mendez because there is sufficient evidence that he harbored an unlawful intent before reaching the rape scene. (See ante fn. 7; see also Lewis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 896–899; People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 332 [“When a perpetrator uses the force necessary to take and carry away an incapacitated person to commit rape, the perpetrator uses the amount of force required by Penal Code section 209, subdivision (b)(1)”].)

32 People v. La Salle (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 139, 146–147 [even assuming victim voluntarily entered defendant’s car, the act became kidnapping by force when the defendant ignored victim’s protests to stop and continued driving to prevent her from leaving], disapproved on other grounds as stated in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498.) Here, Stephanie expressed a desire not to accompany Mendez in the direction he was going and Mendez ignored her pleas. Stephanie testified that Mendez did not stop or slow down the moving car as he drove down the winding rural road, supporting an inference that Stephanie could not safely escape. Thus, there is substantial evidence of forcible asportation. (Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 622.) Mendez is wrong that the evidence only supports the conclusion that he used force during the sexual assaults. Finally, concerning asportation, there is ample evidence establishing the interrelated elements that Mendez moved Stephanie a substantial distance and the movement substantially increased the risk of harm to Stephanie. (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) As to both elements, “a fact finder ‘should instead consider the “totality of the circumstances” . . . including factors [such as] “whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The measured distance of movement is relevant to our inquiry. (People v. Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 468.) Here, Mendez moved Stephanie off the main road and down a rural road over a mile before he pulled over. The evidence demonstrated how this movement changed the environment notwithstanding the rural nature of the entire area. Although the “main road” was still in a rural area, “[o]nce you 33 turn onto [the rural road] and get away from the [main road], at that time of night, there would be little to no traffic or passing cars . . . .” The rural road lacked streetlights and “painted delineation lines in the roadway.” And while the entire surrounding area is dominated by vineyards and “multi-acre plots with maybe one structure on the property,” one side of the rural road entirely lacks residences. Plus, Mendez passed several places where he could have stopped, choosing to park the car where there were no houses “in the immediate vicinity.” And when the police “conducted a neighborhood canvass to talk to neighbors, most of the houses were empty . . . .” Accordingly, even though the main road was also rural, a rational juror could conclude that the movement was a “substantial distance” because it resulted in a substantial change in the context of the environment. The evidence also established that the movement “substantially increased the risk of harm to [Stephanie] over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in [rape].” (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2); see § 209, subd. (b)(2).) Until Mendez pulled over, Stephanie’s “only option to escape was to exit a moving vehicle,” increasing the danger of her foreseeable attempts to escape. (People v. Kelly (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1130.) A juror could also reasonably conclude that, after Mendez parked, an attempt to escape down an unfamiliar, winding, unlit road lacking painted lines would be more dangerous than an attempted escape from the main road’s shoulder. Moving Stephanie from a busier road to a less-trafficked, secluded area also decreased the likelihood of detection. (E.g., People v. Aguilar (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1049 [moving victim 133 feet from sidewalk to unlit area significantly increased risk and was not merely incidental to the attempted rape]; People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153–1154 [moving victim 25 feet from a public road down a steep embankment and into an orchard 34 decreased the possibility of detection, escape, or rescue, and was thus not merely incidental to the rape].) We are not persuaded by Mendez’s contention that there was no decrease in the likelihood of detection because “they were already in remote locations taking in views.” Again, Mendez took Stephanie to a place where less people were nearby or likely to drive past. Likewise, a rational juror could reasonably infer the change of locale increased Mendez’s opportunity to commit additional crimes. Specifically, Mendez had a greater opportunity to choke Stephanie outside of the car and to commit multiple rapes and sex acts on the rural road because there were fewer nearby houses and less traffic than on the main road. Indeed, although the possible dangers need not materialize to prove that the risk of harm substantially increased (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 580), a juror could reasonably conclude that the danger of multiple assaults did materialize as a result of the movement to a secluded spot. (People v. Power (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 126, 139 [“The decreased risk of detection meant that defendant was free to demand longer sexual sessions, involving kinkier sex acts”].) The present circumstances are distinguishable from those in Waqa. There, the defendant dragged the victim from one bathroom stall to a larger stall where he raped her. (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 574–575.) Our colleagues in Division One of this court explained that “the degree of concealment each stall offered did not significantly differ” and “[n]either stall afforded a realistic opportunity to escape over or under a wall or door.” (Id. at p. 581) Thus, the movement did not decrease the chance of detection or increase the danger of an attempted escape. (Id. at pp. 581–582.) The court did allow that the larger space would have made it “easier” to commit certain sex offenses—such as raping the victim in a prone position and oral copulation—but it concluded that “either way he had essentially the same 35 opportunity to commit other crimes, particularly since the two stalls did not significantly differ in the opportunities they afforded for detection or escape.” (Id. at pp. 582–583.) By contrast, Mendez’s opportunities to commit other crimes was increased because moving Stephanie to the more isolated area decreased the chance of detection and escape. 2. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding That Mendez Kidnapped Jorga A rational fact finder could also conclude that Mendez forcibly moved Jorga without her consent when he took her to Eureka and raped her in a motel room.9 The evidence supports the finding that the movement to Eureka was nonconsensual. Mendez’s argument that Jorga voluntarily got in his car and suggested views and destinations in her hometown ignores the evidence that Jorga withdrew any consent she had given to Mendez to be driven around. Jorga expressly stated that she asked Mendez to take her home after they had hung out at a river bar. In the car, before Mendez started driving to Eureka, Jorga told him where she wanted to be dropped off, and throughout the drive she “kept explaining” that she wanted to go home. This testimony supplies sufficient evidence that Jorga did not consent to going to Eureka. Mendez represents that Jorga merely “complain[ed] that it was late, and that she was not too happy about continuing to be a tour guide into the night.” Even assuming that is a plausible reading of her testimony, the jury 9 The jury also found the aggravated kidnapping circumstance attached to the sexual penetration of a foreign object charge (count 16) true. Mendez claims that Jorga consented to the movement in San Francisco, but he does not otherwise challenge the conviction. Therefore, the claim is “forfeited because [it was] not raised in the opening brief under a proper heading” (People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1067, fn. 12) or argued (People v. Anderson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 929).

36 could understand her testimony differently, and therefore we must affirm. (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 576.) Likewise, the jury was not obligated to accept Mendez’s account that Jorga consented to being taken to Eureka by suggesting views in her hometown or by informing Mendez that he could get food in Eureka. Jorga’s later statement to Mendez after he started driving to Eureka that “if he really wanted to go get food, then that was his choice,” does not refute the jury’s conclusion either. As Jorga explained, by that point she felt she had no choice but to stay in the car because “he wasn’t taking [her] home, and he wasn’t really giving any sense that he was going to pull over and possibly let [her] out of the vehicle, and every time [she told] him, ‘Oh, you should take this turn, or you should take this turn,’ to try and lead [them] more back into town, he would ignore [her] and head his own direction.” The jury could therefore reject any suggestion that Mendez had a reasonable, good faith belief that Jorga voluntarily consented to go to Eureka. (Cf. People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [“defendant’s reasonable good faith belief that the victim has voluntarily consented to accompany him constitutes a complete defense to the charge of kidnap[p]ing”].) The same evidence supports the conclusion that the movement was forcible because it shows Mendez ignored Jorga’s requests to go home and kept her in his moving car against her stated wishes. (Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 622.) Jorga testified that she “felt that he wasn’t gonna let [her] out of the car, especially because [they] were driving around and the vehicle was moving” and he did not “giv[e] any sense that he was going to pull over and possibly let [her] out of the vehicle” because he ignored her directions and “head[ed] in his own direction.” Such involuntary asportation is forcible. (Ibid.)

37 The jury could also reasonably infer that Jorga felt compelled out of fear to enter Mendez’s hotel room. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002 [“where the victim reasonably feels compelled under the circumstances to comply with the defendant’s orders under fear of harm or injury from the defendant, the asportation is forcible”].) Mendez was nearly a decade older and about 200 pounds heavier than Jorga. He had ignored her protestations and taken her over 40 miles away from her home to an area she understood as dangerous. In Jorga’s view, Eureka was a “really, really dangerous area with a pretty dangerous . . . homeless population, . . . and at that point [she] had no option but to walk [home]” because—as a minor in the foster system—she “didn’t have any family” or anyone willing to get her, “and [she] felt like [she] essentially risked much greater damage to [her] person if [she] was to just leave.” On its face, the hour and half drive to Eureka was a substantial distance and not incidental to the sexual assault. Mendez made comments throughout the drive about having sex with Jorga, indicating Mendez took Jorga far from her home for the purpose coercing sex acts. Plus, it was late at night, Jorga could not drive because she was not old enough, and she had no one to call to pick her up. In sum, the movement isolated a 16 year old miles from her hometown, resulting in a substantial change in “ ‘ “the context of the environment.” ’ ” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) Sufficient evidence shows that the change in the environment also substantially increased the risk of harm over and above that inherent in sexual assault. First, the jury could reasonably infer that, prior to reaching Eureka, Jorga’s “only option to escape was to exit a moving vehicle,” increasing the danger of her foreseeable attempts to escape (People v. Kelly, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130.) We are not persuaded by Mendez’s 38 conclusory assertion that “Jorga’s was not a situation in which dangerous ‘efforts at escape,’ such as jumping out of a moving vehicle, would occur.” Second, the situation gave Mendez greater control over Jorga, who feared leaving the hotel room on her own at night. Once they were in the hotel room, the much bigger Mendez badgered and attempted to undress Jorga for hours until she “pretty much just gave up and let him take the articles of clothing off of [her].” Third, it was less likely that someone in Eureka would recognize Jorga and that something was off, and it was less likely that someone would detect a sexual assault in a hotel room than in a car or out in the open. Relatedly, sequestering Jorga in a hotel room in a different city afforded Mendez a greater opportunity to commit various sexual offenses without detection. (People v. Power, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 139.) Mendez relies on In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 869, fn. 20, and People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lee (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 772, 791, fn. 48, for the proposition that asportation of a victim in a vehicle substantially increases the danger to the victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape only if “ ‘the victim is forced to travel a substantial distance under the threat of imminent injury by a deadly weapon.’ ” However, those cases addressed kidnappings for robbery under a prior version of section 209 as construed by People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1138, superseded by statute as stated in People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979–980, which did not apply to kidnappings to commit certain sexual offenses. Moreover, “[k]idnapping for the purpose of robbery is not analogous to kidnapping for the purpose of rape.” (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 986.) The dangers inherent in each crime do not neatly overlap. “[A] rape 39 victim is certainly more at risk when concealed from public view and therefore more vulnerable to attack,” whereas in a robbery, “the victims may [be] at less risk [if] tied up [and concealed from view] where they [can] not try to thwart the robbery . . . .” (People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 607; cf. People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1135 [“a common occurrence in robbery, for example, that the victim be confined briefly at gunpoint . . . or moved into and left in another room or place,” some italics omitted].) In any event, as subsequent case law has established, whether forcible movement substantially increases the risk of harm in cases of rape depends on the “ ‘ “totality of circumstances” ’ ” and “ ‘[t]he increased risk may be of either physical or psychological harm.’ ” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) The threat of use of a weapon is not a necessary predicate to finding movement substantially increased the risk of danger to a rape victim. III. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Instructing the Jury on CALCRIM No. 1192 Mendez argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on rape trauma syndrome on the grounds that the People’s expert “disowned” rape trauma syndrome (RTS) and that neither she nor the court defined the term. He further asserts that giving the instruction prejudiced him because it “imbue[d] [the expert’s] testimony with a false sense of scientific authenticity” and “informed” the jurors that the “victim-witnesses should be judged under a different standard.” We disagree. A. Relevant History The People called Jacquelynn Lira as an expert witness and read the following stipulation: “ ‘Jacquelynn Lira is an expert in Rape Trauma Syndrome and a subject matter expert in the areas of victim dynamics, counterintuitive behaviors of survivors, and the impact of trauma. She has 40 worked as a victim advocate since 2007, working directly with survivors of sexual assault, dating and domestic violence, and stalking. Ms. Lira has been deemed an expert in Yolo County and Marin County in the areas of victim dynamics for sexual assault survivors and victim dynamics for domestic violence survivors.’ ” The defense did not object, and the trial court received Lira “as an expert in the fields enumerated.” Lira testified that sexual assault victims do not have a uniform response to trauma. Some victims are emotional, others dissociate, engage in self-harm, or rely on dark humor. More than half the victims that Lira had worked with never reported the sexual assault to law enforcement. Lira clarified that she did not have any personal knowledge about the present case or victims. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether Lira was testifying about “Rape Trauma Syndrome.” Lira answered, “[m]ore or less, yes,” expounding that “ ‘syndrome’ indicates that there is something wrong with how a victim reacts,” and “experts in the field are getting away from that language because ‘syndrome’ has kind of got a negative connotation to it.” Lira explained that there are stages to RTS, stating: “there is an acute stage: How they might feel immediately after and the following weeks after their sexual assault. And then there is a stage where they might be trying to cope and manage the best they can. And then there is the final stage where somebody will actually engage in healing methods to overcome that experience.” Lira affirmed that the research on the acute stage of RTS was “consistent” with her prior testimony that sexual assault victims do not “react emotionally” in a uniform way. Defense counsel then turned to “the original study on Rape Trauma Syndrome” that came out in 1974, but Lira could not recall all its details and 41 said that she had not read it in many years. Lira stated that her testimony was based on her “personal experience working with victims” and on newer research. She expounded that the “science has evolved since” the original study on RTS. Therefore, her “education and training has been focused on what is called the neurobiology of the trauma.” Calling RTS “a little antiquated” and “a little outdated,” Lira testified that the current research about the neurobiology of trauma confirms “essentially a lot of the same concepts [as RTS] but with a better understanding of how the brain reacts to trauma.” Specifically, when trauma occurs, our brain stops storing and categorizing memories normally and pumps hormones through the body for survival. This can impact which details of the assault the victim remembers. Moreover, a victim may “fight, flight, . . . freeze,” or dissociate, with freezing being more common than fighting off an attacker. Lira also testified that most sexual assaults are perpetrated by someone who knows the victim, and a victim of sexual assault might continue to communicate with their assailant to reframe the event and maintain a world view that the world is generally a safe place. After the close of evidence, the prosecution requested the instruction on RTS—CALCRIM No. 1192—on the grounds that the parties had stipulated Lira was a rape trauma expert and that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the instruction. Defense counsel objected, arguing CALCRIM No. 1192 was “confusing” and inapplicable because Lira based her testimony on personal experience and “referred to the word ‘syndrome’ in a pejorative sense.” Defense counsel further stated that he had stipulated to Lira’s qualification as an expert without knowing that she would not “really go into the syndrome, its elements, the things you would expect to find.” The court granted the prosecution’s request.

42 B. Legal Standards We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) “In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) A trial court errs when it gives “an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 (Guiton).) “Nonetheless, giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67.) “The error is therefore one of state law subject to the traditional Watson test” for prejudice, and “reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.” (Guiton, at p. 1130.) “In determining whether there was prejudice, the entire record should be examined, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict.” (Ibid.) C. Analysis At the threshold, we find that Lira testified about RTS. RTS is not a scientific concept trapped in amber. Ten years after the original study on RTS was published, California’s Supreme Court observed cases in which “the alleged rapist has suggested to the jury that some conduct of the victim after the incident—for example, a delay in reporting the sexual assault—is 43 inconsistent with her claim of having been raped, and evidence on rape trauma syndrome has been introduced to rebut such an inference by providing the jury with recent findings of professional research on the subject of a victim’s reaction to sexual assault.” (People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247, italics added.) The court endorsed the use of such evidence for that narrow purpose (while rejecting the use of such evidence to prove that the victim had actually been raped.) (Compare id. at pp. 247–248 to id. at p. 251). In doing so, the court emphasized that RTS “is an ‘umbrella’ concept, reflecting the broad range of emotional trauma experienced by clients of rape counselors” that was subject to being updated by “ongoing studies.” (Id. at p. 250; see id. at p. 241, fn. 4.) In short, an expert’s testimony on RTS is not limited to the original study or its findings; indeed, we would expect a qualified expert to discuss the latest research about the subject and the expert’s experience working with clients. (Cf. People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1161 [testimony on RTS is competent but disputable “expert opinion” about how victims respond to trauma not “scientific” evidence reliable enough to prove a rape occurred].) Here, Lira stated that her primary testimony “[m]ore or less” described RTS. She clarified that the term “syndrome” has become disfavored because of the potential stigma it attaches to victims, who “are behaving normally in an abnormal situation.” She further affirmed that the range of emotional responses during the acute stage of RTS were “consistent” with her testimony during direct examination. When pressed about the original study describing RTS, Lira explained that “[t]he science has evolved since then,” hence “a lot of [her] education and training has been more focused on what is called the neurobiology of the trauma.” (Italics added.) But despite advancements in neurobiology yielding “a better understanding of how the brain reacts to 44 trauma,” recent research and trainings have “the same concepts” as the original RTS study and trainings. We are convinced the exchange was merely a semantic debate instigated by defense counsel repeatedly asking Lira about “the original report on Rape Trauma Syndrome.” Lira did not repudiate RTS by saying experts in the field now disfavor the term “syndrome” or by testifying that further research has updated experts’ understanding of the emotional responses caused by trauma and exhibited by clients of rape counselors. As Mendez acknowledges, Bench Note to CALCRIM No. 1192 for testimony on rape trauma syndrome states, “The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if an expert testifies on rape trauma syndrome.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 1192.) Mendez does not challenge the propriety of the Bench Note. Therefore, because we find Lira testified on RTS, the instruction was warranted. We also find that the jury instructions and Lira’s testimony adequately defined RTS for the jury. As read to the jury, CALCRIM No. 1192 provides that “[r]ape trauma syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in rape cases.” Lira explained that RTS—as described by the original study—was “a diagnosis” comprised of three stages, and she explained the pattern of behavior that rape counselors identify as symptoms of RTS.10 10 Mendez correctly states the proposition that “a trial court has a sua sponte duty to define for the jury any term having a technical meaning peculiar to the law.” But RTS is not a legal term of art and Mendez cites no authority holding that it is. Rather, RTS is “an ‘umbrella terminology’ ” for a range of clinical observations. (People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 241, fn. 4.) In any event, the term was defined for the jury.

45 Even assuming the trial court erred by giving the instruction, we find any error harmless. Mendez asserts that the instruction made it appear that Lira’s testimony based on “neurobiology” had “a settled scientific basis, known to the courts and routinely accepted in rape cases.” We do not see how that is a reasonable reading of the instruction either in isolation or in context of the entire instructions and record. Regarding experts generally, the court instructed the jurors: “You must consider the opinions but are not required to accept them as true or correct. The meaning and importance of any opinion are for you to decide. In evaluating the believability of an expert witness, follow the instructions about the believability of witnesses, generally. In addition, consider the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, training and education, the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate.” CALCRIM No. 1192 does not contradict that instruction or otherwise imply there is a scientific consensus regarding RTS. We reject Mendez’s bald assertion that CALCRIM No. 1192 “directed jurors to excuse otherwise unexplained prosecution witness inconsistencies and failings.” The prosecution’s closing argument did not overstate the scientific consensus regarding RTS or even use the term. The prosecutor summarized Lira’s testimony as “about victim dynamics and behavior” and argued that Lira’s testimony explains the five victim-witnesses’ behavior and inability to recall certain details. Mendez does not argue that the prosecutor made an improper argument. And the jury did not need to accept Lira’s testimony or the prosector’s argument that her testimony about victims generally applied to the victims in the instant case. Accordingly, we conclude there is not a 46 reasonable probability the result would have been more favorable to Mendez had the jury not been instructed on CALCRIM No. 1192. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130.) IV. Mendez Fails to Show Prejudicial Error Caused by Instructing the Jury on CALCRIM No. 3261 Mendez argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the escape rule as to the kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and sexual penetration by a foreign object charges because it was inapplicable and confused the jury. He further contends that “[h]ad jurors not been instructed that both sexual offense and kidnapping continue throughout the evening outing it is not unlikely that a juror would have found either or both the initial and subsequent asportations of the victim were not accompanied by the requisite felonious intent.” We find any error harmless. The escape rule originated in the context of the felony murder rule. (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 341.) The concept is straightforward: whether a murder was committed in the commission of a felony is not a strictly causal or temporal inquiry; rather, the operative question is whether there is “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the felony and murder were part of one continuous transaction.” (Wilkins, at p. 340.) That inquiry inexorably raises another question: what defines “one continuous transaction.” The “escape rule” provides part of the answer: The endpoint of a transaction for purposes of determining whether a certain act has occurred “in the commission of” a felony is demarcated by when the perpetrator has reached a temporary place of safety after completing the felony. (Id. at pp. 344–345.) It is established that where the Legislature has drafted Penal Code statutes with the phrase “in the commission of,” courts presume the 47 Legislature intended to incorporate the same meaning as the phrase has in the felony murder context. (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1307; see also Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 341, and cases cited; People v. Calles (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1222 [“ ‘ “[I]n the commission of” has been given an expansive, not a tailored meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[I]n the commission of” is not the same as “while committing,” “while engaged in,” or “in pursuance.” ’ ”].) CALCRIM No. 3261 defines the escape rule, and therefore should be given “whenever the evidence raises an issue over the duration of the felony and another instruction given to the jury has required some act “during the commission or attempted commission” of the felony.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3261, citing Wilkins, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 347–348.) But the Bench Notes caution that “[t]he instruction should not be given if the issue is when the defendant formed the intent to aid and abet a robbery or a burglary.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3261.) And as explained above, while the escape rule is related to the continuous transaction doctrine, it is not applicable where the issue is when the commission of a crime began. We review the asserted instructional error de novo. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.) Here, the trial court instructed the jury on a modified form of CALCRIM No. 3261, dropping the first paragraph of the pattern instruction, which states: “The People must prove that <insert allegation, e.g., the defendant personally used a firearm> while committing [or attempting to commit] <insert felony or felonies>.” The modified instruction merely stated that kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and sexual 48 penetration by foreign object “continue[] until the perpetrator has reached the place of temporary safety” and defined “a place of temporary safety.” Immediately after giving the modified escape rule instruction, the court stated that if the jury found Mendez guilty of counts 2–6—which consisted of three courts of forcible rape and two counts of forcible oral copulation—then it “must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on Stephanie during the commission of that crime.” During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Stephanie had suffered great bodily injury during the commission of the crimes as evidenced by the bruising on her neck from Mendez strangulating her during the sexual assault. The People concede that “there was no other act that was alleged to have occurred in the commission of the sexual penetration by a foreign object or kidnapping offenses, [so] there was no need to instruct the jury that both crimes ‘continue[d] until the perpetrator ha[d] reached a place of temporary safety.’ ” We agree with this assessment. We generally presume that jurors understand, correlate, and duly follow the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Dejesus-Galindo (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 692, 701.) Here, however, the escape rule instruction concerning kidnapping and sexual penetration by a foreign object did not correlate to any other instruction or to any allegation. The instruction was surplusage and there was no need to give it. The instruction was also inappropriate to give on the other sexual offenses. The alleged great bodily injury was (at least one of) Mendez’s thrice strangulations of Stephanie—the first occurred before he had completed any act of forcible rape or copulation, and the other two occurring at unspecified times during the sexual assaults. The People argue that the instruction was 49 properly given on the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation charges “because the evidence raised an issue over the duration of the rapes and oral copulations against Stephanie”; but even if the duration of the sex crimes was unclear, it does not follow that the instruction was properly given. No evidence or argument suggested that a great bodily injury occurred after the completion of the sexual offenses, and therefore the escape rule was not necessary to determining whether great bodily injury occurred “in the commission” of the sexual offenses. At most, the issue was whether the great bodily injury occurred before the sexual offenses began, and “[t]he [escape rule] instruction should not be given” in such a situation. (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3261.) Nonetheless, such an error is generally not “of federal constitutional dimension.” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Therefore, the error is “subject to the traditional Watson test” for prejudice, and “reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.” (Id. at p. 1130; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) “Under Watson, reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.” (Guiton, at p. 1130.) “In determining whether there was prejudice, the entire record should be examined, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict.” (Ibid.) However, Mendez argues that the modified instruction deprived him of due process on the grounds that it contravened the instructions on the mental state element of kidnapping to commit rape. Specifically, Mendez contends that the modified instruction told jurors that the “act” of the alleged kidnappings “was spread over an indeterminate period of time” and thereby 50 “muddled and diminished the prosecution’s duty to show a nexus of crime and intent.” Put differently, Mendez asserts it is “not unlikely” that the jury believed he formed an intent to rape after the act of kidnapping (or at least, transporting) Stephanie and Jorga, yet the jury found Mendez guilty of kidnapping to commit rape because of the modified CALCRIM No. 3261 instruction. We are not persuaded the instruction conflicted with or altered the requisite mental state of the kidnapping to commit rape (or any other) offense. Again, we presume that the jurors understood, correlated, and duly followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Dejesus-Galindo, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.) Here, the jury was properly instructed that kidnapping to commit rape, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and sexual penetration by foreign object are specific intent crimes. Then the jury was properly instructed that to find Mendez guilty of those crimes, it must find “not only [did Mendez] intentionally commit the prohibited act but [he] must [have done] so with specific intent.” The modified CALCRIM No. 3261 instruction did not contradict those instructions or even mention intent. And the prosecutor later reiterated that kidnapping to commit rape is a specific intent crime, requiring that Mendez “took Stephanie, . . . [and] took Jorga . . . with the intent to commit a sexual offense.” There were no conflicting instructions regarding the mental states of the offense. Therefore, we evaluate prejudice under the Watson standard. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) Viewing the instructions as a whole and in light of the arguments of the parties, we conclude it is not reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to Mendez had the error not occurred. (Ibid.) The instruction stated that the crimes of kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and sexual penetration by foreign object “continues 51 until the perpetrator has reached the place of temporary safety.” (Italics added.) Something only “continues” if it already began. This understanding is confirmed by the dictionary definition of “continue,” which is “to maintain without interruption a condition, course, or action.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. (July 2026) https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/continue. [as of July 16, 2026].) We again acknowledge that the trial court modified the instruction by not instructing the jury on the first paragraph of the pattern instruction, which expressly ties the alleged aggravating act to a base crime. But we do not believe this “left jurors with a new, and far more expansive form of kidnapping and a new and far more expansive form of sexual offense.” Since the jury was correctly instructed that it must find Mendez specifically intended to commit the kidnapping with the intent to rape to find him guilty, we fail to see how an irrelevant instruction on how long such a crime continues would impact the jury’s determination that the crime occurred at all. Moreover, the evidence that Mendez forcibly asported Stephanie and Jorga with the intent to commit rape was strong. (See ante fn. 7.) As to Stephanie, Mendez hid her phone during the drive, which gave him a pretense to coax Stephanie outside the car. A reasonably inference is that he had planned to do so when he reached a suitable destination to rape her. As to Jorga, Mendez encouraged her to drink and try his THC pen before and throughout the asportation and the topic of sex came up while Mendez was driving Jorga away from her hometown against her stated wishes. A reasonable inference is that Mendez had planned to lower her inhibitions for the purpose of raping her after he kidnapped her. Also, the jury found Mendez guilty of sexual offenses against three other women, entitling the 52 jury to consider whether Mendez was disposed to commit sexual offenses. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a); People v. Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1161.) And the parallels between the alleged offenses against are different victims were striking. Other than his crimes against Hayleigh—who Mendez assaulted in his car just outside her home—Mendez drove each victim to an isolated location before he coerced and cajoled for sexual gratification. The trial court did not prejudicially err in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3261. * * * The People ask this court to correct the typographical error on the information and verdict forms referring to subdivision (d)(1) of section 667.61 instead of subdivision (d)(2) as the aggravated kidnapping circumstances related to Stephanie and Jorga. Because there is no evidence or reason to believe that Mendez was misled or to question that the verdict ultimately returned can be understood only as evidencing the jury’s determination to convict Mendez of the aggravated kidnapping circumstances, we deem the error harmless and correctable on appeal. (People v. Curley (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 732, 734, fn. 1; People v. Escarcega (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 853, 858.) The trial court shall correct these errors on the verdict form on remand. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187 [on its own motion, appellate court may order clerical errors corrected]; People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 369–370 [trial court properly modified verdict form to correctly reflect elements of relevant sentence enhancement].) DISPOSITION We direct the trial court to correct the verdict form for counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, and 16 by striking the reference to section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1)

53 and replacing it with a citation to the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

54 _________________________ Sweet, J.* WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Streeter, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Goldman, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Marin, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.