People v. Rose CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Rose CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086796

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD136724)

v.

JAMES MARTIN ROSE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed. James Martin Rose, in pro. per.; and Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

James Martin Rose appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court held a resentencing hearing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. His appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no arguable issues 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. and requesting that we exercise our discretion to review the record for potential issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Rose also filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf. We have independently reviewed the record and find no arguable issue that would result in a modification or reversal of the trial court’s judgment. We also conclude Rose’s arguments provide no basis for relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1999, James Martin Rose was convicted of three counts of forcible rape, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and conspiracy to commit a crime, involving two 16-year-old girls. He admitted a serious felony prior, two prison priors, and a strike prior. The trial court sentenced Rose to 80 years to life, plus six years for the serious felony prior and first prison prior,2 and the judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2000. (People v. Rose (Apr. 25, 2000, D033445) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2023, California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Rose as someone whose sentence might have included a legally invalid enhancement under section 1172.75. The trial court held a hearing and resentenced Rose in August 2025. At the resentencing hearing, the court struck Rose’s two prison priors as legally invalid under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and exercised its discretion to strike the serious felony prior under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court declined, however, to strike 2 The additional year for the second prison prior was stayed.

2 Rose’s strike prior under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The court resentenced Rose to a term of 80 years to life. Rose appealed from the judgment entered after his resentencing. In May 2026, Rose’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues under Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Counsel identified two issues for potential review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike the strike prior; and (2) whether there was “ineffective assistance of counsel . . . when the defense attorney neglected to refute a false allegation that the People raised in their briefing relating to appellant’s C-file.” This court informed Rose of his attorney’s Delgadillo brief and his right to file a supplemental brief. Rose submitted a supplemental brief in response. DISCUSSION Appellate counsel’s brief indicates counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel recognizes that under Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the procedures followed in cases controlled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 are not required in cases such as this, but she asks this court to exercise discretion to undertake independent review of the record. We have exercised our discretion to review the record under Wende and Anders. (See Delgadillo, at p. 232.) We have also considered the potential issues identified by Rose’s appellate counsel. We have not discovered any arguable issue that would result in a reversal or modification of the trial court’s ruling. Competent counsel has represented Rose in this appeal.

3 We next consider the three arguments Rose sets out in his supplemental brief. Rose first argues the trial court failed to exercise informed discretion in resentencing him. His second argument is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by “interfering with appellant[’]s presentation of mitigating exonnerating [sic] evidence.” (Capitalization omitted.) Finally, Rose argues that his trial counsel at the resentencing hearing was ineffective in failing to present mitigating and, in Rose’s view, “potential[ly] exculpatory evidence.” (Capitalization omitted.) The “potential[ly] exculpatory evidence” to which Rose is referring is a document that he asserts is a handwritten statement by someone named Darnisha Johnson.3 In the statement, Johnson states she was “coerced by the San Diego District Attorney’s Office, along with the San Diego police to lie on James Rose (a.k.a. Pokey) to secure his conviction during the times of 1997 and 1998.” With respect to Rose’s first argument, he contends that at resentencing, the trial court “failed to appreciate the breadth of it[s] authority under sections 1172.1, 1172.75 & 1385.” He further asserts that if the court had “considered the relevant evid[en]ce now before the court, including evidence of factual innocence, false imprisonment, and extraordinary mitigations,” there is a chance the court would have chosen to further reduce his sentence. We conclude Rose has not demonstrated error in connection with the court’s understanding of its authority on resentencing. Rather, the record reflects the court was aware of the discretion it possessed in connection with the resentencing proceeding. For example, the 3 The document appears to have been notarized to establish the declarant’s identity.

4 court understood it had discretion to strike Rose’s serious felony prior under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and it exercised that discretion to reduce Rose’s sentence. In addition, the court was aware that it had the discretion to strike Rose’s prior strike under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 504, if doing so would be in furtherance of justice. The court expressly explained its familiarity with the dictates of People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams), in which the Supreme Court provided further guidance for a court’s consideration of Romero motions. Under Williams, the court is to “consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.) The record reflects the trial court undertook this analysis. The court considered the “age of the strike offense” when Rose committed the “current” offenses but also considered the “level of violence” in both the strike offense and the offenses for which Rose was being sentenced. With respect to the strike prior, the court noted it was based on a 1992 conviction for robbery with a personal use of a firearm enhancement, which the court believed demonstrated the use of violence. And the court was particularly troubled by the “level of violence in the current offense[s].” The court noted the crimes involved “[t]he degradation of two young women with the threat of violence, the threat of death,” and specifically noted how one victim “felt justified in jumping from a moving vehicle to escape,” which demonstrated “exactly how serious these two crimes were.” In the court’s view, Rose’s two rape convictions involve “two of the most horrific crimes short of capital murder 5 that this court sees on a regular basis.” So, while the court acknowledged mitigating circumstances such as Rose’s drug addiction, as well as how Rose’s difficult background led him to his “problems,” ultimately the court believed “in totality this is a case that falls well within the spirit of the three strikes law.” The trial court thus adequately understood the scope of its discretion and undertook to exercise that discretion consistent with the applicable standards. Rose’s second argument is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by “interfering with appellant[’]s presentation of mitigating, exonnerating [sic] evidence.” (Capitalization omitted.) Rose seeks to rely on the Darnisha Johnson statement, which he claims was “not available to the defense” at the time of trial. Rose’s argument lacks clarity as to which proceeding he is discussing when he contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct—his 1999 trial or the 2025 resentencing proceeding. Regardless of which proceeding Rose is attempting to challenge, he has failed to demonstrate reversible error. This is because the current direct appeal has been taken from the resentencing proceeding in 2025. Thus, to the extent Rose is attempting to obtain relief regarding alleged conduct undertaken in connection with his 1999 trial, this resentencing appeal does not present a pathway for further review of his underlying convictions. Further, to the extent he is suggesting prosecutorial misconduct related to “interfer[ence]” with his ability to present the Darnisha Johnson statement at the 2025 resentencing hearing, no such misconduct can be demonstrated. The trial court could not have considered such evidence at the resentencing: “Far from being a proceeding at which the trier of fact resolves the issues raised in the case, the sentencing hearing—or resentencing hearing—follows the entry of the verdict and the discharge of 6 the jury, and constitutes the occasion on which the court pronounces the judgment arising from the verdict.” (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1254.) Consequently, “[t]he parties at an ordinary resentencing hearing do not . . . proffer new evidence on the issues decided by the verdict, nor does the court disregard the original verdict.” (Id. at p. 1257.) We thus conclude Rose has not demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct in connection with his 2025 resentencing. Finally, Rose argues his counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective because his attorney failed to “follow-up, investigate or interview” individuals in connection with the Johnson statement, which he claims is exculpatory evidence. “When challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate counsel’s inadequacy. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) As previously explained, “new evidence” purporting to impugn the jury’s verdicts is irrelevant to a trial court’s inquiry at resentencing. Because the court had no reason to consider evidence going to Rose’s guilt or innocence at the resentencing hearing, trial counsel had no reason to pursue additional evidence related to the purported exculpatory evidence in connection with the proceeding underlying this appeal. As a result, counsel’s 7 performance in this regard could not have been deficient. Rose’s third argument therefore also does not provide a basis for reversal. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.