In re J.J. CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 In re J.J. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.J., a Person Coming B348009 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03382A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.J., Defendant and Appellant;

B.R., Objector and Respondent. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Cristina G. Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions; order terminating jurisdiction vacated. Joseph D. MacKenzie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Respondent B.R.

__________________________________________ In this juvenile dependency appeal, I.J. (father) challenges three juvenile court orders. Father challenges the scope of a permanent restraining order, the denial of his motion to dismiss the underlying Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition,1 and the summary denial of his section 388 petition, which sought to dissolve the permanent restraining order entirely. We conclude substantial evidence does not support the inclusion of M.P. (father’s son’s half sibling) as a protected person in the challenged restraining order. Although we find no error with the juvenile court’s denial of father’s motion to dismiss the section 300 petition, we conclude the court abused its discretion in denying father’s section 388 petition without a hearing. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. We also vacate the order terminating jurisdiction.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 BACKGROUND 1. The Family Father and B.R. (mother) dated for nine months in high school. They have one child together, a son, J.J. (son). Mother has one younger child from a different relationship, M.P. (half sister), who initially was named in the proceedings below, but ultimately was dismissed from the case. When the underlying proceedings began, son was six years old. Son and half sister lived with mother and her mother (maternal grandmother). Father lived with his girlfriend of five years. A March 2023 family law order was in place, which specified father had parenting time with son two days a week and alternating weekends. Son is autistic and has a speech delay. He has an Individualized Education Program (IEP) and qualifies for special education and language and speech therapy. He spoke his first word when he was three years old. Mother also has a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder and speech delay. 2. Events Preceding Petition In November 2022 and February 2023, when son was four years old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received two related referrals alleging father had sexually abused son and son was acting out and exhibiting sexualized behaviors. The Department concluded the initial November referral was “unfounded” and the February referral was “Evaluated Out” as a secondary referral. In September 2024, the Department received a new referral again alleging father had sexually abused son and son was exhibiting inappropriate behavior at home and at school. The following day, another similar referral was received. According to 3 the referrals, son recently had disclosed he was scared of father and did not want to visit him. Son stated that, during visits with father, father showered with him, touched son’s penis, “stuck a finger up [son’s] bottom,” “ ‘jiggles’ ” son’s bottom and says “ ‘booty, booty,’ ” and tells son to keep it a secret. It was also reported that son often said the word “ ‘booty’ ” and, at school, tried to kiss another boy, told others to spank him, and touched his penis inappropriately. Law enforcement was called. Son told the responding officer father had touched son’s penis and anus on two occasions and the “ ‘Bad-Touch’ ” was to be kept secret. The officer stated son “displayed the ability to reason through both” the concepts of right and wrong and truths and lies. The officer reported son “was visibly distraught, had tears forming in his eyes and covered himself with a blanket during” the interview, leading the officer “to believe [son] was genuine with his responses and possibly traumatized.” A detective who worked on the earlier referrals as well as on the September 2024 referrals noted while mother could articulate her thoughts, she needed time and usually asked for help. The detective stated maternal grandmother “really hated” father, would speak for mother even when asked not to, was “the driving force behind the [2022] alleged sexual abuse,” and made it difficult to speak with mother alone. Similarly, the social worker who had responded to the earlier referrals remembered mother had a “comprehension delay” and, as a result, maternal grandmother spoke for her. He said father had been cooperative. A Department social worker, Ms. Chen, responded to the September 2024 referrals. She spoke with father and his girlfriend. Father denied the allegations of sexual abuse. Son’s teacher had told father that son danced inappropriately (“shaking 4 his butt in class”) and one time pulled down his pants before he made it to the rest room. Both father and his girlfriend stated son would not tell them what he did at mother and maternal grandmother’s home. Son said “it’s a secret and that he’s not allowed to say anything about mother and [maternal grandmother].” Father believed mother and maternal grandmother were coaching son. Social worker Chen also spoke with mother and maternal grandmother together. Social worker Chen reported “mother would look to [maternal grandmother] to help her answer most of the questions” and maternal grandmother often spoke for mother. They confirmed the allegations contained in the referrals. Mother and maternal grandmother also each alleged father had sexually assaulted mother, which resulted in her pregnancy with son. Additionally, mother stated father had pushed her and grabbed her arms when she was pregnant. No criminal charges were brought against father, however, because law enforcement “didn’t find anything.” Social worker Chen spoke with son alone. Son was unable to answer questions as to the difference between the truth and a lie. It was unclear whether son understood the difference. Son refused to answer some questions, including whether father touched son’s penis, “put fingers in [son’s] butt,” and what “booty” meant. Son also met with another social worker, Ms. Velasquez. According to social worker Velasquez, son “appeared to understand” the difference between a truth and a lie. Each time she reminded son “about the truth and lie, he would think and not say anything.” Son refused to answer most questions, saying simply he did not like to go to father’s home and it was scary there.

5 In September 2024, son’s teacher reported son had been dancing inappropriately, which included “body rolls, like slow motion moving of his torso,” “shak[ing] his butt,” and one time almost pulling down his pants. The teacher was not sure if he needed to go to the rest room. Once, son asked another student to spank him and, at random times, son would say the word “booty” in class. Son had started to do these things a few weeks earlier and had not done them the year before. He seemed to do these things when he was excited about something. His teacher also reported she was able to communicate and have conversations with son. She said son had been “more emotional” recently, but she did not have concerns of abuse or neglect. A few weeks later, son’s teacher reported son’s behaviors had been “escalating.” He seemed more emotionally overwhelmed and had begun grabbing his genital area over his clothes. His teacher noted it “was not uncommon for students on the spectrum to do so as they are exploring that private area” and she had seen past students do the same. She stated son was “really good” at identifying and articulating his emotions and “what he needs.” Son underwent both a forensic medical exam and a forensic interview. The forensic medical exam report stated son gave “a clear disclosure of sexual abuse by . . . father.” Son stated “father touches his penis and ‘sticks his finger’ inside [son’s] anus.” Son also reported “ ‘white stuff, it looks like milk, come out of [father’s]’ (penis)” and that father watched “ ‘bad stuff’ ” at night, “ ‘Boys and girls kissing, they’re all naked.’ ” The medical examiner took an “anal swab” and asked son if “the feeling of the swab is the same as when [father] puts his finger in his butt.” Son replied, “ ‘No, bigger.’ ” Son said father told him to keep his actions a secret. Son’s anogenital exam was “within normal 6 limits,” which does not exclude sexual abuse. The remainder of the physical exam was normal. During the forensic interview, son refused to answer most questions. He sat and moved around in a chair, responding to questions with silence or by pointing to a body part, making gestures or noises, or stating he did not know the answer. When asked if someone put fingers somewhere in his body, son pointed to his butt and said “ ‘yah.’ ” He would not say who. When asked if he felt safe at father’s house, son shook his head no. When asked the same about mother’s house, he said “ ‘yah,’ ” but he refused to discuss what “safe” meant. He pointed to his penis when asked if he had “seen milk come out of someone’s body.” The interviewer reported son “demonstrated a limited understanding of the interview guidelines” but appeared to understand what truths and lies were. The interview was “difficult” because son was “anxious” and “really reluctant.” The interview ended prematurely because son refused to speak. The interviewer believed “there may be something that had happened to him because [son] did have a physical reaction to when she brought up the father and his father’s girlfriend’s names.” She noted, “Although [son] said only a few words throughout his interview, concerns remain due to [son] nodding and saying yes, pointing to his butt and penis, previously reporting that he saw ‘milk’ coming out of his father’s penis, denying that he felt safe at his dad’s house, and appearing anxious and restless when asked about the allegations.” Social worker Chen also spoke with maternal grandfather. He reported son “would wiggle his bottom and tries to pull down his pants in the playground area” and said father does those things. Maternal grandfather said son “has always been this 7 way” “ever since he was a baby” but now “they can understand him better.” He believed “the system had failed” mother and son. Maternal grandfather also reported sexual abuse in the maternal family, involving a maternal great uncle, maternal uncle, and mother. He said maternal grandmother’s brother (maternal great uncle) raped a maternal uncle, who later sexually abused mother. In a later interview, mother also mentioned this abuse. In October 2024, a meeting was held at Department offices with Department staff and members from both maternal and paternal families. During the meeting, both families accused the other of sexual abuse and not caring for son. The maternal family did not address the generational sexual abuse and how it might affect son. Maternal family members, especially maternal grandmother, had to be asked several times not to speak while others were speaking. There was “palpable tension in the room.” Department staff worried about how the families’ treatment and obvious dislike of each other affected son. 3. Petition In October 2024, the Department filed a three-count section 300 petition, on behalf of son and half sister (petition). The three counts were identical and brought under subdivisions (b), (d), and (j) of section 300. They alleged father had sexually abused son on multiple occasions, masturbated in front of son, exposed son to pornography, and told son to keep the sexual abuse a secret. The petition also alleged mother failed to protect son and both son and half sister were at risk as a result of mother’s and father’s conduct. At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court denied father visitation with son, and granted mother’s request for a temporary restraining order protecting her, son, and half 8 sister from father. Son was detained from father and released to mother, with whom he remained for the duration of the underlying proceedings. 4. Adjudication and Disposition In November 2024, another Department social worker, Ms. Gravett, spoke with son, who was “open and emotional.” Son stated everything he previously had said about father was true. He referred to father as “the monster” and said father’s girlfriend knew about the “bad touching.” Son was happy he was not seeing father anymore. Later, son also confirmed the sexual abuse to the investigating detective. When speaking with the detective, son used an apple to show how father touched his bottom. Son put his finger into the indentation on the top of the apple where the stem would be and said father touched like that, “ ‘In it.’ ” Mother told social worker Gravett that son was in therapy and was doing better but cried at night and was afraid of father. Mother explained that, when she first reported sexual abuse in 2022, son was younger and did not talk as much. In January 2025, maternal grandmother similarly told social worker Gravett that son had “ ‘been opening up for the last few months’ ” and “ ‘[a] lot of memories are coming up.’ ” Maternal grandmother reported son cried at night and called father “ ‘Monster.’ ” Social worker Gravett also spoke with father and his girlfriend. Both continued to deny the allegations and father reiterated his belief that maternal grandmother was coaching son. Father “was extremely emotional and crying” and stated he wanted more time with son and to co-parent. Father also spoke with the investigating detective to whom he repeated his belief that mother and her family “hate him” and are lying in order to obtain full custody of son and receive more money from the state 9 due to son’s disability. Father’s girlfriend said son was independent and did not appear scared when he visited. Son told her he was “ ‘not allowed to tell me what happens at his mom[’s] house.’ ” Social worker Gravett also spoke with paternal grandmother, who said the allegations were false and the maternal family told son what to say. She called maternal grandmother “evil.” She explained maternal grandmother and mother never wanted father in son’s life and mother “ ‘goes along with what [maternal grandmother] says.’ ” Paternal grandmother believed mother’s family was abusing the system. She was proud of father for being persistent and working to be in son’s life. The Department concluded it was “apparent” father had sexually abused son. The Department stated son had been “consistent in his statements despite having a speech delay due to his Autism.” He was visibly upset during several interviews and was scared of father. The Department stated son “has shown emotions while disclosing [the sexual abuse] that do not appear to be coached or fake.” A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held in January 2025. Social worker Chen testified. She stated she had interviewed son one time and did not find him reliable. Son was unable to answer her questions regarding the difference between the truth and a lie. She also was unsure if son was truthful during his forensic interview and had concerns that maternal grandmother might have coached son. Nonetheless, she explained the Department recommended sustaining the petition based on the forensic exam, forensic interview, and police report. She testified the “biggest difference” between the earlier 10 unfounded referral and the instant referral was son’s age, development, and improved speech. The juvenile court amended the petition by striking the subdivision (j) count related to sibling abuse, the allegations regarding mother’s failure to protect, and all references to half sister. Noting this was “a difficult case,” the court sustained the petition as amended. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found son described father’s “actions in a very consistent way,” especially given that son was “a six-year old on an IEP.” The court believed son acted out at school in the ways that he did “because that is what he is exposed to.” The court concluded son was not coached. Had there been coaching, the court believed son would have used more sophisticated words and would have alleged father committed more serious transgressions. The court declared son a dependent of the court and removed him from father’s custody and care. Son remained placed with mother under Department supervision. The court issued a permanent restraining order protecting mother, son, and half sister from father (January restraining order). The January restraining order did not allow for court-ordered visitation between father and son. The court ordered father to complete sex abuse counseling for perpetrators and to attend individual counseling. Although the court granted father monitored visits with son in a therapeutic setting, the court also ordered father to comply with active restraining orders, which did not allow for visits. 5. First Appeal Father appealed the court’s January 2025 orders. (In re J.J., B344838 (first appeal).) In his notice of appeal, father 11 stated he was appealing the January “Jurisdictional, Dispositional, and Restraining Order findings and orders.” In his opening brief, however, he challenged only the propriety of the January restraining order. Mother filed a motion to dismiss father’s first appeal because in August 2025, while the first appeal was pending, the juvenile court issued a new, superseding restraining order, which father also appealed and which is the subject of the instant appeal as discussed below. On January 7, 2026, we granted mother’s motion to dismiss father’s first appeal as moot. (In re J.J., B344838.) 6. Department’s July 2025 Report On July 15, 2025, in advance of the scheduled review hearing, the Department submitted its report for the court (July 2025 report). Son was participating in individual and family counseling as well as Regional Center services. The July 2025 report noted “a significant bond between mother and [son].” During the review period, yet another Department social worker, Ms. Perez, met with son several times. She reported son interacted well with her, was “social,” “makes friends easily,” and “has a very active imagination.” During a June 2025 session with son, social worker Perez became concerned son had been coached to say certain things. Without having been asked about father, son said he wanted to talk about “the ‘Bad touch’ ” and he wanted mother to be there. Before then, son had never discussed father with social worker Perez. Social worker Perez reported son’s statements that day “appeare[ed] somewhat rehearsed” and he “appear[ed] ‘matter of fact’ as he discussed the alleged sexual abuse with no show of emotion. In addition, while [son] discussed the alleged sexual abuse of his father, he looked at his mother and then stated, ‘My mom is the best mom in the whole world 12 and she takes good care of me and she loves me.’ ” Social worker Perez reported further, “[Son] expressing sexual abuse from his father at random times without being asked and stating that he did not remember because he was a baby sounded rehearsed and [son] appeared to be concentrating on what he was supposed to say to this CSW.” The Department reported “concerns about emotional competence of [son] due to potential coaching in regards to the sexual abuse allegations.” Father continued to believe maternal grandmother put false allegations in son’s head. Father said maternal grandmother wanted father out of son’s life. Father said he loved son, would not hurt him, and wanted to be involved in his life as his father. Father stated if the Department or court could “see the interactions between him and his son it would show that his son is not afraid of him.” However, the January restraining order prohibited contact between father and son. Thus, father had no visits with son and social worker Perez had not observed them together. Son did not want to visit father. Son “said he would feel ‘scared and anxiety’ ” about visiting with father. Father was participating in individual counseling. He was having difficulty enrolling in sex abuse counseling for perpetrators. He had completed a “Parents in Partnership Parent Orientation” and was open to attending parenting classes for fathers. The Department recommended the juvenile court terminate its jurisdiction with a final custody order granting the parents joint legal custody, sole physical custody to mother, and monitored visitation for father.

13 7. Father’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition and Request to Change Court Order On July 29, 2025, father filed a section 390 motion to set aside the jurisdictional findings and to dismiss the petition in the interests of justice (390 motion). Father argued the court erred in taking jurisdiction based on son’s statements because son did not know the difference between the truth and a lie, his statements were not reliable, he had been coached, and his developmental delays hindered his comprehension. Father claimed it was in the best interests of son to have father in his life and to be raised in a home without coaching. Finally, father argued he did not require treatment because he had not sexually abused son. Although in support of his motion father cited social worker Perez’s recent coaching concerns, father relied predominantly on statements and exhibits the court already had or could have considered. The next day, July 30, 2025, father filed a section 388 petition to change a court order (388 petition). Specifically, father asked the court to dissolve the January restraining order. Father based his request both on his position that the Department’s July 2025 report for the court contained “[n]ew evidence of coaching” as well as on his 390 motion. Father argued the court should grant his 388 petition because it was in son’s best interest “to have his Father involved in his life and for [son] to be raised in a home without coaching. Father has a thorough understanding of the needs of the child and desires to be engaged, active, and support his son’s needs.” 8. July 30, 2025 Review Hearing On July 30, 2025, the same day father filed his 388 petition, the juvenile court held a review hearing. After hearing argument, the court denied father’s 390 motion and summarily 14 denied father’s 388 petition without a hearing. The court stated neither was “appropriate timely or relevant at this time” and believed father’s recourse was “best served by an appeal.” The court found father was attempting to relitigate jurisdiction, stating, “Any additional information or additional pieces of evidence . . . that the father is using as part of his evidence in this motion he certainly has the right to raise that on his appeal and request that the appellate court augment the record or anything else like that. [¶] But this is not the forum.” Similarly, the court told father, “you have the ability to go to a different court and ask for any modifications. But it won’t be through this court.” The juvenile court concluded dependency jurisdiction was no longer needed and terminated its jurisdiction, ordering joint legal custody of son to mother and father and sole physical custody to mother. Father was granted monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting only. The court agreed to amend the January restraining order to allow for the ordered visitation. The court stayed termination of jurisdiction pending receipt of the final custody order. The final custody order was filed and jurisdiction terminated on August 1, 2025. Attached to the final custody order was the amended restraining order, which the court had entered that same day. The new restraining order continued to protect mother, son, and half sister from father but allowed for court-ordered visitation between father and son (August restraining order). 9. Instant Appeal Father appealed the juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 orders and August 1, 2025 final custody order.

15 DISCUSSION 1. August Restraining Order Father argues substantial evidence does not support the inclusion of mother and half sister as protected people in the August restraining order. Although mother agrees substantial evidence does not support the inclusion of half sister, mother argues substantial evidence supports the inclusion of her as a protected person in the August restraining order. The Department took no position on this issue. a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 213.5 permits a juvenile court to issue a restraining order enjoining a person from, among other things, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, harassing, or disturbing the peace of a child, a child’s parent, or other specified people. (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) “ ‘Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not require “evidence that the restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or battered the child.” [Citation.] Nor does it require evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.’ ” (In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.) Courts have held section 213.5 is analogous “to Family Code section 6340, which permits the issuance of a protective order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act in the first instance, if ‘failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner.’ ” (In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 194; see also In re N.L., supra, at p. 1466.) Mother and father agree the substantial evidence standard of review applies to our review of the August restraining order. (See In re N.L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465–1466.) “Under that standard ‘we view the evidence in a light most 16 favorable to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (Id. at p. 1466.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) b. Substantial evidence does not support the inclusion of half sister as a protected person in the August restraining order. However, substantial evidence supports the inclusion of mother. As to half sister, we agree with both father and mother. There is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, that father had contact, or spent time, with half sister or ever acted violently toward her. Moreover, the juvenile court dismissed half sister from the petition, finding she was “separately situated” and there was “absolutely no nexus as to [her].” Thus, the juvenile court erred when it included half sister as a protected person in the August restraining order. As to mother, however, we conclude substantial evidence supports her inclusion in the August restraining order. The record contains evidence that father pushed, grabbed, and sexually assaulted mother in the past. Mother and maternal grandmother both reported father sexually assaulted mother, which resulted in her pregnancy with son. Moreover, in her initial application for the restraining order, mother stated she remained fearful of father. On this record, we conclude 17 substantial evidence supports the inclusion of mother as a protected person in the August restraining order. 2. Section 388 Petition and Section 390 Motion Father argues the juvenile court erred when it denied his 390 motion and 388 petition without a hearing. He claims the court failed to support its denials with legal authority and erroneously believed both the motion and petition were untimely. The Department and mother argue the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child’s best interests.” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 6–7.) Filing a section 388 petition does not automatically entitle the movant to a hearing on the petition. “To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition, the [movant] must make a prima facie showing as to both elements.” (Id. at p. 7.) “ ‘[T]he prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ ” (Ibid.) “The petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing.” (Ibid.) “If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances such that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) “Section 390 authorizes a juvenile court to set aside findings and dismiss a dependency petition if it finds (1) the interests of justice and the welfare of the child require dismissal, 18 and (2) the parent is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” (In re Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.) The juvenile court may grant a section 390 motion “at any time before the minor reaches the age of 21 years.” (§ 390.) A section 390 motion may be brought by way of a section 388 petition. (In re Samuel A., supra, at p. 8.) We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.) Similarly, we review the denial of a section 390 motion for abuse of discretion. (In re K.S. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327, 399– 340.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) b. Section 388 petition Through his 388 petition, father sought to have the January restraining order dissolved.2 To support his request, father relied on the “[n]ew evidence of coaching” the Department had presented in its July 2025 report as well as his pending 390 motion. Because as explained below we find no error in the juvenile court’s denial of the 390 motion, that motion does not 2 At the time father filed his section 388 petition, the August restraining order had not yet been entered. Thus, father’s 388 petition sought to dissolve the then-existing January restraining order. As mentioned earlier, the January restraining order was superseded by the August restraining order. Father’s 388 petition applies equally to the August restraining order.

19 support father’s request. However, the new evidence of coaching does. Social worker Perez’s June 2025 concerns of coaching constituted new evidence for purposes of father’s 388 petition. In June 2025, social worker Perez became concerned that son had been coached to discuss sexual abuse by father. Her concerns were reported in the Department’s July 2025 report. The juvenile court and counsel believed social worker Perez’s concerns did not constitute new evidence because coaching had been an issue since the start of the proceedings. This misses the mark. The issue of coaching and evidence of coaching are two different things. By the July 2025 review hearing, the issue of coaching certainly had been raised repeatedly. At the January 2025 adjudication, the juvenile court considered the possibility that son had been coached and, based on the evidence before it at the time, concluded he had not been. Of course, however, at the January 2025 adjudication, the court did not have before it the concerns of coaching voiced by the new social worker, Ms. Perez, and reported by the Department in July 2025. Those concerns were not and could not have been presented or considered at the jurisdiction hearing. Thus, while we agree the issue of coaching was not new, the coaching concerns raised post-adjudication constituted new evidence for purposes of father’s 388 petition. Without explanation, the juvenile court stated father’s 388 petition was untimely. On appeal, counsel has cited no legal authority supporting such a conclusion. In fact, although father filed the 388 petition on the same day as the review hearing, the Department had reported the evidence on which the petition was based only two weeks earlier. Moreover, the case was not yet 12 months old at the time the 388 petition was filed. We find no 20 support for the conclusion that father’s 388 petition was untimely. The court also incorrectly stated it was not the proper forum for father’s 388 petition. The court concluded neither the 388 petition nor the 390 motion was “appropriate timely or relevant at this time” and stated, “Any additional information or any additional pieces of evidence that . . . father is using as part of his evidence in this motion he certainly has the right to raise that on his appeal and request that that appellate court augment the record or anything else like that.” To the contrary, the juvenile court is the proper forum to hold a hearing to consider new evidence as presented by a section 388 petition. The juvenile court should consider the new evidence first. On appeal, mother claims social worker Perez’s “conclusions” about son’s credibility and coaching would not be admissible. Citing two criminal cases, mother argues “there is no indication that CSW Perez spent enough time with [son] to provide meaningful information about his character for honesty.” First, social worker Perez had “met with [son] for several months” and had never heard him speak of father until June 2025, when she noted a difference in how son interacted with her. Second, social worker Perez did not make any conclusions as to son’s credibility or coaching. Rather, she reported what she observed and stated her concerns. Finally, if at a hearing on father’s 388 petition social worker Perez testified as to her observations and concerns as reported in the July 2025 report, the juvenile court would consider and weigh her testimony. We conclude father made a prima facie showing entitling him to a hearing on his section 388 petition. If the new concerns of coaching are supported by evidence given credit at the 21 hearing—i.e., it is shown that son was coached to say in June 2025 that he was scared of and did not want to visit father and father had sexually abused him—father’s request to modify the restraining order should sustain a favorable decision. (In re Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.) In other words, if it is demonstrated that coaching occurred, the juvenile court not only can dissolve or otherwise appropriately modify the existing restraining order but also can make further orders in son’s best interest. Of course, it is possible the evidence presented at a hearing on father’s 388 petition will prove unconvincing such that no change will be required. Although on appeal counsel proffers a guess as to why, in June 2025, son spoke in the way he did, it is improper to speculate as to whether or not the new evidence of coaching is to be credited.3 That is what a hearing on the new evidence is for. Considering the persistent concerns of coaching throughout these proceedings, the egregiousness of the allegations against father, the animosity between the families, and the special needs and speech delays of both son and mother, it is particularly important that the juvenile court consider and fully address new concerns of coaching. For all of the above reasons, we conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying father’s 388 petition without a hearing.

3 Counsel for the Department asserts the juvenile court could determine that, in June 2025, son was open and matter-of- fact about father’s abuse because son had made progress in therapy and had not seen father in months. This may or may not be true, but the court (not counsel) must make any such determination after holding a hearing on the new evidence.

22 c. Section 390 motion Although a section 390 motion may be brought by way of a section 388 petition, that is not what father did here. He filed his 390 motion the day before he filed his 388 petition. He cited his 390 motion as a reason to grant the 388 petition. We agree with the juvenile court that father’s 390 motion, through which he sought dismissal of the petition, in essence sought to relitigate issues and facts the juvenile court already had considered or could have considered at adjudication. The only part of father’s 390 motion that could not have been considered earlier was social worker Perez’s June 2025 concerns of coaching. Although as noted above, that new evidence is significant with respect to father’s 388 petition, it is less significant with respect to his 390 motion. Even assuming social worker Perez’s June 2025 coaching concerns are substantiated (i.e., son was coached in June 2025), that alone is insufficient to show that son also was coached prior to the January 2025 adjudication. Thus, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s 390 motion. Nonetheless, depending on the outcome of the hearing on father’s 388 petition, it may be that father seeks to file a new section 390 motion. We vacate the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction and remand the matter to the court so that it may modify the existing restraining order and hold a hearing on father’s 388 petition in accordance with this opinion.

23 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 order denying appellant’s section 390 motion is affirmed. The juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 order denying appellant’s section 388 petition is reversed. On remand, the juvenile court is ordered to hold a hearing on appellant’s section 388 petition in accordance with the applicable statute. Additionally, the juvenile court is ordered to modify the August 1, 2025 restraining order by removing half sister M.P. as a protected person. The court’s August 1, 2025 order terminating jurisdiction is vacated. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J. We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.