Dakota Note v. Teymourian CA1/5

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 Dakota Note v. Teymourian CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DAKOTA NOTE LLC, Cross-complainant and Respondent, A169034 v. GAIL SUZANNE MARIE (San Mateo County TEYMOURIAN et al., Super. Ct. No. 22-CIV-04679) Cross-defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Gail Suzanne Marie Teymourian and her husband Nariman Teymourian appeal from a judgment entered against them pursuant to a settlement agreement and stipulation. The Teymourians insist the settlement agreement was unenforceable because bankruptcy court approval was not obtained as purportedly required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 9019. We disagree and affirm.

The Teymourians borrowed more than $28 million from Dakota Note LLC, Natural Software Systems, Inc. Money Purchase Pension Plan, 1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to Standard 8.1 of the California Standards of Judicial Administration, and the First Appellate District Local Rules, rule 19.

1 Tanya Waltimyer, Jason Greenfield, and 5 Palms, LLC (collectively Dakota lenders) between 2018 and April 2022. In November 2022, the Teymourians sued the Dakota lenders for usury and other causes of action that sought to enjoin foreclosure proceedings against multiple real properties securing the loans. In March 2023, the Dakota lenders filed a cross-complaint, alleging the Teymourians’ default on the loans and seeking foreclosure.

In April 2023, Gail filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. After the automatic bankruptcy stay was terminated by operation of law and a foreclosure sale had been completed with respect to one real property, the Teymourians and Dakota lenders entered a settlement agreement and release, in June 2023, which resolved all the disputes between them in exchange for the Teymourians’ payment of $6 million in installments plus interest. The parties further stipulated to entry of judgment in the amount of $6 million plus interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees in the event of an uncured default by the Teymourians, and authorized entry of that judgment by way of ex parte application.

The settlement agreement further states: “The Parties acknowledge that due to the pendency of the Chapter 11 Case, the settlement embodied in this Agreement is conditioned upon approval of the Bankruptcy Court, insofar as it applies to Gail Teymourian, and any property of her bankruptcy estate.” The agreement specifically requires the Teymourians to file a motion for approval in Gail’s bankruptcy case, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019,2 no later than June 21, 2023, which was to be heard no later than July 20, 2023. The Teymourians did not do so; Gail filed a late motion for bankruptcy court approval but then withdrew it. Nor did the Teymourians pay any of the $6 million. On July 20, 2023, Gail’s bankruptcy case was dismissed with prejudice.

In superior court, the Dakota lenders filed the stipulation and an ex parte application for entry of judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 2 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a) provides: “On the trustee’s motion and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”

2 section 664.6. The trial court granted the ex parte application and entered judgment against the Teymourians for $6,502,375 (including interest, attorney fees, and costs).

On appeal from the judgment, the Teymourians contend the settlement agreement is unenforceable because, in purported violation of Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9019, approval of the bankruptcy court was not obtained. We have reviewed the issue de novo but affirm because the Teymourians wholly fail to meet their burden to demonstrate error and are wrong on the law. (See Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1032 [standard of review].)

First, the Teymourians have forfeited their argument on appeal. As an appellate court, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. The appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443; Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598.) To do so, the appellant must provide an adequate record (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348) along with reasoned and intelligible legal argument supported by references to the record and pertinent authority. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B)-(C).)

Here, the Teymourians fail to address the merits of their appeal in a meaningful way. They make a conclusory argument that the settlement agreement “is not enforceable until [bankruptcy] court approval is obtained.” Although they cite Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 and two federal district court opinions “addressing issues concerning the binding nature of a signed settlement agreement before obtaining bankruptcy court approval”—they fail to explain how this authority conflicts with the trial court’s judgment. The plain language of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 only provides the bankruptcy court with authority to approve a settlement; it does not contain any relevant prohibition. In fact, the Teymourians acknowledge “the signed agreement may be binding on the debtor pending court approval . . . .” Accordingly, the Teymourians forfeit their argument on appeal by failing to articulate a reasoned argument, 3 supported by legal authority and citations to the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B)-(C); Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)

Second, the Teymourians are wrong as a matter of contract law. It is well established that “[a] person cannot take advantage of his or her own act or omission to escape liability; if the person prevents or makes impossible the performance or happening of a condition precedent, the condition is excused.” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2026) Contracts, § 846; accord, Rains v. Arnett (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 337, 347.) The Teymourians do not dispute that Gail prevented the bankruptcy court from hearing the approval motion.3 Accordingly, they cannot show error because, in this situation, the contract remains enforceable by the innocent party against the delinquent party. (Vineland Homes, Inc. v. Barish (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 747, 759; accord, Cummings v. Beaton & Assocs. (Ill. 1992) 249 Ill.App.3d 287, 306-309 [applying same rule to case involving bankruptcy approval condition].)

We need not address the parties’ additional arguments.

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Dakota Note LLC is entitled to its costs on appeal.

Burns, J.

WE CONCUR:

Jackson, P. J. Simons, J.

A169034/Teymourian v. Dakota Note LLC 3 It is also undisputed that, since Gail’s bankruptcy case has been dismissed, there is no longer any bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3); Valencia v. Rodriguez (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227.)