Consumer Advocacy Group v. Walmart CA2/8

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 Consumer Advocacy Group v. Walmart CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CONSUMER ADVOCACY B336080 (Consol. with B338937, GROUP, INC., B339083, B340687, B341210)

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV21493) v. WALMART INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

[And four other cases.]

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of  Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. The Kroger Co. et al. (No. 19STCV25041); Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Food Land Market et al. (No. 19STCV18754 consol. with Nos. 19STCV35730 & 20STCV40297); Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Philippine Foodtrade Corp. et al. (23STCV03836); Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. et al. (No. 19STLC08619). Los Angeles County. Mark A. Young, Jon R. Takasugi, Thomas D. Long, and Barbara M. Scheper, Judges. Reversed and remanded. Yeroushalmi & Yeroushalmi and Reuben Yeroushalmi for Plaintiff and Appellant. Alston & Bird, Gregory S. Berlin, and Tracy Yao for Defendants and Respondents Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC. Greenberg Traurig, Willis M. Wagner, Karin L. Bohmholdt, and Alexandra L. Lizano for Defendants and Respondents The Kroger Co., The Kroger Co. of Michigan, Foods Co., and Santa Maura Spice and Garlic Co., Inc. Fisher & Phillips, Alden J. Parker, and David Witkin for Defendant and Respondent Landau Uniforms, Inc. Teraoka & Partners, Steven Garrett, and Steve Teraoka for Defendant and Respondent JFC International, Inc. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and Garth N. Ward for Defendants and Respondents Miravalle Foods, Inc. and Bodega Latina Corporation. Tucker Ellis, Matthew I. Kaplan, and Anna-Sophie Tirre for Defendants and Respondents Philippine Foodtrade Corp., Shun Fat Supermarket Inc., Tran’s Family, Inc., SF Supermarket, Inc., and Aesquivel International Corp. Rogers Joseph O’Donnell and James Robert Maxwell for Defendants and Respondents Williams Sonoma, Inc., Trader Joe’s Company, and Trader Joe’s East, Inc. _________________________________ 2 INTRODUCTION These consolidated appeals arise out of a series of enforcement actions filed by appellant Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (CAG) against various respondents for alleged violations of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.5 et seq.), adopted by California voters as Proposition 65 (Proposition 65 or the Act).1 Before private individuals may bring an enforcement action in the public interest under Proposition 65, they must provide a 60-day notice to certain prosecuting agencies and the alleged violators. (§ 25249.7, subd. (d)(1)–(2).) The trial court dismissed each action filed by CAG on the ground that CAG’s presuit notices failed to comply with the regulations implementing Proposition 65, which require that the notice include the contact information of “a responsible individual within the noticing entity.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 27, § 25903, subd. (b)(2)(A)(1) (section 25903).) Consistent with recent case law addressing this issue, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the actions because 1 CAG brought its enforcement actions against: (1) Walmart Inc., Wal-Mart.com USA LLC, Landau Uniforms, Inc., and JFC International, Inc. (the “Walmart case”); (2) The Kroger Co., The Kroger Co. of Michigan, and Foods Co. (the “Kroger case”); (3) Santa Maura Spice and Garlic Co., Inc., Bodega Latina Corporation, d/b/a El Super, and Food Land Market et al. (the “Santa Maura case”); (4) Williams Sonoma, Inc., Trader Joe’s Company, and Trader Joe’s East, Inc. (the “Williams Sonoma case”); and (5) Philippine Foodtrade Corp., Shun Fat Supermarket Inc., Trans Family, Inc., d/b/a San Gabriel Superstore, and Aesquivel International Corp. (the “Philippine case”) (collectively, Respondents).

3 CAG’s notices substantially complied with section 25903 by providing the contact information for retained counsel. We further conclude that the certificates of merit attached to CAG’s notices complied with the requirement that the person executing the certificate state that he or she “consulted with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the alleged exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 3101, subd. (b) (section 3101).) We accordingly reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. CAG’s presuit notices At issue in these consolidated appeals are five lawsuits brought by CAG in the public interest for alleged violations of Proposition 65. Prior to filing suit, CAG served each of Respondents, along with various prosecuting agencies, with a notice entitled “SIXTY-DAY NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE FOR VIOLATION OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER AND TOXIC ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986.” The notices asserted that certain consumer products made, distributed, or sold by Respondents contained listed chemicals that were known to cause cancer, developmental toxicity, or reproductive toxicity, and that Respondents failed to provide a warning to consumers in violation of Proposition 65. Each notice provided in substantially similar form that: “Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (‘CAG’), the noticing entity, located at 9903 Santa Monica Boulevard #225, Beverly Hills, California 90212, serves this Notice of Violation (‘Notice’) on the Above Listed Entities (‘Violators’) pursuant to and in compliance with Proposition 65. Violators may contact CAG concerning this 4 Notice through its designated person [within the entity], its attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi, 9100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 240W, Beverly Hills, CA 90212, telephone no. (310) 623-1926, facsimile no. (310) 623-1930.”2 Each notice further identified CAG as a California-based organization “dedicated to protecting the [consumer] environment, improving human health, and supporting environmentally sound [commercial] practices.” Each notice also attached a certificate of merit signed by CAG’s attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi, along with a summary of Proposition 65. 2. The Walmart case (case No. 22STCV21493) In 2022, CAG filed suit against Walmart Inc., Wal-Mart.com Inc., Landau Uniforms, Inc., and JFC International, Inc. These defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that CAG’s presuit notice failed to comply with section 25903 because the notice provided the contact information of CAG’s outside counsel rather than an individual “within the noticing entity.” The trial court granted the motion, ruling that section 25903 required strict compliance with its notice provisions, and that CAG’s notice was insufficient because its outside counsel was not an individual “within the noticing entity.” On January 19, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Walmart Inc., Wal-Mart.com Inc., Landau Uniforms 2 While the majority of the notices provided that CAG may be contacted “through its designated person, its attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi,” some notices stated that CAG may be contacted “through its designated person within the entity, its attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi.” This slight difference in language is not relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal.

5 Inc., and JFC International, Inc., and dismissed the action without leave to amend. 3. The Kroger case (case No. 19STCV25041) In 2019, CAG filed suit against The Kroger Co., The Kroger Co. of Michigan, and Foods Co. In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, these defendants similarly argued that CAG’s presuit notice was defective because it did not identify a responsible individual “within the noticing entity” as required by section 25903, and instead identified outside counsel. These defendants further asserted that the notice was defective because CAG failed to serve it on the San Diego County District Attorney. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that CAG’s notice did not strictly or substantially comply with section 25903 because its outside counsel did not meet the definition of an individual “within the noticing entity.” In its ruling, the court did not address the argument that CAG’s notice was also defective because it was not served on the San Diego County District Attorney. On March 28, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of The Kroger Co., The Kroger Co. of Michigan, and Foods Co., and dismissed the action without leave to amend. 4. The Santa Maura case (case No. 19STCV18754) In 2019, CAG filed suit against Bodega Latina Corporation, and later added Santa Maura Spice and Garlic Co. as a defendant in the action. These defendants also moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that (1) CAG’s notice did not identify a responsible individual “within the noticing entity” as required by 6 section 25903, and (2) CAG failed to serve the notice on the San Diego County District Attorney.3 In granting the motion, the trial court ruled that the notice provisions of section 25903 mandated strict compliance, and that CAG’s presuit notice did not satisfy this standard because its attorney was not an individual “within the noticing entity.” The court did not rule on the argument regarding the lack of service on the San Diego County District Attorney because the defendants did not properly include this issue in its notice of motion. On March 19, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Santa Maura Spice and Garlic Co., Inc. and Bodega Latina Corporation, and dismissed the action without leave to amend. 5. The Williams Sonoma case (case No. 19STLC08619) In 2019, CAG filed suit against Williams Sonoma, Inc., Trader Joe’s Company, and Trader Joe’s East, Inc. In moving for judgment on the pleadings, these defendants likewise argued that CAG’s presuit notice failed to comply with section 25903 because it did not identify the contact information of a responsible individual “within the noticing entity.” The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the notice requirements of section 25903 must be strictly construed, and that CAG’s notice was noncompliant because its attorney was not an individual “within the noticing entity.” On August 1, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Williams 3 In its original motion, Santa Maura Spice and Garlic Co. further argued that CAG’s notice did not sufficiently allege the name of each listed chemical involved in the alleged violation, but later withdrew that argument.

7 Sonoma, Inc., Trader Joe’s Company, and Trader Joe’s East, Inc., and dismissed the action without leave to amend. 6. The Philippine case (case No. 23STCV03836) In 2023, CAG filed suit against Philippine Foodtrade Corp., Shun Fat Supermarket Inc., and Trans Family, Inc., and later amended its complaint to add Aesquivel International Corp. as a defendant in the action. These defendants then brought a demurrer to the complaint on the basis that CAG’s presuit notice was defective because it did not provide the contact information of a responsible individual “within the noticing entity” as required by section 25903. The defendants also argued that the certificate of merit attached to CAG’s notice was defective because it stated that its attorney consulted with “at least one person” with the relevant experience or expertise (rather than with “one or more persons”), who reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding “the exposure” to the listed chemical (rather than “the alleged exposure”). The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that CAG failed to provide the defendants with legally sufficient presuit notices and certificates of merit, which were “mandatory prerequisites to filing a Proposition 65 action.” On June 27, 2024, the trial court entered an order dismissing CAG’s action against Philippine Foodtrade Corp., Shun Fat Supermarket Inc., Trans Family, Inc., and Aesquivel International Corp. 7. CAG’s appeals CAG filed a timely notice of appeal in each of its actions against Respondents. This court consolidated the appeals for all purposes.

8 DISCUSSION 1. Overview of Proposition 65 Proposition 65 prohibits businesses from exposing consumers to chemicals known by the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first providing a clear and reasonable warning. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.6.) Violators may be enjoined by the court and liable for civil penalties of up to $2,500 per day for each violation. (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Actions to enforce Proposition 65 may be brought by the state Attorney General, by a district attorney, or by a city attorney of a city with a population in excess of 750,000. (Id., subd. (c).) A private citizen may bring an enforcement action in the public interest provided that: (1) the citizen first gives notice to the alleged violator, the Attorney General, and the district attorneys and city attorneys in the jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred; and (2) at least 60 days have passed without a prosecuting agency commencing an action. (Id., subd. (d)(1)–(2).) For consumer product exposures in violation of Health and Safety Code section 25249.6, the notice “shall include a certificate of merit executed by the attorney for the noticing party, or by the noticing party, if the noticing party is not represented by an attorney. The certificate of merit shall state that the person executing the certificate has consulted with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action, and that, based on that information, the person executing the certificate believes there is a reasonable and meritorious case for the private action.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, subd. (d)(1).)

9 The Governor designated the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) as the lead agency to implement Proposition 65. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 27, § 25102, subd. (o).) “Because the statute provides relatively little definition of the notice requirements,” OEHHA adopted regulations to specify the requirements for the 60-day presuit notices. (OEHHA, Final Statement of Reasons, Adopt Section 12903, Notices of Violation, Tit. 22, Div. 2, Cal. Code Regs. (1996) pp. 2–3 (Final Statement of Reasons on Notices).) These regulations are set forth in section 25903. Section 25903, subdivision (a), provides: “For purposes of Section 25249.7(d) of the Act, ‘notice of the violation which is the subject of the action’ (hereinafter ‘notice’) shall mean a notice meeting all requirements of this section. No person shall commence an action to enforce the provisions of the Act ‘in the public interest’ pursuant to Section 25249.7(d) of the Act except in compliance with all requirements of this section.” Section 25903, subdivision (b), describes the required contents of the notice, stating: “A notice shall provide adequate information from which to allow the recipient to assess the nature of the alleged violation, as set forth in this paragraph. The provisions of this paragraph shall not be interpreted to require more than reasonably clear information, expressed in terms of common usage and understanding, on each of the indicated topics.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Subdivision (b) further provides that the notice “shall identify: [¶] (1) the name, address, and telephone number of the noticing individual or a responsible individual within the noticing entity and the name of the entity; [¶] (2) the name of the alleged violator or violators; [¶] (3) the approximate time period during which the violation is alleged 10 to have occurred; and [¶] (4) the name of each listed chemical involved in the alleged violation.” (Id., subd. (b)(2)(A).) 2. Standard of review An appellate court reviews de novo a ruling sustaining a demurrer or granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Sproul v. Vallee (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 285, 292–293.) “ ‘ “[W]e treat the properly pleaded allegations of [the] complaint as true, and also consider those matters subject to judicial notice.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 293.) The determination of whether a Proposition 65 presuit notice complies with statutory requirements is also subject to de novo review. (Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa’s, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 778, 793–794 (Pancho Villa’s).) 3. Requests for judicial notice Both CAG and Respondents request that this court take judicial notice of certain materials. CAG seeks judicial notice of: (1) 16 superior court decisions construing section 25903 in unrelated cases; (2) two final statements of reasons issued by OEHHA regarding Proposition 65; (3) a Senate Bill Analysis of Senate Bill No. 471, which amended Proposition 65 in 2001; (4) a brief filed by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in an unrelated appeal in 2004; and (5) two letters from the Attorney General in 1995 and 1997, respectively, to private individuals in unrelated matters. In addition, CAG and Respondents each seek judicial notice of a presuit notice that CAG served on an unrelated business that is not a party in any of the current appeals. We grant CAG’s request for judicial notice of the final statements of reasons issued by OEHHA regarding Proposition 65. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (b), (c), 459, subd. (a).) We decline to take judicial notice of the remaining materials because they are not relevant to our 11 resolution of these appeals. (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 790, fn. 4.) 4. CAG’s presuit notices complied with section 25903 On appeal, CAG argues that Proposition 65 does not require strict compliance with its notice provisions, and that even if it does, CAG’s presuit notices to Respondents strictly complied with section 25903 by providing the contact information for its retained counsel. Respondents assert that strict compliance with section 25903 is required, and that CAG’s presuit notices neither strictly nor substantially complied with the requirement that the notice identify “a responsible individual within the noticing entity.” (§ 25903, subd. (b)(2)(A)(1).) At the time the parties completed their initial briefing on appeal, no appellate court had decided whether a presuit notice satisfies section 25903, subdivision (b)(2)(A)(1), by providing the contact information for the noticing entity’s retained counsel rather than an individual “within the noticing entity.” However, since the parties filed their briefs, three appellate courts have considered this issue, and in each case, concluded that (1) section 25903 requires substantial compliance with its notice provisions, and (2) a presuit notice substantially complies with section 25903 by providing the contact information for the noticing entity’s retained attorney. (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 788; The Chemical Toxin Working Group, Inc. v. The Kroger Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 276, 282 (Kroger); The Chemical Toxin Working Group Inc. v. Best Naturals, Inc. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 818, 824–825 (Best Naturals).) We find the reasoning in these cases persuasive and reach the same conclusion here.

12 The first case to address the issue was Pancho Villa’s. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s Proposition 65 presuit notices were defective because they provided the contact information for the plaintiff’s “outside counsel” instead of a “ ‘responsible individual within’ ” the noticing entity. (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 793.) In reversing that ruling, the Fourth District concluded that substantial compliance is the governing test for Proposition 65’s notice requirements. (Id. at pp. 795–798.) The court reasoned that “three core functions” of the presuit notice, as set forth by the OEHHA, were to “(1) enable prosecuting agencies to ‘ “intelligently” ’ assess whether to investigate and to file an enforcement action on behalf of the public; (2) allow violators ‘an opportunity to cure the violation’ and ‘at least prevent the accrual of any further liability for penalties’; and (3) to ‘defin[e] the scope of the private person’s right to sue under the statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 795.) Because the failure to provide the contact information for “ ‘a responsible individual within the noticing entity’ ” does not defeat any of these objectives, the court determined that section 25903 is to be given directory, rather than mandatory, effect. (Ibid.) The court in Pancho Villa’s also observed that the OEHHA’s only comment on the requirement that the notice include the noticing entity’s contact information was that the “ ‘[i]dentification of the party giving the notice is needed to give the receiving parties an opportunity to contact the noticing party to resolve the issues raised in the notice and to identify who will be entitled to pursue a civil action.’ ” (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) The court reasoned that direct contact with the noticing entity’s principal “is not essential to promoting this purpose,” and “[i]ndeed, there is no ‘detailed and 13 specific’ mandate which requires or explains why contact must occur directly” between the noticing and noticed parties. (Ibid.) The court in Pancho Villa’s further concluded that the plaintiff’s presuit notice substantially complied with section 25903 by providing “the name and contact information for its outside counsel, rather than somebody ‘within’ the [plaintiff’s] organization.” (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 798–799.) As the court explained: “[P]roviding attorney contact information meets the OEHHA’s stated objective of ‘giv[ing] the receiving parties an opportunity to contact the noticing party to resolve the issues raised in the notice and to identify who will be entitled to pursue a civil action.’ By identifying outside counsel, [the plaintiff] provided ‘an opportunity’ for [the defendant] to contact [the plaintiff] through its counsel. The ability for [the plaintiff] to exchange information with [the defendant] turns on whether [the] designated contact person has sufficient knowledge of the alleged violation. His or her employment position does not affect whether that core objective is obtained.” (Id. at p. 799.) In Kroger, our colleagues in Division Three similarly held that a Proposition 65 presuit notice that provided the contact information for the plaintiff’s outside counsel, rather than an individual within the plaintiff’s organization, satisfied the notice requirements of section 25903. (Kroger, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 282.) Like the court in Pancho Villa’s, the Kroger court concluded that the doctrine of substantial compliance applies to section 25903, reasoning in relevant part: “[S]ection 25903, subdivision (b)(2), requires ‘adequate information from which to allow the recipient to assess the nature of the alleged violation’ and states ‘[t]he provisions of this paragraph shall not be 14 interpreted to require more than reasonably clear information, expressed in terms of common usage and understanding, on each of the indicated topics.’ … OEHHA also cautioned that ‘the proposed regulation is not intended to require that highly technical information be provided, to require disclosure of the evidence by which a violation will be proven, or to otherwise turn the notice requirement into a trap for the unwary.’ [Citation.] This language supports the conclusion that noncompliance … should be judged by whether the notice provides adequate information for prosecutors and the alleged violator to assess and address the alleged violation.” (Kroger, at p. 293.) The Kroger court further concluded that the plaintiff’s notice substantially complied with the objectives of section 25903 by “ ‘ “giv[ing] the receiving parties an opportunity to contact the noticing party to resolve the issues raised in the notice and to identify who will be entitled to pursue a civil action.” ’ ” (Kroger, at p. 297.) Most recently, in Best Naturals, the First District adopted the reasoning of Pancho Villa’s to hold that a Proposition 65 presuit notice substantially complied with the requirements of section 25903 by identifying the plaintiff’s outside counsel as the entity to be contacted. (Best Naturals, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 824–825.) In reaching its holding, the Best Naturals court also observed that the plaintiff’s notice “evoked no response” from the prosecuting agencies that received it, and that “[f]rom this silence can be deduced that not one of the recipients deemed the notice inadequate or misleading.” (Id. at p. 825.) We find the reasoning in Pancho Villa’s, Kroger, and Best Naturals persuasive, and likewise conclude that the doctrine of substantial compliance applies to the notice requirements of section 25903. We further conclude that CAG’s presuit notices to 15 Respondents substantially complied with section 25903 by providing the name, address, and telephone number of its retained counsel. By providing the contact information for CAG’s retained counsel, the notices met section 25903’s objective of “giv[ing] the receiving parties an opportunity to contact the noticing party to resolve the issues raised in the notice and to identify who will be entitled to pursue a civil action.” (Final Statement of Reasons on Notices, supra, at p. 8; see Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 799; Kroger, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 297.) Indeed, CAG’s notices specifically stated that the alleged violators “may contact CAG concerning this Notice through its designated person, its attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi.” In a supplemental brief filed after Pancho Villa’s was issued, Respondents argue that Pancho Villa’s conflicts with the strict compliance tests articulated in Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1 (Prang). In Prang, Division Two of this district held that it could be inferred the Legislature intended a statute’s requirements to be followed precisely where “(1) ‘the Legislature has provided a detailed and specific mandate’ [citations], or (2) ‘the intent of [the] statute can only be served by demanding strict compliance with its terms.’ ” (Id. at p. 19.) Respondents assert that strict compliance is required if either of the Prang tests is satisfied, and that the first test is satisfied because section 25903 contains a “detailed and specific mandate.” However, this argument was recently rejected in Kroger. As the Kroger court explained, “although language in Prang suggests that either of its tests is independently sufficient to establish that strict compliance is required, the court only reached its conclusion in that case after 16 considering both. [Citation.] Indeed, the Prang court’s analysis of whether strict compliance was necessary to serve the intent behind the statute was far more in-depth than its analysis of whether there was a detailed and specific mandate.” (Kroger, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.) The Kroger court instead “agree[d] with the Pancho Villa’s court’s conclusion that strict compliance with subdivision (b)(2)(A)(1) is not necessary to effectuate the intent of section 25903.” (Ibid.) We agree with both the Kroger court and the Pancho Villa’s court that substantial compliance is the governing test for the notice requirements of section 25903. In their supplemental brief, Respondents also contend that, unlike the plaintiff in Pancho Villa’s, CAG intentionally chose not to comply with section 25903 in providing the contact information for their counsel so that CAG would not be contacted directly by the alleged violators. However, there is no indication that any of the plaintiffs in the above-cited cases unintentionally listed their attorney as the person to be contacted in their presuit notices. Rather, it appears the plaintiffs chose to provide their attorneys’ contact information so that any communications by the noticed parties or their counsel would be directed at the plaintiffs’ counsel. As the Pancho Villa’s court recognized, “counsel may, in fact, be in the best position to communicate about the alleged violation” because the certificate of merit must be signed by the noticing party’s attorney if the noticing party is represented. (Pancho Villa’s, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 799.) A retained attorney who consulted with experts regarding the details of the exposure and evaluated the merits of an enforcement action is “well positioned to communicate with alleged violators and public enforcers.” (Ibid.) Moreover, “irrespective of [the noticing 17 party’s] motivation in commencing the action, ‘ “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 800.) Additionally, it is not clear it would be appropriate to address questions of CAG’s intent in reviewing the pleadings-based motions at issue in these appeals. We accordingly conclude the trial court erred in dismissing CAG’s enforcement actions against Respondents on the ground that CAG’s presuit notices failed to comply with section 25903 by identifying a responsible individual within the noticing entity. 5. CAG’s certificates of merit in the Philippine case complied with section 3101 In their demurrer to CAG’s complaint, the defendants in the Philippine case also argued that CAG’s notices were defective because the attached certificates of merit did not comply with the requirements of section 3101. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court appeared to agree with the defendants’ argument, ruling that “CAG failed to provide legally sufficient pre-suit [notices of violation] and certificates of merit, mandatory prerequisites to filing a Proposition 65 action” (italics added). We conclude the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer on this additional ground. Section 3101 describes the required contents of a certificate of merit that must be attached to any presuit notice alleging a violation of Health and Safety Code section 25249.6. It provides that the certificate of merit “shall contain all of the following statements, and appear in the following form,” and sets forth five statements that must appear in the certificate, including: “I have consulted with one or more persons with relevant and 18 appropriate experience or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the alleged exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action.” (§ 3101, subd. (b).) CAG’s notices to the defendants in the Philippine case attached certificates of merit executed by its attorney, Reuben Yeroushalmi. In addition to the other required statements, each certificate of merit included the following sentence: “I have consulted with at least one person with relevant and appropriate experience or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action.” Respondents contend that this sentence does not strictly comply with section 3101 because it states that (1) the attorney consulted with “at least one person” rather than with “one or more persons,” and (2) the consulting expert reviewed facts, studies or other data regarding “the exposure” rather than “the alleged exposure.” We need not decide, however, whether section 3101 requires strict compliance because, even assuming that it does, CAG’s certificates of merit satisfied this standard. First, the phrase “at least one person,” as used in CAG’s certificates of merit, has the same meaning as the phrase “one or more persons,” as used in section 3101. Both phrases signify that the attorney executing the certificate met with one person, and possibly with more than one person, who has the relevant and appropriate experience or expertise. Second, the omission of the term “alleged” before the term “exposure” does not constitute a deviation from section 3101’s language or form requirements. Respondents claim that the failure to include the word “alleged” materially changes the meaning of the certification because CAG’s attorney is stating only that the consulting expert 19 “confirmed the chemicals at issue are toxic,” and not that “an exposure to the chemicals is occurring at all from use of the products in question.” We disagree. The attorney’s statement certifies that the consulting expert “reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action” (italics added). This language is consistent with the requirements of section 3101. It is also consistent with Health and Safety Code section 25249.7, which likewise does not include the term “alleged” before the term “exposure.” Rather, the statute provides that the certificate of merit “shall state that the person executing the certificate has consulted with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of the action.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.7, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) We therefore conclude the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer in the Philippine case on the ground that CAG’s certificates of merit were legally insufficient. 6. CAG’s lack of service on the San Diego County District Attorney In their motions for judgment on the pleadings, the defendants in the Kroger case and the Santa Maura case also asserted that CAG’s presuit notices were defective because CAG failed to serve the notices on the San Diego County District Attorney despite alleging that violations of Proposition 65 occurred in each county in California. The trial court did not address this argument in granting the motions, and instead based its ruling solely on CAG’s purported failure to comply with section 25903. On appeal, CAG concedes that the omission of the 20 San Diego County District Attorney from its service list means that it cannot recover civil penalties for violations that occurred within San Diego County, but contends that such omission does not render the notices void in their entirety. We agree. In Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 953, CAG mistakenly omitted the San Jose City Attorney from its service list for presuit notices alleging violations of Proposition 65. (Id. at p. 978.) The court of appeal concluded that the omission did not preclude CAG from pursuing an enforcement action for violations outside of the city of San Jose, reasoning: “CAG was required to give notice to ‘the Attorney General and the district attorney and any city attorney in whose jurisdiction the violation is alleged to occur … .’ CAG’s failure to serve the San Jose City Attorney therefore affects entities in that jurisdiction where the violation is alleged to have occurred and the public prosecutor was not properly noticed. It does not affect entities in other cities where the public prosecutor was properly noticed.” (Id. at pp. 978–979.) In this case, CAG’s failure to serve the San Diego County District Attorney affects entities within that jurisdiction, but does not make the entirety of CAG’s enforcement action subject to dismissal.

21 DISPOSITION The judgments of dismissal are reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the orders granting the motions for judgment on the pleadings in case Nos. 22STCV21493, 19STCV25041, 19STCV18754, and 19STLC08619, and the order sustaining the demurrer in case No. 23STCV03836, and to enter new orders denying the motions for judgment on the pleadings and overruling the demurrer. CAG shall recover its costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.